T 


7" 


HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 
FRIEDRICH  VON  BERNHARDI 


HOW  GERMANY 
MAKES  WAR 


BY 

FRIEDRICH  VON  BERNHARDI 

GENERAL  OF  CAVALRY  (RETIRED) 

Author  of  "  Germany  and  the  Next  War" 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT,  1014,  BY 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE 

GENERAL  VON  BERNHARDI'S  book  "On  War  of  To- 
day" is  one  of  the  most  important  military  works  that 
have  appeared  in  recent  years.  It  is  of  special  interest 
at  the  present  moment  as  an  exposition  of  the  ideas 
underlying  the  German  plans  for  the  war  with  the  Al- 
lies, and  the  methods  on  which  the  German  staff  rely 
in  their  operations  in  the  field. 

The  book  is  an  attempt  to  show  how  war  can  be 
successfully  conducted  with  the  enormous  masses  of 
men  now  thrown  into  a  conflict  between  nations,  the 
armies  of  millions  that  put  the  whole  fighting  power 
of  a  people  into  the  battle  line.  General  von  Bernhardi 
insists  that  while  certain  fundamental  principles  of 
war  must  always  hold  good,  their  practical  applica- 
tion has  to  be  considerably  modified  now  that  these 
"armies  of  masses"  are  brought  into  action,  and  have 
to  employ  weapons  and  appliances  more  efficient  than 
any  which  were  used  in  earlier  wars. 

The  book  was  written  for  experts,  and  all  serious 
students  of  war  should  read  the  complete  translation 
of  the  work  issued  last  year  by  Mr.  Hugh  Rees.  But 
many  readers  will  be  glad  to  have  the  condensed  ver- 
sion of  General  Bernhardi's  treatise  contained  in  the 
following  pages.  Some  of  the  more  technical  details 
of  the  original  work  have  been  omitted;  but  nothing 
has  been  thus  set  aside  which  affects  the  writer's  main 
argument.  So,  too,  a  choice  has  been  made  among 
the  numerous  examples  from  military  history  by  which 


VI 

he  illustrates  it.  The  more  interesting  of  these  are 
given ;  for  the  others  the  reader  can  refer  to  the  com- 
plete translation.  Throughout,  the  author's  own 
words  are  used,  only  here  and  there  a  more  familiar 
expression  is  substituted  for  one  which  would  not  be 
so  easily  understood  by  a  reader  unacquainted  with  the 
technical  phraseology  of  German  military  literature. 
The  work  is  none  the  less  interesting  because  the 
General  does  not  always  slavishly  follow  the  theory 
of  the  German  Army  Regulations.  He  boldly  departs 
from  the  mere  letter  of  these  when  he  has  to  show 
what  must  happen  in  the  conflct  of  great  armies  in  the 
field.  The  reader  will  of  course  understand  that  the 
opinions  General  Bernhardi  expresses  as  to  the  policy 
of  our  own  and  other  Governments  and  their  action 
in  the  past  are  given  without  comment  or  correction, 
though  Englishmen  will  in  many  instances  regard 
the  view  thus  put  forward  as  hardly  consistent  with 
the  facts  as  we  know  them.  He  is  writing  as  a  leader 
of  German  military  opinion  for  German  readers,  and 
looks  at  matters  from  a  standpoint  hostile  to  ourselves. 
As  we  read  his  words  we  must  remember  this.  The 
book  is  a  revelation  of  German  policy  as  well  as  of 
German  ideas  on  the  way  in  which  war  should  be  con- 
ducted with  modern  weapons  and  under  the  new  con- 
ditions of  to-day. 


CONTENTS 

PAOB 

EDITOR'S  PREFACE v 

AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION  ix 

CHAPTER    I 

THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR      ....  3 

CHAPTER   II 

ARMIES  OF  MASSES 19 

CHAPTER    III 

FORCE  AND  NUMBERS 41 

CHAPTER   IV 

MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES  •  •  •          57 

CHAPTER   V 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF    CAVALRY  QI 

Note  on  the  march  of  great  armies          .         .104 
CHAPTER   VI 

SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  AND  COMMAND     .  . 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

FACE 

CHAPTER   VII 

ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  .....       135 

CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  OBJECT  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  WAR      .  -       159 

CHAPTER   IX 

TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION        ....       183 

CHAPTER   X 

PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  *  2OQ 

CHAPTER   XI 

NAVAL  WARFARE          ...... 


CHAPTER  XII 

RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT     ....   247 


AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

IN  the  following  pages  I  have  tried  to  summarize  as 
briefly  as  possible  the  results  of  many  years  of  study 
and  of  preliminary  labours  with  a  view  to  furnishing 
the  reader  with  a  survey  of  all  that  concerns  the  con- 
duct of  modern  war.  Much  has  been  written  on  the 
various  branches  of  the  science  of  war.  But  a  book 
embracing  them  all  and  showing  their  relative  de- 
pendency seems  to  be  wanting;  and  yet  it  is  only  by 
distinguishing  and  appreciating  their  connection  with 
the  whole  science  that  the  true  value  of  each  branch 
can  be  properly  gauged.  I  think  that  with  this  book 
I  have  filled  a  gap  in  military  literature. 

I  think  that  I  am  serving  progress  by  my  work, 
and  that  I  am  at  the  same  time  in  harmony  with  the 
best  traditions  of  our  glorious  past.  It  was  always 
timely  progress  which  has  led  us  to  victory,  and  has 
given  us  from  the  outset  a  certain  amount  of  su- 
periority over  our  adversaries.  Such  a  superiority 
we  must  try  to  gain  all  the  more  in  future  as  well, 
since  it  is  only  too  likely  that,  with  the  present  state 
of  affairs  in  the  world,  we  may  be  forced  to  fight 
against  superior  numbers,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
our  most  vital  interest  will  be  at  stake.  The  political 
situation  as  it  is  to-day  makes  us  look  upon  such  a 
war  even  as  a  necessity,  on  which  the  further  develop- 
ment of  our  people  depends. 

Germany  supports  to-day  65,000,000  inhabitants  on 

IX 


x  AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

an  area  about  equal  the  size  of  France,  whilst  only 
40,000,000  live  in  France.  Germany's  enormous  popu- 
lation increases  annually  by  about  1,000,000.  There 
is  no  question,  agriculture  and  industry  of  the  home 
country  cannot  give  permanently  sufficient  employ- 
ment to  such  a  steadily  increasing  mass  of  human 
beings.  We  therefore  need  to  enlarge  our  colonial 
possessions  so  as  to  afford  a  home  and  work  to  our 
surplus  population,  unless  we  wish  to  run  the  risk  of 
seeing  again  the  strength  and  productive  power  of  our 
rivals  increased  by  German  emigration  as  in  former 
days.  Partitioned  as  the  surface  of  the  globe  is  among 
the  nations  at  the  present  time,  such  territorial  acquisi- 
tions we  can  only  realize  at  the  cost  of  other  States  or 
in  conjunction  with  them;  and  such  results  are  pos- 
sible only  if  we  succeed  in  securing  our  power  in 
the  centre  of  Europe  better  than  hitherto.  With  every 
move  of  our  foreign  policy  to-day  we  have  to  face 
a  European  war  against  superior  enemies.  This  sort 
of  thing  is  becoming  intolerable.  The  freedom  of 
action  of  our  people  is  thereby  hampered  to  an  ex- 
traordinary degree.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  is  highly 
dangerous,  not  only  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  which, 
after  all,  is  only  a  secondary  matter  for  us,  but,  above 
all,  is  most  dangerous  to  ourselves.  It  is  we,  whose 
economical,  national,  and  political  development  is 
being  obstructed  and  injured ;  it  is  we,  whose  position 
in  the  world  is  being  threatened  after  we  have  pur- 
chased it  so  dearly  with  the  blood  of  our  best.  We 
must  therefore  strive  to  find  out  by  all  means  who  is 
for  or  who  is  against  us.  On  this  depends  not  only 
the  possibility  of  carrying  into  execution  the  political 
aims  befitting  the  greatness  and  the  wants  of  our 
country,  but  also  the  very  existence  of  our  people  as 
a  civilized  nation. 


AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION  xi 

Hand  in  hand  with  the  increase  of  population  and 
the  growth  of  political  power,  resulting  from  our 
struggles  for  a  united  Germany,  trade  and  industry 
rose  to  an  extent  hardly  experienced  by  any  nation 
before.  Germany's  output  in  brain  work  is  at  the  same 
time  greater  than  that  of  any  other  people.  Our 
prominent  importance  as  a  civilizing  nation  is  plain 
to  everybody  since  the  German  clans  have  joined 
hands  to  form  one  powerful  State.  We  ourselves 
have  become  conscious  of  being  a  powerful,  as  well 
as  a  necessary,  factor  in  the  development  of  mankind. 
This  knowledge  imposes  upon  us  the  obligation  of  as- 
serting our  mental  and  moral  influence  as  much  as 
possible,  and  of  paving  the  way  everywhere  in  the 
world  for  German  labour  and  German  idealism.  But 
we  can  only  carry  out  successfully  these  supreme 
civilizing  tasks  if  our  humanizing  efforts  are  accom- 
panied and  supported  by  increasing  political  power, 
as  evinced  by  enlarged  colonial  possessions,  extended 
international  commerce,  increased  influence  of  Teu- 
tonic culture  in  all  parts  of  the  globe,  and,  above  all,  by 
a  perfect  safeguarding  of  our  political  power  in 
Europe. 

Opposed  to  these  efforts  are  the  most  powerful 
States  of  Europe.  France  wants  to  take  revenge  for 
1870-71,  and  regain  its  old  political  hegemony.  Russia 
has  a  lively  interest  in  not  allowing  our  strength  to 
increase  any  further,  so  that  she  may  pursue  her  po- 
litical plans  in  the  Near  and  Far  East  undisturbed  by 
Germany.  Russia  may  also,  perhaps,  dream  of  a 
future  supremacy  in  the  Baltic.  If  at  the  present  mo- 
ment— weakened  as  she  is  by  recent  events  in  the  Far 
East — she  seems  to  pursue  pacific  tendencies,  she  is 
sure  to  return  to  her  policy  of  aggression  sooner  or 
later.  And,  finally,  England  is  particularly  hostile 


xii  AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

towards  us,  in  addition  to  France.  The  phenomenal 
development  of  our  commerce  and  industry  may  in 
time  become  dangerous  even  to  the  British  oversea 
trade;  the  tremendous  increase  of  our  navy  is  felt  as 
a  constant  menace  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel, 
at  least  should  England  be  involved  in  a  great  war 
elsewhere. 

We  can  be  certain  that  Great  Britain  will  most 
seriously  resist  any  real  extension  of  Germany's 
power,  which,  however,  does  not  include  the  acqui- 
sition of  some  Central  African  territories.* 

It  is  possible  that  in  case  of  war  we  will  have  to 
face  all  these  enemies  single-handed.  At  least,  we 
must  be  prepared  for  this.  The  Triple  Alliance  is 
purely  defensive.  Neither  Austria  nor  Italy  are  bound 
by  treaty  to  support  us  in  all  cases  of  war  or  under 
all  circumstances.  In  so  far  as  their  own  advantage 
is  not  touched,  they  take  no  interest  in  Germany's 
world-politics;  and  it  must  at  any  rate  be  left  an 
open  question  whether  their  statesmen  will  always 
be  far-sighted  enough  to  make  the  lasting  advantage 
of  their  States  the  pole  of  their  policy  even  at  the 
risk  of  a  war.  We  are  thus,  in  all  that  is  essential, 
dependent  on  our  own  strength,  and  must  plainly  see 
that  on  the  power  of  our  defensive  forces  alone  de- 
pends, not  only  our  future  development,  but  our  very 
existence  as  one  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe. 

It  is  true  the  world  is  dominated  to-day  by  the 
idea  of  war  being  an  antiquated  means  of  policy,  un- 
worthy of  a  civilized  nation.  The  dream  of  eternal 
peace  has  got  a  hold  on  vast  sections  of  the  community 
in  the  Old  and  particularly  in  the  New  World. 
Whereas,  formerly,  in  addition  to  Emanuel  Kant, 
only  enthusiasts  and  visionaries  were  the  champions 
*  Written  in  September,  1911. 


AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION  xiii 

of  universal  brotherhood,  the  Governments  of  great 
and  powerful  States  have  now  seized  this  idea  as  well, 
and  are  cloaking  themselves  with  the  mantle  of  a  su- 
perior humanity.  The  arbitration  courts,  which  the 
contracting  Powers  engage  to  obey,  are  meant  not 
only  to  lessen  the  dangers  of  war,  but  to  remove  them 
altogether.  This  is  the  publicly  avowed  object  of 
such  politics.  In  reality,  it  is  hardly  caused  by  an 
ideal  love  of  peace,  but  is  evidently  meant  to  serve 
quite  different  political  purposes. 

It  is  obvious  that,  above  all,  all  those  States  are 
interested  in  such  treaties,  who  wish  to  cover  their 
rear  so  as  to  be  able  to  pursue  the  more  undisturbed 
and  ruthlessly  their  advantages  on  other  parts  of  the 
world's  stage ;  and  from  this  argument  at  once  follows 
that  such  treaties,  where  not  confined  to  some  dis- 
tinctly limited  spheres  of  right,  are  only  a  disguise 
to  conceal  other  political  aims,  and  are  apt  to  promote 
just  that  war,  perhaps,  which  they  pretend  it  is  their 
intention  to  prevent. 

We  Germans,  therefore,  must  not  be  deceived  by 
such  official  efforts  to  maintain  the  peace.  Arbitra- 
tion courts  must  evidently  always  consider  the  existing 
judicial  and  territorial  rights.  For  a  rising  State, 
which  has  not  yet  attained  the  position  due  to  it, 
which  is  in  urgent  need  of  colonial  expansion,  and 
can  only  accomplish  it  chiefly  at  the  cost  of  others, 
these  treaties  therefore  augur  ill  at  once  as  being  apt 
to  prevent  a  rearrangement  of  power.  In  the  face  of 
this  widespread  peace  propaganda,  and  in  opposition 
to  it,  we  must  firmly  keep  in  view  the  fact  that  no 
arbitration  court  in  the  world  can  remove  and  settle 
any  really  great  tension  that  exists  and  is  due  to  deep- 
seated  national,  economical,  and  political  antagonism; 
and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  to  change 


xiv  AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

the  partition  of  the  earth  as  it  now  exists  in  our  favour 
by  diplomatic  artifices.  If  we  wish  to  gain  the  posi- 
tion in  the  world  that  is  due  to  us,  we  must  rely  on  our 
sword,  renounce  all  weakly  visions  of  peace,  and  eye 
the  dangers  surrounding  us  with  resolute  and  unflinch- 
ing courage. 

In  the  situation  we  are  in,  absolutely  necessitating 
an  extension  of  power,  and  requiring  us  to  force  our 
claims  in  the  face  of  superior  enemies,  I  think  the  law 
of  self-preservation  ought  to  have  dictated  to  us  an 
increase  of  our  defensive  forces  by  all  means  available, 
so  as  to  throw  into  the  scale  at  the  decisive  moment 
the  full  strength  of  our  60,000,000  populace.  This 
we  have  not  considered  necessary.  Universal  service, 
which  formed  the  basis  for  our  military  and  political 
greatness,  is  the  law  with  us,  it  is  true,  but  we  have 
not  enforced  it,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  for  a  long  time, 
because  we  shirk  the  sacrifice  we  ought  to  make  in 
the  interest  of  our  armed  forces  and  of  our  future. 
The  further  development  of  our  army  in  proportion 
with  the  growth  of  our  population  is  completely  para- 
lysed for  the  next  five  years  by  a  law  of  the  Empire. 
We  seem  to  have  forgotten  that  a  policy,  to  be  suc- 
cessful, must  be  backed  by  force,  and  that  on  the 
other  hand  the  physical  and  moral  health  of  a  nation 
depends  on  its  martial  spirit.  We  have  accustomed 
ourselves  to  looking  upon  our  armaments  as  a  heavy 
burden,  borne  unwillingly,  forgetting  thereby  that  the 
army  is  the  well  from  which  our  people  constantly 
draws  afresh  strength,  self-sacrificing  spirit,  and  pa- 
triotism. In  the  hour  of  danger  we  shall  have  to  pay 
in  blood  for  what  we  have  neglected  in  peace,  from 
want  of  willingness  to  make  some  sacrifice. 

But  we  have  to  reckon  with  all  these  circumstances 
as  given  factors.  The  enmities  surrounding  us  can- 


AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION  xv 

not  be  exorcized  by  diplomacy.  Armaments,  under 
modern  conditions,  cannot  be  improvized  at  will  the 
moment  they  are  wanted.  It  seems  impossible  to  get 
ahead  of  our  rivals  in  matters  technical.  So  much 
more,  therefore,  must  we  take  care  of  maintaining 
spiritual  superiority  in  case  of  war,  and  of  making 
good,  by  will-power  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  skill 
of  our  operations  on  the  other,  the  superiority  in 
material  and  personnel  possessed  by  our  likely  ad- 
versaries. 

The  more  we  study  the  nature  of  the  art  of  war, 
and  the  more  fully  the  army  is  alive  to  what  is  essen- 
tial in  war  in  general,  and  in  the  conduct  of  modern 
war  in  particular,  the  more  uniformly  and  to  the  point 
will  every  portion  of  our  army  co-operate  in  war, 
and  the  greater  will  be  the  mental  and  moral  superior- 
ity we  shall  gain  over  our  enemies. 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR 


CHAPTER    I 

THE    SECRET    OF    MODERN    WAR 

THE  nature  of  modern  war  is  not  a  simple  matter.  It 
is  subject  to  numerous  modifications  according  to  the 
character  of  the  contending  parties  and  of  the  various 
theatres  of  war.  It  is  altogether  different  when  we 
are  fighting  in  the  Balkans  or  in  Manchuria,  when 
Russians  are  fighting  against  Japanese,  or  Spaniards 
against  Riff-Kabyles.  The  fundamental  principles  of 
war  certainly  remain  the  same,  wherever  it  is  waged; 
but  special  conditions  cause  in  each  case  special  meth- 
ods of  employment  of  the  fighting  forces,  and  these 
latter,  again,  will  frequently  differ. 

If  we  are  moving  with  forces  of  some  size  in  a 
desolate,  roadless,  or  mountainous  country,  we  are 
obliged  to  adopt  proceedings  altogether  different  from 
those  obtaining  in  a  vast,  slightly  undulating  plain, 
where  railways  and  a  well-built  and  extensive  network 
of  roads  abound.  Again,  things  will  be  different  if 
we  carry  on  war  with  small  armies  in  a  country  little 
cultivated,  like  the  English  in  South  Africa,  or  are 
operating  with  armies  of  the  size  of  those  of  the  Great 
European  Military  Powers  in  a  richly  cultivated  and 
densely  populated  theatre  of  war. 

It  is  this  latter  sort  of  war  which  we  are  concerned 
with  most,  for  it  is  such  a  war  we  ourselves  will  have 
to  wage,  and  this  kind  of  war  it  is  that  stares  us  in 


4  HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

the  face  like  an  inscrutable  sphinx.  There  seems  to 
be  no  doubt  that,  in  a  war  like  this,  forces  will  assert 
themselves  which  we  have  no  experience  to  gauge, 
and  the  effect  of  which  we  can  scarcely  properly 
realize.  Whole  nations  are  called  up  to  take  the  field 
against  each  other.  They  are  going  to  fight  with  arms 
of  patterns  more  perfect  than  ever  before.  The  pro- 
portionate numbers  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry 
are  quite  different  from  those  of  former  times.  Means 
of  transport  will  be  used  to  an  extent  and  of  such 
a  perfect  type  as  we  have  never  seen  used  before  by 
any  army  in  the  field.  Every  technical  means  is 
pressed  into  the  service  to  facilitate  communication. 
Even  the  air  must  be  conquered;  dirigible  balloons 
and  flying  machines  will  form  quite  a  new  feature 
in  the  conduct  of  war.  The  question  also  arises  how 
modern  permanent  fortification  will  affect  the  com- 
bat. It  seems  that  all  trade  and  industry  must  stop, 
when  every  capable  youth  is  called  away  from  work. 
It  has  been  said  that  the  effect  of  modern  arms  is 
such  as  to  incapacitate  the  weakened  nervous  system 
of  the  highly  civilized  nations  of  Mid-Europe  to  re- 
sist this  effect  for  any  length  of  time.  And  lastly,  we 
must  also  weigh  the  influence  of  naval  warfare  on 
what  is  going  on  on  land,  and  what  its  effect  will  be 
on  the  whole  campaign.  The  course  of  events  at  sea 
may  mean  starvation  for  the  population.  In  short, 
a  future  war  will  reveal  to  us  a  series  of  seemingly 
incalculable  forces.  One  might  almost  come  to  think 
that  success  in  war  will  be  more  or  less  a  matter  of 
chance,  which  can  in  no  way  be  influenced  by  fore- 
sight; that  the  will  of  the  commander  may  be,  so  to 
say,  switched  off  in  the  uncontrollable  play  of  these 
tremendous  forces;  that  we  can  only  call  up  these 
forces,  and  then  leave  it  to  the  mere  effect  of  their 


THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR         5 

powers,  to  produce  whatever  they  choose  from  this 
turmoil. 

I  think  it  is  not  so,  after  all.  If  we  closely  examine 
the  possible  effect  of  all  the  new  phenomena  which  in 
a  future  war  must  assert  themselves,  and  then  test 
them  in  their  relation  to  the  general  laws  of  warfare, 
we  must  succeed  in  getting  a  general  idea  of  the  na- 
ture of  modern  war,  and  in  ascertaining  a  method  by 
which  we  can  act  most  suitably. 

It  is  true  there  are  still  experienced  and  prominent 
soldiers  who  think  that,  in  spite  of  all  changes  in 
armaments,  Moltke's  strategy  and  conduct  of  war  is 
the  last  word  on  the  subject,  and  that  it  is  now  merely 
a  question  of  finding  out  by  what  principles  Moltke 
acted,  so  as  to  be  prepared  for  successful  military 
operations  in  future  as  well. 

I  do  not  think  that  such  an  interpretation  corre- 
sponds at  all  to  Moltke's  spirit  and  genius.  The  very 
way  he  acted  seems  to  prove  the  truth  that  in  every 
war  we  must  make  use  of  the  lesspns  of  the  past  only 
in  so  far  as  we  can  apply  them  to,  or  modify  them  in 
accordance  with,  the  changed  conditions  of  our  time. 
He,  of  all  men,  was  the  one  who  worked  with  an  open 
mind  at  all  that  concerns  the  conduct  of  war.  He 
never  disregarded  the  lessons  of  any  war,  nor  was  he 
satisfied  with  them  alone.  He  was  ever  looking  ahead, 
to  turn  to  account  new  developments. 

That  is  the  way  he  has  shown  us.  We  are  not  to 
rest  satisfied  with  what  he  has  thought  and  done,  but 
to  go  on  unfettered,  turning  to  account  fresh  develop- 
ments. We  are  to  examine  the  conditions  under 
which  a  future  war  must  be  conducted  without  blindly 
believing  in  authorities,  and,  from  what  Moltke  and 
the  German  wars  of  unification  have  taught  us,  to 


6  HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

develop  new  ideas  and  principles  according  to  modern 
requirements. 

"How  the  actual  operations  will  turn  out  next," 
writes  the  Field-Marshal  in  a  memorial  of  November, 
1 86 1,  concerning  a  future  campaign,*  "becomes  more 
uncertain,  indeed,  the  further  we  trace  their  progress. 
Yet  we  may  consider  the  most  likely  contingencies, 
because  they  always  start  from  given  and  permanently 
existing  conditions.  Experience  of  former  wars  must 
not  be  neglected,  but  is  no  safe  guide  for  our  days. 
Fifty  years  or  a  century  have  since  passed  and 
changed  the  political  and  strategical  situation.  .  .  . 
To  arrive  at  the  result  intended,  the  only  way  left  to 
us  is  to  try  to  anticipate  in  outline  the  military  events 
of  the  future,  and  get  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the 
present  conditions.  Here  we  have  to  reckon  partly 
with  unknown  and  changeable  factors,  yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  often  with  known  and  permanent  ones. 
We  cannot  arrive  at  a  result  correct  in  all  essentials, 
but  we  can  ascertain  what  is  probable,  and  this,  in  war, 
is  always  the  only  basis  on  which  we  can  found  our 
measures." 

What  the  Field-Marshal  expresses  here  seems  to  be 
of  a  more  general  application,  I  think,  than  he  meant 
it  to  be.  What  he  says  of  the  "actual  operations" 
applies  to  war  in  general;  for  is  not  war  experience 
the  only  possible  foundation  of  military  knowledge, 
the  material,  as  it  were,  of  which  theory  is  in  need 
for  a  scientific  structure  of  a  doctrine  of  war,  whilst 
the  changed  conditions  and  new  phenomena  of  the 
moment  always  create,  by  their  presumable  future 
development,  new  factors,  which  in  actual  warfare 
peremptorily  demand  consideration?  But  the  past, 
the  present,  and  the  future  are  invariably  dominated 

*  Moltke's  "Military  Correspondence,"  Part  iii,  No.  4. 


THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR         7 

by  the  general  laws  which  are  always  and  everywhere 
inherent  in  war  as  a  social  phenomenon. 

If,  therefore,  we  wish  to  recognize  the  probable 
character  of  a  future  war  and  the  new  demands  it  will 
make  on  its  conduct,  we  must  proceed  from  the  two- 
fold point  of  view  which  Moltke  considers  necessary 
to  adopt  in  weighing  matters. 

By  the  lessons  which  we  learn  from  military  history 
and  our  own  experiences  of  war  we  must  try  to  dis- 
cern "the  permanent  factors"  with  which  we  have  to 
reckon,  and  the  laws  of  development.  This  is  the 
only  way  we  have  for  further  guidance  of  what  in  war 
is  altogether  possible  and  feasible.  War  experience 
alone  enables  us  to  become  aware  of  all  the  frictions, 
moral  influences,  chances,  and  personal  elements  in 
war,  which  all  are  of  far-reaching  importance,  and 
almost  completely  beyond  theoretical  appreciation. 
But  we  must  next  closely  examine  under  what  external 
and  internal  conditions  a  future  war  must  probably 
be  conducted;  how  the  conduct  of  war  will  be  affected 
by  the  changes  in  military  matters  since  we  gained 
our  last  experiences  in  war ;  what  effects  these  changes 
will  produce.  We  must  examine  how  far  the  results 
of  our  up-to-date  war  experiences  will  be  influenced 
by  these  new  phenomena,  and  we  must  try  to  find  out 
in  what  directions  this  kind  of  influence  is  likely  to 
assert  itself.  In  this  way  alone  can  we  succeed  in 
ascertaining  the  conditions  that  will  probably  obtain 
in  the  next  war,  and  in  gaining  some  guiding  rules  for 
our  action. 

But  that  is  just  the  point.  It  is  not  enough  for  us 
to  discern  the  nature  of  modern  war,  and  thus  to  some 
extent  satisfy  a  theoretical  want;  we  rather  wish  to 
be  able  to  develop  from  this  knowledge  a  doctrine  for 
acting  in  the  field — a  law,  as  it  were,  of  future  victory. 


8  HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

If  we  survey  the  history  of  those  wars,  the  course 
of  which  we  can  judge  in  some  measure,  we  become 
aware  of  many  instances  where  fighting  dragged  along 
without  leading  to  a  final  and  decisive  issue.  Neither 
side  displays  any  special  faculties  that  might  turn  the 
scale  one  way  or  the  other.  The  result  is  then  mostly 
some  compromise  between  the  belligerents  which 
leaves  matters  pretty  well  as  they  were  before,  or  the 
issue  is  brought  about  by  the  gradual  wearing  down  of 
the  weaker  party.  In  other  wars,  on  the  contrary,  a 
real  issue  is  rapidly  come  to  between  two  armies  of 
apparently  equal  strength.  Often  it  is  the  numeri- 
cally weaker  army  which  obtains  the  most  decisive 
victory.  When  this  happens,  it  is  either  a  great  Cap- 
tain whose  genius  has  turned  the  scale,  or  it  is  some 
particular  circumstance  which  gave  victory  to  the 
one  party — a  happy  coincidence  of  favourable  con- 
ditions; a  numerical  or  tactical  superiority;  a  special 
kind  of  armament;  a  moral  superiority  inherent  in 
the  character  of  an  army;  or  a  superior  principle  of 
acting.  Where  such  peculiar  advantages  are  placed 
in  the  hands  of  a  great  general  who  understands  how 
to  make  a  thorough  use  of  them,  success  is,  of  course, 
all  the  greater.  Our  own  Prussian  history  shows  us 
repeatedly  examples  confirming  the  correctness  of  this 
view. 

Under  Frederic  William  I  it  was  discerned  that  the 
fire  of  infantry  was  the  decisive  factor  in  action.  Fire 
tactics  were  therefore  brought  up  to  an  extraordinary 
degree  of  perfection.  The  introduction  of  the  iron 
ramrod  proved  exceedingly  advantageous  to  increas- 
ing the  rapidity  of  fire.  The  Prussian  infantry  is  said 
to  have  delivered  ten  rounds  *  per  minute  even  at  that 

*  Must  be  a  misprint.  Never  known  it  more  than  five. — 
Translator. 


time.  But  rapidity  of  fire  of  that  kind,  and  the  pre- 
cision of  all  movements  as  a  sine  qua  non  to  it,  were 
only  possible  with  an  iron  discipline  and  a  training 
which  no  other  army  could  boast  of  to  an  equal  de- 
gree of  perfection.  The  Prussian  infantry  moved  in 
rigid  formations  in  an  order  which  never  failed  even 
under  the  greatest  stress,  and  thereby,  as  well  as  by 
its  fire,  proved  superior  to  all  its  enemies. 

Frederic  the  Great  next  recognized,  immediately 
after  the  first  battle  he  took  part  in,  that  fire  and  order 
alone  would  decide  nothing  if  they  were  not  accom- 
panied by  a  resolute  offensive.  In  further  develop- 
ing fire  tactics,  on  the  one  hand  by  concentrating  ar- 
tillery at  the  decisive  points,  and,  on  the  other,  by 
making  the  power  of  fire  everywhere  subservient  to 
the  most  determined  offensive,  he  created  a  new  factor 
of  superiority  over  his  adversaries,  which  asserted 
itself  the  more  decisively,  since  he  raised  at  the  same 
time  the  manoeuvring  power  of  his  troops  to  such 
a  height  that  no  other  hostile  army  could  equal  him 
therein.  He  further  saw  that  cavalry  was  only  of 
tactical  value,  under  the  conditions  then  prevailing,  if 
it  understood  how  to  make  use  of  the  speed  of  the 
horse  by  a  vigorous  charge.  By  making  this  idea  the 
leading  principle  of  cavalry  tactics,  he  made  the  Prus- 
sian cavalry  the  most  victorious  in  the  world.  And, 
finally,  in  opposition  to  the  learned  strategists  of  his 
time,  he  saw  the  inexorable  nature  of  war.  Every- 
where, wherever  he  possibly  could,  he  tried,  strategi- 
cally as  well  as  tactically,  to  bring  matters  to  a  most 
decisive  issue,  giving  expression  to  this  idea  also  in 
the  form  of  his  attack.  Only  by  thus  accumulating 
the  actual  factors  of  superiority  did  he  succeed  in 
fighting  victoriously  against  a  world  in  arms. 

But  the  linear  tactics  which  had  developed  in  this 


io          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

way  degenerated  after  Frederic's  death  into  a  system 
of  artificialities,  without  any  practical  value.  Over  the 
mechanical  art  of  leading  troops  the  spirit  of  the 
principle  and  guiding  idea  was  lost;  strategy,  too,  set 
up  the  wildest  systems.  With  this  the  Prussian  army 
lost  its  all-conquering  superiority.  This  became  at 
once  apparent  in  the  wars  of  Frederic  William  II. 
The  soundness  of  the  troops,  it  is  true,  enabled  them 
to  be  victorious  on  the  battlefield,  but  the  conduct  of 
the  war  on  the  whole  was  wanting  the  great  decisive 
features  which  result  only  from  a  clear  perception  of 
war's  real  nature.  The  conduct  of  war  lost  itself 
more  and  more  in  conventional  forms,  which  were 
bound  to  have  an  effect  all  the  more  disadvantageous 
as  the  tactics  were  defective  too  and  did  not  meet  the 
new  demands  originating  from  the  revolutionary  wars. 

In  this  way  all  the  factors  gradually  disappeared 
which  had  made  the  Prussian  army  victorious.  The 
wars  dragged  along  without  any  decisive  issue  until 
Bonaparte  appeared  and  brought  into  the  conduct 
of  war  a  new  element  of  superiority.  By  opposing 
brute  force  to  the  learned  and  conventional  mode  of 
conducting  war  in  his  time,  and  by  aiming  at  the 
utmost  attainable  with  the  simplest  means,  the  great 
Corsican  became  irresistible  to  the  armies  of  his  age, 
until  these  in  turn  made  use  of  his  same  principles 
against  him,  and  until,  by  means  of  the  Prussian  army, 
recruited  from  the  people  by  universal  service,  a  new 
weapon  was  forged  which,  above  all,  proved  superior 
through  an  idealism  peculiar  to  that  army. 

This  acquisition  it  was  which  led  humiliated  Prussia 
to  renewed  victories.  By  retaining  universal  service 
after  the  war,  while  all  other  States  returned  to  the 
old  system  of  professional  armies,  Prussia  once  more 
acquired  a  powerful  superiority  over  her  rivals.  This 


THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR        n 

superiority  was  enhanced  by  Prussia  alone  recognizing 
in  time  the  importance  of  breech-loading  arms  and 
taking  advantage  of  their  greater  efficiency.  The 
result  was  the  brilliant  victories  of  1866  and  1870-71. 
It  does  not  seem  likely  that  under  modern  condi- 
tions we  shall  be  favoured  once  more  by  Fortune  in 
a  similar  manner.  All  the  States  on  the  Continent 
of  Europe  have  introduced  universal  service,  and  have 
thus  formed  national  armies;  all  over  the  world  are 
in  use  the  most  modern  and  most  effective  weapons; 
everywhere  a  most  prolific  use  is  made  of  every  tech- 
nical appliance;  everywhere  in  Europe  the  training 
of  the  troops  is  most  zealously  attended  to,  and  the 
preparedness  for  war  perfected  to  the  utmost.  A  de- 
cided superiority  of  one  army  over  any  other  can  no 
longer  be  attained  under  these  conditions.  Nor  can 
we  count  upon  a  stroke  of  good  fortune  as  we  had 
in  our  last  wars,  where  a  Bismarck  conducted  our 
policy,  and  a  Moltke  our  armies;  just  as  little  dare 
we  rely  on  the  favour  of  special  circumstances  like, 
perhaps,  a  lucky  political  constellation,  which  state- 
craft might  take  advantage  of  with  bold  resolution. 
It  may  be  we  have,  as  a  counterweight  against  the 
probable  numerical  superiority  of  our  likely  adver- 
saries, other  advantages  to  throw  into  the  scale ;  above 
all  an  officers'  corps,  as  no  other  army  has,  with  an 
imperturbable  offensive  spirit  and  a  uniformity  of 
mind  and  feeling  of  duty  which  guarantee  the  stead- 
fast and  resolute  actions  of  everybody.  Yet  these  are 
imponderable  forces,  which  it  is  impossible  to  look 
upon  as  fixed  factors  in  the  reckoning,  and  against 
which  must  be  set  off  the  national  advantages  of  our 
adversaries.  Who  is  there  that  will  deny,  for  instance, 
the  high  military  qualities  possessed  by  the  French 


12          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

soldier,  or  the  stubborn  and  often-tried  power  of  re- 
sistance of  the  Russians? 

If  it  is  thus  impossible  for  us  to  gain  a  numerical 
or  material  superiority,  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
have  no  right  to  claim  a  moral  superiority  for  our 
army  as  a  distinct  asset  of  power,  the  question  is 
forced  upon  us,  whether  it  may  not  be  possible  to 
gain  a  start  on  our  adversaries  by  some  other  means 
which  might  vouchsafe  us  the  possibility  of  victory 
over  these  stronger  enemies?  The  answer  to  that 
question  we  can  only  gather  from  the  experiences  of 
the  past. 

If  we  study  the  campaigns  of  great  soldiers  and 
examine  the  causes  of  their  victories,  we  shall  find 
that  in  the  first  instance  always  moral  qualities  en- 
forced victory.  Superior  resolution,  boldness,  daring, 
and  steadfastness  paralysed  the  energy  of  the  enemy, 
and  carried  forward  the  victorious  troops  to  the  per- 
formance of  extraordinary  deeds. 

It  must,  however,  be  well  understood  that  it  was 
not  the  superiority  of  the  procedure  by  itself  which  in- 
sured victory ;  the  mode  of  action  became  only  superior 
in  reference  to  that  of  the  opponent  and  to  the  whole 
of  the  conditions  governing  war  at  the  time.  Frederic 
the  Great  won  his  daring  offensive  battles  because  his 
adversaries  faced  him  mostly  with  an  inactive  defen- 
sive, and  were  unable  to  paralyse  his  bold  manoeuvres 
by  suitable  counter-moves,  embarrassed  as  they  were 
by  the  rigid  forms  and  views  of  warfare  of  their 
time.  Napoleon  gained  his  splendid  victories  over 
the  inadequate  strategy  and  tactics  of  his  opponents; 
and  the  principle  of  envelopment  of  Moltke's  era  led 
to  success  simply  because  the  enemy  did  not  adopt 
suitable  counter-measures. 

These  reflections  show  us  that  it  is  above  all  a  ques- 


THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR        13 

tion  of  discerning  the  weak  points  inherent  in  the 
modern  military  system  and  conduct  of  war.  Only 
by  recognizing  this  fact  may  we  succeed  in  arriving  at 
a  standard  of  action  which  will  ensure  us  a  superiority 
on  which  we  can  rely. 

He  who  fully  sees  and  completely  masters  the  diffi- 
culties arising  from  modern  conditions  in  the  conduct' 
of  war;  he  who  has  a  clear  and  detailed  insight  into 
what  can  be  done  with  modern  war-appliances  and 
what  not,  and  how  these  must  be  used,  therefore,  to 
have  the  maximum  effect;  what,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  must  avoid,  so  as  not  to  upset  the  powerful  mech- 
anism of  a  modern  army;  he  who  by  reason  of  such 
intelligence  has  arrived  at  clear  and  definite  princi- 
ples of  acting,  and  is  perfectly  aware  of  the  decisive 
factors  leading  to  success,  particularly  under  mod- 
ern conditions — he  will,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  ob- 
tain a  distinct  superiority  over  an  adversary,  who 
from  the  outset  either  acts  on  wrong  principles,  or 
tries  only  in  war  itself  to  arrive  at  that  clearness  which 
he  was  unable  to  attain  by  his  mental  work  in  peace- 
time. This  kind  of  superiority  is,  however,  very  much 
enhanced  if  we  apply  the  knowledge  we  have  obtained 
to  the  preparation  for  war,  which,  in  fact,  is  already 
part  of  the  conduct  of  war  itself.  The  execution 
of  what  has  been  recognized  as  the  most  suitable  is 
then  greatly  facilitated,  and  to  the  mental  superiority, 
which  reveals  itself  in  the  method  of  action,  a  ma- 
terial superiority  is  added.  That  side  will  be  superior 
in  a  way  its  opponent  can  scarcely  retrieve,  which, 
well  aware  of  the  decisive  importance  of  the  subject, 
has  striven  for,  and  has  obtained,  superiority  by  work- 
ing for  it  in  peace-time. 

If,  for  instance,  it  should  be  proved  that  the  com- 
mand of  the  air  will  be  the  decisive  factor  in  a  future 


i4          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

war,  the  army  possessing  the  most  effective  aerial 
fleet  would  evidently  have  a  decided  advantage,  though 
in  other  less  important  departments  it  may  be  inferior 
to  its  adversary. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  a  question  of  competing  with 
our  likely  enemies  in  all  the  various  branches  without 
distinction,  such  as  raising  huge  armies,  increasing 
artillery  and  ammunition,  improving  heavy  artillery 
and  siege  trains,  extending  the  railway  system,  and 
employing  every  modern  technical  appliance.  A  com- 
petition like  this  would  be  ultimately  decided  by  finan- 
cial superiority,  which  we  scarcely  possess.  We  must 
rather  exert  ourselves  to  prepare  for  war  in  a  distinct 
direction,  and  to  gain  superiority  not  in  every  branch, 
but  in  the  one  we  have  recognized  as  decisive,  whilst 
taking  a  correct  view  of  all  other  important  branches. 

Much  independence  of  thought  and  determination  is 
required  of  him  who  acts  in  this  spirit  in  a  responsible 
position  and  stakes  success  in  war,  so  to  say,  on  one 
card.  All  depends,  then,  on  whether  a  future  war  has 
been  correctly  estimated.  Every  error  in  decisive 
questions  must  prove  fatal.  Yet  it  is  the  only  possible 
way  for  obtaining  an  unquestionable  superiority,  and 
almost  every  great  captain  has  followed  it. 

All  the  more  is  it  necessary  to  see  perfectly  clear 
in  these  matters  by  studying  them  thoroughly.  We 
must  resolutely  get  rid  of  the  influence  of  conventional 
views  and  opinions,  extend  and  thoroughly  sift  in 
every  department  the  ideas  we  are  forming  about  a 
future  war,  trace  to  their  utmost  limit  the  conse- 
quences of  all  that  may  be  new  in  a  coming  war,  and 
then  try  to  discover  with  inexorable  logic  the  weak 
and  the  decisive  factors  in  the  whole  picture  thus  un- 
folded before  our  eyes.  If  we  approach  this  task  with 
an  unbiassed  mind,  keep  a  tight  rein  on  our  imagina- 


THE  SECRET  OF  MODERN  WAR        15 

tion,  and  strictly  adhere  to  realities,  the  investigating 
mind  will  see  unveiled -the  mystery  of  a  future  war; 
the  sphinx  will  speak  and  we  shall  descry  the  law  of 
future  superiority. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  only  want  to  learn  from 
the  experiences  of  former  wars  without  working  out 
the  practical  result  of  these  experiences,  if  we  only 
try  to  bring  into  line,  more  or  less  mechanically,  the 
new  phenomena  of  our  time  with  the  old  views,  we 
must  resign  all  idea  of  mastering  the  situation  and 
making  the  most  of  it  to  our  own  advantage ;  in  that 
case  the  war  of  the  future  will  continue  to  be  some- 
thing uncertain,  a  riddle,  the  solution  of  which  is 
looked  for  and  expected  by  the  events  of  the  future. 
But  the  task  is  to  solve  the  riddle  in  advance.  That 
kind  of  mental  labour  must  bear  rich  fruit.  It  will 
best  prepare  victory.  It  must  be  done. 


CHAPTER  II 
ARMIES  OF  MASSES 


CHAPTER   II 

ARMIES  OF   MASSES 

IF  we  review  the  whole  of  military  history  as  far  as 
we  have  access  to  it,  we  become  aware  of  an  infinite 
series  of  different  forms  of  war;  war  we  see  constantly 
changing.  "War,"  says  Clausewitz,  "is  a  perfect 
chameleon,  because  in  each  separate  case  it  changes 
somewhat  its  nature." 

But  if  we  look  closer  into  the  military  events,  we 
perceive  that  in  war,  as  in  almost  all  other  spheres 
of  life,  a  certain  constancy  reigns  supreme;  that  cer- 
tain features  constantly  recur;  that  certain  relations 
between  mode  of  action  and  success  often  remain  the 
same. 

First,  from  its  nature,  the  object  of  war  is  always 
the  same,  we  wish,  as  Clausewitz  has  already  defined 
it,  to  impose  our  will  on  that  of  the  enemy,  by  either 
annihilating  or  damaging  him,  or  warding  him  off; 
or,  maybe,  we  want  to  force  him  to  do,  or  to  give  up, 
what  is  to  our  advantage.  Secondly,  every  combat 
is  governed  by  the  law  of  attack  and  defence.  An 
action  outside  the  limit  of  these  two  notions  is  alto- 
gether unthinkable.  And,  thirdly,  all  actions  in  war 
are  influenced  by  the  physical,  mental,  and  moral  qual- 
ities of  men. 

All  laws  and  principles  which  can  be  derived  directly 
and  purely  from  these  three  factors  must  evidently 
be  looked  upon  as  permanent  laws  and  of  general  ap- 

19 


20          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

plication  in  war,  which  retain  their  decisive  influence 
under  all  circumstances. 

But  in  a  certain  sense  the  character  of  the  theatre 
of  war  also  accounts  for  some  definite  features  of  an 
invariable  type. 

In  war  on  land,  ground  and  the  action  of  troops 
affect  each  other  in  many  ways,  always  in  the  same 
manner.  Defiles  oblige  us  to  decrease  the  front  if  we 
wish  to  pass  them;  steep  gradients  render  upward 
movements  difficult;  eminences  afford  good  view; 
ranges  of  hills  cover  from  sight  and  direct  fire;  and 
similar  instances  of  general  application  may  be  cited 
frequently.  Naval  warfare,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
enacted  on  a  storm-swept  plain,  and  is  subject  to  cer- 
tain immutable  laws  from  the  nature  of  the  sea.  The 
same  applies  to  the  air  and  to  the  combats  we  shall 
see  there  in  the  future.  But  whatever  may  be  the 
theatre  of  war,  there  remain  but  the  three  factors — 
the  object,  the  form  of  action,  and  human  nature — 
which  determine  the  permanent  soul  of  war  from 
which  the  immutable  laws  of  the  art  of  war  must  be 
deducted. 

The  impossibility  of  theoretically  developing  these 
laws  in  their  totality  must  be  plain  to  everybody. 
Nevertheless,  principles  of  this  kind  are  as  necessary 
for  the  practical  conduct  of  war  as  are  the  general 
laws  which  form  its  basis.  All  military  actions  are 
regulated  by  them  from  day  to  day.  All  tactical  regu- 
lations as  well  as  all  measures  of  organization  are 
due  to  them.  To  describe  these  convincingly  and  to 
explain  them  clearly  is  the  purport  of  every  practical 
doctrine  of  war. 

The  difficulty  of  discovering  irrefutably  these  im- 
portant principles  of  warfare  is  chiefly  due  to  the  fact 
that  it  is  very  hard,  on  the  one  hand,  to  procure  all 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  21 

the  material  facts,  from  which  these  principles  must 
be  derived,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we  all  may 
look  upon  this  material  from  very  different  points  of 
view.  And,  indeed,  we  find  that  the  same  experiences 
of  war  are  not  always  judged  alike  in  the  different 
armies,  and  that  new  phenomena  in  the  military  world 
are  not  seldom  appreciated  differently. 

It  will,  therefore,  never  be  possible  •  to  arrive  at 
incontrovertible  results  in  all  that  concerns  military 
matters,  as  they  are  so  uncertain  and  changing;  but 
we  must  rely  on  the  theory  of  probabilities.  To  get 
as  near  to  certainty  as  possible  by  its  aid  will  be  the 
most  we  can  hope  to  attain.  Yet  even  then,  in  so 
far  as  it  concerns  principles  derived  from  experience 
of  war,  we  have  to  get  over  one  difficulty  more,  and 
that  is,  we  must  find  out  whether  the  conditions  are 
still  the  same  as  those  under  which  a  certain  law  was 
recognized  as  being  a  guide  for  us;  whether  we  are, 
therefore,  allowed  to  apply  the  principles  resulting 
from  that  law  straight  to  our  own  action  in  the  pres- 
ent, or  even  in  the  future,  without  coming  into  conflict 
with  the  reality  of  things.  The  conditions  continually 
change  which  determine  the  essential  features  of  war, 
and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  determine  the  amount 
and  the  kind  of  that  change  and  its  probable  influence 
on  the  incidents  of  a  future  war. 

The  outward  conditions  determining  war,  we  know, 
do  not  change  by  leaps  and  bounds,  but  do  so  gradu- 
ally. Even  the  most  momentous  inventions  and  im- 
portant social  revolutions  do  not  suddenly  produce 
a  change  of  all  the  factors  influencing  war.  Thus  it 
has  taken  centuries  after  the  invention  of  gunpowder 
before  the  fire-fight  obtained  its  own,  and  it  is  scarcely 
possible  to  gauge  to-day  the  probable  effect  of  aerial 
navigation  on  the  future  conduct  of  war;  for  it  is 


22          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

almost  always  impossible  to  discern  the  full  signifi- 
cance of  new  inventions  and  innovations.  In  con- 
formity with  the  slow  change  of  the  ruling  factors,  the 
laws  governing  the  mutual  relationship  of  things,  and, 
jointly  with  these  laws,  the  periodical  principles  of 
warfare  as  well,  change  but  gradually.  That  which 
in  the  past  was  fundamentally  right  may  therefore 
often  be  so  in  the  present,  in  spite  of  certain  develop- 
ments having  occurred,  and  form  as  a  rule  a  reliable 
guide  for  recognizing  the  future,  because  things  will 
develop  according  to  a  law,  and,  to  a  certain  degree, 
can  therefore  be  determined  in  advance.  An  example 
will  suffice  to  show  how  the  past  in  this  way  can  be 
made  to  serve  the  future. 

At  the  time  of  Frederic  the  Great  the  armies  were 
greatly  dependent  on  supplies  from  magazines,  or,  at 
least,  they  thought  they  were.  Every  pressure  on 
their  own  lines  of  communication  seemed  to  them  a 
great  danger,  every  threat  on  those  of  the  enemy  a 
great  success.  The  pressure  on  the  enemy's  lines  of 
communication  became  thus  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant maxims  of  operations.  Napoleon,  on  the  other 
hand,  supplied  his  armies  chiefly  from  the  resources 
of  the  theatre  of  war.  By  this  he  made  himself  al- 
most entirely  independent  of  supplies  from  depots.  A 
pressure  on  his  lines  of  communication  affected  him 
little ;  tactical  victory  put  an  end  to  all  anxiety  caused 
by  this  pressure.  His  procedure  was  no  doubt  very 
advantageous  so  long  as  he  was  able  to  subsist  on  the 
country  and  sure  of  tactical  victory.  The  moment  he 
failed  in  both,  as  in  Russia,  the  army  perished  from 
want  of  regular  supplies  from  magazines.  In  the 
campaign  of  1870-71  we  used  Napoleon's  system  in 
combination  with  supplies  from  depots,  which  an- 
swered well  in  opulent  France.  But  we  would  griev- 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  23 

ously  err  should  we  think  that  this  was  the  last  word 
on  the  subject;  and  when  Field-Marshal  v.  der  Goltz 
lays  it  down  as  law  that  we  need  not  mind  a  threat" 
to  our  lines  of  communication,  but  must,  by  striking 
forward,  force  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  threats,* 
the  validity  of  such  a  law  is  very  limited,  and  rather 
applicable  only  if  we  are  sure  of  victory  and  can  live 
on  the  country  without  needing  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation during  the  time  before  we  gain  the  victory. 
But  if  in  future,  as  will  be  most  likely  the  case,  situa- 
tions arise  in  which  armies  are  really  dependent  on 
supplies  from  depots,  the  strategic  importance  of  the 
lines  of  communication  will  again  assert  itself  to  an 
enhanced  degree,  and  similar  principles  in  the  conduct 
of  war  will  prove  necessary  as  they — mutatis  mutan- 
dis— obtained  at  Frederic's  time. 

This  example  will  suffice  to  make  it  clear  in  what 
way  the  development  of  military  matters  is  subject 
to  certain  laws,  and  how  greatly  the  knowledge  of 
these  may  help  us  in  shaping  the  future. 

(After  pointing  out  the  danger  of  attempting  to  elaborate 
a  rigid  system  of  the  "laws  of  war"  which  may  easily  degen- 
erate into  a  mere  rule-of-thumb  method,  and  insisting  on 
the  necessity  of  any  theory  of  war  taking  full  acccount  of 
the  conditions  of  the  time,  the  author  proceeds  to  consider 
the  effect  of  numbers  in  the  wars  of  to-day.) 

Of  all  the  features  which  are  destined  to  influence 
the  conduct  of  war  under  present  conditions,  and  cause 
it  to  strike  new  lines,  it  is  the  levy  of  masses,  above 
all,  which  no  doubt  will  give  its  peculiar  stamp  to  the 
next  war. 

In  the  Central  European  States  the  whole  male  pop- 
ulation, as  far  as  it  is  able  to  carry  arms,  will  be  called 
*  v.  der  Goltz,  "Krieg  und  Heerfiihrung,"  1901. 


24          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

up,  armed,  and  organized  in  tactical  formations.  In 
case  of  any  hostile  invasions,  it  is  more  likely  than 
not  that  a  "people's  war"  would  be  organized  in  the 
true  sense  of  its  meaning.  The  obligation  of  every 
citizen  to  serve  is  a  generally  accepted  principle. 

It  is  true,  not  all  those  obliged  to  serve  are  given  a 
military  training  in  peace-time.  In  Germany,  for  in- 
stance, this  is  far  from  being  a  fact  for  some  time  past. 
Yet  everywhere  enormous  hosts  are  to  be  mobilized 
in  case  of  war,  not  only  for  the  defence  of  the  native 
soil,  but  also  for  attack.  It  is  right,  to  some  extent, 
to  speak  of  the  armies  of  millions  of  modern  times, 
the  like  of  which  have  not  been  seen  before  in  his- 
tory. 

It  is,  of  course,  out  of  the  question  that  armies  like 
these  can  be  of  a  uniform  character.  There  are  in 
Europe  militia  armies  and  standing  armies,  which 
are  absolutely  different  in  character.  In  the  latter 
the  line  regiments,  augmented  on  mobilization  by  the 
latest  annual  contingents  of  reserves,  and  numbering 
in  their  ranks  most  of  the  regular  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers,  are  more  efficient  than  troops 
of  the  second  and  third  lines,  which  are  composed  of 
contingents  of  maturer  ages,  and  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  provide  with  fully  competent  officers. 

The  most  efficient  troops  are  called  upon  to  face 
the  enemy  in  first  line,  and  to  carry  the  war  outside 
the  country.  The  others  are  charged  with  the  duty 
of  furnishing  the  garrisons  of  fortresses,  guarding 
railways,  and  occupying  the  districts  conquered;  or 
they  serve  to  replace  casualties  suffered  by  the  actual 
field  army,  or  by  any  other  fighting  troops.  All  must 
at  least  be  able  to  delay  an  enemy's  attack  by  local 
defence,  and  to  fight  the  enemy  as  guerillas  should 
he  cross  the  frontiers. 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  25 

The  consequence  of  this  general  levy  is  that  the 
military  value  of  the  armies  is  very  much  more  than 
formerly  dependent  on  the  character  and  nature  of 
the  nations  themselves.  The  more  of  the  population 
are  enrolled  into  the  righting  army,  the  more  the 
spirit  of  the  troops  thus  composed  will  be  determined 
by  the  physical  power  as  well  as  by  the  political  and 
social  spirit  of  the  nation.  An  army  with  a  discipline 
handed  down  from  generation  to  generation,  recruited 
from  a  vigorous  folk  accustomed  to  obedience,  which 
has  learned  to  limit  its  desires  for  the  good  of  the 
common  weal,  and  at  the  same  time  is  trained  to  hard 
work  and  in  the  profession  of  arms,  will  give  a  better 
account  of  its  power  of  resistance  against  demoraliz- 
ing influences,  as  well  as  against  the  sufferings,  fa- 
tigues, and  privations  of  a  campaign,  than  the  army 
of  another  nation,  which  is  physically  weakened,  in- 
fected by  revolutions,  or  disused  to  arms  owing  to  in- 
creasing opulence.  Sound  political  training,  preser- 
vation and  strengthening  of  the  spirit  of  discipline  and 
subordination,  readiness  to  make  sacrifices  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  community,  which  constitute  the  really 
loyal  spirit  of  a  citizen,  are  the  necessary  conditions 
for  carrying  on  successfully  the  war  of  masses  in  our 
age.  Where,  however,  the  recruits  who  enter  the 
army  are  accustomed  to  resistance  and  insubordina- 
tion against  all  authority,  the  mechanism  of  a  mod- 
ern army  runs  the  grave  risk  of  breaking  down  even 
under  the  pressure  of  conditions  which  by  themselves 
alone  would  not  be  decisive. 

This  development  entails  the  further  and,  perhaps, 
still  more  important  consequence,  that  the  political 
importance  of  war  has  completely  altered.  Owing  to 
the  fact  that  all  classes  of  the  nation  are  affected,  and 
that  personal  sacrifices  are  imposed  on  each  individual 


26          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

family,  wars  for  frivolous  or  dynastic  purposes  be- 
come impossible.  We  can  and  must  uphold  by  force 
of  arms  only  the  really  vital  interests  of  the  country. 
The  resolve  to  go  to  war  is  also  rendered  very  difficult 
to-day,  because  war  affects  most  deeply  every  member 
of  the  community.  The  sacrifice  in  wealth  and  blood 
that  must  be  exacted  will  probably  surpass  everything 
we  have  experienced  hitherto ;  and  the  dangers  of  such 
an  enterprise,  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  defeat  in 
war,  will  be  far  greater  than  ever.  Prussia's  crushing 
defeat  at  Jena  in  1806,  and  her  rising  in  the  memo- 
rable year  of  1813,  give  us,  perhaps,  an  idea  of  what 
the  sacrifices  will  be  in  a  modern  war,  and  the  oppres- 
sion a  nation  will  have  to  suffer  in  all  likelihood  should 
the  war  bring  on  defeat  and  with  it  the  conquest  of  the 
country  by  the  enemy.  That  France  did  not  suffer 
in  a  similar  way  in  1870-71  is  due  to  the  broadminded 
humanity  with  which  the  Germans  conducted  the  war. 
But  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  other  people  will  mani- 
fest an  equally  high  moral  standard. 

Preparation  of  war  in  peace  costs,  as  it  is,  large 
sums,  and  claims  a  considerable  portion  of  the  national 
revenue.  If  we  mobilize,  the  necessary  expenditure 
rises  enormously.  As  most  of  the  labour  will  be  with- 
drawn at  the  same  time  from  the  market,  and  all 
means  of  living  be  stopped  thereby,  the  whole  of  do- 
mestic life  must  be  shaken  to  the  core. 

It  has  been  asserted,  and  seemingly  substantiated 
scientifically,  that  no  State  could  carry  through  a  war 
waged  with  the  masses  levied  in  our  days.  It  would 
not  only  mean  absolute  domestic  ruin,  but  war  itself 
would  be  completely  paralysed  soon  after  its  out- 
break; the  economic  strength  for  maintaining  such 
huge  armies  would  simply  fail.  For  this  reason  alone 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  27 

a  war  of  that  nature  between  two  civilized  nations 
would  become  impossible. 

I  think  this  view  is  going  much  too  far.  It  is  in 
the  nature  of  human  things  that  they  regulate  them- 
selves automatically,  as  it  were.  Economic  impossi- 
bilities do  not  crop  up  suddenly  and  all  at  once ;  they 
assert  themselves  gradually.  Owing  to  the  stress  of 
the  situation  acting  in  a  similar  manner  in  both  camps, 
the  belligerents  will  be  obliged  to  adapt  themselves 
gradually  to  the  existing  situation.  We  can,  for  in- 
stance, hand  over  workmen  to  some  industrial  and 
agricultural  concerns  from  the  second  and  third  lines, 
when  they  are  not  immediately  wanted  for  military 
operations.  The  victor  in  the  first  decisive  battles 
may  be  able  to  demobilize  altogether  the  forces  in 
rear  of  the  army  the  moment  the  danger  of  hostile 
invasion  has  passed.  The  vanquished  will  sue  for 
peace  all  the  more  readily  the  more  impossible  it  ap- 
pears to  him,  from  an  economical  point  of  view,  to  re- 
establish the  balance  of  power  upset  by  defeat.  But 
where  in  an  indecisive  struggle  the  adversaries  keep 
each  other  in  check,  the  standard  of  their  efforts  will 
be  gradually  lowered,  and  success  will  ultimately  fall 
to  him  who  can  boast  of  the  highest  moral  energy  and 
self-sacrificing  spirit,  or,  where  on  both  sides  the  moral 
motives  are  of  an  equally  high  standard,  can  hold  out 
financially  longest  to  finish  the  war.  In  this  way  the 
factors  ruling  the  conduct  of  war  will  automatically 
adapt  themselves,  as  it  were,  to  the  economic  condi- 
tions, and  a  compromise  between  what  was  intended 
and  what  was  possible  will  of  necessity  be  the  result. 

If  we  have  thus  established  that  an  unfortunate  war 
must  entail  far  more  disastrous  economic  consequences 
than  ever  before,  and  may  lead  to  complete  economic 
ruin,  yet  the  inference  that  war  with  modern  armies 


28          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

could  not  be  carried  to  the  bitter  end  from  reasons 
of  economy  is  not  justified. 

Two  points  of  practical  importance  result,  however, 
from  these  considerations.  First,  the  economic  super- 
iority of  a  nation  forms  by  itself  an  essential  factor 
of  success,  and  the  way  a  State  manipulates  its  finances 
must  have  a  far-reaching  influence  on  the  conduct  of 
war.  Secondly,  all  special  preparations  for  war  must 
be  carried  out  with  the  /greatest  seriousness,  with  the 
utmost  consistency,  and  without  false  economy.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  nowhere  will  half  or  insufficient 
measures  be  punished  more  severely  than  in  the  sphere 
of  armaments.  The  losses  entailed  by  an  unfortu- 
nate war  are  so  great,  the  venture  of  risking  these 
losses  by  insufficient  preparation  is  so  dangerous,  that 
even  the  greatest  sacrifices  for  armaments  seem  justi- 
fied under  all  circumstances. 

From  a  purely  military  point  of  view,  the  growth 
of  armies  renders  all  military  action  much  more  dif- 
ficult. This  difficulty  is  already  felt  when  training 
soldiers.  In  order  to  raise  the  masses  required  for 
war  without  increasing  the  cost  of  peace  training  un- 
duly, the  terms  of  service  had  to  be  reduced  con- 
siderably in  recent  times.  The  training  of  each  man 
must  therefore  be  completed  in  a  very  much  shorter 
time  than  formerly,  and  this  imposes  in  consequence 
a  much  severer  task  on  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers.  A  very  great  amount  of  labour  is  moreover 
thrown  on  them  by  the  fact  that  a  very  much  greater 
number  of  recruits  passes  through  their  hands  than 
in  the  smaller  armies  of  the  past,  and  that  the  numer- 
ous trained  men  must  be  retrained  again  and  again  to 
keep  them  permanently  efficient.  The  consequence  is 
that  the  strength  of  the  trainers  is  taxed  already  to  the 
utmost  in  peace  time. 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  29 

Another  effect  of  these  conditions  with  which  we 
have  to  reckon  is,  that  with  the  growing  size  of  the 
armies  the  tactical  worth  of  the  troops  is  gradually 
decreasing.  The  greater  the  numbers  which  must  be 
raised  for  war,  and  the  more  men  must  be  therefore 
trained  in  peace,  the  more  difficult  it  becomes  to  have 
available  suitable  officers  and  non-commissioned  of- 
ficers to  train  the  men  and  to  lead  them.  In  war, 
moreover,  the  first  line  will  be  weakened  by  having 
to  detail  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  to  new 
formations,  and  the  more  there  are  of  these  new  for- 
mations, the  more  this  will  weaken  the  first  line.  This 
must  impair  the  steadiness  of  the  troops,  and  evidently 
cause  a  moment  to  arrive  when  the  advantage  of 
numbers  is  no  longer  of  any  value  as  compared  with 
the  tactical  worth  of  the  troops.  It  is  just  this  point 
which  the  latest  wars  bring  forcibly  home  to  us.  The 
levies  of  the  French  Republic,  in  spite  of  their  numeri- 
cal superiority,  were  of  no  avail  in  187071  against 
the  firmly-knit  battalions  of  the  Germans;  and  the 
Japanese,  in  spite  of  the  notorious  numerical  in- 
feriority of  their  army,  invariably  defeated  the  nu- 
merically superior  Russians.  In  this  respect  the 
American  War  of  Secession  is  also  exceedingly  in- 
structive. Again  and  again  the  numerically  superior 
armies  of  the  Union  succumbed  to  the  tactically  and 
morally  better  trained  forces  of  the  Confederates. 

The  conduct  of  war  itself  is  further  made  more 
difficult  by  the  masses  of  men.  It  will,  in  the  first 
instance,  prove  exceedingly  difficult  to  move  the  vari- 
ous armies,  which  together  form  a  modern  army,  by 
a  uniform  idea,  and  to  direct  them  in  such  a  way  as  to 
ensure  the  participation  of  every  portion  in  the  main 
issue,  without  wasting  forces  in  minor  operations. 
But  the  difficulties  also  grow  with  the  number  of 


30          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

troops,  from  a  technical  point  of  view.  Railway  trans- 
port, and  the  systematic  movement  of  very  large 
masses,  their  provisioning,  the  necessity  of  keeping 
them  permanently  efficient,  and,  therefore,  of  pro- 
viding for  the  constant  supply  of  ammunition,  the 
evacuation  of  wounded  and  sick,  the  pushing  forward 
of  the  necessary  drafts  of  men,  horses,  and  material, 
the  guarding  of  all  important  roads  and  lines  of  com- 
munication of  the  army,  all  these  necessities  present 
problems  in  the  technical  conduct  of  war  which  are 
very  difficult  to  solve. 

The  enormous  number  of  troops  raised  obliges  us 
to  select  large  areas  for  assembling  them,  and  to  make 
a  thorough  use  of  the  network  of  roads  within  those 
spaces  so  as  to  be  able  to  bring  to  the  front  as  large 
a  number  of  troops  as  possible.  The  same  considera- 
tion will  often  oblige  us  to  march  on  each  road  as 
many  troops  as  possible.  The  number  of  troops  on 
each  road  is  again  limited  by  the  possibility  of  supply- 
ing them,  and  by  the  necessity  of  bringing  into  action 
— though  perhaps  not  on  the  same  day — the  rearmost 
troops  before  the  righting  strength  of  those  in  front 
is  exhausted.  The  necessity  of  provisioning  the  troops 
and  of  replacing  armaments  demands  at  once  that, 
on  all  lines  of  advance,  stores  of  equipments  and  pro- 
visions must  be  collected,  pushed  forward,  and  issued 
to  the  troops  without  this  mechanism  being  allowed 
to  stop  for  a  single  day.  The  difficulty  is  enhanced 
when,  owing  to  the  number  of  troops,  "living  on  the" 
country"  becomes  impossible,  and  all  supplies  have 
to  be  brought  up  from  the  rear. 

The  strategic  mobility  of  the  large  modern  armies 
is,  under  these  circumstances,  palpably  far  inferior 
to  that  of  smaller  armies,  which,  at  least,  in  a  rich 
theatre  of  war  that  provides  supplies  without  diffi- 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  31 

culty,  could  move  with  much  greater  freedom.  It  is, 
moreover,  evident  that  a  large  army,  with  numerous 
march  columns  moving  parallel  with  each  other,  needs 
more  time  for  wheeling,  concentrating,  and  forming 
a  battle  line  than  a  smaller  one,  and  has  to  contend 
with  greater  difficulties  of  supply.  Topographical 
obstacles,  too,  are  manifestly  more  difficult  to  over- 
come by  large  masses  than  by  smaller  bodies.  Owing 
to  the  clumsiness  of  all  movements,  and  the  time  they 
take,  all  decisions  of  headquarters  must  be  prepared 
long  beforehand;  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  make 
always  constant  use  of  the  intelligence  daily  received 
about  the  enemy.  This  again  obliges  us  to  push  recon- 
naissance very  far  ahead,  so  as  to  have  as  early  as 
possible  information  about  the  enemy's  measures. 
This  increases  the  depth  of  the  army  on  the  march, 
and  with  depth  grows  the  difficulty  of  operating.  All 
these  conditions  must  be  thoroughly  considered,  if 
we  wish  to  form  a  clear  idea  of  modern  warfare.  Yet 
even  they  do  not  include  all  the  difficulties  of  operating 
which  arise  merely  from  the  number  of  troops. 

In  most  cases,  especially  when  we  are  obliged  to 
fight  against  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy,  we  will 
have  to  apportion  to  the  actual  Field  Army  troops 
of  at  least  the  second  line — therefore  reserve  forma- 
tions in  Germany.  These  will  be  inferior  to  the  line 
troops  in  power  of  marching,  as  well  as  in  discipline 
and  fighting  qualities.  The  men  comprising  them  are 
still  perfectly  efficient  physically  at  their  age  of  from 
twenty-four  to  thirty  years,  but  often  no  longer  ac- 
customed to  particular  military  exertions.  Nor  can 
rapidly  created  new  formations  ever  prove  as  thor- 
oughly trained  and  steadfast  as  a  body  of  troops 
firmly  welded  together  in  peace  time.  A  standard 
infantry  can  only  be  created  under  modern  conditions 


32          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

in  war,  and  when  facing  the  enemy.  To  raise  cavalry 
reserve  units  to  the  same  level  as  regiments  of  the 
line  is  altogether  impossible,  and  new  formations  of 
artillery  will  but  very  gradually  attain  the  same  ef- 
ficiency as  a  unit  thoroughly  trained  and  knit  together 
in  peace,  and  thoroughly  practised  in  shooting  and 
driving.  Headquarters  are  therefore  obliged  to 
reckon  even  in  the  first  decisive  battles  with  troops 
of  varying  tactical  value. 

As  regards  tactics,  very  considerable  difficulties  as- 
sert themselves,  also,  in  the  employment  of  masses, 
which  with  smaller  bodies  do  not  exist  at  all,  or  to  a 
less  extent.  The  use  of  ground  for  tactical  purposes 
has  become  very  much  more  difficult  for  the  huge 
armies  of  modern  times,  than  was  formerly  the  case, 
especially  on  the  defensive.  It  is  exceedingly  difficult 
to  find  defensive  positions  suiting  armies  of  some  nine 
to  twelve  army  corps.  In  most  cases  we  will  have  to 
include  in  the  position  portions  of  ground  affording  no 
advantages  to  the  defence  at  all,  or,  worse  still,  fa- 
vouring the  attack.  With  the  mass  of  troops  avail- 
able, we  can,  of  course,  occupy  the  less  favourable 
sections  of  the  ground  more  strongly,  and  thus  try  to 
neutralize  the  disadvantages  we  have  to  take  into  the 
bargain ;  yet  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  advantage 
of  the  defensive,  of  being  able  to  spare  troops  just 
on  account  of  the  ground,  is  partly  lost  thereby,  be- 
cause we  are  obliged  to  employ  troops  in  passive  de- 
fence, which,  if  the  whole  position  had  been  better, 
we  could  have  used  for  other  purposes.  A  similar 
disadvantage  asserts  itself,  also,  in  the  tactical  offen- 
sive. It  will  not  always  be  easy  to  find  spaces  suf- 
ficiently favourable  for  deployment  of  the  large  num- 
bers in  the  attack  of  modern  armies.  Often  we  shall 
be  forced  to  deploy  troops  on  unfavourable  ground. 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  33 

In  this  way  the  modern  armies  of  masses  render  the 
conduct  of  war  difficult  in  many  ways.  But  they 
themselves  contain  besides  an  element  of  danger  that 
must  not  be  underrated. 

The  mechanism  of  such  an  army  is  so  enormous  and 
complicated  that  it  can  only  be  kept  going,  and  be 
directed,  if  all  its  parts  work  fairly  reliably,  and  if 
it  is  spared  great  and  extensive  moral  shocks.  We 
cannot,  of  course,  count  upon  the  fortunes  of  war 
keeping  us  free  from  experiences  of  this  kind,  just  as 
little  as  we  can  count  upon  being  victorious  in  every 
action.  These  shocks  can  be  got  over  if  they  are  felt 
only  locally.  But  when  large  concentrated  masses 
are  once  out  of  hand,  when  panic  has  seized  them, 
when  supplies  fail  throughout,  and  the  spirit  of  in- 
subordination is  rampant  in  those  masses,  they  are 
not  only  powerless  to  resist  the  enemy,  but  become  a 
positive  danger  to  themselves  and  to  their  own  com- 
manders. 

War  conducted  with  large  modern  armies  is  there- 
fore, in  any  case,  a  risky  game,  taxing  to  the  utmost 
the  resources  of  a  State  in  men  and  money.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  is  only  natural  that  measures 
are  adopted  everywhere  to  make  it  possible,  should 
war  break  out,  to  finish  it  rapidly,  and  quickly  relieve 
the  tension  which  must  arise  when  the  whole  nation 
is  called  to  arms. 

This  has  caused  arrangements  to  be  made  for  the 
mobilization,  immediately  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
of  all  the  nation's  fighting  power,  and  for  the  strate- 
getic  concentration  of  as  many  troops  for  simultane- 
ous action  as  space  and  other  conditions  will  permit. 
From  this  it  follows  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  a 
great  and  unexampled  contest  of  millions  of  men  will 


34          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

take  place,  which  will  impress  on  modern  war,  in  its 
initial  stage  at  least,  its  special  feature. 

But  we  cannot  assume  that  the  conditions  which 
result  from  the  calling  up  of  a  whole  nation's  strength, 
and  from  strategetic  concentration  at  the  threatened 
frontier  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  will  continue 
throughout  its  whole  progress. 

If  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  peculiar  circum- 
stances caused  the  armies  to  arrive  in  the  theatre  of 
war  slowly  and  by  degrees,  and  to  grow  constantly 
stronger  in  numbers  as  the  struggle  proceeded,  it  will 
probably  be  the  reverse  in  a  Central  European  War. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  in  the  course  of  a 
long  war  the  economic  conditions  must  from  physical 
necessity  tend  to  reduce  the  employment  of  masses. 
But  there  are  some  other  reasons  tending  in  the  same 
direction. 

There  will  first  and  foremost  be  the  natural  waste, 
which  will  very  rapidly  reduce  the  masses  in  the  field. 
Apart  from  the  losses  in  action,  the  waste  in  men  was 
very  great  already  in  1870-71.  The  loss  by  march- 
ing alone,  until  the  first  actions  took  place,  was  8  to 
9  per  cent.,  and  during  the  war  the  companies  espe- 
cially became  greatly  reduced,  often  to  half,  and  even 
less,  their  full  establishments.  The  waste  was  also 
great,  of  course,  in  the  drafts  that  had  come  out.  All 
this  will  no  doubt  be  far  worse  in  future.  In  the  vast 
numbers  called  up  we  must  be  prepared  to  find  in- 
ferior men.  The  losses  the  troops  of  the  first  line  will 
suffer  when  marching  are  therefore  sure  to  be  greater 
than  formerly;  they  will  enormously  swell  when  we 
must  operate  with  troops  of  inferior  quality.  We 
must  also  reckon  with  the  fact  that  some  men  of  the 
older  contingents  of  reserves,  fathers  of  families,  and 
politically  unreliable  subjects,  will  try,  by  some  pre- 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  35 

text  or  other,  to  escape  service,  and  often  so,  perhaps 
successfully.  In  1870-71  in  France,  during  the  sec- 
ond phase  of  the  war,  the  republican  authorities  were 
frequently  obliged  to  use  the  most  stringent  measures 
to  get  the  men  to  serve.  Large  numbers  will  be  there- 
fore lost  from  this  cause.  The  course  of  the  war  will 
probably  produce  similar  effects.  The  efforts  made 
at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  are  so  great,  that 
it  is  scarcely  possible  to  increase  them,  at  least  in 
countries  like  France,  which  raises  its  last  men  on  the 
first  day  of  mobilization.  If  such  an  army  is  vic- 
torious, the  inducement  for  further  great  exertion 
ceases,  but  if  the  war  takes  an  unfavourable  course, 
it  will  often  seem  hopeless  to  continue  it  when  the 
supply  of  men  has  been  exhausted,  and  the  force  that 
brought  these  masses  into  the  field  will  then  give 
way. 

All  these  circumstances  will  probably  cause  the  size 
of  the  armies  to  dwindle  away  rapidly  after  the  first 
decisive  battles,  especially  when  the  physical  and  moral 
strength  of  a  people  does  not  come  up  to  the  high 
demands  a  modern  war  exacts.  The  war  of  masses 
will  thus  undoubtedly  lose  much  of  the  character  pe- 
culiar to  it  during  the  progress  of  events.  In  the 
conduct  of  war  itself,  conditions  are  also  likely  to 
arise,  giving  a  different  stamp  to  the  combats  after 
the  first  great  decisive  battles.  It  is  quite  a  different 
thing  when  two  intact  armies  meet  on  equal  terms 
at  the  frontier,  or  when  one  army  victoriously  invades 
the  enemy's  country,  and  the  other,  beaten,  but  fight- 
ing in  its  own  country,  retreats.  The  conditions  under 
which  the  struggle  is  continued  then  change  in  many 
ways,  as  we  shall  discuss  afterwards.  The  war  of 
1870-71  already  took  the  course  here  described, 


36          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

though  not  in  so  clear  a  form  as  we  may  expect  to 
see  in  future. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War,  it  is  true,  was  of  a  char- 
acter altogether  different.  From  beginning  to  end  it 
was  a  uniform  struggle  of  two  modern  armies;  yet  we 
cannot  accept  this  as  a  proof  at  all  that  matters  will 
take  a  similar  turn  in  future.  The  conditions  were 
quite  peculiar  which  forced  upon  it  this  uniform  na- 
ture. The  main  forces  of  both  contending  armies  were 
in  this  case  tied  to  the  only  existing  railway,  because 
they  were  dependent  on  it  for  their  supplies.  That 
railway  formed  the  clamp  which  kept  both  armies 
closely  concentrated  and  obliged  them  on  the  whole 
to  advance  against  each  other  frontally.  But  noth- 
ing justifies  the  assumption  that  in  countries  with  an 
extensive  railway  system,  permitting  the  use  of  differ- 
ent bases,  things  will  be  the  same  as  in  Manchuria. 
We  must,  rather,  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  owing 
to  the  enormous  size  of  the  armies,  a  future  war  in 
Central  Europe  will  be  of  a  twofold  nature.  The  war 
at  the  time  of  concentration  will  reveal  the  special 
features  of  a  modern  war  with  masses.  The  opera- 
tions afterwards,  however,  which  must  result  from 
the  first  great  decisive  battles,  will  be  more  like  those 
we  have  witnessed  hitherto.  This  latter  period  will 
be  less  distinguished  by  the  special  modern  features 
due  to  the  size  of  the  combined  forces  in  strategical 
and  tactical  operations  than  by  the  achievements  of 
modern  military  technics,  which  will,  of  course,  mani- 
fest their  far-reachin,g  influence  also  during,  and  im- 
mediately after,  concentration  for  war.  In  addition 
to  the  effect  of  masses  in  future  wars  we  must,  there- 
fore, also  thoroughly  investigate  into  these  modern 
war  appliances  if  we  wish  to  gain  a  clear  conception  of 
the  nature  of  the  next  war. 


ARMIES  OF  MASSES  37 

But  before  we  turn  to  the  description  and  examina- 
tion of  these  mechanical  appliances  we  must  once 
more  consider  numbers  in  their  all-important  relation 
to  force.  Mass  (numbers)  and  force  are  not  identical. 
Force  does  not  at  all  grow  always  in  the  same  ratio 
as  numbers.  Between  force  and  numbers  there  is, 
rather,  a  relation  that  often  varies  and  depends  on  a 
variety  of  circumstances,  demanding  more  than  ever 
special  consideration  at  this  age  of  enormous  armies. 


CHAPTER  III 
FORCE  AND  NUMBERS 


CHAPTER   III 

FORCE  AND  NUMBERS 

WHEN  we  were  glancing  at  the  inevitable  consequences 
of  calling  up  for  war,  in  our  days,  the  whole  nation, 
we  became  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  masses  them- 
selves contained  some  elements  of  weakness,  that 
they  are  sometimes  even  a  kind  of  danger  to  our  own 
conduct  of  war,  but  that  nevertheless  all  States  of 
Europe  are  dominated  by  the  "mania  for  numbers," 
and  that  the  general  tendency  is  rather  to  increase  the 
levies  to  the  utmost  limit  of  financial  and  personal 
capacity.  There  is  no  idea  of  stopping  this  for  the 
time  being.  Numbers  seem  to  the  present  generation 
the  decisive  factor  in  war. 

The  importance  attributed  to  numbers  in  general 
by  all  Continental  States  of  Europe  is  naturally  based 
on  the  assumption  that,  taking  armament,  equipment, 
and  recruiting  as  about  equal,  the  efficiency  of  the 
various  European  Armies  would  be  about  equal,  that 
we  could  consequently  attain  a  distinct  and  tangible 
superiority  only  by  superiority  of  numbers. 

But  this  faith  in  numbers  is  a  delusive  idea.  The 
experience  of  war  at  all  times  makes  this  clear,  and 
nothing  is  more  dangerous  than  to  expect  numerical 
superiority  to  do  what  it  cannot  perform  by  itself. 
The  size  of  the  armies  employed  is  certainly  one  of 
the  most  decisive  factors  of  force.  Yet  we  must  not 
overrate  its  importance.  For  the  theory  of  war,  the 

41 


42          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

notion  of  numbers  is  at  first  the  only  possible  gauge 
we  have  for  estimating  force;  but  the  practical  soldier, 
when  applying  theory,  must  always  remain  aware  that 
force  is  equal  to  numbers  only  in  theory,  and  not  at 
all  so  always  in  practice. 

The  numerical  strength  of  an  army  is  at  first  the 
only  factor  of  force  which  can  be  ascertained  for 
certain.  All  other  components  of  this  force  can  only 
be  estimated,  and  are  thus  liable  to  deceive  in  an  in- 
finite variety  of  ways.  Knowledge  of  the  enemy's 
numerical  strength  gives  us,  for  all  that,  some  kind  of 
safe  guide  for  judging  what  we  may  expect  he  can  do, 
if  we  add  that  knowledge  to  our  estimation  of  his 
military  qualities,  weaknesses,  and  peculiarities.  In- 
deed, this  guide  may  become  an  absolutely  safe  one 
if  we  have  become  acquainted  already,  by  experience 
of  war,  with  the  enemy's  peculiarities  and  efficiency, 
and  are  therefore  no  longer  dependent  on  mere  guess- 
work. It  was  thus  possible,  for  instance,  on  the  Ger- 
man side,  after  the  battles  of  Woerth  and  Spicheren, 
to  get  a  precise  idea  of  the  high  tactical  worth  of  the 
French  army,  its  mode  of  fighting,  and  want  of  initia- 
tive on  the  part  of  the  leaders.  If,  in  addition,  exact 
intelligence  was  available  about  their  numerical 
strength,  German  headquarters  held  a  safe  guide  for 
determining  the  vital  force  of  the  enemy.  Where,  of 
course,  the  armies  are  composed  of  troops  differing  in 
value,  their  total  numerical  strength  affords  no  safe 
guide  for  what  the  enemy  is  capable  of  doing.  Yet 
we  must  remember  that  even  troops  of  different  value 
at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  let  us  say  first-line 
troops  and  new  formations,  may  during  the  war  attain 
a  certain  amount  of  equality.  The  weaker  and  less 
efficient  elements  will  gradually  disappear  from  the 
ranks,  owing  to  the  fatigues  and  privations;  death 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  43 

will  have  its  due,  taking  away  too  often  the  best  and 
most  daring  men ;  war  experience  is  gained  by  all  por- 
tions, and  by  degrees  makes  up  for  the  deficiency  in 
training.  All  these  elements  work  together,  to  efface 
gradually  the  difference  in  the  value  of  the  troops. 
If  once  this  stage  is  arrived  at,  if  the  enemy  has  be- 
come aware  of  this  development  by  experience,  his 
intelligence  about  numbers  will  again  be  to  him  the 
decisive  factor  for  estimating  the  enemy's  power. 

The  same,  of  course,  holds  good  for  our  own  troops 
too.  If  their  qualities  are  so  well  known  to  their 
commander  that  he  can  form  a  correct  estimate  of 
them,  numbers  afford  him  the  scale  by  which  to  meas- 
ure the  force  he  must  stake  in  each  individual  case 
to  ensure  success.  If  we  are  altogether  justified  in 
assuming  the  value  of  the  troops  of  both  belligerent 
parties  as  perfectly  equal,  numbers  will  form  the  ab- 
solute gauge  for  what  force  we  must  use. 

In  the  practical  conduct  of  war,  numbers  will  there- 
fore always  form  one  of  the  most  essential  factors  in 
strategical  calculations,  and  of  success.  Yet  numerical 
superiority  is  not  always  the  most  important  condition 
for  success. 

There  are  often  occasions  where  superior  numbers 
are  of  no  avail.  When  Bourbaki  attacked  the  position 
on  the  Lisaine,  he  was  altogether  unable  to  deploy  his 
forces  on  the  comparatively  narrow  space  he  had 
selected  for  attack.  Of  the  326  guns  he  had  brought 
with  him  he  could  only  get  80  into  position;  his  in- 
fantry had  no  room  for  deploying  their  superior  num- 
bers; and  so  he  had  to  give  in  before  the  numerically 
weaker  enemy;  and  during  his  retreat  his  numerical 
strength  brought  further  disaster  upon  him,  because 
he  was  unable  either  to  move,  or  supply  in  a  proper 
manner  the  numbers  he  had. 


44          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Conditions  may  arise  where  time  makes  it  impos- 
sible for  the  numerically  stronger  party  to  concentrate 
superior  masses  at  the  proper  moment.  In  other  cases, 
again,  it  is  the  tactical  and  operative  clumsiness  of 
armies  which  makes  it  impossible  for  them  to  use  their 
superior  numbers  effectively  in  the  face  of  a  more 
mobile  and  tactically  better  organized  enemy.  Mili- 
tary history  abounds  in  such  examples. 

Further,  there  may  be  situations  in  which  large 
masses  mean  destruction  owing  to  the  disproportion 
between  the  numbers  and  the  nature  of  the  theatre 
of  war.  Poverty  of  the  country  and  few  roads  mostly 
go  together,  because  roads  are  not  made  arbitrarily, 
but  originate  from  traffic  of  men  and  goods,  and  can 
only  exist  in  proper  proportion  to  this  traffic.  There 
may  very  well  be  cases  where  it  is  positively  impos- 
sible to  provision  troops  beyond  a  certain  number, 
and  to  keep  them  efficient  to  fight  and  to  move.  The 
most  telling  example  of  this  fact  is  furnished  by 
Napoleon's  campaign  in  1812  in  Russia,  where  the 
bulk  of  the  army  did  not  succumb  to  the  rigours  of  a 
Russian  winter,  as  legend  will  have  it.  It  mostly 
perished  during  its  advance,  because,  with  a  sparsely 
populated  and  roadless  country,  it  was  impossible  to 
march  the  army  divided,  and  supply  it  regularly. 
Then  the  hungry  mass  broke  all  bonds  of  discipline; 
the  losses  on  the  march  grew  enormously,  and  of  the 
whole  grand  army,  which,  more  than  300,000  strong 
at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  had  begun  its  ad- 
vance under  the  personal  command  of  Napoleon,  some- 
thing like  123,000  men  only  reached  the  battlefield 
of  Borodino,  and  only  90,000  Moscow.  These  rem- 
nants only  perished  from  hunger  and  the  cold  during 
the  retreat. 

If,  in  the  cases  mentioned,  numbers  were  of  no  use 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  45 

owing  to  the  peculiar  and  unfavourable  conditions 
prevailing,  we  learn,  on  the  other  hand,  from  innumer- 
able examples  of  military  history,  that  even  under  the 
most  favourable  conditions  for  operating  with,  and 
deploying,  troops,  the  advantage  of  superior  numbers 
was  neutralized  by  the  superior  military  and  moral 
worth  of  the  numerically  weaker  party.  The  Romans 
conquered  the  world  with  inferior  numbers;  and  we 
need  only  open  the  great  book  of  Prussian  history  to 
become  aware  of  this  fact  from  our  own  glorious  past. 

The  moral  worth  of  troops  thus  gains  decisive  im- 
portance in  addition  to  numbers,  and  this,  under  the 
conditions  of  modern  warfare,  will  weigh  all  the  more 
heavily  in  the  scale.  The  capability  of  modern  troops 
to  endure  fatigues  and  fight  with  energy,  and  their 
moral  strength  under  privations  and  disaster  depend, 
under  modern  conditions,  on  many  other  things,  and 
differ,  therefore,  much  more  from  those  prevailing 
at  the  time  of  professional  armies,  which  contained 
in  their  ranks  many  veteran  soldiers,  who  had  faced 
death  a  hundred  times.  Less  than  formerly  must  we, 
therefore,  gauge  to-day  the  efficiency  of  an  army  by 
numbers  alone. 

The  value  of  modern  troops  rests  on  national  char- 
acter, and  on  the  system  of  service;  on  the  moral  and 
physical  soundness  of  the  men;  on  the  training  of 
man  and  horse ;  on  armament  and,  equipment ;  on  the 
obedience  to  which  the  men  have  been  educated;  on 
the  amount  of  self-reliance  and  initiative  which  is, 
nevertheless,  developed  in  them ;  in  no  small  measure, 
on  the  confidence  the  men  have  in  their  superiors ;  on 
the  esprit-de-corps  by  which  the  troops  are  animated ; 
and  lastly,  on  the  ready  zeal  and  devotion  which  the 
personality  of  the  commander  is  able  to  rouse  and  to 
preserve.  The  power  of  an  army  further  depends  on 


46          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

the  proficiency,  intelligence,  and  heroism  of  the  of- 
ficers. The  value  of  armies  will  therefore  vary  ac- 
cording to  the  general  state  of  civilization  of  the  na- 
tions, and  their  military  institutions,  and  so  long  as 
the  national  character  and  the  state  of  culture  of  the 
nations,  from  which  the  armies  spring,  differ,  as  is  still 
the  case  in  Europe,  we  do  not  go  wrong,  in  spite  of 
the  similarity  of  all  military  organization,  in  assum- 
ing that  the  various  armies  differ  very  much  in  their 
military  efficiency. 

We  have  already  pointed  out,  that  even  within  one 
and  the  same  army,  the  various  categories  of  troops 
are  of  very  different  character,  and  that  by  filling  up 
the  cadres,  existing  in  peace,  with  reserves  on  mobili- 
zation, the  value  of  a  unit  may  even  be  lowered.* 

The  strategist  in  the  armchair  does  not,  of  course, 
like  these  things,  and  it  is  at  any  rate  very  much  sim- 
pler in  all  military  plans  to  operate  with  tactical  units 
as  if  they  were  as  equal  as  the  pieces  on  the  draught- 
board, and  not  of  varying  value.  We  would,  in  that 
case,  have  a  fixed  rule  for  estimating  the  power  of 

*  An  instructive  illustration  of  this  fact  is  afforded  by  the 
Imperial  French  Army  in  1870.  Here,  the  reserves  called 
up  often  became  a  source  of  weakness,  and  brought  the 
seeds  of  disintegration  into  the  ranks  of  the  well-disciplined 
peace-formations.  The  example  of  Lapasset's  Brigade,  be- 
longing to  the  Fifth  Corps,  is  in  this  respect  especially  char- 
acteristic. This  brigade  had  joined  the  Second  Corps,  dur- 
ing the  retreat  from  the  Saar.  Arrived  in  front  of  Metz, 
the  brigade  commander  asked  to  be  allowed  to  hand  over 
his  reservists  to  the  fortress  garrison.  He  thought  he  could 
do  better  with  the  weaker  peace  establishments  alone.  His 
request  was  granted,  and  indeed  it  was  this  brigade  which 
never  budged  an  inch  of  ground,  in  spite  of  the.  most  vio- 
lent attacks  of  the  Germans,  whilst  other  French  troops  in 
less  difficult  situations  were  often  much  shaken  in  their 
morale. — Lapasset,  1817  to  1875,  "Memoires,"  1900. 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  47 

an  enemy,  and  could  not  only  employ  our  own  troops 
indiscriminately,  but  also  augment  them  at  will,  so 
long  as  we  have  trained  men,  and  money.  But  such 
a  strategic  calculation  would  hopelessly  break  down 
in  the  face  of  the  stern  realities  of  war;  and  to  meet 
these  successfully  we  must  always  reckon  with  the 
actual  values ;  not  numbers  decide,  but  force. 

The  elements,  however,  from  which  force  origi- 
nates, are  almost  all  imponderable,  and  we  can  never 
succeed  in  expressing  in  a  formula,  universally  appli- 
cable, the  ratio  that  exists  between  force  and  num- 
bers, and  in  fixing  the  limits  beyond  which  increase 
of  force  through  increase  of  numbers  will  be  neu- 
tralized by  the  elements  of  weakness  which  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  result  from  such  increase  of  num- 
bers. But  some  points  may  be  noted  which  should 
never  be  lost  sight  of. 

We  must  first  of  all  remember  that  the  tactical  in- 
crease of  force,  which  we  may  hope  to  gain  by  rein- 
forcements in  numbers,  vanishes  if  accompanied  by 
strategic  disadvantages  which  neutralize  or  even  ex- 
ceed this  tactical  increase  of  force.  We  can  certainly 
never  be  too  strong  in  battle,  yet  there  may  be  situa- 
tions where  we  must  give  up  numbers  in  return  for 
other  advantages.  This  will  be  the  case,  for  example, 
if  the  opportunity  is  favourable  for  acting  rapidly,  and 
would  be  lost,  should  we  wait  until  the  largest  numbers 
possible  are  concentrated.  The  accumulation  of  troops 
may  also  impair  their  mobility  and  deployment  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  turn  the  tactical  advantage  aimed  at 
into  a  positive  disadvantage. 

We  must,  secondly,  be  clear  on  the  point  that 
numerical  strength  is  only  effective  as  such,  if  the 
troops  employed  are  actually  fit  to  do  the  work  im- 


48          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

posed  on  them.  Nowhere  more  than  in  war  is  it  neces- 
sary to  deal  with  realities  only. 

Lastly,  we  must  never  forget  that  the  moral  and 
mental  factors  of  force  are  always  the  ruling  factors, 
and,  within  certain  limits — which  in  each  case  must 
be  very  differently  defined  according  to  special  circum- 
stances— are  more  important  than  the  numerical  fac- 
tors. This  goes  even  so  far  as  to  make  the  force  of 
psychical  impulses  sometimes  counterbalance  almost 
completely  all  other  defects,  and  the  influence  of  one 
single  great  personality  may  raise  to  a  marked  degree 
the  general  level  of  efficiency  of  whole  armies — nay, 
even  of  whole  States. 

If  the  greater  efficiency  of  troops  is  thus  a  factor 
which  to  some  extent  may  make  up  for  inferiority  in 
numbers,  and,  with  equal  numerical  strength,  repre- 
sents a  decisive  superiority,  we  should  think  that,  at 
least,  with  equally  efficient  troops  on  both  sides,  supe- 
rior numbers  under  otherwise  equal  conditions  should 
guarantee  us  victory  at  least  in  theory.  Yet  military 
history  proves  that  it  is  not  so. 

The  reason  for  this  apparent  inconsistency  is  very 
simple.  The  way  of  conducting  war  it  is  which  gives 
victory  to  the  one  or  the  other  party.  By  the  ad- 
vantages of  natural  or  artificially  prepared  ground, 
by  the  greater  advantages  he  may  derive  from  his 
armaments,  and  by  other  circumstances,  forces  accrue 
to  the  defender,  which  sometimes  suffice  to  establish 
his  superiority  over  the  enemy;  the  assailant  tries 
to  gain  superiority  by  the  advantages  inherent  in 
the  initiative  and  in  offensive  tactics.  By  this  means 
he  may  succeed  in  defeating  portions  of  the  enemy's 
forces  before  the  latter  can  concentrate  them  all 
against  him,  and  in  becoming  by  this  local  victory  the 
numerically  stronger  party.  The  superiority  which 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  49 

one  or  the  other  side  may  thus  obtain,  may  and  can  be 
even  so  pronounced  as  .to  compensate  for  the  original 
inferiority,  and  thus  procure  for  the  weaker  army, 
supposing  the  troops  to  be  equally  efficient,  the  possi- 
bility of  conquering  the  stronger  enemy.  But  for  such 
success  we  must  always  presume  superior  leadership, 
which  can  change  almost  everything  to  its  favour. 
Here  again  we  are  confronted  by  an  entirely  impon- 
derable power.  It  will  never  be  possible  to  determine 
what  the  effect  of  this  power  will  be  in  each  case.  The 
increase  of  force  produced  by  the  absolute  confidence 
of  the  troops  in  their  leaders;  the  terror  spread  by  a 
great  name;  the  elasticity  of  genius  in  the  moment  of 
danger;  and  the  importance  of  ingenious  plans  of 
operation  positively  defy  all  calculation.  But  when 
we  see  generals,  who  are  not  equal  to  their  task,  bring 
to  naught  the  best  performances  of  troops  and  the  ef- 
fect of  greatly  superior  numbers ;  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  notice  the  successes  gained  by  great  captains 
against  overwhelming  odds,  no  room  is  left  for  doubt 
that  great  generalship  is  of  decisive  importance,  and 
that  it  can  make  up  for  greatly  superior  numbers  of 
the  enemy. 

Yet  experience  and  theoretical  considerations  show 
again  that  the  most  ingenious  generalship  is  bound  to 
fail  when  opposed  to  superior  numbers  that  exceed 
a  certain  limit;  that  numbers,  when  they  can  act  as 
such  and  are  large  enough,  can  neutralize  all  mental 
and  moral  superiority;  that  an  equalization  of  num- 
bers by  genius  is,  after  all,  only  possible  within  cer- 
tain limits,  and  that  a  certain  amount  of  numerical 
superiority  is  simply  crushing,  physically. 

Two  means,  we  have  seen,  a  commander  has  to  get 
the  better  of  even  a  stronger  enemy.  He  can,  by 
making  clever  use  of  the  tactical  advantages  of  the 


50          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

defensive,  or  by  some  successful  offensive  action,  in- 
flict such  losses  on  the  enemy  as  to  neutralize  thereby 
his  superior  numbers,  or,  at  least,  their  efficient  em- 
ployment. If  we  start  from  this  fact,  we  necessarily 
arrive  at  the  following  result :  A  general  may  neutral- 
ize the  superiority  of  an  enemy,  if  the  proportionate 
numerical  strength  on  both  sides  leaves  any  chance 
at  all  of  inflicting  on  the  enemy,  one  way  or  the  other, 
losses  large  enough  to  neutralize  his  superiority.  But 
if  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  one  party  is  so 
great  as  to  preclude  the  weaker  party  from  decisively 
affecting,  even  by  possible  successes  in  the  tactical 
defensive  or  by  successful  offensive  actions,  the  total 
effect  of  the  enemy's  numbers,  then  no  generalship 
avails  to  neutralize  the  effect  of  such  superiority. 

This  is  the  most  essential  law  of  numbers. 

The  great  captain  of  the  French  Revolution  may 
be  cited  as  an  example.  Especially  in  his  first  cam- 
paigns in  1796,  the  ever-victorious  Corsican  repeatedly 
succeeded  in  overpowering,  by  local  victories,  far  su- 
perior forces  of  the  enemy  with  an  army  that  at  first 
had  been  totally  neglected.  By  seizing  his  opportunity 
when  his  enemies  were  separated,  he,  with  his  con- 
centrated forces,  first  defeated  one  group  of  the  en- 
emy, and  then  turned  round  to  defeat,  with  the  same 
force,  the  other  group.  His  enemies  never  succeeded 
in  .uniting  their  forces  against  him;  but  the  portions 
first  defeated  represented  such  a  large  fraction  of 
their  whole  available  force,  that  by  their  defeat  the 
original  superiority  was  lost. 

The  latest  wars  show  the  same  law.  The  Japanese 
were  surely  perfectly  clear  on  the  point,  when  they 
attacked  Russia  at  the  beginning  of  1904,  that  all  the 
military  forces  of  the  Tzar  were  many  times  superior 
to  their  own.  But  there  was  doubtless  the  chance  of 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  51 

conquering  those  forces  of  the  enemy  which  could  be 
employed  within  a  measurable  time,  victories  which 
were  bound  to  shake  the  whole  edifice  of  Russian 
power  to  its  foundation,  and  make  the  enemy  inclined 
to  conclude  peace.  We  know  the  events  proved  this 
reckoning  correct. 

All  the  examples  cited  clearly  show  us  the  law  of 
numbers  in  a  positive  sense.  The  numerically  weaker 
conquers  because  he  is  strong  enough  to  beat  such  a 
large  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  locally  in  attack, 
or  to  weaken  the  stronger  adversary  materially  and 
morally  in  the  defence,  to  such  an  extent  as  will  coun- 
terbalance, by  the  one  way  or  the  other,  the  original 
disparity  in  numbers. 

Military  history,  however,  shows  us  also  that  this 
law  cannot  be  infringed  without  punishment.  When 
Napoleon,  who  so  often  and  so  brilliantly  had  beaten 
superior  numbers  with  weaker  bodies,  wanted  to  en- 
force victory  with  an  army  so  much  weaker  than 
those  of  his  enemies  that  even  the  most  famous 
local  victories  could  no  longer  change  their  pro- 
portionate numbers,  he  succumbed,  and  was  bound 
to  succumb. 

We  have  convincing  proof  of  it  in  the  campaign  of 
1814.  Napoleon  turned  against  the  Silesian  army 
which  was  marching  in  separate  columns,  dealing  it 
crushing  blows  and  driving  it  back  with  heavy  losses. 
But  this  success  was  not  enough  to  restore,  even  to 
some  extent,  the  balance  of  the  total  forces;  and 
when  this  victorious  general  went  in  turn  for  the  main 
army  of  the  Allies,  he  succumbed  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy's  masses,  though  they  were  used  even  with  little 
energy. 

A  similar  thing  happened  in  the  American  War  of 


52          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Secession.  For  a  long  time  General  Lee,  the  great 
leader  of  the  Southern  army,  was  constantly  able  to 
restore  the  balance  of  force  by  local  victories,  gained 
on  the  inner  line  over  the  numerically  far  superior 
enemy,  reducing  the  latter's  superiority  over  and  over 
again.  But  his  resources  declined;  all  the  vital  com- 
munications of  the  Southern  States  were  gradually 
cut  off,  making  the  superiority  of  the  North  so  over- 
whelming that  no  local  victory  could  any  longer  reduce 
it,  and  no  local  defence  make  up  for  it.  And  thus  the 
valiant  band  of  heroes  of  the  Southern  States  was 
ultimately  obliged  to  surrender  its  arms,  which  it  had 
so  chivalrously  wielded — before  a  positively  crushing 
superiority. 

The  law  of  numbers  teaches  also  a  positive  doctrine. 
If  it  shows  us,  on  the  one  side,  the  limits  which  even 
genius  and  its  inspiring  strength  cannot  transgress  in 
this  life  without  being  wrecked;  it  shows  us,  on  the 
other,  how  much  even  a  limited  force  may  achieve. 
By  this  law  success,  at  least  within  certain  limits,  is 
no  longer  at  the  mercy  of  purely  material  forces; 
Napoleon's  dictum  proves  false — that  victory  is  on  the 
side  of  the  big  battalions;  the  mechanical  superiority 
of  numbers  does  not  reign  supreme;  genius  of  leader- 
ship, superiority  of  mental  and  moral  forces  will  come 
to  their  due  so  long  as  they  do  not  strive  after  the 
impossible;  a  bold  and  clear-sighted  policy  may  look 
forward  to  well-deserved  success. 

This  holds  good  for  our  German  Fatherland  as 
well.  If  Germany  is  involved  in  war,  she  need  not  re- 
coil before  the  numerical  superiority  of  her  enemies. 
But  so  far  as  human  nature  is  able  to  tell,  she  can 
only  rely  on  being  successful  if  she  is  resolutely  deter- 
mined to  break  the  superiority  of  her  enemies  by  a 


FORCE  AND  NUMBERS  53 

victory  over  one  or  the  other  of  them  before  their 
total  strength  can  come  into  action,  and  if  she  prepares 
for  war  to  that  effect,  and  acts  at  the  decisive  moment 
in  that  spirit  which  made  Frederic  the  Great  seize  the 
sword  against  a  world  in  arms. 


CHAPTER  IV 
MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES 


CHAPTER   IV 

MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES 

AFTER  having  attempted  to  reduce  the  importance  of 
numbers  to  its  true  value,  and  give  force  its  due  with 
regard  to  numbers,  we  must  now  cast  a  glance  at 
the  military  appliances  by  which  the  human  mind  has 
been  unceasingly  endeavouring  to  enhance  force  by 
pressing  into  its  service  the  powers  of  Nature. 

Among  the  mechanical  achievements  of  our  age, 
modern  arms  rank  first,  because  they  directly  affect 
fighting.  They  must  be  considered  first.  But  it  would 
not  answer  my  purpose  if  I  gave  a  complete  survey 
of  the  present  state  of  armaments  in  the  different 
armies.  I  must  leave  that  to  expert  knowledge  in  each 
particular  branch.  For  me,  it  is  a  question  of  tracing 
the  influence  of  arms  on  the  conduct  of  war.  I  there- 
fore need  allude  to  technics  only  in  so  far  as  it  is 
necessary  to  understand  tactics. 

The  infantry  being  always  the  decisive  arm,  its 
armament  is,  above  all,  of  the  greatest  importance. 
This  is  shown  in  all  wars  by  the  fact  that  the  losses 
caused  by  infantry  fire  are  always  considerably  higher 
than  those  through  other  arms. 

The  efficiency  of  infantry  arms  in  the  different 
armies  is  approximately  the  same  since  the  small  cal- 
ibre has  been  adopted  everywhere.  Their  rapidity  of 
fire  is  great.  About  twenty  rounds  can  be  fired  per 

57 


58         HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

minute.  In  compliance  with  its  range,  the  sights  of 
almost  every  new  weapon  are  provided  with  a  scale  of 
2,000  metres.*  Most  armies  use  the  modern  pointed 
bullet.  Differences  in  armaments  which  might  affect 
tactics  do  not  exist  anywhere.  The  German  rifle,  in 
particular,  may  be  said  to  be  a  good  one  in  every  re- 
spect. It  quite  comes  up  to  modern  requirements.  Its 
efficiency,  rapidity,  and  accuracy  of  fire  are  good.  Its 
construction  is  simple  and  serviceable.  Somewhat  be- 
hind time  is,  perhaps,  the  French  Lebel  rifle,  which, 
in  addition  to  other  defects,  has  still  its  magazine 
along  and  underneath  the  barrel,  whilst  all  other 
armies  have  introduced  centre-magazines.  Conse- 
quently, they  are  in  France  seriously  engaged  with  the 
question  of  re-arming  their  infantry,  hoping  to  gain 
thereby  a  start,  especially  over  Germany. 

For  all  that,  with  the  adoption  of  small  calibre 
and  clip-magazine,  as  well  as  with  the  introduction 
of  smokeless  powder,  and  of  pointed  projectiles, 
the  development  seems  to  have  reached  a  certain 
climax,  and  to  have  come  to  a  finish  for  the  time 
being. 

Some  States,  it  is  true,  are  considering  whether  the 
time  has  not  come  for  adopting  an  automatic  rifle, 
which  would  allow  of  a  very  much  greater  rapidity  of 
fire.  Trials  have  shown  that  up  to  100  rounds  per 
minute  can  be  fired  with  such  a  rifle,  which  at  the 
present  moment  is  actually  being  introduced  in  Mex- 
ico. France  and  England  are  hard  at  work  construct- 
ing a  similar  weapon.  In  both  these  States  the  re- 
quirements to  be  fulfilled  by  this  kind  of  arm  have  been 
made  known  officially,  proclaiming  thus  a  public  com- 
petition, as  it  were.  France  seems  to  be  nearer  the 
solution  of  this  problem  than  England.  Commandant 
*  About  2,200  yards,  or  i}4  miles. 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     59 

Chauchat  has  invented  a  machine-rifle  ("fusil  mitrail- 
leuse") weighing  but  16  pounds,  and  enabling  one 
man  to  fire  200  to  300  rounds  per  minute.  Efforts  are 
being  made  to  construct  from  this  model  an  infantry 
rifle  not  exceeding  8  pounds  in  weight.  An  armourer 
of  the  small  arms  factory  at  St.  Etienne  is  said  to 
have  already  produced  such  a  weapon  which,  with  a 
calibre  of  6.5  mm.,  comes  up  to  all  requirements.  It 
is  not  known  whether  it  has  a  chance  of  being  adopted. 
Trials  are,  at  any  rate,  pushed  forward  vigorously, 
and  we  may  be  sure  of  France  introducing  a  new  rifle 
at  no  distant  date,  an  automatic  rifle,  or  one  with 
magazine  case.* 

The  most  material  influence  exercised  by  the  im- 
provement of  infantry  rifles  is  the  dissolving  effect 
produced  on  infantry  formations  in  action. 

Under  modern  conditions,  closed  bodies  of  infantry 
cannot  expose  themselves  to  rifle  fire  even  at  distant 
ranges,  say  2,000  yards,  without  suffering  most  serious 
losses.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  there  is  a  chance  of 
coming  under  fire,  the  infantry  must  deploy  for  ac- 
tion, so  as  to  pass  quickly  into  extended  order  the 
moment  the  enemy's  fire  begins  to  tell.  All  further 
manoeuvring  is  then  out  of  the  question ;  forwards  or 
backwards  is  here  the  only  thing  permissible  and  pos- 
sible. The  troops  can  only  fight  in  single  rank  in  loose 
skirmishing  lines.  Circumstances,  ground,  the  en- 
emy's fire,  and  our  own  intentions  determine  the  in- 
tervals between  the  skirmishers.  Within  effective 
range,  infantry  can  only  advance  by  rushes  or  crawl- 
ing, making  at  the  same  time  the  best  possible  use  of 
the  ground.  Efforts  will  be  made  in  most  cases  to 
decide  the  fire  action  at  the  medium  ranges  of  1,000 
or  800  yards.  It  is  not  likely  that  on  open  ground  we 

*"La  France  Militaire,"  No.  7,851,  January  25,   1910. 


60          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

can  approach  the  enemy's  position  closer  than  this  be- 
fore his  fire  has  been  at  least  partly  fought  down  or 
subdued. 

The  character  of  fighting  has  altogether  changed 
through  all  this.  While  it  was  formerly  a  question  of 
leading  the  men  forward  in  more  or  less  closed  bodies, 
under  the  direct  control  of  their  officers,  with  a  por- 
tion only  of  the  men  extended  in  skirmishing  lines  or 
swarms,  all  the  fighting  troops  now  move  in  extended 
order,  where  each  man  fights  and  acts  individually. 
Officers  can  no  longer  assert  a  direct  influence,  as 
formerly;  the  greater  noise  during  an  action  renders 
it  more  difficult  for  orders  to  be  heard.  Often  the 
few  officers  left  can  only  act  by  their  example  during 
the  action  itself.  The  supports  as  well  are  obliged 
to  advance  over  open  ground  in  extended  order,  and 
can  no  longer  follow  the  firing  line  so  closely  as  for- 
merly, because  the  dangerous  zones  behind  that  line 
have  been  very  much  increased,  owing  to  the  flatness 
of  trajectories,  and  because  the  shrapnel  fire  directed 
against  the  foremost  fighting  lines  forces  the  supports 
to  keep  at  a  proper  distance,  if  they  do  not  wish  to 
suffer  unduly  without  being  able  to  inflict  any  damage 
themselves.  On  that  account  all  distances  in  action 
have  increased. 

Through  the  introduction  of  an  automatic  rifle, 
effect  of  fire,  it  is  true,  would  probably  be  increased; 
but  many  disadvantages  would  result  therefrom.  The 
new  weapon  would  allow  an  overwhelming  mass  of 
projectiles  to  be  hurled  upon  the  enemy  in  the  short- 
est possible  time  at  a  given  moment  in  action;  the 
physical  labour  of  the  men  when  firing  would  be  re- 
duced. On  the  other  hand,  a  great  deal  more  ammu- 
nition would  be  spent,  of  course,  and  there  would  be 
greater  danger  of  wasting  ammunition  than  there  is 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     61 

now.  The  question  further  arises  whether  it  will  be 
possible  for  the  men  to  carry  sufficient  ammunition 
in  attack  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  rifle.  Should 
these  rifles  carry  still  farther  than  the  best  of  our  pres- 
ent rifles,  the  troops  will  probably  have  to  deploy  for 
action  earlier.  But  it  is  scarcely  likely  that  the  fore- 
most fighting  line  will  have  to  extend  in  yet  looser 
formation.  The  limits  at  all  compatible  with  an  or- 
derly conduct  of  the  fight  have  been  reached  as  regards 
that  point.  I  do  not  believe,  on  the  whole,  that  the 
introduction  of  automatic  rifles  would  cause  tactics  to 
change  appreciably.  Without  doubt,  it  would  benefit 
the  defence  in  the  first  instance. 

Nor  is  another  new  invention  likely  to  affect  tactics. 
It  is  the  so-called  "flame-killer,"  a  material  manufac- 
tured in  the  form  of  powder,  which,  added  to  the 
charge,  does  away  with  the  flash  at  the  muzzle  without 
impairing  accuracy  of  fire. 

Infantry  fire  is  very  much  enhanced  by  machine 
guns  which,  with  ballistic  properties  equal  to  those  of 
the  modern  infantry  rifle,  can  deliver  600  rounds  per 
minute,  the  gun  being  at  the  same  time  designed  to 
sweep  with  its  fire  a  certain  frontage  of  the  target  by 
means  of  a  slowly  acting  traversing  arrangement  for 
the  barrel. 

The  effect  of  these  guns  at  known  ranges  against 
low  targets  is  very  destructive  when  the  gun  is  care- 
fully served.  But  when  the  range  is  wrongly  esti- 
mated, or  the  gun  is  improperly  served,  fire  effect  is 
very  much  impaired,  the  cone  of  dispersion  being 
much  shallower  than  that  of  infantry  fire,  where  the 
individual  marksmen  commit  manifold  errors  in  aim- 
ing and  firing,  and  thus  cause  a  greater  depth  of  the 
cone  even  when  the  range  is  known.  But  with  ma- 
chine-gun fire  the  error  committed  by  the  gun  is  al- 


62          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

ways  the  same  for  each  projectile,  and  the  cone  is 
therefore  very  shallow.  Chance  hits,  as  with  infantry 
fire,  are  nearly  impossible.  By  providing  machine- 
guns  with  telescope  sights  it  was  thought  better  aim- 
ing could  be  insured;  but  the  vibration  of  the  gun 
when  fired  renders  the  use  of  that  appliance  difficult. 
Hoses  have  been  introduced  to  carry  on  the  steam 
generated  by  the  water  in  the  cooling  apparatus  when 
the  gun  is  fired  rapidly,  so  as  to  prevent  the  steam 
from  being  seen,  making  it  thus  more  difficult  for  the 
enemy  to  range  on  the  guns  in  action. 

The  efficiency  of  the  machine  guns  in  use  to-day 
and  adopted  by  the  different  armies  is  approximately 
everywhere  the  same.  Germany  has  adopted  Maxim's 
system  with  hoses  for  steam  exhaust,  like  most  of  the 
other  great  armies.  Telescope  sights  are  not  used. 
France  attaches  great  value  to  equipping  the  army 
with  machine-guns.  She  has  procured  large  numbers 
of  them,  and  apparently  tries  by  these  means  to  make 
up  for  her  shortness  in  infantry,  which  she  can  no 
longer  increase  owing  to  the  numbers  of  her  popula- 
tion. She  has  adopted  Hotchkiss's  and  Puteaux's  sys- 
tems. The  latter  system  is  said  to  be  undergoing  im- 
provements which  raise  the  rapidity  of  fire  from  600 
to  800  rounds  per  minute.  France  takes  also  an  inter- 
est in  the  construction  of  light  machine-guns  in  the 
form  of  a  rifle  like  that  of  Chauchat,  which  I  have 
mentioned.  England,  it  is  said,  has  resolved  upon  the 
introduction  of  a  similar  rifle  as  well.  For  the  mo- 
ment the  British  Army  is  equipped  with  Maxim  and 
Colt  machine-guns.  Two  guns  are  attached  to  each 
battalion,  and  six  to  a  cavalry  brigade.  Austria  has 
adopted  for  the  field  army  Schwarzlose's,  and  for  for- 
tress warfare  Skoda's  machine-guns.  The  other  great 
military  powers  are  equipped  with  Maxim  guns,  partly 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     63 

apportioned  to  infantry  and  partly  to  cavalry,  to  raise 
their  fire  force.  The  mode  of  transporting  the  guns 
depends  on  the  method  in  which  they  are  intended  to 
be  used,  and  varies  in  the  different  armies.  The  guns 
are  partly  carried  on  pack  animals  and  partly  on 
wagons,  whence  they  are  placed  for  firing  on  a  sledge 
or  gun-carriage.  If  need  be,  they  can  be  fired  straight 
from  the  transport  wagon,  or  the  gun-carriage  is  at 
the  same  time  used  as  the  means  of  transport.  Expe- 
rience alone  can  tell  which  of  the  patterns  are  the  most 
useful. 

It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  the  machine-guns, 
especially  when  used  in  numbers,  will  exercise  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  influence  on  tactics.  If  these  guns  are 
to  co-operate  with  infantry  in  action,  the  latter  will 
somewhat  have  to  look  after  that  auxiliary  arm,  the 
employment  of  which  depends  so  much  on  special  cir- 
cumstances. There  is  a  risk,  then,  especially  in  the 
attack,  of  infantry  regulating  its  advance  too  much 
by  the  machine-guns,  and  losing  thereby  its  freedom 
of  action. 

The  weapons  of  field  artillery  have  developed  as 
rapidly  as  those  of  infantry.  The  effect  of  this  arm 
has  enormously  increased  since  our  last  wars.  The 
ballistic  properties  have  been  considerably  improved 
since  1870-71,  and  the  ranges  have  materially 
lengthened.  Through  the  use  of  smokeless  powder  the 
possibilities  of  the  effect  of  artillery,  and  through  the 
adoption  of  new  guns  and  projectiles,  the  nature  of 
this  effect,  have  been  greatly  enhanced.  Shrapnel  shell 
is  used  in  addition  to  common  shell.  The  effect  of 
both  kinds  of  these  projectiles  has  greatly  increased. 
In  addition,  combined  projectiles  are  lately  being  in- 
troduced, which  can  act  as  common  shell  or  as  shrap- 
nel shell.  It  is  anticipated  that  this  kind  of  universal 


64         HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

shell,  or  composite  projectile,  will  be  adopted  by  all 
armies  within  measurable  time.  By  the  fuse-setting 
apparatus  the  setting  of  fuses  for  the  different  ranges 
is  rendered  easier  and  more  rapid ;  it  does  away,  at  the 
same  time,  with  a  source  of  inaccuracy  due  to  setting 
the  fuse  by  hand.  A  mechanical  time  fuse,  with  clock- 
work that  starts  on  a  round  being  fired,  is  designed  to 
diminish  the  irregularities  in  the  acting  of  the  time 
fuse,  and  to  lengthen  the  shrapnel  range.  But  this  in- 
vention has  so  far  not  been  adopted  anywhere. 
Through  the  introduction  of  guns  with  their  barrels 
recoiling,  rapidity  of  fire  is,  however,  very  materially 
increased,  because  the  rough  corrections,  at  least,  for 
relaying  the  gun  approximately  after  each  round,  are 
done  away  with.  By  the  use  of  shields  the  gunners 
are  pretty  fairly,  though  not  perfectly,  protected 
against  fire  from  shrapnel  and  infantry.  The  rapidity 
and  accuracy  of  fire  is  further  affected  very  advan- 
tageously by  the  improvements  in  the  apparatus  for 
laying  the  guns.  The  independent  line  of  sight  allows 
a  division  of  labour  between  two  gunners,  thus  facili- 
tating and  accelerating  laying,  especially  for  searching 
fire.  The  telescope  sight  makes  it  easier  for  the  layer 
to  see  clearly  and  aim  accurately  at  the  target,  in  spite 
of  the  long  ranges  at  which  artillery  is  firing  to-day; 
this,  again,  reacts  favourably  on  the  accuracy  of  fire. 
The  hinged  stereo-telescope,  owing  to  its  optical  prop- 
erties and  its  fixed  stand,  makes  it  possible  to  find  out 
and  clearly  trace  in  detail  even  targets  otherwise  diffi- 
cult to  see  on  the  ground;  it  allows,  moreover,  the 
effect  of  fire  to  be  well  observed  by  those  who  fire. 

In  addition  to  guns,  which  held  the  field  alone  for 
some  time,  howitzers  have  recently  been  introduced 
again.  The  necessity  of  destroying  the  enemy's  field 
entrenchments  and  hitting  targets  behind  cover  has 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     65 

brought  this  about.  These  guns  are  apportioned  to 
the  field  troops  as  light  and  heavy  field  howitzers.  The 
former  have  calibres  of  9.5  to  10.5  centimetres,  and 
the  latter  of  12  to  15.5  centimetres.  Both  have  auto- 
matic recoil  and  protective  shields,  and  can  be  used  for 
direct  as  well  as  for  high-angle  fire. 

The  heavy  howitzers,  to  which  everybody  attaches 
great  importance,  use  direct  fire  against  solid  upright 
targets  like  walls,  buildings,  entanglements,  etc.,  with 
ordinary  common  or  high-explosive  shells,  and  against 
shield  batteries  and  living  targets  with  common  shell 
or  shrapnel.  Opinions  differ  on  the  use  of  the  latter. 
We  have  not  introduced  them  in  Germany. 

Of  decisive  importance  for  the  tactical  employment 
of  artillery  is,  lastly,  the  development  of  indirect  fire, 
which,  owing  to  the  modern  means  of  laying  guns,  can 
be  manipulated  with  great  certainty,  so  long  as  the 
commander  is  able  to  watch  the  target.  The  artillery 
can  thus  be  effective  without  laying  itself  open  to  fire 
that  can  be  observed.  The  gun  is  laid  with  the  help  of 
auxiliary  aiming  points.  So  much  importance  was 
attached  in  France  to  this  kind  of  fire  that  the  guns 
always  fired  indirectly,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  using 
auxiliary  aiming  points  (point  de  reperage}.  But  the 
new  Artillery  Regulations  of  autumn,  1910,  have 
abandoned  this  extreme  view. 

When  firing  from  covered  positions,  the  fire  is 
watched  from  observation  ladders,  carried  as  a  rule  on 
observation  wagons,  and  provided,  if  need  be,  with 
protective  shields,  or  it  is  watched  from  points  in  the 
country,  from  which  the  targets  can  be  seen,  and  which 
can  be  connected  with  the  firing  battery,  if  necessary, 
by  telephone,  for  the  transmission  of  the  commander's 
orders.  Laying  for  indirect  fire  is  facilitated  by  the 


66          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

panorama  telescope,  which  allows  an  unlimited  and 
direct  use  of  auxiliary  aiming  points. 

Lastly,  we  must  mention  the  quick-firing  guns  of 
small  calibre,  which,  with  a  bore  of  3.7  centimetres 
and  similar  diameters,  can  fire  about  300  rounds  per 
minute,  and  are  effective  even  up  to  5,000  metres.  In 
the  South  African  war,  these  so-called  pom-poms 
proved  of  great  service,  so  much  so  that  the  English 
cavalry  was  supplied  with  them  after  peace  was  con- 
cluded.* The  great  mobility  of  these  guns,  the  ease 
with  which  their  fire  can  be  observed,  and  the  rapidity 
with  which  a  certain  amount  of  effect  can  be  obtained, 
make  them  seem  an  arm  especially  useful  for  cavalry. 
But,  for  all  that,  they  did  not  find  favour  with  the 
German  army. 

The  field  army  of  the  German  Empire  is  equipped 
with  a  7.7  centimetre  quick-firing  gun.  It  is  sur- 
passed in  many  ways  by  more  recent  patterns,  yet  it 
comes  up  to  the  tactical  requirements.  Its  mobility, 
at  any  rate,  is  excellent.  It  is  equipped  with  time- 
shrapnel  for  5,000  metres  range,  giving  a  forward  ef- 
fect of  300  metres  for  the  cone  of  fire  at  the  most 
favourable  ranges ;  and  with  common  shell  that  can  be 
used  also  with  time  fuse ;  but  the  use  of  common  shell 
with  time  fuse  is  effective  only  when  the  bursting  point 
is  in  a  distinct  position  with  regard  to  the  target ;  the 
common  shell  with  time  fuse  is  therefore  not  a  partic- 
ularly serviceable  projectile.  No  other  State,  for  that 
reason,  uses  common  shell  with  time  fuse.  But  the 
range  of  shrapnel  has  been  increased  to  6,000  metres 
and  more  by  almost  all  other  nations.  The  Japanese 
are  even  said  to  have  attained  a  range  of  7,500  metres 
for  time-shrapnel.  The  independent  line  of  sight, 
which  Germany  has  not  yet  adopted,  is  being  used  al- 
*  Have  been  withdrawn  since. — Translator. 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     67 

ready  in  various  other  armies  (France,  England,  Tur- 
key, Italy,  partly  in  Russia,  Belgium,  and  others). 

Besides  guns,  the  German  artillery  is  equipped  with 
light  quick-firing  field  howitzers,  to  be  used  for  direct 
as  well  as  for  high-angle  fire,  and  thus  able  to  cut 
through  strong  overhead  cover  of  field  entrenchments. 
Its  shrapnel  has  the  same  range  as  that  of  the  guns, 
with  slighter  effect  in  depth.  This  howitzer  fires  a 
newly-constructed  composite  projectile  (05),  which 
can  be  either  used  as  common  shell  or  as  shrapnel  shell. 
As  common  shell  with  time  fuse,  it  is  more  effective 
against  targets  behind  cover  when  the  bursting  point 
is  correctly  situated,  than  the  common  shell  of  guns; 
and  for  percussion  shell  it  contains  a  contrivance  for 
setting  the  percussion  fuse  "with  delay." 

Owing  to  the  large  calibre  (10.5  centimetres),  each 
round  of  a  howitzer  is  more  effective  than  one  from  a 
gun.  But  this  difference  is  counterbalanced  by  the 
greater  rapidity  of  fire  from  guns,  and  by  the  fact 
that  the  howitzer  batteries  carry  less  ammunition  than 
the  gun  batteries.  The  greater  number  of  light  pro- 
jectiles gives  more  chances  of  hitting  when  sweeping 
and  searching  than  the  smaller  number  of  heavy  pro- 
jectiles. The  replenishing  and  supply  of  ammunition 
is  also  affected  by  the  difference  in  calibre;  on  the 
other  hand,  owing  to  the  adoption  of  a  universal  pro- 
jectile, the  preparedness  of  howitzer  batteries  for  any 
kind  of  fire  is  materially  increased. 

The  German  heavy  1 5-centimetre  quick-firing  field 
howitzer  can  cut  through  the  strongest  overhead  cover 
of  field  entrenchments,  and  fight  down  in  a  very  short 
time  field  artillery  recognized  as  such,  and  under  ob- 
servation. It  uses  only  common  shell  with  percussion 
fuse,  with  or  without  retardation  for  high-angle  fire. 
Its  explosive  and  detonating  force  is  very  great,  and 


68          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

therefore  likely  to  shake  the  morale  of  troops,  even  if 
there  is  not  much  actual  damage  done  to  materiel  or 
personnel.  But  the  heavy  field  howitzers  are  no  good 
against  permanent  or  provisional  works.  If  the  field 
army  is  to  deal  with  them,  heavier  guns  must  be  ap- 
portioned to  it.  Even  the  21 -centimetre  mortar,  with 
which  the  German  heavy  artillery  is  equipped  for  that 
purpose,  and  which  is  going  to  be  replaced  by  an  im- 
proved type  of  the  same  calibre,  may  sometimes  prove 
insufficient.  So  it  will  be  necessary  to  introduce  still 
larger  calibres.  Such  a  gun,  a  25-centimetre  howitzer 
on  gun-carriage,  has  already  been  constructed  by 
Krupp,  as  we  see  from  "Loebell's  Annual"  of  1910. 

Long  guns  of  large  calibre,  designed  more  for  for- 
tress and  siege  warfare,  can  also  be  attached  to  the 
heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army  for  special  purposes. 
They  are  the  10  and  13  centimetre  guns  of  latest  de- 
sign. The  latter  ranges  up  to  2,000  metres  and  more, 
and  by  its  far-reaching  and  effective  shrapnel  fire  may 
sometimes  be  of  great  use  for  enfilading  the  enemy's 
approaches,  searching  the  ground  in  rear,  and  similar 
objects. 

To  be  complete,  I  may  yet  mention  that  the  13- 
centimetre  gun  and  the  21 -centimetre  mortar  of  recent 
construction  are  provided  with  a  contrivance  by  which 
means  the  guns  need  not  be  fired  from  platforms,  and 
can  traverse  unfavourable  ground,  such  as  soft  ground 
and  marshy  meadows,  and  use  country  roads. 

Closed  bodies  of  troops  can  no  longer  move  to-day 
within  the  zones  of  effective  artillery  fire.  When 
coming  within  its  range,  we  are  obliged  to  unfold  the 
masses  coming  up  by  the  roads  and  to  split  them  up 
into  fractions,  so  that  these  may  find  some  cover  on 
the  ground,  at  least  from  sight.  This  is  all  the  more 
necessary  because  the  roads  can  be  enfiladed  by  indi- 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     69 

rect  artillery  fire  with  the  aid  of  maps.  The  forma- 
tions when  moving  must  also  be  chosen  so  as  to  offer 
as  small  a  target  as  possible  to  the  cone  of  dispersion 
of  shrapnel  fire.  We  will  be  often  forced  to  cross  dan- 
gerous stretches  of  ground  by  night  and  approach  the 
enemy's  position  under  cover  of  darkness.  As  a  re- 
sult of  this  increased  effect  of  artillery,  it  becomes  nec- 
essary to  begin  the  attack  formation,  where  it  is  not 
covered  by  ground,  much  sooner  than  hitherto ;  indeed, 
at  distances,  generally,  preventing  personal  reconnais- 
sance of  the  ground  and  of  the  enemy's  measures  by 
the  leader,  thus  obliging  him  to  make  his  decisions  on 
what  information  he  receives  from  his  reconnoitring. 
It  is  obvious  that  this  distant  artillery  fire  must  affect 
strategy  and  tactics  widely  as  regards  time  and  space. 
All  preparatory  movements  of  troops  on  the  battle- 
field itself  must  be  made  beyond  the  zone  of  artillery 
fire,  and  thus  begin  a  long  way  off.  If  hostile  aviators 
can  see  these  movements,  they  must  be  made  if  possible 
so  as  to  avoid  the  zone  of  indirect  artillery  fire  as  well. 
All  enveloping  movements  must  therefore  begin  at 
some  distance  from  the  battlefield.  They  must  be 
carefully  veiled  or  initiated  by  night  marches,  if  they 
are  to  be  a  surprise.  Greater  distances  must  be  kept 
between  the  lines  of  infantry  following  behind  each 
other,  owing  to  the  great  depth  of  shrapnel  fire;  the 
intensity  of  fire  has  contributed  to  loosen  the  fighting 
formations  of  infantry,  which  in  turn  causes  the  bat- 
tlefields to  increase  in  extent  out  of  proportion  with 
the  number  of  troops  engaged.  All  this  taken  together 
requires  reconnoitring  to  be  done  more  rapidly,  so  as 
to  group  the  forces  early,  not  only  according  to  the 
wants  of  strategy,  but  of  tactics  and  the  future  con- 
duct of  the  action  itself  as  well.  Modern  fire  affects, 
of  course,  the  tactical  employment  of  cavalry  too. 


70          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

The  infantry  being  obliged  to  deploy  for  action 
early,  still  more  so  is  this  necessary  for  cavalry,  which 
presents  a  more  favourable  target  than  its  sister  arm. 
Nor  can  it  hope  to  escape  the  effects  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  by  the  rapidity  of  its  movement  when  the 
guns  are  properly  served ;  it  will  suffer  grievous  losses 
if  it  comes  under  effective  shrapnel  fire  when  in  dense 
formations.  Cavalry  must,  therefore,  adopt  loose  for- 
mations early  in  action  so  as  not  to  afford  the  enemy's 
artillery  a  good  target.  The  occasion  for  cavalry  to 
charge  infantry  under  specially  favourable  circum- 
stances will  also  be  rare,  considering  the  formations 
in  which  infantry  fights  and  the  effect  of  modern  fire- 
arms as  described  already  in  another  chapter.*  But 
when  cavalry  is  obliged  by  circumstances  to  charge  the 
front  of  troops  steadily  firing,  the  form  of  charge  must 
be  altogether  different  from  what  it  was  before.  It 
can  no  longer  use  the  line  in  two  ranks  when  charging 
infantry  in  action,  as  that  would  be  simply  self-de- 
struction. The  cavalry  will  try  to  cross  the  dangerous 
zone  at  its  greatest  speed,  several  lines  deep  in  single 
rank,  with  intervals  between  the  troops,  and  with 
closed  bodies  in  small  columns  in  the  rearmost  line. 
It  will,  if  possible,  advance  on  the  broadest  front  per- 
missible, and  from  different  directions,  so  as  to  dis- 
tract the  hostile  fire.  Frontal  charges  made  on  artil- 
lery lines  have  more  chances  to  succeed  than  on  in- 
fantry firing,  if  the  charge  is  delivered  in  suitable  for- 
mation. But  it  is  hardly  ever  likely  that  on  the  battle- 
fields of  to-day  artillery  can  be  charged  in  front  with- 
out the  necessity  of  charging  infantry  at  the  same  time. 
Charges  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  artillery,  however, 
have  great  chances  of  succeeding  now  as  before.  But 
these  will  be  of  very  rare  occurrence  in  direct  co- 
*Vol.  i.,  book  i.,  chap,  ii.,  p.  39. 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     71 

operation  with  infantry,  and  then  only  on  a  small  scale. 
The  cavalry  is  thus  almost  completely  driven  away 
from  the  common  battlefield  of  the  other  arms  by  the 
modern  weapons,  and  mainly  restricted  to  acting  on 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  hostile  army.  On  the  other 
hand,  cavalry  is  now  itself  equipped  with  firearms,  and 
can  use  them  when  charging  is  impossible.  This  opens 
to  cavalry  new  spheres  of  activity,  which  promise 
great  and  important  results  if  it  understands  how  to 
make  full  use  of  its  mobility,  by  being  mounted,  for 
acting  in  decisive  directions  with  its  firearms. 

Firearms  absolutely  rule  tactics  to-day,  and  dictate 
to  tactics  their  laws.  They  have  altogether  changed 
the  conditions  under  which  cavalry  can  act,  conditions 
which  the  cavalry  cannot  disregard  without  losing  its 
place  in  modern  war.  The  way  in  which  it  must  act  in 
future  will  be  described  in  another  chapter. 

The  need  for  greater  fire  effect  that  asserts  itself  in 
all  branches  of  warfare  has  even  led  to  our  falling 
back  on  methods  which  seem  to  be  altogether  anti- 
quated. For  close  combat,  especially  for  the  posses- 
sion of  entrenched  positions  and  permanent  works,  it 
has  become  necessary  to  look  for  some  means  of  com- 
pensating for  the  artillery  fire  which  cannot  accom- 
pany the  attack  up  to  the  last  stages,  nor  support  the 
defence  to  the  very  last.  So  we  have  fallen  back  on 
hand  grenades,  which,  at  close  ranges,  are  hurled  into 
the  enemy's  works,  where  they  explode.  Such  projec- 
tiles may  also  be  thrown  from  small  mortars.  The 
development  of  these  missiles  is  not  yet  in  its  final 
stage ;  more  may  be  expected  of  them  in  the  future. 

Krupp  has  lately  constructed  a  contrivance  for 
throwing  bombs  that  will  probably  be  of  much  serv- 
ice.* A  bomb  filled  with  high  explosives,  and  fixed  to 
*  "Kriegstechnische  Zeitschrift,"  vol.  v.,  1910. 


72          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

a  guiding  rod,  is  inserted  into  the  loaded  cannon  at  the 
muzzle,  with  the  guiding  rod  first,  and  in  such  a  way 
as  to  bring  the  bomb  to  sit  on  the  muzzle,  whence,  on 
discharge,  it  is  thrown  forward  with  sufficient  ac- 
curacy at  a  high  angle  of  elevation.  The  projectile, 
weighing  over  80  kilograms,  attains  a  maximum  range 
of  300  metres,  and  owing  to  its  very  steep  trajectory 
can  be  thrown  behind  any  cover.  The  cannon  rests 
on  a  gun-carriage  that  can  be  put  on  wheels,  and  is 
narrow  enough  to  be  moved  about  in  the  trenches. 
Its  effect  is  solely  due  to  the  fire,  smoke,  and  air-pres- 
sure produced  by  the  enormous  explosive  charge. 
Nothing  can  keep  alive  in  its  proximity.  The  suffo- 
cating smoke  and  the  poisonous  gases  will  make  it 
probably  impossible  for  any  one  to  occupy  the  parapet 
behind  which  some  of  these  bombs  have  exploded. 
Perhaps  obstacles  can  also  be  destroyed  by  these  pro- 
jectiles, and  men  be  rendered  unconscious  in  the  de- 
fences of  the  ditch.  The  importance  of  this  new  arm 
can  only  be  established  by  experiments. 

The  efforts  also  for  fighting  balloons  with  artillery 
have  already  produced  some  fair  results.  Captive 
balloons  can  be  brought  down  easily  by  any  field  ar- 
tillery with  shrapnel  fire,  and  against  non-captive  bal- 
loons and  other  air-craft  good  results  have  already 
been  obtained  with  guns  designed  especially  for  that 
purpose. 

The  perfection  of  firearms  having  thus  plainly  af- 
fected the  tactical  employment  of  all  arms  and  their 
formations  when  in  motion  or  in  action,  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  cause  protection  to  be  sought,  against  undue 
losses  as  well  as  against  view,  by  an  increased  use  of 
natural  cover,  by  looser  fighting  formations,  and  by 
movements  at  night,  has  led,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
greater  value  being  attached  to  artificial  cover. 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     73 

The  infantry,  which  is  the  most  exposed,  made  the 
first  efforts  to  guard  against  the  effects  of  the  enemy's 
fire.  Trials  were  made  to  protect  the  skirmishers  by 
bullet-proof  equipments  (Dove's  cuirass)  ;  recently  the 
knapsacks  were  armoured,  so  that  the  infantry  men 
should  find  some  cover  when  lying  down  behind  them. 
But  all  these  devices  are  of  no  practical  value  so  far. 
Extensive  use,  however,  has  been  made  in  the  last 
wars  of  earth  cover,  constructed  before  and  during  an 
action;  and  we  may  be  sure  of  similar  efforts  being 
made  in  future. 

Shallow  trenches  for  skirmishers  lying  down  chiefly 
protect  against  frontal  fire  of  infantry;  deep,  narrow 
trenches  for  firing  standing,  which  are  sometimes  pro- 
vided with  splinter-proof  overhead  cover,  give  protec- 
tion from  shrapnel  fire  as  well.  Strong  overhead  cover 
provides  protection  against  high-angle  fire  for  sup- 
ports held  in  readiness  close  in  rear  of  the  foremost 
line;  covered  approaches  allow  reserves  to  be  led  for- 
ward into  the  firing  line  unseen  and  without  loss.  If 
time  and  material  are  available,  closed  earthworks  can 
be  built  to  form  specially  strong  pivots  of  a  defensive 
position. 

Artillery,  too,  feels  the  need  of  cover.  This  is  clear- 
ly seen  by  their  efforts  to  take  up  covered  positions  and 
fire  indirectly.  It  has  also  led,  as  we  have  seen  al- 
ready, to  the  introduction  of  protective  shields,  which 
give  fair  cover  from  frontal  shrapnel  and  infantry 
fire.  Batteries  facing  each  other  frontally  cannot 
therefore  hurt  each  other  much  by  shrapnel  fire.  We 
must  try  to  cause  damage  by  full  hits  of  common 
shell.  The  composite  projectile  of  the  German  field 
howitzers  will,  without  doubt,  prove  particularly  ef- 
fective for  that  purpose.  We  can  also  endeavour  to 
obtain  hits  behind  the  shields  by  oblique  fire.  To  meet 


74          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

such  fire  it  has  been  often  proposed  to  use  broader  and 
curved  shields.  But  these  could  not  procure  complete 
cover  either.  At  any  rate,  a  frontal  duel  between  ar- 
tilleries of  equal  efficiency  can  only  be  decisive  to-day 
if  a  large  amount  of  time  and  ammunition  is  spent; 
artillery  can,  therefore,  hold  out  for  some  time  under 
the  fire  of  hostile  artillery  without  even  sufficiently 
replying  to  it.  Both  these  points  are  important  for 
the  tactical  conduct  of  an  action. 

Cavalry,  when  it  decides  to  use  the  carbine,  will  feel 
the  want  of  entrenchments  as  well.  The  Boers  in 
Africa,  who  were  really  fighting  as  mounted  troops 
only,  have,  as  we  saw,  made  continual  use  of  entrench- 
ments. But  the  experiences  gained  there  scarcely 
apply  to  European  conditions.  The  African  horse- 
men seem  to  have  carried  their  entrenching  tools  in 
their  oxen  wagons,  and  it  is  only  due  to  the  incredible 
slowness  of  African  warfare  that  the  tools  were  al- 
ways in  time  for  use.  This  would  be  impossible  dur- 
ing active  operations  in  Europe.  Here,  the  experiences 
of  the  American  War  of  Secession  may  rather  apply. 
During  the  great  cavalry  combats  of  those  days,  use 
was  also  often  made  of  firearms,  but  we  hear  little  of 
cavalry  entrenching,  while  infantry  did  so  extensively 
in  the  defence;  the  actions  came  off  too  rapidly  and 
energetically  for  that;  and  so  they  will  probably  in  a 
future  war.  Still,  cavalry  may  often  find  itself  in 
future  in  situations  where  it  will  be  obliged  to  en- 
trench for  an  obstinate  defence,  especially  in  locali- 
ties. The  fewer  means  cavalry  has  for  that  purpose, 
the  more  it  needs  to  make  the  best  use  of  ground  and 
existing  buildings  for  neutralizing  the  effect  of  mod- 
ern arms. 

The  preceding  comments  having  demonstrated  that, 
in  field  operations,  fire  and  cover  have  increasingly 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     75 

affected  each  other,  we  see  that  the  same  process,  but 
to  a  greater  measure,  has  taken  place  in  fortress  war- 
fare. The  heavy  garrison  guns  have  also  developed 
in  a  manner  altogether  surprising,  and  attained  ranges 
and  force  of  percussion  necessarily  affecting  deeply 
the  construction  of  permanent  fortifications. 

Where  it  was  a  question  of  securing  certain  objects 
against  being  reached  by  hostile  fire,  the  works  cover- 
ing them  had  to  be  pushed  further  forward  to  meet 
the  longer  range  of  the  guns;  where,  on  the  other 
hand,  cover  was  to  be  provided  from  the  effects  of  that 
fire,  the  defender  was  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  alto- 
gether new  constructions.  Under  no  circumstances 
could  he  suffer  the  attacking  artillery  to  be  superior 
in  this  respect.  If,  in  active  operations  in  the  field, 
the  construction  of  cover  is  not  always  convenient, 
though  often  an  auxiliary  means  that  cannot  be  avoid- 
ed, effective  cover  from  the  enemy's  fire  in  for- 
tress warfare  is  by  itself  the  determining  factor.  And 
thus,  to  attain  complete  cover,  concrete  and  armour 
plates  were  adopted,  efforts  being  made  as  far  as  pos- 
sible to  secure  the  objects  against  hostile  fire  by  their 
position  as  well. 

Under  the  force  of  circumstances  two  typical  forms 
of  modern  permanent  fortification  have  been  evolved, 
namely,  large  army  fortresses,  and  barrier  forts.  The 
object  of  the  latter  is  to  block  certain  communications, 
and  to  secure  the  possession  of  some  important  points 
in  the  country,  whence  the  surrounding  ground  can  be 
commanded  by  artillery;  and,  where  coast  defences 
are  concerned,  to  sweep  the  channels  or  defend  points 
specially  favourable  for  landing.  The  large  fortresses, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  meant  to  secure  the  possession 
of  large  towns,  which,  for  some  reason  or  other,  are 
of  strategic  importance.  It  being  impossible,  owing 


76          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

to  their  size,  to  secure  them  by  continuous  lines,  we 
surround  them  with  a  chain  of  forts  pushed  far  in  ad- 
vance, which  must  possess  great  power  of  resistance, 
and  form,  as  it  were,  pivots  of  defence.  The  intervals 
between  these  works  are  defended  by  the  garrison  of 
the  fortress,  and  strengthened  by  suitable  entrench- 
ments. Intermediate  works  and  ammunition  depots, 
of  permanent  construction,  are  to  facilitate  an  ener- 
getic defence. 

The  disadvantage  of  these  large  fortresses  is  their 
extent.  They  need  strong  garrisons  for  their  defence 
and  take  away  forces  from  the  field  army.  We  must, 
therefore,  when  constructing  such  fortresses,  always 
impose  some  limitations  on  ourselves  as  to  the  number 
of  points  to  be  fortified  as  well  as  to  their  extent.  But 
the  various  defensive  works,  be  they  barrier  forts  or 
forts  of  a  fortress,  we  must  withdraw  from  the  en- 
emy's sight  as  much  as  possible,  by  site  and  structure 
on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  must  make  them 
as  capable  of  resistance  as  possible.  Overhead  and 
outside  cover  are  made  of  concrete,  and  the  guns  are 
placed  in  the  permanent  works  protected  by  armour. 
Observing  stations  are  armoured,  too.  The  flank  de- 
fences of  the  ditches  are  secured  against  direct  fire  by 
being  placed  behind  the  counterscarp,  or  sunk  in  the 
bottom  of  the  ditch,  where  they  can  scarcely  be  struck 
by  direct  fire. 

In  the  face  of  these  new  means  and  kinds  of  forti- 
fication, the  siege  artillery  adopted  guns  of  a  calibre 
growing  larger  and  larger;  accuracy  of  fire  was  striven 
after  as  far  as  possible,  so  as  to  pierce  the  solid  cover 
and  hit  the  small  targets  presented  by  the  armoured 
cupolas  topping  the  armoured  turrets.  These  things 
developed  pretty  well  alike  in  all  the  great  armies. 
In  Germany,  the  garrison  artillery  is  equipped  with 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES      77 

15-centimetre  howitzers — being  the  same  gun  as  the 
heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army — with  the  new  21- 
centimetre  mortars,  and  with  long  lo-centimetre  and 
13-centimetre  guns,  which  later  have  replaced  the  long 
15-centimetre  gun.  The  1 5-centimetre  howitzers  are 
chiefly  meant  for  fighting  down  the  artillery  and  in- 
fantry positions.  The  field  artillery  is  co-operating 
with  these  guns  in  the  defence  as  well  as  in  the  at- 
tack. The  2 1 -centimetre  mortars  are  mainly  used 
against  the  strongest  works  of  the  enemy,  and  against 
guns  protected  by  armour.  These  latter  are  partly 
heavy  guns  for  distant  ranges,  and  partly  quick-firing 
guns  of  small  calibre  for  close  defence  and  for  sweep- 
ing ditches  and  obstacles. 

It  is,  however,  not  anticipated  that  decisive  results 
will  be  obtained  with  these  guns  against  modern  cover. 
All  that  can  be  obtained,  perhaps,  is  a  temporary 
throwing  out  of  gear  of  the  armour  turrets'  mech- 
anism, thus  causing  their  fire  to  be  kept  down.  But 
experiments  in  peace  and  experience  of  war  have  dem- 
onstrated that  heavier  guns  than  those  mentioned  are 
wanted  actually  to  demolish  modern  works.  If  we 
bear  in  mind  the  enormous  strength  a  real  modern  for- 
tress may  possess,  we  must  realize  from  the  outset 
that  considerably  stronger  guns  must  be  used  than  our 
2 1 -centimetre  mortars.* 

For  instance,  200  armour  turrets  have  been  ordered 
for  the  fortifications  of  Antwerp,  each  turret  being 
armed  with  two  1 5-centimetre  guns;  for  some  fortifi- 
cations of  Reval,  20  armour  turrets  for  3O-centimetre 
guns  are  said  to  be  provided;  and  in  America,  gun- 
trials  have  been  made  against  armoured  concrete  more 

*  The  experiences  of  the  attack  on  the  forts  of  Liege  and 
Namur  show  that  the  Germans  have  obtained  these  heavier 
guns  since  this  was  written. — Editor's  Note. 


78          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

than  6  metres  thick.     Modern  artillery  must  take  ac- 
count of  all  this  kind  of  cover  in  fortress  warfare  so 

as  at  least  to  match  it. 

***** 

The  art  of  war  has,  perhaps,  profited  most  by  recent 
progress  in  practical  science ;  the  rage,  even,  for  being 
as  modern  as  possible  in  that  field  goes  in  many  ways 
far  beyond  what  may  be  of  practical  value.  We  must 
not  overrate  the  importance  of  practical  inventions  for 
war,  nor,  above  all,  imagine  that  mechanical  appli- 
ances, be  they  ever  so  excellent,  can  make  amends  for 
deficiency  in  military  and  moral  qualities.  But  we 
must,  on  the  other  hand,  with  inexorable  logic  and 
consistency,  theoretically  and  practically,  draw  the  con- 
sequences actually  and  necessarily  resulting  from  this 
progress  in  technics.  To  foresee  these  actual  and 
necessary  consequences  of  new  mechanical  achieve- 
ments, and  to  take  notice  of  them  in  practice,  is  one  of 
the  most  essential  tasks  in  the  preparation  for  war 
even,  and  Prussia  especially  can  boast  of  brilliant  suc- 
cesses in  this  domain  in  times  past.  To  examine  the 
achievements  of  modern  times  from  this  point  of 
view  seems,  therefore,  a  task  especially  needful. 

We  have  seen  that  the  effect  of  modern  firearms  ex- 
ercises a  great  and  direct  influence  on  the  character  of 
the  combat,  and,  therefore,  on  the  conduct  of  an  ac- 
tion ;  and  we  had  to  acknowledge  that,  indirectly,  strat- 
egy is  affected  as  well  by  the  altered  nature  of  battle. 

It  is  just  the  reverse  with  the  influence  of  the  means 
of  transport  on  the  conduct  of  war.  They  directly 
increase  strategic  mobility  of  the  troops,  and  benefit 
the  strategic  grouping  of  the  forces;  but  indirectly 
they  are  of  some  importance  for  the  conduct  of  battle, 
by  promoting  the  independence  of  the  troops  of  their 
lines  of  communication,  by  facilitating  the  bringing  up 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     79 

of  supplies,  and  by  creating  possibilities  for  concentra- 
tions and  movements  which  did  not  exist  formerly. 
Commanders  acquire  thereby  greater  freedom  of 
action. 

The  most  important  means  of  transport  are,  of 
course,  the  railways,  which  alone  make  it  altogether 
possible  to  concentrate,  move,  and  supply  the  huge 
numbers  of  modern  armies.  The  efficiency  of  this 
grand  means  of  communication  has  been  substantially 
raised  since  the  last  great  wars  of  Germany.  All  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  have  striven  to  enlarge  the 
railway  nets,  often  even  from  a  military  point  of  view 
chiefly. 

In  case  of  war,  the  whole  railway  service  is  placed 
under  military  authority.  All  railway  administrations, 
with  their  whole  personnel  and  materiel,  come  under 
the  military  railway  authorities.  The  whole  railway 
service,  as  applied  to  military  purposes,  is  in  Germany 
controlled  by  the  Director  of  Field  Railways.  Most 
of  the  railways  continue  of  course  to  work  as  in 
peace  generally,  even  in  case  of  war.  Those  lines 
which  come  under  war  conditions  are  expressly  named. 
They  will  be  those  lines  which  are  considered  as  being 
in  the  theatre  of  war  or  in  its  neighborhood.  On  these 
lines,  too,  the  railway  service  remains  in  the  hands  of 
the  civilian  railway  directors  and  administrations,  but 
the  basis  of  all  traffic  on  them  is  the  military  time- 
table. How  far  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  railway 
is  to  be  made  use  of  is  decided  by  the  Director  of  Field 
Railways,  who  also  issues  orders  as  to  whether,  and  to 
what  extent,  public  traffic  may  be  allowed.  Public 
traffic  is  never  allowed,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  on 
the  lines  in  the  actual  theatre  of  war. 

"Military  management"  takes  the  place  of  war  man- 
agement on  those  lines  which  have  been  captured  dur- 


80          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

ing  the  war,  or  have  been  constructed  by  the  military 
authorities.  "Military  management"  may  also  be  or- 
dered for  lines  which  work  under  peace  or  war  man- 
agement. In  that  case  the  military  directors  of  rail- 
ways take  over  the  administration  and  control  of  the 
lines. 

Owing  to  the  importance  the  railways  have  gained 
to-day  for  all  movements  of  troops,  it  is  not  only  a 
question  of  making  use  of  all  existing  railways;  it 
may  also  become  necessary  to  build  new  lines,  to  re- 
pair those  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  render  useless  lines  used  by  the  enemy,  or 
those  which  we  must  leave  in  his  hands. 

Special  means  of  transport  will  still  be  necessary  to 
communicate  between  railheads  and  troops,  and  the 
amount  of  transport  must  become  the  greater  the  more 
the  troops  outdistance  these  railheads.  The  impor- 
tance of  these  means  of  transport  grows  when  only 
few  railways  are  altogether  in  the  theatre  of  war,  and 
when  the  army  conquering  invades  the  enemy's  coun- 
try, where  all  the  railways  have  been  thoroughly  de- 
molished, and  when,  lastly,  we  do  not  succeed  in 
rapidly  and  completely  repairing  what  has  been  de- 
stroyed. 

In  all  European  wars,  draught  animals  were  almost 
exclusively  used,  so  far,  for  this  kind  of  transport, 
exceptionally,  perhaps,  pack  animals.  But  it  is  ob- 
vious, and  is  confirmed  by  experience  as  well,  that 
this  mode  of  supplying  troops  is  bound  to  be  very 
slow  and  difficult.  The  draught  or  pack  animals  need 
first  of  all  themselves  a  good  deal  of  supplies,  if  they 
are  to  keep  efficient;  and  secondly,  their  power  of 
marching  is  certainly  very  limited — at  any  rate,  not 
at  all  materially  greater  than  that  of  the  troops  them- 
selves; and  this  causes  the  troops  sometimes  to  re- 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     81 

strict  their  movements  out  of  regard  for  supplies.  It 
was,  therefore,  one  of  the  first  problems  for  mechanics 
to  design  means  for  limiting,  as  much  as  possible, 
transport  by  animal  power. 

Motors  now  do  away  with  this  defect.  They  are 
the  latest  achievement  in  military  transport  service, 
and  seem  specially  fitted  for  facilitating  materially  the 
transport  of  goods  behind  the  armies.  All  draught 
animals  can  now  be  spared,  which  is  of  greatest  im- 
portance ;  a  few  vehicles  can  carry  very  much  greater 
loads  than  those  of  draught  animals,  and  the  speed 
of  these  vehicles  is  much  greater  than  that  of  the 
former  columns,  thus  enabling  the  troops  to  be  sup- 
plied without  their  needing  to  shorten  the  marches 
demanded  by  strategy. 

Whenever  personal  reports  or  communications  be- 
tween distant  headquarters  are  of  importance,  or  even 
desirable  only,  the  motor-car  is  a  suitable  means  of 
conveyance.  The  car  is  certainly  tied  to  good  roads, 
but  then  there  is  no  need  for  shunning  little  detours 
since,  owing  to  its  speed,  the  car  can  cover  in  a  very 
short  time  even  long  distances.  Motor-cars  are  also 
suitable  for  conveying  orders.  These  cars  make  it 
possible  for  superior  headquarters  to  remain  longer 
in  billets  for  further  work,  and  yet  to  be  in  their 
new  quarters  at  the  proper  time.  They  can  also  be 
used  for  guarding  telegraph  lines  and  sometimes  signal 
stations;  the  small  autos  especially  can  relieve  the 
cavalry  very  much  of  orderly  and  relay  duties.  The 
private  motor-cars  are  thus  on  the  border  between 
the  means  of  transport  and  the  actual  means  of  com- 
munication. 

But  we  cannot  warn  too  strongly  against  overrating 
the  efficiency  of  motor-cars,  and,  thus,  their  military 
importance.  Their  mechanism  is  still  very  delicate, 


82          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

and  easily  deranged,  when  not  treated  carefully,  and 
when  not  kept  clean.  Damage  to  tyres  is  of  every- 
day occurrence;  barricades,  wire  entanglements,  and 
similar  things,  cleverly  arranged,  may  easily  prove 
fatal  to  motor-cars,  especially  at  night.  Their  use  is, 
therefore,  chiefly  confined  to  the  roads  within  safe 
reach  of  our  own  troops,  and  not  too  much  endangered 
by  hostile  inhabitants.  The  cars  will,  of  course,  be 
also  used  sometimes  in  districts  threatened  by  the 
enemy,  but  in  that  case  we  can  never  count  for  certain 
on  a  journey  being  successful.  The  performance  of 
this  kind  of  conveyance  depends  on  many  conditions, 
which  may  easily  upset  all  calculations.  Their  use 
as  a  means  of  communication  in  the  foremost  line,  or 
even  for  reconnaissance,  is  therefore  very  limited.  We 
have  built  armoured  motor-cars,  it  is  true,  which  are 
to  be  used  in  enterprises  likely  to  be  interfered  with 
by  the  enemy,  and  have  even  armed  these  cars  with 
light  guns  and  machine-guns,  but  no  serious  military 
value  can  really  be  attached  to  these  experiments. 
By  being  armoured,  these  motors  lose  their  chief  ad- 
vantage, namely  speed  and  handiness. 

The  whole  telegraph  service  is  organized  to  accom- 
pany and  facilitate  operations  in  a  successful  offensive 
war.  But  whether  it  will  be  always  possible  to  es- 
tablish and  change  communications  seems  rather 
doubtful.  The  demands  made  in  this  respect  are  ex- 
ceedingly exacting,  and  can  scarcely  be  met,  espe- 
cially when  retrograde  movements  become  necessary. 
To  take  up  and  relay  lines  behind  an  army  advancing 
is  always  possible;  but  when  we  retire,  we  will  often 
be  obliged  to  abandon  the  material;  the  possibility 
of  permanently  maintaining  telegraphic  communica- 
tion with  Headquarters  of  Commands  will  then  be 
doubtful;  and  if  we  further  bear  in  mind  that  in  vast 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     83 

districts  the  lines  will  be  threatened  by  the  popula- 
tion or  hostile  patrols  it  becomes  obvious  how  exceed- 
ingly important  it  is  to  have  means  of  communication 
not  dependent  on  connecting  wire. 

This  want  is  met  by  field  signalling  appliances  and 
wireless  telegraphy. 

The  former  is  an  optical  telegraph  with  which  either 
sunlight  or  a  powerful  signalling  lamp  is  used. 

Far  more  useful  and  applicable  is  wireless  telegra- 
phy. By  it  communication  can  be  established  for  long 
distances,  and  without  visual  connection,  and  it  is  al- 
most altogether  independent  of  weather  and  ground. 
But,  electric  waves  extending  in  the  air  in  all  direc- 
tions, there  is  the  disadvantage  of  foreign  apparatus 
reading  our  messages  as  well.  We  guard  ourselves 
against  this  by  using  cipher,  and  adopting  special 
measures. 

The  equipment  of  wireless  stations  is  very  com- 
plicated and  bulky,  and  must  be  carried  on  wagons. 
A  thoroughly  trained  personnel  is  necessary  to  serve 
it.  Its  use  with  the  troops  is,  under  these  circum- 
stances, inadmissible.  But  wireless  telegraphy  is  ex- 
cellently adapted  for  connecting  the  highest  commands 
with  each  other  and  with  the  advanced  army  cavalry, 
which  should  be  equipped  with  wireless  stations  as  a 
matter  of  principle.  The  apparatus  taken  in  the  field 
can  safely  transmit  intelligence  up  to  200  kilometres, 
as  far  as  it  has  been  developed  to-day.  Good  service 
will  also  be  rendered  by  wireless  telegraphy  in  connect- 
ing besieged  fortresses  with  the  country  outside,  and 
in  the  defence  of  coastlines.  Probably  all  countries 
have  therefore  established  permanent  wireless  stations 
in  the  big  fortresses  and  at  other  important  points. 
It  must  further  be  assumed  that  all  European  armies 
have  similar  arrangements  to  our  own,  and  that  we 


84          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

can  hardly  lay  claim  to  being  superior  in  any  of  these 
technical  departments. 

Modern  technics  have  thus  tried  to  ensure  the  safe 
transmission  of  intelligence  in  all  sorts  of  ways  and 
manners ;  and  though  each  of  the  means  has  its  weak- 
nesses and  disadvantages,  yet,  taking  them  all  to- 
gether and  in  combination,  they  will,  in  a  most  decisive 
manner,  contribute  to  making  it  possible  for  the  mod- 
ern armies  of  masses  to  be  led.  Their  importance  for 
active  operations  in  war  cannot  be  rated  too  highly. 

These  means  of  communication  will  materially  aid 
command  in  battle  too.  With  the  size  of  modern 
armies  and  with  the  extension  of  battlefields  conse- 
quent thereon,  it  is  much  more  difficult  than  formerly 
to  ensure  the  safe  transmission  of  orders  and  reports ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  has  become  very  much  more 
important  for  proper  connection  to  be  maintained 
with  subordinates  in  action,  through  the  fact  that  the 
size  of  the  masses  employed  makes  it  very  difficult 
to  counter-order  measures  once  adopted.  To-day  it  is 
therefore  still  more  important  than  formerly  to 
have  reliable  means  of  communication  between  com- 
manders. 

If  intercommunication  between  the  leaders,  and  be- 
tween them  and  their  troops,  is  only  maintained  by 
mounted  men  (adjutants,  orderlies,  etc.),  uniform 
control  of  an  action  is  possible  only  within  a  com- 
paratively limited  space.  Mechanical  communication 
must  therefore  step  in  for  longer  distances.  If  the 
roads  are  favourable,  motor-cars  can  be  used  for  that 
purpose;  sometimes  flag  and  field  signalling  may  be 
worked;  and  lastly,  telegraph  lines  can  be  laid  as  well 
on  extensive  battlefields  if  the  corps  telegraph  de- 
tachments are  requisitioned.  But  the  most  suitable 
appliance  for  such  purpose  seems  to  be  a  telephone 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES     85 

that  can  be  easily  handled.  These  considerations  have 
led  to  telephone  detachments  being  formed  for  head- 
quarters of  superior  commands;  these  detachments 
are  equipped  with  8  kilometres  of  a  light  field  cable 
that  can  be  laid  in  about  twenty  minutes  per  kilo- 
metre. The  stores  are  carried  on  a  wagon,  which 
also  carries  the  men.  Telephone  connection  ensures 
direct  personal  intercourse  between  the  commands 
concerned,  but  this  at  the  same  time  harbours  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  danger.  It  is,  that  superior  com- 
manders may  feel  tempted  to  encroach  upon  the  sphere 
of  subordinate  leaders  by  meddling  with  details  with- 
out being  able  to  judge  of  what  is  going  on ;  and  that 
the  subordinate  commanders  may  try,  by  asking  ques- 
tions, to  shift  to  higher  quarters  responsibility  which 
it  is  their  own  duty  to  take.  Demoralization  may 
also  easily  spread  from  one  command  to  the  other  by 
means  of  the  telephone.  The  apparatus  must  there- 
fore be  used  with  deliberate  caution,  and  only  by  the 
proper  authorities.  The  advantages  it  affords  are  so 
great,  however,  that  we  cannot  dispense  with  its  use 
on  the  battlefield.  Good  use  can  also  be  made  of  the 
telephone  detachments  when  the  troops  are  at  rest, 
either  to  connect  the  main  body  in  quarters  with  the 
reserve  of  outposts,  or  army  corps  headquarters  with 
the  divisions,  and  these  with  each  other  when  the 
corps  telegraph  detachment  is  not  available.* 

*  Reliable  reports  say  that  a  simplification  of  the  field 
telegraphs  is  planned,  and  has  already  been  tried  at  the 
Emperor's  manoeuvres  in  1911;  namely,  the  corps  telegraph 
detachments,  less  the  Morse  apparatus,  have  been  amal- 
gamated with  the  telephone  detachments  of  the  higher  com- 
mands to  form  larger  telephone  units.  These  will  be  at  the 
disposal  of  army  corps  commanders,  and  used  by  them  in 
sections  according  to  wants.  The  telephone  detachments 
with  the  troops  are  not  affected  by  this  reorganization. 


86          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

The  troops  themselves,  with  their  present  tactics, 
have  also  felt  the  want  of  telephone  connection  of  the 
various  units  with  each  other  and  with  their  com- 
manders. The  troops  have  therefore  been  equipped 
with  telephone  appliances  as  well. 

The  covered  positions  taken  up  by  artillery,  when 
the  leader  is  often  at  an  observing  station  some  dis- 
tance from  his  command,  have  made  it  necessary  to 
connect  him  with  his  men  by  telephone  to  make  it 
possible  for  him  to  direct  the  fire.  But  the  difficulty 
of  bringing  to  the  knowledge  of  subordinate  officers 
the  orders  of  the  higher  artillery  commanders  in  the 
long  artillery  lines,  especially  when  stationed  in 
groups,  often  makes  telephone  connection  between  the 
various  commanders  a  necessity  too. 

The  infantry  telephone  is  very  suitably  applied  on 
outpost  duty;  and,  as  personal  transmission  of  orders 
is  almost  impossible  during  an  attack,  the  infantry 
tries  to  make  the  best  of  signalling  flags  and  tele- 
phones in  action,  as  well.  But  these  aids  are  scarcely 
to  be  relied  upon.  When  the  powerful  material  and 
psychical  effects  of  an  offensive  action  assert  them- 
selves, there  is  no  room  at  all  any  more  for  the  special 
issue  of  orders  demanding  deliberation  and  an  altered 
course  of  action ;  one  law  prevails  then  alone :  the 
iron  will  to  beat  the  enemy. 

We  must  finally  mention  the  latest  achievements  in 
technics,  namely,  aeronautics. 

The  various  kinds  of  air  craft,  like  the  motor  vehi- 
cles, are  important  as  a  means  of  reconnaissance,  of 
communication,  and  of  transport ;  and  they  promise  to 
be  much  more  so  than  hitherto.  For  the  present,  of 
course,  airships  and  flying  machines  cannot  be  con- 
sidered quite  perfect  for  war  service.  But  it  is  merely 


MODERN  ARMS  AND  APPLIANCES      87 

a  question  of  time  for  that  problem  to  be  completely 
solved  by  mechanics. 

The  Zeppelin  airships  are,  owing  to  their  size,  very 
stable,  have  great  lifting  power  and  a  wide  radius  of 
action.  They  are,  moreover,  in  so  far  safe  against 
injury  as  the  gas  that  carries  the  balloon  is  distributed 
among  a  good  number  of  independent  gas-tight  com- 
partments; the  balloon,  therefore,  need  not  neces- 
sarily come  down,  if  some  of  them  have  been  emptied. 
But  these  airships  have  this  against  them,  that  they 
cannot  be  taken  to  pieces,  but  must  be  shelved  in  spe- 
cial sheds,  and  that  they  cannot  be  transported.  An 
empty  Zeppelin  balloon  can  only  be  moved  for  a  very 
short  distance,  and  then  only  with  the  aid  of  a  very 
great  number  of  men.  To  use  these  airships  we  need, 
therefore,  specially  prepared  anchorages.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  a  war  they  will  go  forward  from  the  per- 
manent sheds  established  in  the  frontier  districts,  and 
can  then  return  to  them  after  finishing  their  trip. 
But  when  we  advance  into  the  enemy's  country,  we 
must  carry  portable  sheds  if  we  wish  to  continue  using 
these  ships.  And  so  these  have  already  been  provided ; 
they  can  be  taken  by  rail,  and  have  proved  their  worth 
at  trials  in  manoeuvres. 

Compared  with  the  rigid  airships,  the  semi-rigid  and 
non-rigid  airships  have  considerable  advantages.  The 
semi-rigid  balloon  is  quickly  mounted,  the  gas  being 
applied  direct;  owing  to  the  rigid  frame  or  keel  to 
which  it  is  attached,  it  possesses  comparatively  great 
solidity;  it  can  be  taken  to  pieces  and  moved  about, 
and  therefore  be  used  without  requiring  a  shed.  The 
rigid  keel,  however,  which  can  be  taken  to  pieces, 
makes  the  ship  need  several  wagons  for  transport. 
The  size  of  the  ship,  as  used,  so  far,  in  Germany,  pre- 
vents it  having  the  carrying  capacity  or  the  wide 


88          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

radius  of  action  of  a  Zeppelin  ship.  But  its  present 
measurements  are  not  at  all  final,  and  may  easily  at- 
tain those  of  a  Zeppelin  balloon,  as  matters  stand 
to-day  in  the  world  of  technics.  The  Parseval  airship 
is  still  easier  to  get  ready  and  to  dismantle  than  the 
military  semi-rigid  airship,  and  can  be  transported  on 
two  wagons.  The  disadvantage  of  both  these  sys- 
tems is  that  any  serious  injury  to  the  cover  will  in- 
fallibly bring  down  the  balloon,  since  the  gas  is  not 
distributed  in  numerous  independent  compartments  as 
in  the  Zeppelin.  Still,  both  these  kinds  of  airships, 
semi-  and  non-rigid,  can  directly  accompany  the 
troops,  and  be  used  anywhere.  This  renders  them  al- 
ways much  more  useful  for  military  purposes  than 
Zeppelin's  system,  which  is,  moreover,  much  more 
dependent  on  the  weather,  and  has  yet  to  prove  its 
military  worth. 

It  is,  of  course,  an  advantage  if  sheds  can  be  pro- 
vided sometimes  for  semi-rigid  and  non-rigid  airships, 
as  we  then  need  not  empty  and  refill  the  balloons 
again  when  in  daily  use.  Portable  sheds,  taken  into 
the  field,  will  benefit  these  airships  too. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY 

THE  fire  of  modern  rifles  and  guns  has  deeply  affected 
the  tactics  of  the  three  arms,  as  we  have  seen.  While 
it  has  altered  only  the  form  of  fighting  of  infantry 
and  artillery,  and  the  manner  of  their  tactical  employ- 
ment, without  touching  the  importance  of  both  these 
arms  as  a  whole,  and  within  the  army,  it  has  had  a 
far  greater  influence  on  cavalry.  Not  only  the  tactical 
formations  used  by  cavalry  in  action  have  changed, 
but  its  employment  is  altogether  different. 

The  effect  of  modern  firearms,  with  all  its  conse- 
quences, has  caused  occasions  for  successful  charges 
against  firearms  to  be  of  very  rare  occurrence  in  the 
latest  wars,  and  they  will  be  rarer  still  in  future.  Such 
charges  have,  however,  positively  ceased  to  be  of  de- 
cisive importance  in  battle,  by  reason  alone  of  the 
comparative  small  numbers  of  cavalry.  Owing  to  the 
enormous  size  of  modern  armies  and  the  extent  of  the 
battlefields,  a  successful  charge  of  even  so  large  a  body 
as  a  cavalry  division  could  no  longer  bring  about  a 
decision  by  itself.  But  the  cavalry  has  nevertheless 
hitherto  stuck  to  the  fiction  that  its  relation  to  the 
other  arms  was  still  similar  to  what  it  was  formerly — 
that  an  action  of  the  three  arms  combined  was  possible 
even  to-day,  as  in  the  days  of  Frederic  and  Napoleon. 
The  cavalry  looks  now,  as  it  looked  then,  upon  a 
charge  in  battle  as  its  paramount  duty;  it  has  almost 


92          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

deliberately  closed  its  eyes  against  the  far-reaching 
changes  in  warfare.  By  this  it  has  itself  barred  the 
way  that  leads  to  great  successes.  The  responsible 
military  authorities  have  failed  in  the  same  way.  Very 
reluctantly  the  cavalry  was  armed  with  firearms,  at 
first  even  with  quite  useless  weapons,  and  it  is  but 
very  recently  that  the  German  cavalry  got  an  efficient 
rifle ;  its  use  is  still  looked  upon  as.  quite  a  subordinate 
matter.  The  tactical  exercises  of  cavalry  divisions  are 
still  carried  out  as  of  old;  we  still  cannot  bring  our- 
selves to  enter  heart  and  soul  upon  the  tasks  imposed 
on  us  by  the  new  order  of  things.  Superior  com- 
manders, too,  are  still  imbued  with  obsolete  ideas,  and 
employ  cavalry  according  to  these  ideas.  The  Em- 
peror's manoeuvres  in  1909  furnish  an  interesting 
example  of  this.  Cavalry  owes  its  decline  to  all  these 
circumstances.  But  whether  it  will  gain  in  future  the 
place  due  to  it  will,  above  all,  depend  on  whether  the 
rank  and  file  will  resolve  with  open  eyes  to  break  with 
the  ideas  of  the  past,  and  devote  themselves  to  the 
tasks  of  the  present  without  reserve. 

The  German  cavalry  need  not,  for  all  that,  give 
up  the  hope  of  successfully  charging  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery. Any  one  who  wished  to  deduce  from  my  re- 
marks that  I  thought  the  time  for  such  charges  was 
a  thing  of  the  past  would  completely  misunderstand 
me.  I  am  rather  of  opinion,  and  have  always  stood 
up  for  it,  that  modern  infantry  will  sometimes  present 
a  favourable  object  for  a  charge,  especially  when  it 
is  a  question  of  infantry  of  the  second  and  third  lines. 
If  such  infantry  is  demoralized  by  the  dissolving  in- 
fluences of  modern  action,  is  out  of  hand  of  the  com- 
manders, and  no  longer  fires  deliberately,  it  will  easily 
enough  become  a  prey  of  a  bold  cavalry  charge  from 
various  directions  if  the  ground  offers  at  least  some 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY   93 

advantages.  Such  situations  are  sure  to  arise  even 
to-day,  especially  in  pursuits.  The  enemy's  artillery, 
standing  far  behind  the  foremost  fighting  line,  can 
also  often  be  attacked  by  cavalry,  though  not  in  front, 
yet  from  the  flanks,  and  especially  in  rear,  if  the  en- 
emy has  used  up  his  reserves. 

Obsolete  I  only  hold  to  be  that  opinion  which  thinks 
that  the  main  task  of  our  cavalry  is  to  co-operate  di- 
rectly with  the  other  arms  and  to  charge  in  battle; 
which  desires  to  subordinate  all  action  of  cavalry  to 
this  task,  treats  fire-fight  of  cavalry  merely  as  a  last 
resource,  and  would  like  to  restrict  the  strategic  free- 
dom of  that  arm  by  constant  deference  to  its  possible 
employment  on  the  battlefield. 

If  the  cavalry  takes  the  field  in  a  future  war  with 
notions  of  that  kind,  it  will  certainly  not  give  us  that 
advantage  which  we  otherwise  can  expect,  and  have  a 
right  to  expect,  from  it. 

The  relations  of  cavalry  to  the  other  arms,  and 
altogether  to  the  conduct  of  war,  have,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  completely  altered.  An  action  of  the  three  arms 
combined  in  the  old  sense,  as  is  still  hovering  before 
the  mind  of  our  cavalry  soldiers  as  a  delusive  ideal  of 
bygone  times,  is  no  longer  feasible  at  all.  The  partici- 
pation of  cavalry  in  the  decisive  action  of  infantry 
and  artillery  is  no  longer  necessary.  All  the  more  im- 
portant it  is  to  be  absolutely  clear  on  the  tasks  which 
a  future  war  will  demand  the  cavalry  to  solve,  and 
on  the  mode  by  which  these  tasks  must  be  solved. 
The  superior  commanders  and  the  cavalry  itself  must 
learn  to  deal  with  these  problems,  and  prepare  them- 
selves to  carry  them  out,  if  the  cavalry  is  to  continue 
to  be  a  useful  instrument  of  war  in  the  future. 

Reconnoitring  and  screening  must  be  mentioned 
first  of  all  in  this  connection.  Both  have  eminently 


94          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

gained  in  importance  under  modern  conditions.  Ad- 
vantageous as  it  is  to  have  as  accurate  and  as  early 
information  as  possible  on  the  enemy's  measures,  and 
to  screen  our  own  concentrations  and  movements 
with  the  object  of  surprising  the  enemy  and  increasing 
thereby  the  chances  of  success,  the  advantage  will  be 
all  the  greater  when  great  masses  are  concerned.  The 
larger  the  armies  are  which  are  being  moved,  and 
the  longer  it  therefore  takes  to  concentrate  them  or 
change  their  direction  of  march,  the  more  important 
it  becomes  to  reconnoitre  in  time,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
initiate  early  enough  the  measures  which  may  have 
become  necessary  through  the  facts  ascertained  by 
reconnaissance.  Modern  arms  indirectly  influence 
reconnaissance  in  so  far,  too,  as,  owing  to  the  long- 
range  and  effective  indirect  fire  of  artillery,  we  must 
deploy  for  action  sooner  than  formerly.  It  will  be 
very  exceptional  for  superior  commanders  to  recon- 
noitre personally  before  such  deployment.  They  are 
thus  almost  entirely  dependent  on  the  results  of  cavalry 
reconnaissance,  not  only  for  their  operations,  but  also 
for  their  dispositions  for  battle.  This  makes  cavalry 
reconnaissance  all  the  more  valuable,  but  also  calls  for 
greater  efficiency  of  that  arm. 

The  cavalry  must  precede  the  armies  as  far  forward 
as  possible,  to  beat  the  hostile  cavalry  and  push  it 
back  vigorously,  so  as  to  allow  our  own  patrols  to 
approach  rapidly  the  hostile  columns  and  discover 
their  movements.  So  long  as  an  efficient  hostile 
cavalry  is  in  the  field,  our  own  will  be  hampered  in 
all  its  enterprises,  and  accordingly  obtain  little  infor- 
mation. We  must  further  bear  in  mind  that  the 
enemy's  cavalry  may  decline  to  fight  with  cold  steel, 
using  the  carbine  instead,  and  be  supported  in  this 
action  by  detachments  composed  of  all  arms.  The 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY   95 

cavalry  must  therefore  be  prepared  to  undertake  in- 
dependent operations  of  an  extensive  nature  and  be 
able  to  beat  by  dismounted  action  strong  hostile 
forces,  or  to  turn  them.  If  it  can  do  both,  then,  and 
only  then,  will  it  carry  out  its  object. 

Offensive  power  is,  however,  not  enough  for  cav- 
alry; it  must  have  also  learned  to  push  out  its  recon- 
noitring bodies  rapidly  and  systematically,  and  to  send 
back  as  fast  as  it  possibly  can  to  the  headquarters 
concerned  the  early  information  it  has  obtained.  Great 
horsemanship,  combined  with  daring  boldness  and 
vigilance  of  patrols  and  reconnoitring  squadrons,  are 
necessary  to  attain  these  objects;  all  mechanical  means 
must,  moreover,  be  used  to  promote  rapidity  of  gain- 
ing and  transmitting  intelligence  of  decisive  impor- 
tance. The  army  cavalry  must  therefore  be  equipped 
and  conversant  with  wireless  telegraphy,  telephones, 
signalling  apparatus,  and  flying  machines.  The  cav- 
alry must  also  keep  as  much  as  possible  in  constant 
touch  with  any  dirigible  airships  that  may  be  avail- 
able. The  airships  must  arrange  their  action  so  as  to 
work  ahead  of  the  cavalry,  and  furnish  it  with  intelli- 
gence about  large  concentrations  of  the  enemy  or  their 
approach  to  enable  the  cavalry  to  adopt  its  measures 
accordingly.  These  ships  must  therefore  beat  the  en- 
emy's airships  and  flyers,  and  start  early  to  meet  them 
with  that  object.  To  ensure  co-operation  in  recon- 
naissance on  land  and  in  the  air,  it  will  often  be  ad- 
visable to  place  the  cavalry  and  airships  under  one 
uniform  command.  The  intimate  co-operation  of 
these  two  arms  will  best  ensure  success.  We  will  also 
be  obliged  to  attach  to  the  cavalry  specially  designed 
guns  to  support  our  airships  in  their  fight  against 
those  of  the  enemy,  or  to  fight  them  independently. 

Early  reconnaissance  is  particularly  important  to 


96          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

that  party  which  has  resolved  to  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive, strategically  or  tactically.  That  party  has 
then  surrendered  the  initiative  to  the  enemy,  and  must 
conform  to  his  will.  It  cannot  arrange  for  suitable 
measures  of  defence  until  sufficiently  informed  as  to 
the  grouping  and  main  direction  of  attack  of  the  en- 
emy; it  runs  the  risk  of  being  too  late  with  these  de- 
fensive measures,  if  it  does  not  receive  correct  intelli- 
gence about  the  enemy's  measures  in  ample  time.  At 
the  same  time,  it  will  be  its  concern  to  screen  the  po- 
sition of  its  own  reserves,  so  as  to  deliver  a  counter- 
attack by  surprise.  The  assailant,  on  the  other  hand, 
who  seizes  the  initiative  and  imposes  his  will  on  the 
enemy,  is  in  the  first  instance  interested  in  screening 
his  concentration  and  his  main  direction  of  attack  so 
as  to  act  by  surprise,  and  thus  make  it 'impossible  for 
the  enemy  to  adopt  his  counter-measures  in  time.  But 
it  is  also  desirable  for  him  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  the 
strength  and  grouping  of  the  hostile  reserves,  so  that 
he  may  not  come  unexpectedly  on  stronger  forces  than 
he  had  anticipated.  In  this  way  the  cavalry  has  al- 
ways to  face  the  double  task  of  simultaneously  recon- 
noitring and  screening;  and  it  will  often  have  to  de- 
cide on  which  of  these  activities  it  has  to  lay  the 
greatest  stress.  When  screening,  it  will,  above  all, 
be  a  question  of  warding  off  with  firearms  any  hostile 
attacks,  because  effective  screening  is  generally  only 
possible  by  defensive  action  in  combination  with 
ground.  Sometimes  only  when  advancing  must  we  try 
to  screen  offensively  by  boldly  attacking  every  hostile 
party,  down  to  a  single  patrol,  pushing  them  back,  and 
endeavouring  to  capture  the  enemy's  dispatch-riders. 
If  screening  is  to  be  supported  by  airships  and  flyers, 
it  can  be  only  done  offensively  by  attacking  the  hostile 
aerial  fleet  and  trying  to  render  it  harmless. 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY   97 

When  we  are  reconnoitring,  and  not  screening,  we 
must  always  try  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  cold 
steel,  as  we  wish  to  attain  our  object  quickly,  and 
must  therefore  decide  an  action  rapidly,  and  that  can 
only  be  done  by  charging.  In  case  of  need  only,  when 
there  is  no  other  course  open,  must  we  have  recourse 
to  the  carbine.  Since  both  parties  have  an  equal  in- 
terest, as  a  rule,  in  gaining  rapid  success,  we  are 
justified  in  assuming  that  during  the  first  period  of 
a  war  there  will  be  great  cavalry  charges,  and  that 
only  that  party  will  have  recourse  to  firearms  which, 
from  experience,  has  become  aware  of  the  enemy's 
superiority  when  charging ;  the  party  using  its  firearms 
must  then  be  beaten  by  dismounted  action  as  well. 
From  this  it  follows  that  cavalry,  intent  on  carrying 
out  its  duties,  must  also  prove  superior  in  dismounted 
action,  so  as  not  to  lose  in  fire  action  the  superiority 
it  has  gained  with  cold  .steel. 

In  addition  to  reconnoitring  and  screening,  the 
cavalry  must  at  all  cost  act  on  the  enemy's  lines  of 
communication.  This  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in 
modern  war.  The  larger  the  armies,  the  less  they  are 
able  to  live  on  the  country;  the  quicker  and  the 
farther  the  firearms  shoot,  the  more  ammunition  will 
be  spent.  In  equal  measure  grows  the  importance  of 
supplies  and  of  the  lines  of  communication;  the  in- 
terruption of  regular  supplies  may  prove  then  all  the 
more  fatal.  Here,  therefore,  is  a  field  for  the  cavalry 
to  achieve  far-reaching  successes.  Even  tactical  de- 
cisions may  be  affected,  at  least  indirectly,  by  the 
enemy's  supplies  of  ammunition  being  cut  off  directly 
in  rear  of  the  battlefield. 

In  view  of  these  dangers  threatened  by  cavalry, 
both  parties  will  take  pains  to  guard  in  sufficient 
strength  with  troops,  at  least  of  the  second  and  third 


98          HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

lines,  those  communications  which  may  be  endangered. 
It  will  therefore  not  be  easy  for  the  attacking  cavalry 
to  carry  out  its  mission.  It  will  not  only  have  to  beat 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  will  certainly  oppose  it, 
off  the  field,  but  it  must  also  operate  independently 
on  the  flank  and  in  rear  of  the  enemy  for  days,  and 
perhaps  for  weeks,  entirely  separated  from  its  own 
army,  and  be  able  to  capture  by  swift  attack  any  sup- 
ply columns  on  the  march  or  while  parking,  as  well  as 
depots  on  the  lines  of  communication.  The  cavalry 
must  therefore  be  specially  equipped  for  these  duties, 
and  have  substantial  fighting  power,  not  only  mounted, 
but  above  all  dismounted.  If  its  own  strength  is  not 
sufficient,  cyclists  must  be  attached  to  it,  because  a 
combination  of  cavalry  with  cyclists  will  undoubtedly 
prove  altogether  extremely  effective. 

Fears  have  been  expressed  that  enterprises  against 
the  enemy's  communications  might  jeopardize  the  par- 
ticipation of  cavalry  in  battle,  and  thus,  of  course,  its 
participation  in  pursuit  or  covering  retreat  as  well. 
The  German  cavalry  training,  too,  warns,  as  it  were, 
against  these  kinds  of  enterprises,*  because  the  cavalry 
might  be  diverted  from  what  is  still  considered  its 
paramount  duty — namely,  charging  in  battle.  Views 
forming  the  basis  of  such  regulations  are  in  no  way 
in  harmony  with  the  requirements  of  modern  war, 
and  completely  misjudge  the  relative  value  of  employ- 
ing troops.  I  think,  moreover,  that  the  objection  of 
raids  diverting  a  well-led  cavalry  from  its  proper 
duties  is  perfectly  untenable.  If  the  raid  is  made  in 
a  decisive  direction — that  is  to  say,  in  a  direction  in 
which  the  commander-in-chief  has  decided  to  bring 
about  the  final  issue;  if  the  cavalry  commander  is 

*"Exerzier  Reglement  fur  die  Kavallerie,"  paragraphs 
527  and  395. 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY   99 

kept  constantly  informed  of  the  intentions  of  general 
headquarters  and  on  the  general  situation,  which  seems 
feasible  by  wireless  telegraphy  or  by  some  other  means, 
he  can  easily  move  towards  the  enemy's  army  when 
the  crisis  is  approaching,  and  appear  on  the  day  of 
battle  on  the  flanks  and  in  rear  of  the  adversary  like 
Stuart  at  Gettysburg.  The  raid  itself  will  lead  him 
in  the  decisive  direction. 

He  who  wants  to  keep  the  cavalry  always  in  close 
proximity  to  the  flanks  or  even  behind  the  battle-front, 
will  never  derive  any  advantage  from  that  arm  under 
modern  conditions;  the  cavalry  will  in  that  case  stand 
idling  about  on  the  battlefield,  vainly  waiting  for  its 
chances  to  come.  Freedom  and  movement,  together 
with  every  kind  of  action,  are  the  life  and  soul  of  that 
arm,  which  is  bound  to  decay  if  it  does  not  succeed  in 
adapting  itself  to  modern  requirements. 

The  cavalry  in  the  North  American  War  of  Seces- 
sion, approaching  its  tasks  with  an  unbiassed  mind  and 
not  being  hampered  by  tradition  and  routine,  soon 
found  the  right  way  for  great  activity.  The  South 
African  War,  too,  is  very  instructive  in  this  respect. 
General  Buller,  who  seems  to  have  been  still  imbued 
with  perfectly  antiquated  ideas  about  cavalry,  always 
wanted  to  have  that  arm  on  his  flanks  to  cover  them, 
even  when  they  were  not  at  all  threatened;  he  thus 
hampered  all  freedom  of  action  of  cavalry.  The  con- 
sequence was  that  his  cavalry  did  nothing.  General 
French,  on  the  other  hand,  took  the  opposite  stand. 
Extensive  raids  around  the  enemy  against  his  flanks 
and  rear  was  the  principle  of  his  action,  and  he  would 
have  done  even  more  than  he  did  in  this  direction, 
had  not  General  Roberts  repeatedly  clipped  his  wings 
and  held  him  tight,  and  had  not  the  horses  completely 
broken  down.  But  the  fundamental  ideas  of  his 


ioo        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

cavalry  leading  were  undoubtedly  right,  strategically 
as  well  as  tactically.  A  warm  adherent  of  cold  steel 
and  ever  ready  to  charge,  he  still  knew  the  full  value 
and  importance  of  the  firearm,  and  never  hesitated  to 
attack  dismounted  whenever  it  suited  the  case. 

But  it  has  not  only  been  asserted  that  raids  against 
the  enemy's  lines  of  communication  will  jeopardize 
the  cavalry's  participation  in  battle — it  has  been 
further  asserted  that  these  kinds  of  enterprises  are 
not  at  all  possible  under  modern  conditions.  The 
numerous  lines  of  communication-defence  troops,  and 
the  extensive  telegraphic  system  of  European  theatres 
of  war,  would  make  it  always  possible  to  concentrate 
superior  forces  against  such  cavalry  and  paralyse  its 
action.  I  think  this  view  is  wrong. 

Certainly,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  occasions  for 
such  enterprises  will  be  rare.  When  the  French  army 
is  concentrating  on  one  line  from  the  Belgian  to  the 
Swiss  frontiers,  we  cannot  dispatch  a  cavalry  corps  on 
the  French  lines  of  communication.  But  when,  during 
the  course  of  the  war,  different  and  separate  army 
groups  will  be  forming — as  will  always  be  the  case — 
a  suitably-equipped  cavalry  will  certainly  be  able  to 
operate  against  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear.  If  we 
study  the  campaign  of  1870-71  from  this  point  of 
view,  we  shall  not  be  long  before  we  arrive  at  this 
conviction.*  Of  course,  the  troops  employed  on  such 
a  raid  must  not  only  have  considerable  fighting  power, 
but  must  also  be  equipped  with  columns  and  trains 

*  The  German  General  Staff,  too,  seems  to  share  my  opin- 
ion. When  discussing  the  great  Russian  raid  under  Misht- 
shenko  against  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  Japanese, 
the  General  Staff  holds  my  view  that  the  second  period  of 
the  war  in  1870-71  shows  a  whole  number  of  cases  where 
such  raids  could  have  been  carried  out  successfully,  and 
expressly  emphasizes  that  the  failure  of  the  Russians  was 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY  101 

capable  of  moving  as  rapidly  as  the  troops  themselves, 
making  them,  for  some  time  at  least,  independent  of 
the  country,  as  well  as  of  their  own  lines  of  communi- 
cation. By  destroying  the  enemy's  railway  and  tele- 
graph lines,  as  well  as  by  spreading  false  intelligence, 
the  raiding-corps  must  try  to  keep  the  enemy  uncer- 
tain about  its  activity,  and  render  his  concentration 
for  a  counter-offensive  difficult.  By  demonstrative 
movements,  and  rapid  marches,  sometimes  carried  out 
at  night,  the  corps  must  deceive  the  enemy,  escape 
his  countermoves,  and  appear  where  the  blow  is  least 
expected.  It  is,  of  course,  altogether  presumed  that 
these  demands  are  met  when  cavalry  is  employed  in- 
dependently in  this  way  as  well  as  in  reconnaissance 
and  pursuit.  If  these  demands  are  satisfied,  the  raids 
will  prove  feasible  too.  Their  importance  is  generally 
underrated.  I  not  only  think  them  possible,  but  a 
downright  necessity,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  deal  with 
the  strategic  operations;  and  I  believe  that  raids  will 
not  only  favourably  influence  the  decisive  issue  in  bat- 
tle, but  also  lead  the  cavalry  in  a  favourable  direction 
on  the  battlefield  itself. 

At  the  final  issue  of  battle  the  cavalry  divisions  can 
also  take  their  due  share  only  if  they  are  able  to  act 
with  firearms  in  considerable  strength.  There  being 
no  longer  any  question  of  cavalry  co-operating  con- 
stantly and  closely  with  the  other  arms  in  the  way  it 
is  still  done  with  infantry  and  artillery,  the  cavalry, 
combined  into  large  masses,  must  try  to  intervene 
from  the  flanks  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  to  become 
effective  chiefly  by  the  direction  of  its  attack.  That 

no  proof  against  the  feasibility  of  such  enterprises  in  future. 
("The  Russo-Japanese  War:  German  Official  Account,  the 
Raid  to  Yin-kou,  and  the  Battle  of  San-de-pu,"  vol.  v. 
Hugh  Rees,  Ltd.) 


102        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

must  be  made  against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  en- 
emy. Its  mobility  enables  the  cavalry  to  envelop  the 
enemy's  flanks  and  penetrate  to  his  rear.  It  must  not 
be  afraid  of  abandoning,  then,  altogether  its  own  lines 
of  communication  for  the  time  being.  It  will  always 
be  able  to  regain  them  again.  If  it  is  opposed  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  that  cavalry  must  be  attacked  with- 
out hesitation,  beaten,  and  pursued  with  portions  of  the 
force.  This  is  presumed  for  all  further  enterprise.  If 
it  is  successfully  accomplished,  then  the  road  is  open 
to  great  achievements.  The  moment  has  now  arrived 
when  the  cavalry  can  render  invaluable  services  to 
the  other  arms,  though  not  in  direct  co-operation,  by 
drawing  upon  itself  hostile  troops,  and  preventing 
them  from  intervening  in  the  decisive  issue.  The  vic- 
torious cavalry  will  first  employ  its  artillery,  machine- 
guns,  and,  if  need  be,  its  carbines  against  the  enemy's 
flanks,  reserves,  artillery,  and  ammunition  columns, 
and  use  every  opportunity  for  acting  offensively, 
mounted  and  dismounted,  without,  however,  engaging 
in  an  obstinate  fight  against  superior  numbers.  Its 
mobility  enables  it  here  again  to  get  away,  and  rapidly 
reappear  at  another  place.  The  cavalry  must  per- 
petually try  to  threaten  and  damage  the  enemy  where 
he  would  feel  it  most,  but  must  reserve  its  main  fight- 
ing power  for  the  moments  of  the  crisis.  At  these 
moments  it  must  not  mind  heavy  losses  if  it  can  effec- 
tively contribute  to  gaining  victory.  It  will  reso- 
lutely attack  and  push  back  in  good  time  the  detach- 
ments the  enemy  has  pushed  forward  for  protecting 
his  flanks  and  rear,  and  thus  have  the  road  clear  when 
the  final  crisis  arrives.  It  is  then  of  great  consequence 
that  the  cavalry  should  act  effectively  at  all  costs,  and 
intervene  in  the  decisive  combat  itself  by  charging, 
if  that  can  be  done,  otherwise  by  fire  action. 


THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CAVALRY  103 

Of  great  importance  is,  lastly,  the  co-operation  of 
cavalry  in  pursuit.  Direct  pursuit  in  front,  as  will 
naturally  follow  from  the  nature  of  the  fight,  must, 
of  course,  be  chiefly  left  to  the  infantry  and  artillery, 
armed  as  they  are  to-day,  because  the  bullet  reaches 
farther  and  surer  than  the  swiftest  charge.  But  to 
pursue  along  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  is  the  share  of 
the  cavalry,  which  must  try  to  forestall  the  hostile 
march-columns,  break  into  their  flanks,  and  head  them 
off,  especially  at  places  where  the  ground  is  favour- 
able for  causing  delay  to  the  flying  enemy.  The  vic- 
tory having  been  bought  with  streams  of  blood,  the 
time  has  now  come  for  reaping  the  harvest  by  in- 
flicting on  the  retreating  enemy  losses  twofold  and 
threefold  the  amount  we  have  suffered.  Fire  and 
cavalry  charges — where  the  demoralization  of  the  en- 
emy allows  it — must  do  here  equal  damage. 

The  fact  that  vigorous  pursuit  was  never  under- 
taken by  cavalry  in  recent  times,  at  least  not  in  Euro- 
pean theatres  of  war,  has  led  people  to  think  very 
often  that  the  idea  of  cavalry  pursuit  is  mere  the- 
ory, and  can  never  be  turned  into  practice.  I  do  not 
share  this  opinion,  but  think  that  this  fact  is  simply 
due  to  the  manner  in  which  cavalry  was  employed,.and 
to  its  defective  equipment. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  in  almost  all  its  spheres  of 
action  the  importance  of  cavalry  in  war  has  very 
much  increased  with  the  growth  of  armies,  though  its 
employment  differs  somewhat  from  that  of  former 
times.  But  that  army  is  sure  to  derive  a  great  ad- 
vantage which  is  firmly  resolved  to  discard  antiquated 
views  and  assign  to  its  properly  equipped  cavalry 
those  duties  which  modern  arms  and  military  exigen- 
cies have  imposed  upon  it. 


104        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 


NOTE 

[The  March  of  Great  Armies — General  von  Bernhardi 
discusses  in  detail  the  problem  of  the  marching  and  supply 
of  the  great  masses  of  men  that  form  the  armies  of  to-day. 
He  points  out  that  in  order  to  diminish  the  length  of  the 
columns  it  will  often  be  necessary  to  use  the  whole  width 
of  the  road  and  march  in  double  column,  cyclist  and  motor 
companies  of  engineers  going  out  in  front  to  clear  away 
obstacles  and  widen  the  road  at  difficult  points.  He  also 
discusses  the  question  of  marching  across  country  and  night 
marching: 

"Owing  to  the  many  roads  sometimes  required,  but  not 
available  in  the  operations  of  large  armies,  we  may  want  to 
shorten  the  march  columns  with  a  view  to  accelerating  con- 
centration on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  of  facilitating 
supplying  the  troops  from  the  rear.  To  attain  these  objects, 
double  columns  of  route  are  used.  This  makes  the  march 
itself  more  difficult,  especially  on  dusty  and  bad  roads;  but 
it  is  only  feasible  if  the  roads  permit  the  march  to  be  con- 
tinued on  such  a  broad  front  during  the  whole  time  it  lasts, 
or  if  narrow  portions  of  the  road  can  be  turned.  It  is  there- 
fore advisable,  if  such  difficulties  are  anticipated,  to  bring 
up  some  engineers  who,  covered  by  cavalry  and  cyclists, 
precede  the  column  with  the  object  of  widening  the  road 
where  necessary,  of  marking  out  a  military  road,  or  of 
making  fords  passable.  We  must,  at  any  rate,  avoid  form- 
ing again  the  single  column  of  route  during  the  march. 

Similar  reasons  to  those  necessitating  the  shortening  of 
columns  of  route  may  sometimes  induce  us  to  march  across 
country.  When  turning  defiles,  when  deploying  for  action, 
and  on  other  occasions,  we  must  often  leave  the  regular 
roads  altogether.  The  troops  must,  therefore,  be  practised 
also  in  marching  across  country,  so  as  to  get  rapidly  over 
any  difficulties  that  may  arise. 

The  idea  of  performing  long  marches  across  country 
seems  somewhat  monstrous  in  our  eyes  to-day.  We  are  so 
spoiled  in  making  our  operations  dependent  on  roads  that  we 
can  scarcely  realize  any  other  mode  of  operating.  And  yet 
it  is  quite  natural,  requiring  nothing  that  has  not  been 
proved  possible  by  the  experience  of  wars  of  former  times. 


NOTE  105 

Frederic  the  Great's  army  often  marched  for  miles  across 
country.  I  need  only  mention  Schwerin's  advance  to  the 
Battle  of  Prague  as  an  example  of  this.  Engineer  parties 
were  often  attached  to  the  heads  of  columns  to  remove  or 
bridge  likely  obstacles.  We  see  these  measures  adopted 
already  in  the  First  Silesian  War.  Artillery  and  transport, 
if  possible,  used  roads.  We  have  not  the  least  cause  for 
assuming  that  what  was  possible  then  would  be  impossible 
to-day.  The  opposite  is  true.  The  engineers  are  to-day 
far  more  efficient  than  formerly,  and  the  country  is  gener- 
ally more  cultivated  and  richer  in  roads.  Even  when  we  are 
marching  across  country  we  can  now  and  then  use  roads, 
though  not  first-class  roads,  of  course.  There  is  no  reason, 
either,  why  the  artillery  and  transport  of,  say,  two  army 
corps  should  not  march  to-day,  as  then,  on  the  road,  while 
the  infantry  is  marching  on  both  sides  of  it,  advanced  guards 
going  ahead,  marking  out  and  making  possible  the  way  for 
the  infantry.  This  procedure  may  sometimes  be  very  much 
more  practical  than  marching  two  army  corps  behind  each 
other  by  one  road,  or  shortening  the  march  columns.  One 
thing  is,  of  course,  necessary,  and  that  is  that  when  march- 
ing in  this  way  there  must  be  one  uniform  command.  If 
there  is  no  metalled  road  at  all,  the  artillery  must  move 
across  country,  too,  and,  in  case  of  need,  the  necessary 
transports  as  well,  if  the  object  cannot  be  reached  by  a 
roundabout  way.  The  marches  must  then  be  made  shorter. 
Engineers  will,  in  such  cases,  always  precede  the  column. 
It  will  be  as  well  to  make  frequent  changes  in  the  units 
marching  at  the  head  of  the  column,  because  they  have  the 
hardest  task.  If  the  track  across  country  is  once  firmly 
trodden  down,  there  are,  as  a  rule,  no  longer  any  special 
difficulties.  Of  course,  we  do  not  march  like  this  at  ordi- 
nary times;  but  when  large  armies  are  closely  concentrated 
marching  in  this  way  may  greatly  enhance  their  power  of 
operating.  Naturally,  it  is  always  desirable  to  have  the 
country  to  be  traversed  reconnoitred  beforehand. 

"Like  marches  across  country,  so  will  night  marches  be- 
come necessary  in  a  future  war  more  frequently  than  hith- 
erto. They  will  be  used  to  escape,  for  instance,  reconnais- 
sance by  balloons,  to  avoid  losses  by  artillery  fire,  or  to  ap- 
proach the  enemy's  position  unobserved.  If  marches  have  to 
be  executed  across  country  in  the  dark,  it  is  absolutely 


io6        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

necessary  to  reconnoitre  the  country  minutely  beforehand 
and  to  fix  landmarks  which  cannot  be  missed  even  in  dark- 
ness. Such  marches  cannot  be  arranged  off-hand;  they 
must  be  carefully  prepared.  The  troops,  too,  must  be  prac- 
tised in  them,  and  acquire  a  certain  amount  of  skill  in 
marching  by  night  if  they  wish  to  avoid  disorder  at  de- 
cisive moments.  At  night  we  should  not  march  in  double 
column  on  roads,  because  difficulties  increase  in  darkness, 
and  controlling  the  column  is  easier  if  one  side  of  the  road 
is  left  free.  But  when  marching  across  country  it  will  be 
advisable  sometimes  to  execute  the  movement  in  shorter 
and  broader  columns,  so  as  to  keep  the  troops  better  in 
hand." 

In  discussing  the  question  of  supply,  he  points  out  that 
with  the  huge  masses  of  to-day  it  is  impossible  for  an  army 
to  live  on  the  resources  of  the  country.  It  must  depend  on 
supply  trains — usually  of  motor  wagons — working  from  the 
nearest  railhead,  and  drawing  supplies  of  food,  ammuni- 
tion, etc.,  from  magazines  accumulated  at  advanced  bases. 
This  makes  the  problem  of  changing  the  direction  of  the 
advance  a  difficult  one,  and  an  operation  against  the  line  of 
communications,  if  successful,  will  have  a  greater  effect  than 
ever  before,  for  the  result  will  be  that  immense  masses  of 
troops  will  be  in  danger  of  starvation.  He  insists  that 
instead  of  working  the  supply  of  a  group  of  army  corps  as 
a  single  unit,  it  will  be  necessary  to  provide  each  corps 
with  its  special  supply  train,  carrying  such  a  reserve  of 
supplies  as  will  make  it  possible  to  keep  the  corps  sup- 
plied for  a  few  days  either  when  the  communications  are 
endangered,  or  when  a  change  of  direction  is  being  made 
and  the  whole  general  system  of  supply  is  being  transferred 
to  a  new  group  of  roads.  He  analyzes  in  detail  several 
possible  changes  of  direction  in  order  to  show  how  in  each 
case  the  problem  of  temporarily  supplying  the  troops  and 
shifting  the  lines  of  supply  may  be  best  solved.  He  then 
returns  to  the  general  question  of  the  handling  of  great 
armies  in  war.] 


CHAPTER  VI 
SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  AND  COMMAND 


CHAPTER   VI 

SELF-RELIANCE,    METHOD,    AND    COMMAND 

WE  have  seen  that  the  fire  of  modern  arms  forces  us 
to  give  up  all  close  formations  in  action,  and  to  form 
loose  skirmishing  lines  in  the  foremost  fighting  line, 
as  loosely  as  the  necessity  of  effective  fire  will  permit. 
The  fronts  in  action  correspond  with  this  looseness, 
and  with  the  wider  extension  of  the  skirmishing  lines 
caused  by  it.  The  same  number  of  troops  can  to-day 
embrace  a  far  greater  space  than  formerly  if  a  greater 
organization  in  depth  is  not  insisted  upon.  The  artil- 
lery is,  owing  to  the  distant  fire  of  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery, obliged  to  use  indirect  fire.  The  cavalry  has  al- 
most completely  disappeared  from  the  common  battle- 
field of  the  other  arms.  With  the  enormous  size  of  the 
army  have  also  grown  enormously  the  extent  of  the 
battlefields  and  the  areas  of  operation.  The  vital 
points  in  the  existence  of  armies,  their  organization, 
and  the  method  of  moving  them,  are  altogether  differ- 
ent from  what  they  were  formerly.  All  this  causes  an 
absolute  change  in  the  formal  conditions  of  strategy 
and  tactics. 

But  with  the  forms  so  also  have  changed  the  spirit- 
ual means  which  give  life  to  these  forms.  The  army 
and  its  leaders  must  of  course  be  animated  by  bold- 
ness and  initiative  as  much,  and,  perhaps,  even  more 
to-day  than  in  the  wars  of  the  past,  if  we  want  to  be 
successful.  But  the  physical  and  moral  qualities  by 

109 


I  io        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

which  this  spirit  must  manifest  itself  are,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  many  ways,  different  from  those  prevailing  at 
the  time  of  close  formations.  Especially  must  the  in- 
fluence of  command  be  different  from  what  it  was 
formerly.  In  this  regard  no  one  has  as  yet  arrived 
at  a  perfectly  clear  conception  of  what  it  should  be, 
and  in  spite  of  completely  altered  conditions  in  actions 
and  in  operations,  tendencies  assert  themselves  over 
and  over  again,  of  working  with  means  belonging  to 
a  past  age.  The  latest  wars  show  this  in  a  striking 
manner. 

It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  acquaint  oneself 
thoroughly  with  the  actual  nature  of  modern  war  and 
combat,  with  the  object  of  arriving  at  a  perfectly  clear 
conception  of  them. 

Let  us  first  of  all  present  to  our  minds  what  a  mod- 
ern action  demands  from  the  two  chief  arms,  and  be- 
fore all  what  the  mode  of  action  is  which  decides 
matters,  namely,  the  attack,  without  which  a  victory 
can  hardly  be  conceived.  The  infantry  advances  in 
widely-extended  lines.  The  influence  of  commanders, 
as  far  as  it  is  transmitted  by  orders,  is  small.  Exten- 
sion is  too  great,  the  noise  of  battle  too  loud,  the 
tension  of  nerves  too  severe  for  the  voice  to  be  heard. 
Laboriously  the  most  urgent  directions  are  passed  on 
along  the  line  from  man  to  man.  At  close  and  decisive 
ranges  the  example  of  the  officers  only  prevails.  But 
the  enemy's  projectiles  reap  a  terrible  harvest,  par- 
ticularly among  the  leaders,  who  are  obliged  to  expose 
themselves  most.  All  influence  upon  the  men  then 
fails,  units  become  mixed,  everybody  is  left  to  him- 
self; the  man  as  such  becomes  prominent,  yet  not  the 
man  who  is  led  to  victory,  but  the  man  who  wants 
himself  to  conquer.  Almost  all  the  time  he  is  in  ac- 
tion he  is  left  to  himself.  He  himself  must  estimate 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND    in 

the  distances,  he  himself  must  judge  the  ground  and 
use  it,  select  his  target  and  adjust  his  sights.;  he  must 
know  whither  to  advance;  what  point  in  the  enemy's 
position  he  is  to  reach ;  with  unswerving  determination 
he  by  himself  must  strive  to  get  there.  Arrived  in 
the  enemy's  position,  he  must  know  what  he  is  to  do. 
If  the  attack  is  not  progressing,  if  it  is  impossible  to 
gain  ground  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  fire,  he  must 
create  cover  for  himself.  If  it  comes  to  reteating,  he 
must  obstinately  cling  to  the  ground  fighting.*  Hardly 
ever  can  he  count  upon  receiving  directions  from  his 
superiors.  But  what  holds  good  for  the  private,  holds 
good  all  the  more  for  the  leaders  of  all  grades.  They 
cannot  count  upon  receiving  orders  in  the  midst  of 
fighting.  It  is  as  a  rule  impossible  to  send  directions 
from  the  rear  into  the  foremost  fighting  line.  To 
count  upon  reliable  communication  by  signs  from  the 
rear  to  the  front  is  a  fancy  no  serious  soldier  should 
entertain  for  one  moment.  Once  the  troops  have 
come  within  effective  ranges  of  the  enemy's  fire  all 
regular  and  comprehensive  issue  of  orders  ceases.  All 
success  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  clear-sighted  ac- 
tion of  individual  groups  and  men,  on  the  example 
of  leaders,  or  of  those  who  feel  called  upon  to  lead. 
This  is  what  a  modern  infantry  action  looks  like; 
self-reliance  is  everything.  It  was  so,  it  is  true,  in  the 
last  wars,  during  the  final  stages  of  infantry  combat, 
but  in  future  the  stage  where  initiative  is  everything 
will  begin  much  sooner  than  formerly,  and  from  the 
outset  in  a  manner  much  more  pronounced. 

Artillery  action  will  Reveal  similar  features.  So 
long  as  the  batteries  are  under  cover,  are  firing  indi- 
rect, and  are  exposed  only  to  sweeping  and  searching 

*  Vide  v.  Bernhardi,  "Taktik  und  Ausbildung  der  Infan- 
terie." 


ii2        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

fire,  regular  control  can  certainly  be  exercised  over 
large  units.  But  when  artillery  has  to  unlimber  in  the 
open,  and  can  be  taken  under  fire,  the  effect  of  which 
the  enemy  can  watch,  not  only  the  combined  action 
of  large  units,  but  the  issue  of  orders  by  battery  com- 
manders themselves  will  soon  fail,  or  sometimes  be- 
come altogether  impossible.  Sections  and  single  guns 
will  be  obliged  to  fire  independently,  as  often  was 
the  case  in  1870-71 ;  for  the  voice  of  the  officer  com- 
manding the  battery  will  not  be  heard,  transmission 
by  word  of  mouth  will  likewise  become  impossible  in 
the  din  of  battle,  and  soon  numerous  officers  will  have 
fallen.  I  am  convinced  we  are  deceiving  ourselves 
if  we  believe  a  regular  control  of  fire  to  be  possible 
under  these  circumstances.  The  self-reliance  of  in- 
dividual subordinate  leaders  and  men,  and  not  a  uni- 
form control,  will  be  the  decisive  factor  in  the  last 
instance. 

These  conditions  are  bound  to  exercise  a  far-reach- 
ing influence  on  the  issue  of  orders.  The  troops  can 
only  act  with  self-reliance  in  a  proper  manner  if  they 
are  thoroughly  and  sufficiently  informed  as  to  the  in- 
tentions of  the  commander  and  the  object  of  the  fight. 
During  the  action  itself  any  communication  can  reach 
the  troops,  especially  the  infantry,  in  exceptional  cases 
only,  namely,  when  for  the  time  being  they  have 
reached  some  cover,  where  the  commanders  can,  on 
the  one  hand,  deal  with  the  troops  directly,  and  on 
the  other  receive  orders  themselves. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  troops  have  to  rely, 
as  long  as  the  action  lasts,  solely  on  what  they  knew 
about  the  object  of  the  action  and  the  co-operation  of 
the  various  units  before  the  battle  began.  This  is  over- 
looked too  often. 

To-day  the  mode  of  issuing  orders  in  manoeuvres 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     113 

is  such  that  the  troops  often  do  not  get  a  combined 
operation  order  at  all.  Special  instructions  are  often 
given  to  commanders  of  units  alone  when  charged 
with  a  definite  task.  The  connection  of  this  indi- 
vidual task  with  the  whole  plan  of  action  is  very  often 
not  apparent  in  these  instructions.  That  commander 
then  issues  his  orders  in  a  similar  manner.  In  this 
way  every  one,  of  course,  gets  to  know  his  special 
duty,  but  rarely  how  to  co-operate  with  neighbouring 
bodies.  Even  if  the  superior  authorities  have  issued 
an  actual  operation  order,  the  effect  is  mostly  the  same. 
Only  superior  commanders  become  acquainted  with  it, 
issuing  but  parts  of  it  as  a  rule  to  their  subordinates. 
And  so  it  happens  that  even  brigadiers  and  colonels 
are  often  unable  to  get  a  clear  view  of  the  situation. 
Captains,  to  crown  all,  know  nothing  at  all,  as  a  rule, 
about  the  plan  of  battle,  merely  receiving  for  their 
companies  some  direction  from  the  battalion  com- 
mander, who  habitually  counts  upon  being  able  to 
send  further  orders  to  the  troops  during  the  action 
by  his  adjutant,  because  of  real  danger  there  is  none 
in  peace  time.  At  the  same  time  superior  commanders 
are  too  frequently  found  in  the  foremost  line,  where 
they  can  survey  all,  and  adopt  suitable  measures,  with- 
out realizing  that  all  this  is  impossible  in  real  action. 

We  must  break  with  this  system  altogether.  A  new 
method  of  issuing  orders  must  take  its  place,  if  we 
do  not  wish  command  to  fail  on  active  service;  for 
what  we  have  practised  in  peace  will  be  done  habitu- 
ally in  war,  however  impracticable  it  may  be. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  self-reliance  of  the  various 
groups  and  men  leading  to  confusion  during  battle, 
and  that  they  may  act  in  accordance  with  the  inten- 
tions of  Headquarters,  it  is  imperative  to  adhere  rigor- 
ously to  a  systematic  issue  of  orders  before  entering 


H4        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

battle.  Everybody  must  know  so  much  of  the  general 
situation  as  is  requisite  for  him  to  know  within  the 
sphere  of  his  command,  to  enable  him  to  act  with 
self-reliance  under  any  circumstances,  even  should  the 
conditions  be  found  to  differ  from  what  the  order 
presumed,  or  change  in  the  course  of  action.  He  only 
who  knows  the  plan  of  the  whole  is  able  to  act  suitably 
in  sudden  emergencies.  There  will  certainly  be  cases 
when  there  is  no  time  to  proceed  systematically  and 
when  the  situation  calls  for  prompt  and  instantaneous 
action;  but  the  conditions  of  modern  war  generally 
require  and  allow  orders  to  be  issued  in  detail  and 
systematically,  because  the  attack  must  begin  far 
away  from  the  enemy,  and  the  reserves  must  as  a  rule 
be  held  back  far  in  rear.  Prompt  action,  too,  as  oc- 
casion may  demand,  which  precludes  us  from  issuing 
detailed  and  special  orders,  can  take  the  most  correct 
and  suitable  form  only  if  based  on  the  general  situa- 
tion previously  made  known.  The  successful  attacks 
in  future  will  materially  depend  on  the  first  measures 
adopted  and  on  the  method  of  issuing  orders.  General 
Headquarters  must,  therefore,  always  issue  a  clear  and 
comprehensive  operation  order  distinctly  showing  the 
object  of  the  battle,  the  general  plan,  and  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  various  parts;  and  this  order  must  not  be 
communicated  to  the  superior  commanders  alone; 
everybody  must  know  its  essential  portions. 

The  same  principles  hold  good  for  the  defence,  ex- 
cept that  here  all  is  naturally  less  difficult.  In  a  de- 
liberate defence  there  will  surely  always  be  time 
enough  for  regular  and  detailed  orders  to  be  issued; 
and  also  during  the  battle  itself,  especially  when  the 
fighting  troops  are  lying  under  cover,  it  will  often  be 
possible  for  orders  to  reach  them. 

It  is  necessary,  also,  to  issue  to  the  artillery  orders 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     115 

which  will  enable  and  permit  everybody  to  act  with 
self-reliance.  It  is  not  at  all  enough  to  indicate  to 
the  various  artillery  brigades  and  batteries  their  posi- 
tions and  targets.  Far  more  important  is  it  for  all 
to  be  informed  on  the  tactical  object  of  the  fire.  The 
artillery  must  know  the  task  given  to  the  infantry  in 
the  battle,  and  must  be  in  a  position  to  judge  fully 
how  it  can  best  aid  the  infantry  in  solving  its  task, 
so  that  all  subordinates,  knowing  the  situation,  are 
perfectly  free  to  act  with  self-reliance  at  the  given 
moment. 

Acting  with  self-reliance  in  the  sense  and  spirit  of 
General  Headquarters,  and  of  the  uniform  plan  of 
battle  known  to  us,  is  the  decisive  factor  in  modern 
battle. 

Matters  are  somewhat  different  with  cavalry.  If 
it  is  used  dismounted,  it  must,  of  course,  be  systemati- 
cally furnished  with  orders  like  any  other  troops ;  nay, 
even  more  so,  as  there  is  the  additional  care  for  the 
led  horses,  which  the  commander  concerned  can  only 
station  correctly  if  acquainted  with  the  general  situa- 
tion and  the  plan  of  action.  But  in  real  mounted  ac- 
tion detailed  orders  are  well-nigh  impossible.  Every- 
thing is  enacted  in  rapid  succession,  at  a  rapid  pace, 
in  the  shortest  possible  time,  and  only  by  a  brief  order 
and  word  of  command  can  the  will  of  the  leader  pro- 
duce action.  Sometimes  the  trumpet  may  also  help  to 
intervene.  But  it  is  possible  to  issue  orders  here  in 
this  way,  because  behind  the  commander  are  his  troops 
to-day,  as  formerly,  in  close  formation,  able  to  hear 
his  voice  and  trained  to  act  with  regularity  on  the 
briefest  call  or  hint. 

If  the  individual  is,  therefore,  tied  here  to  the  mass, 
all  the  more  prominent  become  the  initiative  and  self- 
reliance  of  the  superior  leaders.  They  must  always 


n6        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

be  fully  acquainted  with  the  strategic  situation  from 
which  the  action  develops;  the  general  and  guiding 
plan  of  action  must  be  briefly  communicated  to  them. 
They  must  have  learnt  to  understand  from  a  few 
tersely  coined  words  the  idea  and  the  will  of  the 
supreme  commander.  They  must,  however,  not  re- 
ceive this  will  in  the  form  of  an  order,  but  as  a  task, 
leaving  them  full  liberty  in  the  choice  of  the  means 
for  its  execution.  The  supreme  commander  cannot 
know  how  the  subordinate  commander  will  find  the 
situation,  he  cannot  discount  the  enemy's  counter- 
measures  in  advance,  and  must,  therefore,  leave  to 
his  subordinate  all  the  more  perfect  freedom  of  action, 
as  there  will  never  be  time  for  asking  questions  and 
giving  subsequent  directions  during  the  rapid  course 
of  a  cavalry  action. 

If  independence  of  action  in  cavalry  combats  is  thus 
generally  restricted  to  superior  commanders,  and  down 
to  squadron  commanders  only  when  they  are  charged 
with  a  special  duty,  the  necessity  of  independent  action 
of  even  the  smallest  group  becomes  all  the  more  promi- 
nent when  the  main  duties  of  cavalry  are  involved — 
namely,  reconnoitring,  screening,  and  raids  on  the  en- 
emy's lines  of  communication.  Reconnoitring  squad- 
rons, patrols,  and  other  detached  bodies,  cannot  be 
given  stringent  orders,  but  only  tasks,  which  they 
must  try  to  solve  with  self-reliance,  in  the  spirit  of  a 
situation  about  which  they  have  been  informed.  They 
will  often  find  the  situation  different  from  what  the 
superior  was  able  to  tell  them ;  it  will  often  change  in 
the  course  of  events.  Over  and  over  again  will  the 
individual  be  called  upon  to  show  judgment  and  de- 
termination. A  strict  method  and  the  greatest  self- 
reliance  must  go  hand  in  hand  here,  to  enable  every 
one  to  respond  to  this  call. 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND    117 

Reconnoitring,  screening,  and  reporting  must  be 
arranged  systematically;  the  system  must  be  clearly 
expressed  in  the  detailed  instructions  given  to  the 
members  concerned,  to  enable  them  to  understand 
the  connection  of  these  three  duties ;  this  system  must 
become  a  second  nature  to  all  the  troops,  so  that  every 
one  can  find  his  way  about  in  it.  Every  individual 
member,  on  the  other  hand,  must  be  trained  in  self- 
reliance  and  be  left  to  exercise  it,  so  that  when  the 
situation  changes  and  the  enemy's  action  is  felt  every 
one  is  able  to  act  suitably  in  the  spirit  of  the  whole. 
The  cavalry  soldier  must,  more  than  any  other  in- 
dividual of  the  army,  rely  upon  himself  when  on  stra- 
tegic service,  and  upon  his  own  judgment  as  well  as 
upon  his  boldness.  The  amount  of  his  self-reliance 
is  at  the  same  time  the  measure  of  his  work. 

The  same  reciprocal  effect  between  system  and  self- 
reliance  as  required  by  the  combat  and  strategic  ser- 
vice of  cavalry  must,  under  modern  conditions,  be 
also  demanded  from  the  conduct  of  operations  and 
the  action  of  the  various  units  during  the  operations. 
All  movements  of  masses  must  be  carried  out  system- 
atically, if  maximum  performances  are  to  be  at- 
tained. In  arranging  the  marches  and  regulating  sup- 
ply it  is  absolutely  necessary,  as  we  have  seen,  to  be 
strictly  systematic,  so  as  to  prevent  most  serious  checks 
in  the  movements  of  the  whole  army.  Its  mobility  di- 
rectly depends  on  this  system  being  adhered  to,  and 
commanders  of  troops  must  fully  master  its  laws  to 
be  able  to  fulfil  their  duties.  Yet  the  system  alone 
is  not  enough  for  the  proper  execution  of  the  strategic 
movements. 

Two  factors  appear  as  a  disturbing  element ;  firstly, 
friction,  which  asserts  itself  in  all  actions  in  war,  is 
caused  by  misunderstandings,  unforeseen  accidents, 


n8        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

personal  failings,  and  similar  reasons,  and  will  always 
exercise  anew  a  paralysing  influence  on  the  mechan- 
ism; and,  secondly,  the  intervention  of  the  enemy. 
When  one  or  the  other  of  these  disturbances  in  the 
systematic  course  of  a  military  operation  occurs,  it 
is  bound  to  have  an  effect  all  the  more  injurious,  the 
greater  the  tension  under  which  the  whole  and  neces- 
sary system  was  working.  In  such  a  case  there  is  only 
one  means  of  keeping  the  entire  mechanism  going, 
namely,  the  self-reliant  action  of  every  link  in  the 
chain  of  this  system,  in  taking  care  that  the  wants  of 
the  movement  are  first  of  all  met  by  increased  march 
performances  of  some  portions  and  other  suitable 
measures,  and  that  next  the  disorder  in  the  whole 
mechanism  is  again  removed. 

But  such  self-reliant  action  is  only  possible  when 
all  individual  members  are  informed  on  the  general 
situation.  Here  again,  therefore,  arises  the  necessity 
for  a  systematic  issue  of  orders,  which,  without  re- 
stricting individual  action  more  than  is  necessary,  must 
transmit  enough  of  the  knowledge  on  the  general  situ- 
ation and  the  strategic  object  to  enable  the  various 
portions  in  case  of  need  to  act  with  self-reliance  in  the 
proper  manner.  The  modern  means  of  communica- 
tion and  intelligence  certainly  facilitate  in  all  such 
cases  the  co-operation  of  every  part,  but  for  all  that 
do  not  replace  self-reliance. 

The  way  in  which  the  English  conducted  the  South 
African  War  is,  in  this  respect,  extremely  instructive. 
Here  a  system  of  perfect  centralization  of  command 
prevailed.  Every  strategic  and  tactical  movement  was 
prescribed  by  the  central  authority  to  the  minutest 
detail ;  personal  initiative  was  confined  to  the  narrow- 
est limits.  When  it  appeared  it  was  at  once  sup- 
pressed, and  where  initiative  proved  necessary  it  failed 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     119 

nearly  always.  Especially  when  Lord  Kitchener  be- 
came Commander-in-Chief,  centralization  of  com- 
mand appeared  in  its  acutest  form,  giving  rise  to  alto- 
gether stereotyped  measures.  The  result  matched  the 
action.  As  little  as  they  ever  succeeded  in  beating  the 
Boers  decisively  in  the  first  part  of  the  campaign,  as 
little  did  they  succeed  in  suppressing  the  guerillas  in 
the  second  part.  The  self-reliant  initiative  of  a  de 
Wet,  a  de  la  Rey,  and  a  Botha  defied  all  the  thumb- 
rule  measures  of  British  General  Headquarters,  which 
positively  precluded  all  independent  action  of  subordi- 
nate commanders.  The  English  must  confess,  and 
they  do  confess,  that  their  army  completely  failed  in 
this  respect.*  Complaints  on  the  purely  literal  obedi- 
ence and  want  of  self-reliance  and  initiative  of  the 
English  generals  were  heard  from  all  sides.  They 
characterize  the  opinion  the  English  had  of  their  own 
army.  It  had  apparently  ceased  to  appreciate  that 
self-reliance  is  everywhere  necessary  corollary  to  any 
systematic  action. 

The  larger  the  portions  of  an  army  with  which  we 
have  to  deal,  the  more  independence  must  be  granted 
to  them,  because  General  Headquarters  cannot  survey 
the  details  so  well  with  large  bodies  of  troops  as  they 
can  with  smaller  ones. 

A  divisional  commander  knows  exactly  where  each 
of  the  units  belonging  to  his  command  is  at  the  mo- 
ment; a  general  commanding  an  army  corps  knows 
exactly  the  area  occupied  by  his  divisions,  and  the 
positions  of  the  supply  depots  apportioned  to  him,  and, 
if  his  corps  is  marching  by  one  road,  the  whole  appa- 
ratus of  his  lines  of  communication.  The  commander 
of  an  army,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  informed  on  the 
interior  arrangements  made  by  the  army  corps.  He 
*  "The  Times'  History  of  the  War  in  South  Africa." 


120        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

only  deals  with  army  corps  and  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation; it  is  the  business  of  the  corps  to  arrange  in 
detail  the  intercourse  with  the  latter.  The  Comman- 
der-in-Chief  finally  deals  with  the  area  of  operation 
and  the  objectives  of  the  various  armies,  with  the  rail- 
heads and  intercommunication  in  general.  It  is  im- 
possible for  him  to  survey  the  detailed  arrangements 
of  the  armies,  still  less  of  the  army  corps. 

The  larger  the  command  of  a  general,  the  less, 
therefore,  must  he  interfere  with  the  details  of  the  ar- 
rangements for  which  his  subordinate  commanders 
are  responsible:  for  orders  emanating  from  General 
Headquarters  and  interfering  in  matters  of  which  the 
authority  issuing  the  order  cannot  know  the  details, 
generally  prove  infeasible  or  cause,  to  say  the  least, 
grave  inconveniences;  these  grow  with  the  size  of  the 
operating  masses,  because  with  them  frictions  and 
possible  misunderstandings  increase. 

This  caused  Field-Marshal  Moltke  to  issue  no 
further  orders  at  all  to  the  armies  or  independent 
army  portions,  but  to  send  them  only  directives.  The 
object  to  be  attained  was  communicated  to  the  army 
commanders,  and  they  were  given  certain  points  of 
view  on  which  they  were  to  act.  Where  their  spheres 
of  action  came  in  contact  with  each  other,  a  dividing 
line  was  indicated,  or  one  portion  was  placed  under 
the  command  of  the  other.  But  the  mode  of  execut- 
ing their  task  was,  as  a  rule,  left  to  the  subordinate 
commanders,  and  only  occasionally  did  the  Field-Mar- 
shal intervene  by  giving  definite  instructions  on  how  to 
act. 

The  experiences  gained  with  this  system  were  not 
always  satisfactory.  Repeatedly  it  became  apparent 
that  army  commanders  were  unable  to  grasp  the  spirit 
of  Moltke's  brief  directives,  because  they  were  not 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     121 

conversant  with  Moltke's  train  of  thought.  Collisions 
and  strategic  difficulties  were  the  consequence.  I  need 
only  mention  the  advance  of  the  First  and  Second 
Armies  to  the  Saar,  and  the  operations  against  Mac- 
Mahon  ending  at  Sedan.  In  both  cases  the  mode  of 
issuing  orders  did  not  suffice  to  bring  about  regular 
systematic  movements.  Too  much  independence  was 
left  to  the  subordinate  commanders;  they  did  not  en- 
ter into  the  spirit  of  Moltke's  orders,  and  the  tech- 
nical difficulties  of  the  operations  ordered  were  neither 
recognized  nor  overcome.  In  future  we  shall  be 
obliged  to  develop  Moltke's  system  further. 

Directives  of  a  general  nature,  like  those  given  at 
that  time,  would  not  always  suffice  to-day  for  the  co- 
operation of  several  armies.*  We  shall  often  have  to 
adopt  more  detailed  and  definite  measures  for  guaran- 
teeing uniform  action  in  the  enormous  mechanism  of 
modern  armies  and  for  preventing  the  various  bodies 
from  disturbing  each  other.  The  numbers  are  now 
greater  than  before  in  proportion  to  the  space  avail- 
able. This  often  causes  the  various  portions  of  the 
whole  army  to  be  in  close  touch  with  each  other,  thus 
necessitating  some  definite  instructions  to  be  given. 
Yet  we  must  again  guard  against  going  too  far  in 
this  direction.  Only  what  is  absolutely  necessary  must 
be  ordered.  The  greatest  possible  independence  of 
the  various  portions  must  always  be  preserved.  It 
needs  much  training  of  the  mind,  great  tact,  and  a  per- 
fect mastery  of  the  technical  elements  of  warfare  to 
find  the  proper  limits  between  what  must  be  ordered 

*  The  directives  given  also  by  General  Freiherr  v.  Falken- 
hausen  in  his  book,  "Flankenbewegungen  und  Massenheer," 
are  not  sufficient  I  think.  The  areas  of  operation  of  the  vari- 
ous armies  are  not  clearly  defined  it  seems  and  the  system 
of  reconnaissance  and  subsistence  not  definitely  regulated. 


122        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

and  what  must  not  be  ordered.  The  personal  char- 
acter of  the  subordinate  must  also  be  considered.  To 
one  may  be  left  more  freedom,  the  other  we  must  tie 
by  more  definite  orders.  The  psychological  moment 
plays  here  a  great  role.  At  any  rate,  operations  of 
modern  armies  must  never  be  ordered  which  can  only 
succeed  if  everything  is  arranged  to  the  minutest  de- 
tail by  General  Headquarters,  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  can  be  so  carried  out.  There  is  then  still  al- 
ways the  danger  of  invincible  friction  being  produced. 
When  practising  in  peace,  on  the  manoeuvre  field  as 
well  as  on  the  map,  we  are  always  tempted  to  limit 
the  independence  of  subordinates  in  the  interest  of 
our  own  intentions  and  views,  many  succumbing  to 
this  temptation.  I  have  repeatedly  had  this  experience. 
At  war  games,  when  dealing  with  strategy,  General 
Headquarters  ordered  operations  which  could  only 
be  executed  if  the  marches  were  systematically  ar- 
ranged in  the  minutest  detail  by  General  Headquarters 
down  to  the  army  corps  and  their  trains.  The  neces- 
sary orders  were  dispatched  in  long  telegrams  to  the 
various  army  corps.  It  was  quite  arbitrarily  assumed 
here  that  the  troops  lived  entirely  on  the  country  and 
were  followed  by  regularly  formed  echelons  of  their 
columns  and  trains.  The  connection  with  the  depots 
and  railheads  was  not  considered  at  all,  else  the  whole 
arrangement  would  have  been  recognized  as  impossi- 
ble in  theory  alone.  These  assumptions  were  un- 
natural; the  writing  and  transmission  of  the  orders 
were  impossible  as  regards  time.  The  whole  pro- 
cedure would  have  failed  on  active  service,  for  the 
most  part  in  the  issue  of  orders  alone.  In  other  cases 
the  lines-of -communication  system  would  have  broken 
down.  And  if  we  now  imagine  such  a  procedure  tak- 
ing place,  let  us  say,  in  the  thinly-populated  fields  of 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND    123 

Russia,  we  shall  be  able  to  realize  ^11  the  danger  of 
conceiving  war  based  on  arrangements  of  this  sort. 
Paper  can  stand  a  lot  of  things,  but  in  reality  we  pay 
for  such  follies  with  lost  battles  and  ruined  armies. 
The  temptation  to  issue  such  orders  for  ensuring  the 
co-operation  of  various  bodies  during  intricate  opera- 
tions has  often  asserted  itself  in  war,  too.  In  South 
Africa,  as  I  have  mentioned  before,  English  General 
Headquarters  completely  succumbed  to  it.  During 
the  so-called  "drives,"  for  instance,  a  similar  mode 
was  adopted.  Everything  was  ordered  by  General 
Headquarters,  to  the  smallest  detail,  even  regarding 
supply  columns  and  their  movements.  Here  only 
small  detachments  were  certainly  involved,  scattered 
over  a  wide  space,  and  an  enemy  consisting  as  a  rule 
of  some  few  hundred  undisciplined  Boers.  Yet  the 
system  failed.  Because  of  the  nececsity  of  adhering 
to  the  system  ordered,  the  enemy  was  of  less  concern, 
and  the  Boers  remained  masters  of  the  situation.* 

If,  by  ordering  too  much,  we  sometimes  produce 
the  opposite  of  order  and  co-operation,  and  therefore 
thoroughly  fail  in  our  object,  we  must  never,  on  the 
other  hand,  out  of  regard  to  the  self-reliance  of  sub- 
ordinates, be  afraid  of  ordering  plainly  and  distinctly 

*  These  "drives"  were  arranged  in  regular  shooting  fash- 
ion. The  tract  of  country  to  be  driven  over  for  Boers  lay, 
as  a  rule,  between  two  blockhouse  lines  approximately  par- 
allel with  each  other.  At  one  of  the  open  ends  troops  were 
posted  like  sportsmen,  as  it  were,  toward  whom  a  line  of 
beaters  drove  the  Boers  from  the  other  open  end.  During 
night  the  beaters  bivouacked  in  small  groups  of  about 
six  men. 

All  the  large  detachments  of  the  Boers  of  course  broke 
through,  partly  on  the  flanks  and  partly  through  the  line  of 
beaters,  and  then  marched  wherever  they  liked.  Only  strag- 
glers were  caught,  at  the  expense  of  an  enormous  amount 
of  force,  of  money,  and  of  Kitchener  spirit. 


124        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

what  is  really  necessary.  Moreover,  no  subordinate 
leader  must  be  left  in  the  dark  as  to  what  is  to  be 
done.  But  this  "what  is  to  be  done"  must  always  keep 
within  the  limits  of  what  can  be  carried  out  practically 
without  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  and  must  never  be  de- 
termined by  what  is  merely  desirable. 

A  study  of  the  Russian  War  in  Manchuria  is  highly 
instructive  in  this  respect.  There  was  no  end  of  or- 
ders. Every  commander  encroached  upon  the  sphere 
of  his  subordinates,  often  ordering  details  with  which 
he  had  nothing  to  do.  But  the  troops  were  never 
clearly  and  distinctly  told  what  they  were  to  do.  Su- 
perior commanders  hardly  ever  expressed  their  will 
in  unambiguous  terms.  Everybody  shirked  responsi- 
bility. It  was  never  plain  whether  the  desirable  was 
really  to  be  attained  by  all  means.  A  firm  resolution 
was  never  apparent.  By  this  mode  of  issuing  orders 
the  firm  will  to  conquer  was  ultimately  drowned. 

Command  in  modern  war  demands  the  greatest 
amount  of  tact,  wise  self-restraint,  and  rigorous  clear- 
ness. The  problem  of  command  is  not  only  to  move 
the  troops  and  concentrate  them  for  action;  its  task 
is  the  wider  one  of  causing  self-reliant  action  of  the 
spiritual  forces  of  the  army  and  its  leaders,  and  of 
producing,  as  if  by  magic,  the  maximum  perform- 
ances, and  of  carrying  away  the  whole  to  perform  the 
greatest  deeds  by  concentrating  all  self-reliance  and 
all  mental  and  moral  forces  upon  the  attainment  of  the 
object  indicated  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

It  is  a  delusion  to  believe  this  to  be  possible  without 
staking  one's  full  personality,  and  yet  we  see  a  modern 
tendency  trying  to  limit  the  very  personal  element  in 
command. 

In  an  essay  of  the  "German  Review,"  called  "The 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     125 

War  of  our  Days,"  *  is  described  in  a  specially  strik- 
ing manner — certainly  more  humorously  than  profes- 
sionally— the  kind  of  command  people  often  prefer  to 
call  "modern"  to-day:  "The  Commander-in-Chief  is 
further  in  rear  in  a  house  with  spacious  writing  rooms, 
where  wire  and  wireless  telegraphy,  telephone  and 
signalling  appliances  are  at  hand,  where  crowds  of 
motor-cars  and  motor-cycles,  ready  to  go  any  dis- 
tance, are  waiting  for  orders.  Here,  in  a  comfortable 
arm-chair,  in  front  of  a  large  table,  the  modern  Alex- 
ander has  before  him  the  whole  battlefield  on  a  map; 
thence  he  telephones  stirring  words,  and  there  he  re- 
ceives the  reports  of  the  army  and  corps  commanders, 
of  the  captive  balloons,  and  of  the  dirigible  airships." 

It  is  an  idea  much  in  vogue  to-day,  and  given  here, 
perhaps,  in  too  extreme  a  form,  that  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  the  supreme  leader,  ought  to  be  far  behind 
the  front  in  a  central  position,  in  rear,  surrounded  by 
all  the  adjuncts  of  modern  technics;  but,  surely,  the 
question  instinctively  rises  in  all  of  us,  whether  it  is 
really  imperative  for  the  General-in-Chief  to  abandon, 
as  here  described,  all  personal  influence,  and  to  con- 
fine himself  to  telephoning  from  the  arm-chair  "stir- 
ring" words,  the  stirring  force  of  which  may  then  be 
fairly  doubted. 

It  seems  to  me,  we  must  not  judge  of  matters  in 
this  one-sided  and  summary  fashion,  as  was  done 
there. 

First  of  all,  I  think  we  must  make  a  difference  be- 
tween strategic  and  tactical  command.  The  opera- 
tions of  the  army  must,  of  course,  be  directed  from 
a  central  office  as  was  done  by  General  Headquarters 
in  1870-71. 

*  Deutsche  Revue,  January,  1909,  "Der  Krieg  der  Gegen- 
wart." 


126        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

At  such  a  place  the  Commander-in-Chief  can  dis- 
pose over  all  the  necessary  rooms  maps,  and  all 
the  means  for  issuing  orders.  Here  will  also  con- 
verge all  the  means  of  communication — chiefly,  there- 
fore, telegraph  lines — for  keeping  General  Headquar- 
ters constantly  informed  of  all  that  is  happening,  and 
of  the  course  of  operations,  and  for  transmitting  its 
orders.  Efforts  will  be  made  to  change  quarters  not 
too  often,  so  as  not  to  interrupt  too  much  consecutive 
work.  General  Headquarters  therefore  follows  the 
army  only  by  stages.  Army  Headquarters  manages 
in  a  similar  manner  so  long  as  the  operations  are  pro- 
ceeding and  the  troops  are  marching,  while,  of  course, 
Army  Corps  Headquarters  will  always  remain  with 
their  troops. 

But  matters  are  altogether  different  the  moment 
tactical  command  is  involved.  Here  we  shall  have 
to  distinguish  between  cases  of  a  varying  nature;  for 
the  manner  of  command  must  be  quite  different  when 
a  single  army  is  fighting  a  battle,  or  when  even  several 
armies  are  fighting  united  on  the  battlefield,  from 
what  it  must  be  in  a  great  battle,  in  which  the  bulk 
of  the  forces  of  the  whole  army  are  taking  part  in 
various  distant  groups. 

In  the  latter  case  it  may  sometimes  be  imperative, 
owing  to  the  great  extent  of  the  battlefield  or  owing 
to  the  distances  apart  from  each  other  of  the  various 
local  battlefields,  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  re- 
main in  centrally  situated  headquarters,  though  the 
necessity  for  such  action  will  surely  not  always  arise. 
But  his  activity  in  that  case  will  be  altogether  different 
from  what  the  anonymous  author  of  the  "German 
Review"  depicts.  The  Commander-in-Chief  will  then, 
of  course,  only  deal  with  his  army  commanders ;  from 
them  alone  he  receives  reports,  to  them  alone  will  he 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     127 

send  his  instructions.  He  will  allow  himself  to  inter- 
fere with  the  details  of  army  commands,  and  to  send 
orders  to  individual  corps,  only  in  exceptional  and 
urgent  cases.  He  will  retain  direct  command  only 
over  reserves  and  sometimes  over  detached  bodies. 
He  will,  no  doubt,  also  abstain  from  sending  stirring 
messages  by  telephone.  All  reports  and  news  about 
the  enemy,  however,  are  not  received  by  him  in  the 
first  instance,  but  by  the  army  commanders  who  con- 
trol the  dirigible  airships,  captive  balloons,  and  other 
reconnoitring  organs.  The  army  commanders,  on 
their  part  again,  deal  directly  only  with  the  corps  com- 
manders, no  matter  whether  the  former  are  personally 
present  on  the  battlefield  or  not.  The  main  task  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief  is,  in  such  a  case,  to  draw 
the  strategic  consequences  from  the  results  of  the  in- 
dividual tactical  decisions ;  with  these  he  reckons  as  if 
with  given  factors. 

Things,  however,  will  take  a  different  aspect  when 
we  have  to  deal  with  the  battle  of  a  single  army,  or 
with  the  combined  battle  of  several  armies — with  bat- 
tles, therefore,  like  those  of  St.  Privat  and  Sedan. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  will  in  such  a  case  certainly 
make  use  of  all  the  technical  adjuncts  as  well,  in  order 
to  keep  in  touch  with  the  various  subordinate  bodies; 
he  will  establish  himself  in  a  central  spot,  whereto  all 
the  means  of  communication  converge.  But  he  is  not 
at  all  obliged  to  look  for  such  a  central  place  far  from 
the  battlefield.  The  very  perfection  of  the  mechanical 
means  of  communication  makes  him  independent  of 
any  field  position.  Nor  is  he  personally  at  all  tied 
permanently  to  this  central  spot — to  the  arm-chair  of 
a  modern  Alexander;  for  has  he  not  the  mechanical 
means  of  keeping  in  constant  communication  with  it? 
He  will,  therefore,  not  let  himself  be  deprived  of  the 


128        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

privilege,  should  he  think  it  necessary,  of  intervening 
personally  at  the  decisive  points  of  the  battlefield,  and 
of  inspiring  the  troops  by  his  personality,  as  the  great 
captains  in  every  age  have  done. 

Be  the  battlefield  ever  so  extended,  at  one  spot  of 
the  wide  front  the  plot  laid  by  the  strategic  and  tacti- 
cal conditions  will  thicken  to  a  crisis.  That  is  the 
point  where  the  director  of  battle  must  be  also  found 
in  future.  Here  his  personal  intervention  may  be  of 
decisive  importance,  especially  when  troops  of  co-ordi- 
nate commanders  are  required  to  co-operate,  as,  for 
instance,  was  the  case  at  St.  Privat. 

Two  German  armies  were  united  here  for  battle — 
namely,  the  First  and  Second  Armies.  They  encoun- 
tered the  enemy's  position  on  a  broad  front.  As  soon 
as  its  extent  was  recognized,  a  glance  on  the  map 
should  have  sufficed  to  reveal  the  fact  that  St.  Privat 
was  the  decisive  point.  The  French  left  wing  was 
leaning  direct  on  the  strongest  works  of  the  fortress. 
Here  the  greatest  possible  resistance  was  to  be  ex- 
pected. Even  if  this  wing  had  been  successfully 
pushed  back,  it  would  only  have  brought  the  victor 
under  the  guns  of  the  St.  Quentin  and  Plappeville 
Forts.  It  was,  moreover,  then  still  possible  for  the 
French  to  retreat  north,  provided  their  right  wing 
held  its  ground.  But  if  the  Height  of  St.  Privat  was 
captured,  the  whole  position  of  the  French  army  be- 
came impossible,  the  army  being  hopelessly  pushed 
into  the  fortress.  It  was,  therefore,  merely  a  question 
of  pinning  the  French  forces  to  the  ground  along  the 
whole  length  of  their  front;  at  the  most,  an  attempt 
might  have  been  made  to  support  the  frontal  attack 
by  enveloping  the  French  left  flank  through  the  Bois 
de  Vaux.  But  at  St.  Privat  it  was  necessary  to  defeat 
the  enemy.  Here  the  Guard  and  Twelfth  Corps  were 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     129 

to  co-operate.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
ensure  their  united  and  uniform  action.  But  General 
Headquarters  was  not  far  from  Gravelotte  on  the 
right  wing,  and  Prince  Frederic  Charles  was  standing 
at  Habonville,  likewise  far  away  from  the  decisive 
field.  And  so  the  co-operation  of  the  two  corps  on 
the  left  flank  was  left  more  or  less  to  chance,  and  it 
was  merely  owing  to  the  goodwill  prevailing  every- 
where that  it  was  brought  about  at  all.  When  the 
First  Brigade  of  Guards  attacked,  the  Forty-fifth  In- 
fantry Brigade  was  standing  at  the  little  wood  of 
Auboue,  intervening  just  in  time  on  its  own  initiative 
when,  in  the  moment  of  the  crisis  Lieutenant  v.  Ese- 
beck,  likewise  on  his  own  initiative,  called  its  atten- 
tion to  the  serious  struggle  of  the  Guards.  The  Forty- 
eighth  and  Forty-sixth  Infantry  Brigades  were  but 
coming  up.  The  Forty-seventh  was  standing  in  re- 
serve behind  St.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  after  having  taken 
part  in  the  assault  on  that  village.  A  combined  order 
for  both  army  corps  was  altogether  wanting;  each 
acted  in  the  way  it  thought  best.  If  Army  Head- 
quarters had  been  on  the  spot  here,  matters  would  have 
been  materially  different. 

Similar  examples  could  be  freely  quoted  from  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  If,  for  instance,  Kuropatkin 
had  been  in  person  on  the  battlefield  of  Sandepu,  he 
would  have  convinced  himself  of  the  advantage  the 
situation  presented,  and  could  have  altered  his  orders, 
which  were  paralysing  the  attack.  But  he  remained 
in  the  central  position,  and  meanwhile  the  battle  was 
lost. 

Whatever  we  may  think,  it  is  always  the  personal 
opinion,  based  on  what  we  see  with  our  own  eyes, 
which  is  of  decisive  importance  on  the  battlefield,  be- 
cause here  not  only  comes  into  play  the  mutual  rela- 


130        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

tionship  of  time,  space,  and  force,  as  in  strategic 
operations,  but  also  directly  those  imponderable  fac- 
tors, which,  produced  at  the  moment  can  only  be  ap- 
preciated when  personally  seen;  it  shows  that  he  who 
voluntarily  keeps  away  from  the  battlefield  without 
any  necessity  for  it,  abandons  at  the  same  time  the 
best  part  of  what  he  can  perform  personally.  The 
moment  the  Commander-in-Chief  has  become  aware 
of  the  point  where  the  main  issue  will  be  brought 
about,  he  must  not  hesitate  to  go  there  and  separate 
himself  temporarily  from  his  centre  of  intelligence, 
with  which  he  will,  however,  remain  constantly  in 
communication. 

We  here  become  aware  of  one  of  the  advantages  of 
the  offensive.  The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  at- 
tacking army  knows,  as  a  rule,  where  he  will  decide  the 
issue;  he  can  go  there  in  person  and  accordingly  ar- 
range from  the  outset  his  whole  intelligence  service. 
But  the  General-in-Chief  of  the  defending  army  must 
await  the  development  of  the  attack  before  he  can 
judge  where  the  decisive  issue  will  be  forced  on  him, 
or  where  he  himself  will  enforce  it.  It  is  only  then 
that  he  can  select  a  suitable  position  for  himself  and 
arrange  for  his  intelligence  service.  That  is  one  of 
the  disadvantages  consequent  on  giving  up  the  initia- 
tive. Kuropatkin  could  have  been  on  the  spot  on 
the  morning  of  the  attack  at  Sandepu,  and  could  have 
at  once  adopted  the  most  comprehensive  measures. 
Oyama  could  not  go  until  the  decisive  importance  of 
the  Russian  attack  had  been  recognized.  He  was 
bound  to  have  the  last  hand  in  all  his  counter-measures 
in  regard  to  space  as  well  as  to  time.  But  neither 
ought  he  to  have  allowed  himself  to  be  tied  to  the 
comfortable  arm-chair  of  a  modern  Alexander. 

The  Commander-in-Chief 's  place  is  to-day,  as  for- 


SELF-RELIANCE,  METHOD,  COMMAND     131 

merly,  where  the  issue  is  decided,  and  where  he  can 
himself  survey  the  decisive  field  of  battle.  The  possi- 
bility of  regaining  his  central  position,  in  case  of  need, 
within  a  short  space  of  time  by  modern  means  of  com- 
munication, will  facilitate  his  resolve  of  going  him- 
self to  the  battlefield.  But  it  is  the  duty  of  the  intelli- 
gence service  to  bring  to  him  there  the  necessary  news 
and  to  transmit  thence  his  orders.  Telephone,  tele- 
graph, motor-cars,  motor-cycles,  and  flying  machines 
are  available  for  that  object.  To  simplify  as  much 
as  possible  the  apparatus  needed  for  this,  and  to  relieve 
the  Commander-in-'Chief  in  every  possible  way,  to 
limit  the  receipt  and  transmission  of  reports  and  or- 
ders as  far  as  possible — that  is  the  duty  of  the  staff. 
But  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself  must  try  to  keep 
his  mind  and  memory  free  from  the  details  of  events 
with  which  only  the  commanders  of  troops  are  di- 
rectly concerned ;  he  must  only  keep  in  view  the  great 
and  decisive  factors,  and  leave  the  rest  to  his  subordi- 
nate commanders,  but  he  must  rapidly  and  vigorously 
intervene  the  moment  the  issue  hangs  in  the  scale.  To 
act  in  this  way  is  the  most  difficult,  but  the  most  need- 
ful task  of  the  spiritual  systematics  of  generalship. 
The  magnitude  of  the  task  grows  with  the  magnitude 
of  the  masses  engaged.  On  the  one  hand  grows  with 
it  the  number  of  reports  coming  in,  which  are  only 
too  apt  to  confuse  the  great  features  of  the  whole 
picture,  and,  on  the  other,  the  measures  once  adopted 
can  only  be  cancelled  with  difficulty  and  under  penalty 
when  large  bodies  of  the  army  are  involved  which 
are  sometimes  far  away.  The  weight  of  responsibility 
and  the  difficulty  of  rightly  gauging  effects  and  con- 
sequences have,  before  all,  become  greater.  Only  a 
great  and  open  mind  is  equal  to  this  task. 


CHAPTER  VII 
ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE 


CHAPTER   VII 

ATTACK   AND    DEFENCE 

REFLECTIONS  so  far  have  shown  that  the  modern 
arms,  through  their  increased  effect  in  all  directions, 
exercise  a  far-reaching  influence  on  tactics.  The  mod- 
ern armies  of  masses  bring  to  the  battlefield  elements 
which  have  never  before  been  dealt  with  by  the  science 
of  war.  Technics  have  furnished  the  art  of  war  with 
means  opening  not  only  new  avenues  to  transport  and 
communication  service,  but  taking  in  the  air  as  a  field 
of  action  as  well. 

Under  these  altered  conditions,  acting  and  reacting 
upon  each  other  in  so  many  ways,  the  investigating 
mind,  trying  to  trace  the  effects  due  to  these  new 
phenomena,  is  in  the  end  faced  by  the  question, 
whether  the  fundamental  conditions  of  all  warfare 
where  all  military  action  comes  into  play — namely, 
whether  the  relation  of  attack  and  defence — has  not 
altered  too,  on  account  of  the  many  means  hitherto 
unknown  and  now  used  in  modern  warfare. 

This  relation  determines  the  nature  of  war  in  so 
many  ways  as  to  make  it  altogether  impossible  to 
deal  with  the  art  of  war  without  being  perfectly  clear 
on  the  reciprocal  effect  of  attack  and  defence.  We 
must,  therefore,  not  mind  the  trouble  of  closely  ex- 
amining their  mutual  action  and  reaction. 

Clause witz   considers   the   defensive   the   stronger 

135 


136        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

form  of  conducting  war.*  I  do  not  share  this  opinion. 
I  rather  think  we  must  compare  attack  and  defence 
in  a  twofold  manner:  firstly,  as  a  means  of  fighting; 
and,  secondly,  as  a  mode  of  action  in  conducting  war. 
As  a  means  of  fighting,  the  defence  may  be  stronger, 
yet  an  offensive  mode  of  action  in  conducting  a  war 
may  prove  still  stronger.  The  conditions  decisive  for 
both  are  absolutely  different,  and  cannot  directly  be 
compared  with  each  other  at  all. 

If  we  first  of  all  compare  defence  and  attack  as  a 
means  of  fighting,  I  certainly  seem  to  have  no  doubt 
of  the  defence  being  substantially  superior,  and  having 
even  gained  in  strength  by  the  development  of  modern 
armaments. 

Glancing  first  at  infantry  action  alone,  we  shall  find 
that  the  greater  efficiency  of  the  rifle  benefits  the  de- 
fence above  all,  and  increases  the  advantages  arising 
from  the  nature  of  things. 

The  defender  to  begin  with  has,  at  least  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  the  choice  of  the  position  in  which 
he  intends  to  fight.  He  will  select  it  so  as  to  have 
a  clear  field  of  fire,  sweep  all  the  ground  in  front,  and 
remain  himself  under  cover  of  the  ground  at  the 
same  time.  This  allows  him  to  use  his  weapons  thor- 
oughly with  the  least  exposure  to  himself.  The  de- 
fender always  presents  a  small  target  because  he  fires 
lying  down,  and,  if  possible,  from  behind  cover,  while 
the  assailant  must  traverse  the  whole  field  of  attack  as 
a  target.  However  much  the  latter  may  strive  to  keep 
low,  he  must  show  himself  always  more  than  the  de- 
fender. The  defender  can,  moreover,  shoot  more  in 
the  course  of  an  action  than  the  assailant,  who  must 
spend  part  of  the  time  in  advancing;  his  fire  will  gen- 
erally be  more  effective  than  that  of  his  opponent,  as 
*  Clausewitz,  "On  War,"  book  vi.,  chap,  i.,  etc. 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  137 

he  is  able  to  take  deliberate  aim,  with  his  rifle  as  a 
rule  supported,  and  he  is  often  in  a  position  to  note 
the  ranges  before  the  action  begins;  while  the  assail- 
ant is  obliged  to  deliver  his  fire  after  most  violent  and 
fatiguing  movements  occasioned  by  the  advance.  The 
defender,  besides,  can  dispose  as  it  were  of  an  unlim- 
ited number  of  cartridges.  He  can  store  them  before- 
hand inside  the  cover  behind  which  he  himself  is 
lying,  and  replenish  them  as  a  rule  without  much  dif- 
ficulty during  the  action.  This  advantage  accrues  to 
him  from  the  choice  of  the  position.  The  assailant, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  generally  only  the  ammunition 
which  he  carries  on  his  person,  the  rounds  of  the  killed 
and  wounded  be'ing  but  a  scanty  resource.  The  troops 
can,  of  course,  provide  themselves  with  ample  ammu- 
nition before  the  battle  begins,  but  the  carrying  ca- 
pacity of  the  individual  man  is  limited,  and  ammuni- 
tion can  only  be  replenished  during  the  attack  by  re- 
serves bringing  it  into  the  firing  line.  This,  too,  is  of 
no  great  avail,  the  supports  coming  into  action  them- 
selves needing  their  own  ammunition  and  being  able 
to  carry  but  a  small  surplus  for  distribution.  They 
will  suffer  considerable  loss  before  they  reach  the 
foremost  fighting  line.  This  shows  a  further  advan- 
tage for  the  defence.  The  defender  can,  as  a  rule, 
place  his  supports  so  as  to  be  covered  at  least  against 
direct  fire,  and  only  to  be  exposed  to  serious  losses  at 
the  moment  they  come  into  real  action.  The  assailant, 
on  the  other  hand,  must  bring  up  his  reinforcements 
through  the  zone  of  fire  his  foremost  line  has  already 
traversed,  if  he  wishes  to  make  use  of  his  masses,  and 
he  must,  therefore,  expose  them  to  losses  before  he 
gets  the  benefit  of  their  intervention. 

In  all  these  items  the  defender  derives  very  much 


138        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

greater  advantages  from  the  improvements  of  the  rifle 
than  the  attacker. 

The  greater  the  range  of  the  arms,  the  sooner  must 
the  actual  deployment  for  attack  begin;  the  greater 
the  space  the  assailant  has  to  traverse  as  a  target,  the 
greater  will  be  his  physical  exertions,  and  the  less  fa- 
vourable for  the  assailant  will  become  the  proportion 
of  the  number  of  rounds  both  opposing  parties  can 
exchange.  It  is,  besides,  all  the  more  difficult  for  the 
assailant  to  replenish  his  ammunition  the  deeper  the 
field  of  attack  which  he  has  to  cross ;  and  the  ammuni- 
tion spent  is,  moreover,  then  much  greater,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  greater  rapidity  of  fire.  It  is  even  doubtful 
whether  it  will  be  always  possible,  under  the  present 
conditions,  to  take  the  ammunition  from  the  dead  and 
wounded  during  the  hottest  fire-fight.  The  advantage, 
also,  of  the  fire  of  the  modern  rifle  being  more  graz- 
ing than  that  of  the  old  arm — giving,  therefore,  aimed 
fire  a  greater  chance  of  hitting — is  more  especially 
to  the  benefit  of  the  defender,  not  only  because  he 
can  aim  with  greater  calmness  than  the  attacker,  who 
is  in  constant  motion,  but  because  he  is,  as  already 
mentioned,  also  very  often  able  to  mark  the  ranges 
in  his  front  and  then  fire  with  the  correct  sight,  where- 
as the  attacker  must  always  estimate  the  ranges  afresh 
while  he  is  advancing.  The  greater  the  distances  at 
which  the  action  begins,  the  more  will  this  advantage 
assert  itself,  because  the  errors  in  estimating  the  range 
grow  with  the  distance,  and  affect  the  firing  at  distant 
ranges  more  unfavourably  than  at  the  nearer  ranges. 
The  assailant  can  certainly  ascertain,  with  the  ordi- 
nary range-finders,  the  distances  at  the  beginning  of 
an  action,  but  during  the  advance  itself  they  are  use- 
less. The  units  of  the  assailant  which  are  to  rein- 
force the  foremost  fighting  line  will  also,  in  the  face 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  139 

of  the  present  rifle,  suffer  more  than  formerly  when 
moving  into  the  fighting  line,  because  the  dangerous 
zone  behind  the  firing  line  is  greater  than  with  fire 
from  weapons  having  a  shorter  range  and  steeper  tra- 
jectory. The  defender  will  scarcely  feel  this  disad- 
vantage, because  his  supporting  bodies,  as  I  said  be- 
fore, are,  as  a  rule,  behind  some  kind  of  cover  at 
least. 

The  defender  has,  lastly,  the  advantage  of  being 
able  to  make  a  far  more  extensive  use  of  artificial 
cover  than  the  assailant,  and  this  advantage  weighs 
all  the  more  heavily  the  more  efficient  the  arms,  and 
the  more,  therefore,  the  chances  of  greater  losses. 

The  side  which  voluntarily  decides  to  act  on  the  de- 
fensive, and  it  is  not  suddenly  thrown  on  it,  has  the 
chance  of  more  or  less  strongly  entrenching  itself  in 
the  position  occupied,  increasing  thereby  the  advan- 
tages afforded  by  the  country,  and  neutralizing  any  of 
its  disadvantages.  The  attacking  infantry  can,  on 
the  other  hand,  create  but  quite  hasty  cover  during  its 
advance,  this  kind  of  cover  on  the  ground  as  found 
giving  naturally  very  little  protection,  and  being  of 
advantage  under  particular  circumstances  only. 

The  fact  that  the  Japanese  often  entrenched  in  the 
attack  has  led  to  the  propagation  of  views  about  the 
advantages  of  this  procedure,  which,  in  my  opinion, 
go  far  beyond  the  mark. 

It  is  at  once  clear  that,  if  cover  is  being  prepared  in 
the  foremost  line  during  an  action,  and  within  effec- 
tive fire  of  the  enemy,  the  intensity  of  the  fire  of  the 
attacker  must  suffer.  The  losses  of  the  latter  while 
digging  will  accordingly  become  greater,  whereas  those 
of  the  defender  will  be  less.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  fire  of  the  defence  is  so  weak  as  to  allow  the  fore- 
most fighting  line  to  entrench  without  serious  loss,  it 


140        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

is  plain  that  it  is  possible  to  get  forward  without  en- 
trenching. 

If  in  the  last  wars  the  attacking  infantry  has  re- 
peatedly dug  itself  into  the  ground  during  an  action, 
even  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy,  we  canngt  at 
all  conclude  from  this  that  this  procedure  is  expedient 
in  itself  and  in  all  situations.  It  rather  follows  that 
either  the  fire  of  defence  was  ineffective  and  that,  in 
spite  of  this  the  assailant  had  not  resolution  enough 
to  push  on  vigorously,  or  that  he  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  secure  first  the  ground  gained  against  reverses, 
and  to  create  a  firm  base  for  continuing  the  attack,  and 
to  fall  back  on  in  case  of  failure.  At  any  rate,  digging 
into  the  ground  by  the  foremost  fighting  line  means 
interrupting  the  attack  and  paralyzing  the  will  to 
attack.  Only  under  the  stress  of  dire  necessity  should 
this  be  permissible.  The  effort,  however,  of  securing 
the  ground  gained  and  creating  solid  pivots  in  case  of 
a  reverse  is  justifiable. 

Taking  these  reflections  into  account,  we  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  foremost  line  of  the  attack 
must  only  use  the  spade  when,  during  the  advance,  a 
section  of  ground  suitable  for  entrenching  has  been 
reached,  and  the  strength  is  failing  for  any  further 
advance,  and  it  now  becomes  a  question  of  securing, 
above  all,  the  possession  of  the  ground  captured; 
therefore,  during  the  transition  from  the  attack  to 
the  defence,  though  a  temporary  defence  only.  But 
it  will,  on  the  other  hand,  always  be  of  advantage  for 
the  supports — which,  being  in  rear  of  the  attacking 
line,  cannot  themselves  fire  and  are  beyond  the  enemy's 
most  effective  fire — to  entrench  so  as  to  protect  them- 
selves against  losses  and  to  create  pivots  on  which 
the  foremost  line  can,  in  case  of  a  reverse,  establish 
itself  when  retreating.  But  this  kind  of  cover  will 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  141 

always  be  of  a  very  hasty  nature  only.  The  con- 
struction of  proper  artificial  cover  by  the  assailant  is 
generally  possible  only  if  he  makes  use  of  the  night, 
and  proceeds  to  entrench  systematically,  to  gain 
ground.  But  an  expedient  of  this  sort,  belonging 
really  to  fortress  warfare,  is  always  an  exception,  and 
should  be  used  only  if  we  cannot  advance  at  all  in  any 
other  way.  This  procedure  is  generally  altogether 
out  of  the  question  during  active  operations,  as  being 
far  too  tedious. 

Taking  it  all  in  all,  the  benefit  the  attacker  can 
derive  from  entrenching  is  very  small ;  but  the  possi- 
bility of  creating  for  himself  artificial  cover  is  a  real 
and  substantial  advantage  to  the  defender. 

In  opposition  to  this  view,  experienced  and  promi- 
nent tacticians,  it  is  true,  attribute  to  trench-work  in 
the  attack  a  very  much  greater  importance  than  I  can 
concede.  I  even  find  the  view  supported  that  broad 
spaces,  affording  no  protection  whatever,  could  be 
traversed  by  attacking  infantry  only  with  the  aid  of 
the  spade,  and  by  advancing  as  in  fortress  warfare 
from  trench  to  trench,  and,  if  necessary,  under  cover 
of  night.  I  think  this  view  goes  decidedly  too  far. 

In  my  opinion  it  is  impossible  to  advance  by  day, 
as  in  fortress  warfare,  without  the  means  we  have 
available  there.  In  fortress  warfare  nobody  dreams 
of  entrenching  by  day  within  effective  hostile  fire. 
We  slowly  work  forward  by  sapping,  or  use  the  night 
to  form  a  lodgment  by  surprise.  There  can,  of  course, 
be  no  question  of  sapping  in  active  operations;  but 
should  we  wish  to  wait  for  the  night  to  traverse  every 
extensive  open  space,  active  operations  would  be 
turned  into  a  war  of  positions,  and  the  defender  would 
be  given  the  chance  of  strengthening  his  position,  and 
adopting  the  measures  necessary  for  its  defence  in 


142        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

perfect  quietness.  Therefore,  a  procedure  like  this 
can  be  expedient  only  in  exceptional  cases,  such  as 
fortress  warfare ;  other  means  must  be  found  for  get- 
ting over  open  ground  in  the  attack.  I  shall  return  to 
this  question  as  I  proceed.  Here  I  am  first  of  all  con- 
cerned with  proving  that  the  possibility  of  creating 
cover  in  the  country  affords  the  defender  far  greater 
advantages  than  the  assailant;  and  this  view  can 
hardly  be  contested  even  if  a  much  greater  importance 
is  attached  to  spade-work  in  the  offensive  than  is  at- 
tached by  me. 

A  further  advantage  accrues  to  the  defensive  by  the 
use  of  machine-guns.  Conditions  favouring  the  effect 
of  that  arm  will  generally  be  found  only  in  the  de- 
fensive. The  machine-guns  can  here  be  brought  into 
positions  whence  they  can  continue  to  act  and  accurate- 
ly fire  at  known  ranges,  without  interfering  with  the 
fire  of,  or  endangering,  their  own  infantry.  Some- 
times they  may  fire  from  a  commanding  position  even 
over  their  own  infantry.  Hostile  infantry  advancing 
will  also  often  present  a  favourable  target. 

I  do  not  deny  that 'machine-guns  can  also  be  used 
with  advantage  under  favourable  conditions  in  the 
attack;  but  they  are  essentially  a  weapon  for  defence, 
and  can  generally  give  a  full  account  of  their  value  in 
defence  only. 

The  relation  of  attack  and  defence  being  determined 
by  the  infantry  firearm,  this  relation  is  somewhat  al- 
tered by  the  artillery.  By  rendering,  through  its  dis- 
tant fire,  the  strategical  and  tactical  initiation  of  the 
attack  more  difficult,  the  artillery  no  doubt  benefits  the 
defence;  but  the  modern  development  of  that  arm  has, 
on  the  other  hand,  disclosed  also  some  features  advan- 
tageous for  the  attack.  All  in  all,  I  think  we  are 
justified  in  assuming  that  the  artillery  of  to-day  serves, 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  143 

first  of  all,  the  idea  of  attack,  and  facilitates  the  of- 
fensive. This  fact  is,  perhaps,  even  the  most  impor- 
tant result  of  the  modern  development  of  artillery. 

The  defender  stands  in  a  fixed  position.  His  in- 
fantry must  advance  sufficiently  forward  in  the  coun- 
try to  sweep  as  much  as  possible  the  entire  foreground, 
and  to  be  able  to  fire  effectively  upon  the  attacking  in- 
fantry. His  infantry  can,  therefore,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, be  reached  by  the  artillery  of  the  attack, 
even  if  it  is  standing  behind  cover  and  firing  indirectly. 
This  gives  an  immense  advantage  to  the  artillery  of 
the  attack,  for  the  conditions  of  the  artillery  of  the 
defence  are  totally  different.  The  latter  faces  movable 
infantry  targets  which  it  must  fight. 

With  the  means  of  laying  the  guns  to-day,  it  is  no 
doubt  possible  to  fire  also  indirectly  on  movable  tar- 
gets, but  the  same  effect  as  with  direct  fire  from  an 
open  position  cannot  be  obtained  for  any  length  of 
time.  When  using  the  latter  kind  of  fire,  any  change 
in  the  position  of  the  target  can  at  once  be  accounted 
for  by  taking  direct  aim  and  following  the  target; 
with  indirect  fire  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  always  nec- 
essary to  alter  the  position  of  the  contrivances  for 
laying;  it  is  true,  this  can  be  effected  in  a  simple  and 
exact  manner.  The  fire  of  batteries  or  brigades  can 
in  that  way  be  uniformly  transferred.  The  artillery 
in  covered  positions  has  moreover  the  advantage  of 
being  able  to  deliver  its  aimed  fire  quietly,  not  being 
under  direct  fire  itself;  but  then  it  must  be  supposed 
that  the  target  can  be  observed,  and  that  the  connec- 
tion— often  by  telephone — between  the  position  of 
the  guns  and  the  observing  commander  who  is  direct- 
ing the  fire,  is  working  without  a  hitch.  Any  inter- 
ruption of  this  connection,  as  may  easily  happen  in 
war,  makes  indirect  fire  altogether  impossible. 


144        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Efforts  are  therefore  made  by  the  defending  artil- 
lery to  establish  the  observing  stations  as  much  as 
possible  securely  behind  the  batteries  or  aside  of  them. 
In  a  ranged  battle,  however,  this  will  rarely  be  feasible. 
As  a  rule,  the  observing  stations  will  be  rather  in  ad- 
vance of  the  artillery  positions,  at  points  in  the  coun- 
try affording  a  good  view  over  the  field  of  action. 
They  will,  therefore,  be  often  immediately  within  the 
area  commanded  by  the  hottest  fire  of  the  enemy, 
which  will  easily  cause  derangements  in  the  communi- 
cations, or  loss  among  the  observing  personnel. 

To  this  must  be  added  yet  another  disadvantage  of 
the  indirect  fire  of  the  defensive  artillery;  only  in  the 
rarest  cases  will  it  be  possible  for  this  fire  to  fight  the 
attacking  infantry  to  the  very  last  stages  of  the  attack. 
Just  when  that  infantry  has  come  up  close  to  the  po- 
sition and  the  situation  begins  to  be  critical,  the  indi- 
rect fire  will,  as  a  rule,  fail.  It  will  depend  on  the 
configurations  of  the  ground  how  long  it  can  be  con- 
tinued. Gun  batteries  have  in  this  respect  less  favour- 
able chances  than  the  howitzer  batteries.  Owing  to 
the  greater  flatness  of  the  trajectories  of  the  guns,  the 
artillery  position  must  sometimes  be  selected  far  in 
rear  of  the  cover  and  of  their  own  infantry  position, 
so  as  to  prevent  the  non-swept  ground  in  front  of  the 
latter  from  extending  too  far.  Owing  to  the  steeper 
trajectory  of  the  howitzer  batteries,  they  can  move  up 
closer  to  the  cover  to  obtain  the  same  results,  and 
therefore  make  use  also  of  steeper  slopes.  But  in 
both  cases  the  support  by  artillery  fire  will  be  missed 
by  the  defender's  infantry  just  at  the  most  decisive 
moments,  if  the  defensive  artillery  remains  in  its  cov- 
ered position.  If,  therefore,  a  thoroughly  effective 
artillery  fire  is  to  be  obtained  against  the  enemy's  at- 
tacking infantry  up  to  the  very  last  stages  of  the  at- 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  145 

tack,  the  defender  must  advance  his  guns  far  enough 
to  take  the  attacking  infantry  under  direct  fire;  he  is 
therefore  obliged  to  make  his  artillery  more  or  less 
visible.  This  has  been  proved  necessary  over  and  over 
again  in  the  battles  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The 
batteries  had  repeatedly  to  leave  their  cover  to  have 
any  effect  at  all.  The  artillery  of  the  attack  is  thus  in 
a  position  of  directing  an  observed,  and  therefore  ef- 
fective, fire  on  the  batteries  of  the  defence  when  un- 
limbering  in  the  open,  without  having  to  show  itself, 
while  the  defending  batteries  can  only  fight  their  invis- 
ible adversary  with  sweeping  and  searching  fire. 

The  attacking  artillery,  firing  indirect,  has  besides 
this  advantage  over  the  defending  artillery,  that  its 
observing  stations  are  beyond  the  zone  of  infantry  fire, 
and,  if  they  are  not  discovered  by  the  defender,  are 
also  beyond  the  zone  of  artillery  fire,  and  therefore, 
as  a  rule,  less  exposed  than  those  of  the  defender. 

The  fact  that  the  attacking  artillery  cannot  be  di- 
rectly fired  upon  by  the  defender,  unless  the  ground  is 
altogether  unfavourable  for  the  former,  is  of  special 
importance,  and  means  a  material  tactical  advantage 
for  the  assailant,  since  his  artillery  is  the  most  danger- 
ous enemy  of  the  defending  infantry.  If  the  attack- 
ing infantry  is  not  very  superior,  and  is  unable  to  make 
an  enveloping  attack,  it  will  scarcely  ever  succeed  in 
fighting  down  the  defender's  infantry.  Its  attacks 
over  open  ground  will  fail  as  a  rule.  The  artillery 
must  pave  the  way  and  render  the  attacking  infantry's 
road  to  victory  easier.  It  must  keep  down  the  fire 
of  the  defending  infantry,  and  thus  give  its  own  in- 
fantry the  chance  of  crossing,  also,  stretches  of  open 
ground.  If  the  assailant  has  also  heavy  field  how- 
itzers, their  fire  will  very  soon  produce  a  crushing 
effect  on  the  visible  portions  of  the  defensive  artillery, 


146        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

make  the  infantry  pivots  of  the  defender  untenable, 
and  render  it  also  extremely  difficult  for  him  to  main- 
tain the  shelter-trenches  and  any  localities  he  may 
have  occupied.  The  artillery  of  the  attack,  on  the 
other  hand,  standing  under  cover,  can  only  be  fought 
by  the  defender,  as  I  said  before,  with  sweeping  and 
searching  fire — a  fire  therefore  not  very  effective — nor 
will  his  heavy  howitzers  often  be  capable  of  doing  ma- 
terial damage  to  the  assailant. 

In  opposition  to  this  view,  many  hold  that  the  at- 
tacking artillery,  if  it  wishes  to  support  its  own  in- 
fantry effectively,  must  accompany  it,  during  its  ad- 
vance, with  some  portions  at  least,  and  this  for  moral 
reasons  alone — because  the  infantry  should  feel  cer- 
tain it  is  being  supported  by  its  artillery ;  the  latter,  of 
course,  would  then  lose  the  advantage  of  being  able 
to  fire  from  covered  positions. 

This  opinion  is  seemingly  a  little  out  of  date.  It 
is  a  matter  of  course  for  the  artillery  of  the  attack 
to  advance  to  within  the  most  effective  ranges  of  the 
enemy,  and  if  it  does  not  find  any  covered  positions 
there,  it  must  sometimes  unlimber  in  the  open.  But 
in  no  case  is  it  necessary  for  the  artillery  to  approach 
closer.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  always  be  more  ad- 
vantageous for  the  batteries,  after  having  found  the 
range,  to  continue  their  effective  fire  without  a  break, 
than  to  cease  fire  with  the  object  of  approaching  the 
enemy  closer.  It  is  just  in  the  decisive  phase  of  the 
attack  that  the  artillery  must  not  for  a  single  moment 
stop  or  slacken  its  fire.  It  is,  I  believe,  wrong  to 
think  that  a  moral  impression  is  made  upon  the  in- 
fantry by  the  direct  accompaniment  of  artillery.  The 
foremost  fighting  line,  which  is  concerned  here  most, 
cannot  notice  at  all  whether  the  artillery  is  coming 
forward  during  the  combat,  as  the  artillery  is  any- 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  147 

how  obliged  to  remain  always  far  in  the  rear  of  it. 
The  best  moral  support  for  the  attacking  infantry  is 
when  it  sees  shrapnel  and  common  shells  bursting 
without  a  break  over  and  within  the  enemy's  line,  en- 
veloping it  in  smoke.  But  a  disagreeable  and  dis- 
couraging effect  is  sure  to  be  produced,  if,  just  at 
the  critical  moment,  the  artillery  fire  ceases  or  grows 
weaker,  on  account  of  the  batteries  changing  positions, 
for  the  artillery  is  there  to  shoot  and  not  to  drive  dur- 
ing the  attack.  At  the  beginning  of  the  action  the 
artillery  must  no  doubt  move  up  close  to  the  enemy; 
during  the  action  it  will  generally  do  well  to  remain 
in  position.  That  special  circumstances  may  lead  to 
this  principle  being  departed  from,  and  to  batteries 
pushing  even  right  into  the  infantry  fire,  is  of  course 
possible;  but  it  will  generally  be  advisable,  for  the 
sake  of  effect,  not  to  accompany  the  attacking  infantry 
immediately,  but  to  leave  to  the  artillery  the  advantage 
of  firing  uninterruptedly  from  the  covered  positions. 
The  artillery  of  the  attack  should,  from  the  outset, 
recognize  that  its  task  is  to  combat  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry, and  only  fire  on  hostile  artillery  when  either 
the  effect  of  the  latter  becomes  particularly  dangerous 
to  the  attacking  artillery,  or  to  portions  of  the  attack- 
ing infantry,  or  when  the  defending  artillery  shows 
itself  in  open  positions.  The  artillery  of  the  defence, 
on  the  other  hand,  will,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  like- 
wise do  well  not  to  enter  into  a  combat  with  the  invis- 
ible artillery  of  the  attack,  as  promising  so  little  suc- 
cess. Of  course,  its  main  interest  is  to  fight  down  the 
hostile  batteries,  but  it  has  little  chance  to  do  so  suc- 
cessfully. It  will  therefore  generally  be  content  with 
commanding,  first  of  all,  the  roads  by  which  the  enemy 
is  approaching,  and  then  fighting  as  long  as  possible 
the  attacking  infantry  from  covered  positions.  It  will 


148        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

deal  with  hostile  artillery  only  if  there  is  some  chance 
of  doing  so  successfully,  or  if  there  is  an  absolute 
need  for  it.  If  the  artillery  of  the  defence  is  obliged 
to  show  itself  in  the  course  of  the  action,  the  shields 
will  give  it  some  protection  against  hostile  artillery; 
but  if  it  is  opposed  to  heavy  howitzers,  it  must  try  to 
escape  their  effect  by  frequent  change  of  position. 
This  will  be  no  easy  task. 

Matters  would  be  different,  I  think,  if  from  balloons 
we  succeeded  in  reconnoitring  the  position  of  the  bat- 
teries behind  cover,  and  in  observing  and  correcting 
the  fire  directed  against  them.  The  South  African 
War  has  proved  that  this  is  possible  from  a  balloon ; 
but  that  it  should  be  feasible  to  observe  continually 
the  fire  of  all  the  batteries  in  action  on  a  modern 
battlefield  in  this  manner,  and  to  keep  the  observations 
so  distinct  from  each  other  that  the  necessary  cor- 
rections can  be  effected  in  accordance  with  the  obser- 
vations made  by  the  balloons,  is  highly  improbable  on 
account  of  the  mass  of  bursting  shells,  and  on  account 
of  the  danger  the  balloons  are  exposed  to  from  the 
enemy's  balloons  and  also  from  his  artillery  fire.  A 
spasmodic  and  disconnected  observation  from  bal- 
loons, on  the  other  hand,  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  a 
decisive  factor  at  all.  From  all  this  I  believe  that  we 
cannot  attribute  any  special  importance  to  the  artillery 
duel  in  a  modern  battle,  and  that  therefore  the  fact 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  artillery  of  to-day  serves 
first  of  all  the  idea  of  attack,  while  the  defender  will 
only  derive  full  advantage  of  his  batteries  if  he  knows 
how  to  assume  the  offensive. 

If  in  attack  we  are  superior  in  artillery,  the  infantry 
superiority  need  not  be  so  great  as  otherwise,  and  in- 
versely. But  it  will  never  be  possible  to  determine 
theoretically  what  the  best  proportion  of  the  arms  to 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  149 

each  other  should  be.  We  can  never  be  too  strong  in 
attack.  This  holds  good  for  infantry  as  well  as  for 
artillery. 

The  advantages  of  the  defence  culminate  in  the 
possibility  of  making  full  use  of  the  ground,  and  in 
the  more  effective  delivery  of  infantry  fire  over  a 
field  carefully  selected,  and  from  behind  cover.  The 
advantages  of  the  attack,  on  the  other  hand,  originate 
essentially  from  the  "proud  privilege  of  the  initiative," 
from  its  operative  mobility,  and  from  the  moral  fac- 
tors brought  into  play  by  it.  It  is  but  rarely  that 
battles  are  fought  purely  frontally;  it  is  but  rarely 
that  the  assailant  will  allow  the  defender  to  make  use 
of  all  the  advantages  afforded  him  by  the  defensive 
form  of  combat;  and  it  is  but  rarely  that  the  moral 
forces  will  balance  each  other.  We  therefore  must 
compare  attack  and  defence  not  only  as  a  form  of 
fighting,  but  we  must  also  consider  both  as  a  mode  of 
conducting  war  in  their  reciprocal  effect,  before  we 
can  form  a  final  judgment  on  their  true  value  in  war. 

The  assailant,  as  a  rule,  has  a  free  choice  in  the 
selection  of  the  direction  of  his  attack.  The  defender, 
generally  not  knowing  this  direction,  must  prepare  to 
meet,  if  not  all,  at  least  the  most  likely  enterprises 
of  the  enemy.  He  cannot  distribute  his  forces  in  the 
best  way  to  suit  a  definite  case.  He  is  always  rather 
in  a  certain  sense  obliged  to  occupy  a  position  of 
readiness;  and  not  before  the  direction  of  attack  is 
discerned,  and  he  has  ascertained  how  best  to  meet  it, 
can  he  put  his  troops  in  motion  accordingly.  The 
assailant  has,  therefore,  a  double  advantage.  Firstly, 
he  can  prepare  his  enterprise  with  a  distinct  end  in 
view,  and  employ  his  whole  force  in  compliance  with 
a  uniform  plan;  and,  secondly,  he  can,  as  regards 
time,  space,  and  tactics,  make  use  of  the  time  the 


150        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

defender  needs  for  reconnoitring,  making  up  his  mind, 
and  initiating  his  counter-measures.  He  thus  gains 
a  start  not  easily  retrieved.  But  with  the  choice  of 
the  direction  of  attack,  the  further  advantage  is  con- 
nected of  being  able  to  concentrate  and  use  effectively 
a  great  numerical  superiority  in  the  decisive  direction 
before  the  enemy  can  arrange  his  defence  in  sufficient 
strength.  We  can  further  conduct  the  attack  so  as  to 
prevent  the  special  advantages  of  the  defence  from 
asserting  themselves.  By  enveloping  a  flank  of  the 
enemy,  by  threatening  his  line  of  retreat,  or  by  attack- 
ing him  in  flank  (though  we  thereby  give  up  temporar- 
ily our  own  lines  of  communication),  we  force  him 
to  fight  outside  the  country  he  had  selected  for  his 
battlefield,  and  sometimes  to  execute  a  change  of  front 
under  the  pressure  of  a  decisive  attack.  Sudden  at- 
tack and  surprise,  choice  of  the  direction  of  attack, 
with  all  the  advantages  accruing  from  it,  gaining  space 
and  time,  threatening  the  hostile  lines  of  communica- 
tion— these  have  ever  been  the  advantages  of  the  offen- 
sive mode  of  action. 

In  contrast  with  this,  the  defender  has,  apart  from 
the  effects  of  arms,  certainly  in  general  all  the  advan- 
tages of  ground  in  his  favour.  For  meeting  an  attack 
once  recognized  as  such,  he  has,  moreover,  to  traverse, 
inside  a  tactical  or  strategical  defensive  position, 
shorter  distances  than  the  assailant  who  intends  to 
envelop  or  take  him  in  flank;  yet  both  advantages 
are  only  conditional;  their  worth  is  extremely  fluctu- 
ating. The  advantage  of  ground  can  only  fully  assert 
itself  if  the  assailant  is  obliged  to  come  in  the  direc- 
tion locally  most  favourable  for  the  defence,  and  at- 
tacks the  front  chosen  by  the  defender;  the  advantage 
of  the  shorter  roads  only  if  the  direction  of  the  en- 
emy's attack  has  been  discerned  in  time.  We  cannot, 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  151 

therefore,  count  these  two  advantages  as  safe  factors, 
and,  indeed,  so  little  can  we  do  so,  as  the  chief  advan- 
tage of  the  attack  is  based  on  the  very  fact  that  the 
defender,  as  proved  by  experience,  when  opposed  by 
an  energetic  and  clear-sighted  assailant,  is  too  late, 
as  a  rule,  with  his  counter-measures,  in  spite  of  the 
shorter  roads,  and  unable  to  make  always  full  use  of 
the  advantages  of  the  ground. 

Now,  the  advantages  accruing  to  the  attack  from  all 
these  conditions  are  increased  and  enhanced  by  the 
enormous  moral  superiority  due  to  the  attack.  Clause- 
witz  is  not  inclined  to  concede  this  to  the  attack  from 
the  very  beginning.  But  this  probably  is  for  the  most 
part  due  to  his  dealing  with  a  defence  throughout  con- 
ducted offensively.  But  if  we  merely  consider  the 
offensive  and  defensive  as  a  mode  of  action,  which  I 
think  is  the  only  proper  way  to  do,  we  surely  arrive 
at  a  different  result. 

There  is  in  the  attack  itself  a  force  that  carries 
away  everything,  and  puts  in  motion  from  the  outset 
every  mental  faculty  and  moral  power,  and,  by  direct- 
ing them  all  to  one  single  object,  incites  them  to  the 
highest  exertions.  The  defender,  on  the  contrary, 
remains  at  first  engaged  in  the  calmer  occupation 
of  watching  and  waiting,  in  the  enervating  uncertainty 
of  what  the  enemy  is  going  to  do,  and  whether  it  will 
be  recognized  in  time.  But  when  he  is  ultimately 
obliged  to  act,  he  does  so  generally  under  the  pressure 
of  the  full  knowledge  of  facing  superior  power,  reso- 
lution, and  energy,  and  an  enemy  who  has  already 
gained  a  start  over  him  in  space  and  time,  the  impor- 
tance of  which  it  is  difficult  to  estimate.  The  pure 
defence  is  of  a  passive  nature;  it  will  often  be  pro- 
ductive of  the  greatest  endurance,  of  the  most  heroic 
devotion,  but  it  is  wanting  in  the  positive  object  which 


152        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

turns  resolution  into  action,  and  raises  the  will  to  its 
highest  pitch.  It  is  only  when  engaged  in  positive 
action  with  a  definite  object  that  the  highest  per- 
formances are  developed,  and  so  firmly  is  this  fact  es- 
tablished that  the  defence  itself  is  obliged  to  assume 
the  offensive  if  it  wishes  to  assert  itself  permanently 
and  gain  positive  results. 

There  is  one  quality  above  all  in  man  which  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  in  all  warfare,  and  really  bene- 
fits the  attack  exclusively — boldness. 

Fortune  smiles  upon  bold  commanders  before  all 
others.  They  are  the  men  who  have  filled  the  pages 
of  the  world's  history  with  their  proud  achievements, 
and  gave  the  laws  to  their  time.  They  seem  to  enthral 
fortune  by  a  powerful  charm,  and  only  succumb  where 
with  insolent  conceit  they  try  to  trespass  the  limits  of 
the  possible.  That  this  is  so  lies  in  the  nature  of 
things. 

Of  all  psychical  qualities  boldness  harmonizes  most 
with  the  nature  of  war — that  is,  striving  to  attain  the 
utmost.  Its  superiority  is  due  to  the  fact  that  bold- 
ness is  one  of  the  qualities  rarest  found  in  men,  that 
an  extraordinary  strength  of  will  and  character  is 
needed  to  keep  it  active  under  the  pressure  of  respon- 
sibility and  danger  unavoidable  in  war,  especially  for 
the  commander.  The  effects  of  superior  boldness 
come,  therefore,  always  as  a  surprise.  They  find  the 
adversary  unprepared,  and  thereby  not  only  establish 
a  moral  superiority,  which  soon  will  exercise  a  par- 
alysing influence  on  every  portion  of  the  hostile  army, 
but  which  will,  moreover,  turn  into  a  gain  of  time 
and  space  that  is  of  inestimable  value  in  war;  for  in 
every  single  case  the  time  necessary  for  the  counter- 
measures  of  the  party  surprised  and  the  demoraliza- 
tion it  suffers  benefit  the  bold  assailant,  which  he  can 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  153 

take  advantage  of  both  in  space  and  in  tactics.  It 
scarcely  needs  pointing  out  that  a  bold  conduct  of  war 
cannot  be  always  absolutely  sure  of  success.  But 
failure  is  then  not  due  to  the  nature  of  boldness,  but 
to  other  factors.  It  may  be  through  a  totally  wrong 
appreciation  of  the  whole  situation,  which  led  to  en- 
terprises impossible  in  themselves,  or  through  acci- 
dental and  other  effects  which  equalized  or  excelled 
the  superiority  established  by  boldness. 

If  now,  by  reason  of  these  reflections  of  a  general 
nature,  we  fix  our  glance  in  particular  upon  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  war,  it  is  seen  that  there  are  ele- 
ments in  them  showing  that  the  superiority  of  offen- 
sive warfare  under  modern  conditions  is  greater  than 
formerly. 

Above  all,  it  is  the  size  of  the  mid-European  armies 
of  to-day  which  gives  a  decided  advantage  to  him  who 
is  conducting  war  offensively,  an  advantage  which  as- 
serts itself  in  tactics  as  well  as  in  strategy. 

The  greater  the  masses  concerned,  and  the  broader 
the  front  on  which  they  must  therefore  deploy  for 
bringing  their  weapons  into  effect,  the  longer  time 
will,  naturally,  all  the  intended  concentrations  and 
changes  of  front  take,  because  the  distances  to  be 
covered  grow  with  the  size  and  spatial  extension  of 
the  troops;  the  more  difficult  it  is,  accordingly,  to 
bring  all  the  troops  at  the  same  time  into  action.  This 
difficulty  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  with  the  growing 
masses  the  march  technics  and  supply  arrangements 
become  more  intricate,  and  on  their  part  limit  the  free- 
dom of  movement. 

All  these  circumstances  benefit  the  offensive  mode 
of  action,  because  the  advantages  of  space  and  time 
originating  from  the  initiative  grow  in  the  same  ratio 
as  the  difficulties  of  moving  masses.  If  the  assailant 


154        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

has  once  succeeded  in  concentrating  a  superior  mass 
against  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  defensive  position, 
the  counter-measures  of  the  defender  will  take  all  the 
longer  time,  the  greater  the  mass  which  he  must  move, 
the  broader  the  front  on  which  it  has  been  distrib- 
uted, and  the  more  the  assailant  has  succeeded  in  tak- 
ing him  by  surprise. 

Even  the  simple  operation  of  shifting  reserves  be- 
hind the  defensive  front  becomes  more  difficult  the 
more  extended  the  front;  the  danger  of  their  being 
too  late  grows  with  the  distances.  The  difficulty  of 
carrying  out  unforeseen  movements  of  masses  will  be 
incalculable,  when  it  is  not  only  a  question  of  shifting 
reserves,  but  of  a  more  or  less  decided  change  of  front, 
as  might  be  enforced  by  the  assailant  through  an  en- 
veloping or  a  flank  attack.  The  Battle  of  Mukden  is 
somewhat  of  a  guide  for  judging  about  shifting  troops 
in  this  way.  Here  a  new  front  had  to  be  opposed  to 
the  wide  enveloping  attack  of  Nogi's  army,  which  ne- 
cessitated a  partial  deployment  towards  the  flank. 
Comparatively  few  troops  only  were,  however,  in- 
volved in  this  movement.  But  should  it  once  become 
a  question  of  changing  front  with  a  modern  army  in 
the  same  way  as  the  Austrians  had  to  do  at  Leuthen,  a 
movement  like  this  would  last  for  days,  and  the  assail- 
ant would  have  the  chance  of  beating  the  hostile  troops 
arriving  in  succession  one  after  the  other  with  superior 
numbers.  ".  .  .  An  army  of  100,000  taken  in  flank 
can  be  beaten  by  30,000  men,"  says  Frederic  the  Great. 

And  so  indeed  with  the  growing  masses  the  chances 
of  an  offensive  mode  of  conducting  war  grow  at  an  in- 
creased ratio. 

But  a  further  advantage  accruing  to  the  assailant 
from  the  present  conditions  consists  in  his  being  able, 
in  a  deliberate  attack  at  least,  to  employ  his  best  troops 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  155 

in  the  decisive  direction,  while  the  defender,  not 
knowing  the  main  direction  of  attack,  must  oppose 
him  with  the  forces  immediately  available  at  the  front 
attacked.  Owing  to  the  great  difference  in  value  of 
the  troops  of  a  modern  army,  this  advantage  may 
sometimes  be  of  decisive  importance.  If  we  bear  in 
mind  what  good  and  reliable  troops  have  achieved  at 
all  times  against  less  disciplined  troops,  it  is  easily 
conceived  how  important  a  proper  choice  of  troops  is 
when  a  decisive  action  is  involved. 

I  think  I  have  now  considered  the  relation  of  attack 
and  defence  from  every  point  of  view,  and  do  not  see 
what  other  point  could  be  adduced  one  way  or  the 
other.  I  can  therefore  summarize  the  result  of  these 
reflections  to  this  end :  that  the  defence  as  a  form  of 
fighting  is  stronger  than  the  attack,  but  that  in  the  con- 
duct of  war  as  a  whole  the  offensive  mode  of  action 
is  by  far  superior  to  the  defensive  mode,  especially 
under  modern  conditions.  "It  is  always  better  to  act 
offensively,  even  if  we  are  inferior  in  numbers.  The 
enemy  is  often  bewildered  by  boldness,  and  allows 
advantages  to  be  snatched  from  him,"  writes  Frederic 
the  Great  to  Louis  XV.,  and  it  is  surely  somewhat  con- 
clusive if  we  are  one  with  him  in  military  questions. 

The  dictum  on  the  superiority  of  the  offensive  is  of 
fundamental  importance.  It  rules  the  whole  domain 
of  the  art  of  war;  it  must  determine  all  action  in  war 
and  for  war,  to-day  more  than  ever.  But  this  princi- 
ple, if  we  wish  to  count  upon  military  successes,  must 
go  hand  in  hand  with  the  knowledge  that  the  attack, 
tactically,  is  infinitely  more  difficult  under  modern 
conditions  than  at  any  time  before ;  that  the  assailant, 
where  he  intends  to  enforce  the  decision,  needs  a  very 
considerable  superiority,  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
strategy  to  insure  him  this  superiority. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  OBJECT  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  WAR 

THE  probability  of  the  Germans  having  to  fight  by 
sea  and  by  land  against  greatly  superior  numbers  is 
obviously  near  at  hand.  Their  political  development 
requires  this  combat  as  a  biological  necessity.  It  is, 
then,  positively  breaking  the  backbone  of  self-reliance, 
resolution,  and  will  to  conquer  of  the  nation  if  a 
theory  of  war  is  preached  which  presents  numerical 
superiority  and  the  material  means  of  warfare — 
masses,  arms,  and  war-machines — as  the  decisive  fac- 
tors, and  more  or  less  switches  off  the  spiritual  and 
moral  elements  of  victory.  To  spread  such  a  doc- 
trine is  all  the  more  noxious  and  pernicious,  because 
it  is  actually  a  wrong  doctrine,  looks  for  the  cardinal 
points  of  preparation  for  war  at  the  wrong  place,  and 
is  calculated  to  force  policy  into  paths  of  renunciation 
by  grossly  overrating  the  importance  of  numerical 
superiority,  and  thereby  the  danger  of  a  war  with  a 
numerically  stronger  enemy. 

Just  on  account  of  the  situation  in  which  Germany 
finds  herself  is  it  of  the  utmost  importance  that  correct 
views  should  be  spread  not  only  in  the  army,  but 
also  among  the  people  themselves,  and  that  the  con- 
viction should  be  kept  alive  that  to-day  as  well  as  at 
King  Frederic's  time  100,000  men  can  be  beaten  by 
30,000  if  resolutely  and  boldly  led,  and  animated  by 
the  true  spirit  of  a  soldier. 

159 


160        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

For  it  is  the  spirit  which  decides  in  war  to-day  as 
well  as  in  former  times;  it  is  the  spirit  of  command 
and  the  spirit  of  the  troops.  Resolution  and  boldness 
have  the  same  ascendancy  as  of  yore;  the  proud  privi- 
lege of  initiative  is  valid  as  of  yore;  victory,  as  of 
yore,  is  not  tied  to  a  definite  system,  but  may  be  gained 
in  a  variety  of  forms  even  against  substantial  numeri- 
cal superiorities. 

Having  dealt  in  detail  with  the  means  available  for 
the  conduct  of  war,  there  is  no  question,  therefore, 
when  discussing  the  conduct  of  war  itself,  of  estab- 
lishing special  systems  and  rules  for  the  employment 
of  troops;  but,  rather,  of  shedding  full  light  on  the 
factors  on  which  victory  depends,  so  that  the  com- 
mander, while  correctly  appreciating  all  effects  and 
reciprocal  relations,  can  act  with  perfect  freedom  of 
mind. 

Politics  have  a  determining  influence  on  the  con- 
duct of  war,  which  is  justified  within  certain  limits. 
These  limits  must  be  discerned.  The  broad  outlines 
of  action  and  the  nature  of  generalship  have  to  be 
considered.  The  utilization  of  time  and  space  is  of 
far-reaching  importance ;  momentous  reciprocal  effects 
exist  between  them  which  must  be  elucidated.  The 
tactical  and  strategic  importance  of  reserves  and  the 
importance  of  the  operative  element  in  war  must  be 
minutely  weighed.  The  distribution,  grouping,  and 
movement  of  the  forces  for  action  may  be  of  decisive 
importance.  The  principles,  therefore,  have  to  be  dis- 
cussed which  must  be  decisive  for  command  in  war. 
Success  or  failure,  lastly,  create  situations  necessitat- 
ing action  under  ever-varying  circumstances.  But  all 
these  conditions  on  which  the  conduct  of  war  depend 
are  subject  to  the  superior  influence  of  spiritual  and 
moral  forces,  and  gain  their  true  importance  only  by 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  161 

the  spiritual  and  moral  atmosphere  from  which  they 
spring.  The  ultimate  and  supreme  factors  of  success 
must  be  looked  for  in  the  psychical  qualities  of  indi- 
vidual actors  and  of  the  peoples;  and  beyond  the  con- 
sequences of  victory  and  defeat,  moral  strength  and 
moral  greatness  retain  an  importance  which  deter- 
mines historical  development  in  the  last  and  supreme 
instance. 

War  develops  directly  from  the  political  conflicts  of 
States;  this  may  be  caused  by  questions  of  power, 
national  antagonism,  colonial  efforts,  or  commercial 
competition.  The  cause  of  the  war  is  always  of  po- 
litical nature,  and  often  exercises  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  mode  of  conducting  the  war.  It  is,  therefore, 
impossible  to  appreciate  correctly  the  nature  of  war 
in  all  its  relations  and  effects  if  we  view  it  outside  the 
political  reasons  which  brought  it  about — as  a  thing 
by  itself,  as  it  were.  War  between  civilized  States  is 
nothing  else  but  a  means  of  policy  for  attaining  its 
intentions,  or,  as  Clausewitz  says,  "a  continuation  of 
policy  by  other  means,"  and  it  is  this  fact  which  in 
reality  limits  above  all  its  nature  to  achieve  the  utmost, 
and  contributes  a  great  deal  to  the  variety  of  its  char- 
acter. 

Owing  to  the  heavy  material  and  personal  sacrifices 
involved  in  a  modern  war,  with  its  levy  of  the  whole 
people,  wars  between  civilized  States  for  frivolous  po- 
litical purposes  will  probably  in  future  be  avoided. 
The  mere  threat  of  going  to  war  is  alone  sufficient  to 
exercise  an  exceedingly  injurious  influence  upon  com- 
mercial and  financial  affairs,  thus  entailing  heavy  loss 
of  money.  Yet  even  to-day  it  need  not  always  be  a 
question  of  vital  importance  to  make  war  possible. 
Antagonistic  political  efforts  comprising  important  in- 
terests may  often  suffice  to  give  cause  for  an  appeal 


162        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

to  arms.  For  France,  the  preservation  of  her  colonial 
empire  is  not  a  vital  question,  as  she  has  not  popula- 
tion enough  to  colonize ;  and  yet  she  would,  no  doubt, 
defend  her  colonies  by  force  of  arms.  With  the  nu- 
merous conflicting  relations  existing  between  the  vari- 
ous States,  it  might  also  happen  that  a  seemingly  in- 
different political  purpose  may  give  cause  for  a  mili- 
tary collision  if  that  purpose  was  merely  the  pretext 
or  the  fortuitous  form  of  expression,  below  which  are 
hidden  deep-seated  antagonistic  interests.  That  is  the 
reason  why  it  is  not  always  the  ostensible  political 
purpose  which  settles  the  character  of  the  war,  but 
the  conflict  of  great  national  interests  brought  to  the 
full  knowledge  of  the  people  by  the  war.  When  Na- 
poleon III  began  the  war  in  1870,  they  were  dynastic 
interests  which  he  pursued.  But  the  war  at  once  grew 
beyond  this  narrow  limit,  and  became  a  powerful' 
struggle  of  two  nations  for  supremacy  in  Europe. 

The  purposes  pursued  by  policy  do  not  always  co- 
incide with  real  interests  of  the  State.  They  are 
settled  by  men  who  are  subject  to  the  fate  of  all  man- 
kind— of  judging  with  a  narrow  mind  and  limited 
views,  whose  mode  of  thinking  is  often  devoid  of 
greatness,  and  whose  character  frequently  lacks  firm- 
ness— men  who  are  often  influenced  by  exclusive  in- 
terests, deficient  public  spirit,  and  personal  ambition. 
Nations  may  also  be  deceived  in  their  views,  may 
strive  after  wrong  objects,  and  misunderstand  their 
true  missions.  And  so  it  may  happen  that  even  in  our 
days  wars  may  arise  which  are  not  at  all  caused  by 
important  interests  of  the  State.  But  they  will  then 
always  bear  a  character  different  from  those  which  do 
not  spring  from  arbitrariness,  but  from  political  ne- 
cessity. 

This  is  the  first  and  often  decisive  influence  of  pol- 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  .WAR  163 

icy  on  the  conduct  of  war,  because  the  general  charac- 
ter of  the  war  is  determined  by  the  political  conditions 
from  which  the  conflict  arose.  The  magnitude  and  the 
nature  of  the  interests  at  stake  exercise  an  automatic 
influence  on  the  intensity  of  the  fight  and  the  forces 
employed. 

In  the  case  of  Russia  and  Japan,  neither  of  the  two 
States  had  the  intention  of  subjugating  the  other.  But 
the  Japanese  fought  for  their  position  in  the  world, 
for  their  recognition  as  a  civilized  State,  for  their  su- 
premacy in  Eastern  Asia.  Their  whole  political,  na- 
tional, and  public  future  depended  on  the  success  of 
their  arms.  Hence  the  enthusiastic  participation  of 
the  whole  nation  in  the  heroic  struggle ;  hence  the  self- 
sacrificing  spirit  of  staking  the  full  strength  of  the 
nation. 

Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  fought  for  a  limited 
political  object — the  supremacy  in  Eastern  Asia,  and 
free  access  to  the  ocean.  To  the  bulk  of  her  people 
these  ideas  were  altogether  foreign.  Not  for  a  single 
moment  did  the  war  become  a  national  war;  not  for 
a  single  moment  was  it  conducted  with  the  united 
forces  of  Russia — nay,  it  unchained  in  Russia  herself, 
and  even  in  the  army,  forces  hostile  to  the  State, 
which  meant  to  use  the  war  for  purposes  of  home  pol- 
itics, and  ultimately  brought  about  a  revolution.  The 
tension  in  the  conduct  of  war  was  accordingly  slight. 
Nowhere  was  the  feeling  apparent  that  it  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  conquer  in  this  struggle.  This 
could  be  most  distinctly  seen  in  all  military  action,  and 
by  the  character  of  the  whole  war.  On  the  Russian 
side  it  never,  in  its  totality,  became  heroic.  The  spirit 
of  the  army  was  not  nourished  by  the  spirit  of  the  na- 
tion for  whose  interest  the  army  was  fighting. 

A  further  influence  of  policy  on  the  conduct  of  war 


164        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

is  established  by  the  fact  that  policy  must  choose  the 
moment  for  the  State  to  take  up  arms.  Policy  must 
then,  of  course,  not  only  consider  the  purely  political 
conditions,  but  must  also  have  regard  to  the  military — 
i.e.,  the  state  of  its  own  as  well  as  of  the  hostile  army, 
and  the  military  forces  of  the  likely  allies  of  both 
sides.  In  this  sense  the  military  affairs  exercise  also 
a  legitimate  influence  on  policy.  For  all  that,  it  is 
the  statesman,  and  not  the  soldier,  who  decides  on 
peace  or  war,  thus  settling  at  the  same  time  the  general 
situation  in  which  the  war  must  be  fought  out.  The 
commander  who  actually  conducts  the  war  must  ac- 
cept the  situation  as  it  is ;  he  has  no  choice  left  whether 
a  Frederic  the  Great  places  him  before  a  great  task 
at  the  most  opportune  hour,  or  whether  a  Frederic 
William  III  forces  him  to  fight  under  the  most  fatal 
circumstances.  The  happy  choice  of  the  moment  for 
beginning  the  war  may  be  decisive  for  the  whole 
course  of  it. 

But  with  all  this  the  influence  of  policy  on  the 
conduct  of  war  is  not  yet  exhausted. 

If  war  is  resolved  upon,  the  military  object  takes 
the  place  of  the  political  purpose;  this  object  is  de- 
termined by  the  amount  and  the  kind  of  military 
success  considered  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  the 
political  purpose — that  is  to  say,  therefore,  for  break- 
ing the  will  of  the  opponent  sufficiently  as  no  longer 
to  resist  our  political  intentions.  The  "military  ob- 
ject" may  be  imagined  and  termed,  as  it  were,  the 
equivalent  of  the  "political  purpose." 

This  object  cannot  always  be  fixed  from  purely  mili- 
tary points  of  view,  since  we  must  continually  bear 
in  mind  the  reaction  of  the  military  action  on  the 
political  affairs.  Political  considerations  may  become 
decisive  even  for  the  choice  of  the  direction  of  the 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  165 

offensive,  as  we  shall  explain  in  detail  afterwards,  and 
the  political  situation  is  often  directly  decisive  for 
the  amount  of  the  military  efforts  and  the  determina- 
tion of  the  military  object  equivalent  to  them. 

In  theory  it  is  no  doubt  best  from  a  purely  military 
point  of  view  to  fix  this  military  end  as  high  as  pos- 
sible— that  is  to  say,  therefore,  to  keep  the  perfect 
submission  of  the  hostile  State  always  in  view.  Only 
an  opponent  completely  disarmed  is  under  all  circum- 
stances obliged  to  submit  to  our  will.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  is  but  weakened  to  a  certain  extent, 
we  can  never  be  sure  of  attaining  this  object.  But 
this  utmost  cannot  always  be  upheld  in  the  world  we 
really  live  in. 

In  many  cases  it  is  altogether  impossible  to  break 
the  enemy's  power  of  resistance  completely.  A  per- 
fect subjugation  of  Russia,  for  instance,  would  be 
impossible  for  any  European  State  simply  owing  to 
spatial  conditions,  and  if  England  or  Japan  would 
become  involved  in  a  war  with  the  United  States  of 
North  America  they  could  surely  not  think  of  abso- 
lutely disarming  that  opponent.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  political  purpose  often  does  not  even  make  it  de- 
sirable actually  to  destroy  the  hostile  power.  When 
Frederic  the  Great  attacked  Austria  in  1740,  he  never 
thought  of  completely  overthrowing  that  State,  be- 
cause in  that  case  the  French  would  have  become  mas- 
ters of  Germany,  which  was  not  at  all  in  the  interest 
of  Prussia.  He  only  wished  to  injure  Austria  suffi- 
ciently to  cede  Silesia  to  him  so  as  to  prevent  further 
calamities,  otherwise  he  wished  to  uphold  her  as  a 
great  power  in  the  interest  of  Germany. 

Lastly,  there  are  political  purposes  totally  out  of 
reasonable  proportion  to  the  intention  of  completely 
crushing  the  enemy's  military  power;  or  the  relations 


166        HOW.  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

of  the  neighbouring  States  to  the  State  assailed  may 
make  it  seem  too  dangerous  to  vanquish  him  entirely. 
The  fear  of  challenging  new  and  perhaps  superior 
opponents  will  often  cause  us  to  fix  the  military  object 
within  certain  bounds. 

Yet  we  must,  on  the  other  hand,  bear  in  mind  that 
military  success  also  reacts  on  policy.  Great  decisive 
successes  spread  a  salutary  fear.  The  rapid  and  de- 
cisive victories  gained  by  Prussia  in  Bohemia  in  1866 
may  be  said  above  all  to  have  caused  Napoleon  to 
abandon  his  intervention  in  favour  of  Austria,  and  in 
187071  it  was  probably  the  magnitude  of  the  Ger- 
man victories  that  prevented  our  numerous  enemies 
from  drawing  the  sword  in  favour  of  France. 

From  all  these  reflections  we  must  logically  con- 
clude that  it  is  imperative  to  fix  the  military  object 
always  as  high  as  the  armaments  and  the  general  po- 
litical situation  possibly  admit. 

In  the  actual  conduct  of  the  war  the  foremost  and 
most  essential  demand  that  must  be  made  on  the 
genius  of  command  is,  to  estimate  correctly  the  char- 
acter of  the  war  and  the  nature  of  the  enemy;  to  dis- 
cern where  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  hostile  resist- 
ance will  be  found,  and  to  adopt  its  own  measures  ac- 
cordingly. It  is  only  if  the  commander  judges  and 
acts  correctly  concerning  these  things  that  he  can  do 
full  justice  to  his  task. 

This  demand  is  evidently  exceedingly  difficult  to 
fulfil,  else  command  would  not  have  so  often  fallen 
short  of  it.  There  are  generally,  and  especially  at 
the  beginning  of  a  war,  only  a  few  palpable  facts  by 
which  we  can  form  an  opinion;  as  a  rule,  it  is  a 
question  of  imponderabilities  that  must  be  gauged. 
For  this  is  wanted  a  kind  of  scenting  spiritually  what 
the  senses  often  are  totally  unable  to  grasp.  The 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  167 

one-sidedness  and  narrowness  of  human  judgment, 
which  is  but  rarely  able  to  view  things  objectively, 
misguide  us,  too,  in  this.  Only  a  great  and  open 
mind,  at  the  same  time  refined  by  professional  knowl- 
edge, will  nearly  always  hit  upon  the  right  thing. 
Who,  knowing  the  history  of  mankind,  would  like  to 
deny  that  most  men,  called  upon  to  form  such  a  judg- 
ment, are  incompetent  to  satisfy  this  ideal  demand? 
We  only  see  too  often  that  judgment  and  action  do 
not  meet  the  situation  nor  do  full  justice  to  the  true 
magnitude  of  the  task.  On  the  other  hand,  it  cannot 
often  be  proved  that  vigorous  action  has  shot  beyond 
the  mark,  and  caused  any  harm  thereby.  A  surplus  of 
military  performance  will  scarcely  ever  be  injurious. 
That  commander  will,  therefore,  always  have  the 
best  chances  who,  in  the  military  action  itself,  brushes 
completely  aside  all  points  of  view  that  might  exer- 
cise a  paralysing  effect,  and  who  tries  always  and 
under  any  circumstances,  with  the  utmost  energy,  to 
gain  what  is  at  all  possible  to  gain  under  the  condi- 
tions as  given  after  correctly  appreciating  the  enemy 
— of  course,  not  in  every  part  of  the  theatre  of  war, 
but  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  a  whole.  This  point 
being  already  decisive  when  fixing  the  object  of  the 
war,  it  is  twice  as  important  for  the  military  action 
itself  which  is  to  attain  this  object.  He  who  acts  in 
this  spirit  does  not,  at  any  rate,  run  the  risk  of  achiev- 
ing less  than  the  situation  demands,  and  obtains,  in 
any  case,  that  moral  superiority  over  a  less  energetic 
opponent  which  is  seen  by  the  actual  results.  He  who, 
without  heeding  any  subordinate  motives,  always 
strives  for  the  utmost  with  a  vigour  that  harmonizes 
with  that  utmost,  has  an  advantage  by  itself  over 
every  opponent  who  finds  or  believes  himself  to  be 
restricted  by  all  kinds  of  minor  intentions,  and  by 


i68        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

theoretical,  political,  or  even  personal  scruples.  Only 
too  often — and  this  is  inherent  in  human  nature — have 
commanders  looked  for  pretexts  and  fictitious  reasons 
to  spare  them  the  resolve  to  do  the  utmost.  This 
weakness  gives  an  advantage  to  the  more  resolute  op- 
ponent. 

With  reference  to  this  we  need  only  consider  Kuro- 
patkin's  mode  of  action  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 
His  plan  was  to  gain  gradually,  by  retreating,  numeri- 
cal superiority  over  the  enemy,  at  first  thought  to  be 
stronger,  and  then  to  assume  the  offensive  for  the 
final  issue.  The  very  plan  was  faint-hearted,  and  was 
absolutely  contrary  to  the  endeavour  of  performing 
the  maximum  possible.  In  carrying  it  out,  the  will 
to  conquer  was  entirely  lost.  Even  after  he  had  a 
very  substantial  numerical  superiority  at  his  disposal, 
of  which  he  was  perfectly  aware,  this  commander  was 
unable  to  make  up  his  mind  to  risk  all  and  strive  for  a 
really  great  success  with  his  united  forces.  But  his 
opponent  resolutely  took  advantage  of  this  weakness, 
and  only  thereby  was  able  to  command  victory. 

How  differently  from  the  Russian  commander  does 
true  genius  act !  Genius  always  tries  the  most  decisive 
issue,  because  it  knows  that  the  greater  the  victory,  the 
surer  all  minor  intentions  are  achieved  and  all  scruples 
disarmed;  because  it  feels  that  it  is  boldness  which  is 
most  apt  to  perplex  and  paralyse  the  enemy,  creating 
thereby  not  only  favourable  conditions  for  success,  but 
in  case  of  failure  also  affording  a  certain,  and  as  a  rule 
sufficient,  security  for  retreat. 

When  Moltke  undertook  to  fight  the  Battle  of  St. 
Privat  with  front  reversed,*  he  was  well  aware  of 
acting  with  extreme  boldness  and  of  taking  into  the 

*  I.e.,  with  a  front  formed  toward  his  original  line  of 
advance  after  having  marched  round  Metz. 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  169 

bargain  a  great  risk.  If  the  attack  failed,  retreat  was 
likely  to  become  very  difficult  owing  to  the  direction 
of  the  lines  of  communication  with  respect  to  the 
front,  especially  if  the  French  pushed  vigorously  from 
Metz  on  both  banks  of  the  Moselle.  But  the  Field- 
Marshal  also  knew  that  in  case  of  success  victory 
would  be  all  the  more  momentous;  he  knew  that  the 
boldness  of  his  mode  of  action  alone  gave  him  a  tre- 
mendous moral  (and  thus  the  most  effective)  prepon- 
derance, and  he  was  allowed  to  presume  that  the 
French,  as  he  had  learned  to  know  them,  could  surely 
not  be  expected  to  show  the  utmost  energy  and  bold- 
ness even  should  they  succeed  in  victoriously  main- 
taining their  ground.  And,  indeed,  his  calculation 
proved  correct,  for  the  enemy's  resolutions  were  most 
of  all  affected  by  the  moral  superiority  of  the  Ger- 
mans. Even  before  the  very  beginning  of  the  battle, 
Bazaine  had  thought  of  retreat,  and  the  very  half- 
heartedness  and  uncertainty  of  his  resolution  made 
him  lose  the  battle,  because  this  irresolution  prevented 
him  from  engaging  all  his  forces  for  the  decisive  is- 
sue, and  infected  all  his  subordinate  commanders.  On 
August  1 6,  too,  at  Mars-la-Tour,  he  lost  the  battle 
chiefly  from  want  of  resolution. 

To  strive  always  for  the  highest  possible  success 
with  the  utmost  energy  is  the  first  principle  of  all  war- 
fare, and  that  commander  will  never  acquire  highest 
fame  who  falls  short  of  this  demand.  The  fate,  not 
only  of  battles,  but  of  whole  wars  and  States,  often 
depends  on  the  commander's  energy,  that  looks  upon 
every  success  but  as  an  incitement  to  further  deeds, 
and  upon  every  failure  as  an  inducement  to  wipe  it 
out  at  once  by  other  successes. 

The  demand  of  striving  always  after  the  utmost 
possible  success  being  thus  one  of  the  fundamental 


i;o        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

ideas  of  the  art  of  war,  it  is,  nevertheless,  impossible 
to  determine  theoretically  what  in  each  case  must  be 
fixed  as  the  utmost  of  success.  This  must  always  be 
gauged  in  each  case  as  it  occurs,  falls  within  the  com- 
pass of  each  individual's  reasoning,  and  thus  incurs 
the  penalty  to  which  all  human  thought  and  deed  is 
subject — the  chance  of  erring.  We  seem  to  turn  here 
in  a  vicious  circle,  since  in  the  last  instance  personal 
opinion  must,  after  all,  again  decide.  It  seems  the 
same  regarding  the  forms  and  the  other  rules  for  ac- 
tion, and  it  begins  to  look  as  if  the  phrase  "to  strive 
after  the  utmost  with  the  utmost  energy"  sets  up  a 
demand  indeed,  but  does  not  put  us  at  all  in  the  way 
of  solving  the  problem. 

Yet  that  is  not  so.  Definite  rules  for  the  conduct  of 
war  can  certainly  never  be  given.  A  theory  of  the 
conduct  of  war  as  an  infallible  guide  for  action  is 
impossible.  The  doctrine  must  confine  itself  to  con- 
sidering the  implements  of  war  and  forms  of  opera- 
tion in  their  reciprocal  effects,  weighing  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  the  different  procedures,  and  thus  furnish- 
ing the  commander  with  the  material  on  which  to 
form  his  judgment.  But  from  these  theoretical  and 
critical  reflections  the  guiding  lines  for  action  develop 
spontaneously. 

If  we  are  requested  always  to  fix  our  eye  on  the 
maximum  success  attainable,  that  means  nothing  else 
but  that  from  all  possible  solutions  of  a  military  prob- 
lem we  must,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  select  that  which 
promises  the  maximum  success;  arbitrariness  of  judg- 
ment is  thereby  confined  to  narrow  limits,  and  the 
will  is  necessarily  directed  upon  the  utmost.  If  we 
are,  at  the  same  time,  requested  to  subordinate  all  our 
action  to  the  law  of  developing  the  highest  possible 
force  and  the  strongest  possible  tension  of  energy, 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  171 

the  conduct  of  war  will  receive  its  peculiar  stamp 
from  that. 

There  is  even  more  in  the  demand,  apparently  so 
simple,  of  always  striving  after  the  highest  possible 
success. 

Attack  alone  achieves  positive  results ;  mere  defence 
always  supplies  but  negative  results.  The  maximum 
possible  success  is  by  itself,  therefore,  attainable  only 
through  the  offensive,  and  the  results  of  the  offensive 
are  increased  by  boldness. 

In  this  way,  from  the  injunction  to  strive  always 
after  the  greatest  success,  results  the  further  funda- 
mental demand  of  acting  always  offensively,  if  the  con- 
ditions in  any  way  admit  of  this;  where  we  are  obliged 
to  act  on  the  defensive,  to  conduct  it  always  with  the 
reservation  of  acting  offensively  afterwards  and  never 
to  be  urged  into  a  passive  defence  except  under  direst 
necessity. 

There  may  certainly  be  cases  where  a  purely  passive 
defence  is  imperative,  and  where  the  gain  of  time  is 
the  maximum  possible  success.  Inferior  strength  com- 
bined with  special  advantages  of  ground,  state  and 
character  of  the  forces,  and  also  the  political  situation, 
may  force  us  into  a  passive  defence.  But  we  must 
then  be  perfectly  aware  that  we  are  submitting  to 
the  will  of  the  enemy,  and  abandoning  all  chance  of 
finishing  the  combat  according  to  our  own  free  will. 
That  remains  always  a  disadvantage. 

Every  military  situation  must  therefore  be  examined 
as  a  matter  of  principle,  whether  it  cannot  be  solved 
offensively,  and  not  till  every  avenue  to  an  offensive 
mode  of  action  seems  blocked  must  we  resolve  upon 
the  defensive.  If  General  von  der  Tann  had  been 
conscious  of  this  guiding  principle  of  all  warfare, 
when  the  French  advanced  on  Orleans,  he  would  have 


172        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

stuck  to  his  original  and  ingenious  plan  of  evacuating 
the  town  and  throwing  himself  from  the  north  upon 
the  flank  of  the  hostile  army  then  approaching,  instead 
of  opposing  it  on  the  defensive.  He  would  then,  in 
all  probability,  have  gained  a  splendid  victory  at  Coul- 
miers,  instead  of  suffering  a  defeat. 

Offensive  warfare  must,  of  course,  not  be  imagined 
to  be  an  uninterrupted  and  continuous  offensive  pro- 
cedure of  every  single  portion  of  the  whole  force 
under  any  circumstances.  It  will  certainly  be  often 
imperative — especially  when  greatly  superior  in  num- 
bers— to  proceed  offensively  along  the  whole  line 
where  we  are  in  touch  with  the  enemy.  But  just  as 
often  will  it  be  a  question  of  combining  an  offensive 
with  a  defensive  procedure,  and  what  is  demanded 
here  is  merely  that  the  ultimate  carrying  through  of  a 
general  offensive  should  be  the  ruling  idea. 

All  action  in  war  is,  however,  governed  by  the  an- 
tagonism of  attack  and  defence  and  their  reciprocal 
effect.  Where  the  attack  encounters  the  defence, 
their  antagonism  becomes  manifest;  but  where  the 
same  party  makes  use  partly  of  the  offensive  and 
partly  of  the  defensive  modes  of  action,  their  recipro- 
cal effects  assert  themselves.  These  latter,  as  has  been 
pointed  out  already,  are  due  to  the  fact  that  the  de- 
fence in  front  is  tactically  stronger  than  the  attack. 
We  can  therefore  spare  forces  where,  in  combination 
with  the  ground,  we  act  on  the  defensive,  and  use 
them  elsewhere  for  strengthening  the  offensive.  It  is 
only  a  question  of  determining  the  proportion  of  the 
offensive  and  defensive  groups  to  each  other  in  a  way 
to  prevent  us  being  beaten  in  the  defensive  before 
our  own  attack  has  brought  about  a  victorious  issue. 

It  is  consequently  of  the  utmost  importance  to  esti- 
mate properly  the  offensive  and  defensive  power  of  the 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR  173 

hostile  and  of  our  own  troops,  and  to  apportion  the 
forces  accordingly. 

This  grouping  must  never  be  only  based  on  numeri- 
cal conditions,  nor  be  done  in  a  purely  mechanical  way ; 
it  must  rather  be  done  with  due  regard  to  the  vital 
strength  of  the  troops,  their  peculiar  aptitude  for  the 
task  to  be  solved,  the  nature  of  the  different  theatres 
of  war,  the  likely  existence  of  fortresses,  and  other 
circumstances  facilitating  or  aggravating  attack  and 
defence.  Every  modern  army  is  composed  of  troops 
differing  in  military  value ;  not  to  all  can  be  given  the 
same  tasks.  Even  the  performances  of  the  same  troops 
will  often  greatly  differ  under  different  circumstances. 
Imponderable  factors  frequently  raise  or  lower  their 
military  value.  Previous  victories  or  defeats,  confi- 
dence in  the  commander,  and  similar  causes,  exercise 
a  far-reaching  influence.  Where  configuration  and 
cultivation  of  ground  favour  the  defence,  and  where 
fortresses  afford  secure  points,  we  can,  as  a  rule,  do 
with  troops  fewer  in  number  and  of  lesser  worth  than 
where  open  ground,  affording  little  cover,  makes  us 
expect  severe  losses,  and  hence  requires  greater  con- 
tempt of  death  and  determination.  The  relation  of 
the  arms  to  each  other  must  also  be  considered.  The 
troops  apportioned  for  defence  must  be  amply  sup- 
plied with  machine-guns ;  for  attack  the  best  infantry 
and  the  bulk  of  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army 
should  be  combined.  Where  the  conditions  are  fa- 
vourable for  cavalry  action,  the  mass  of  that  arm  will 
be  employed.  It  is  certainly  highly  important  not  to 
break  up  the  customary  tactical  formations  and  place 
the  troops  under  the  command  of  leaders  unknown  to 
them,  and  in  whom  they  cannot  have  confidence.  But 
we  must  never  be  fettered  by  the  organization  as  we 
find  it  in  such  a  narrow  way  as  not  to  venture  on 


174        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

this  account  arranging  for  what  is  the  most  practical. 
Especially  the  auxiliary  arms  of  different  units  we 
may  often  have  occasion  to  unite  for  carrying  out  par- 
ticular duties.  An  important  factor  for  distributing 
the  forces  is,  moreover,  time.  This  became  already 
apparent  when  we  discussed  the  inner  line,  but  is 
equally  important  for  every  action  in  war  where  it  is 
necessary  to  combine  attack  and  defence.  In  that  case 
it  will,  as  a  rule,  not  depend  so  much  on  the  defending 
troops  holding  out  altogether  as  long  as  possible,  like, 
perhaps,  the  garrison  of  a  fortress,  but  on  offering 
resistance  in  general,  and  delaying  the  issue  long 
enough  for  the  attacking  troops  to  be  on  their  part  vic- 
torious in  the  decisive  direction.  The  defending  troops 
may  often,  at  least  in  strategic  defence,  also  retire 
within  certain  limits  without  thereby  jeopardizing  the 
success  of  the  whole  operation — in  short,  they  must 
in  a  given  space  fight  to  gain  time.  To  this  must  be 
paid  due  regard  also  in  the  distribution  of  the  forces. 
Attacking  and  defending  troops  must  be  able  to  act 
in  harmony  with  each  other,  and  work  into  each 
other's  hands.  Lastly,  the  choice  of  the  superior  com- 
manders, and  especially  of  those  who  are  to  hold  an 
independent  command,  is  of  most  decisive  importance. 
To  Hannibal  as  well  as  to  Fabius  Cunctator  must  be 
apportioned  the  task  that  would  suit  each. 

To  distribute  harmoniously  the  forces  in  this  sense 
is  in  every  single  case,  in  strategy  as  well  as  in  tactics, 
the  first  practical  duty  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
The  way  in  which  he  carries  out  this  duty  forms  the 
basis  of  the  further  course  of  events. 

He  who  employs  too  many  troops  on  the  defensive 
fronts  will  be  short  of  forces  for  the  decisive  attack. 
He,  on  the  other  hand,  who  occupies  the  defensive  line 
too  weakly  must  be  in  constant  fear  of  the  enemy 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR    175 

overpowering  it  before  his  own  attack  has  succeeded 
and  brought  about  the  decisive  issue.  But  the  same 
danger  accrues  to  him  who  in  attack  or  defence  has 
underestimated  the  enemy's  fighting  strength.  His 
strategic  account  will  then  prove  always  faulty. 

All  strategic  and  tactical  questions  can  in  the  last 
instance  be  traced  back  to  this  reciprocal  effect  of 
attack  and  defence,  this  seemingly  so  simple  relation. 
We  can,  therefore,  easily  judge  how  highly  important 
a  correct  appreciation  of  this  relation  must  be  for  the 
whole  conduct  of  the  war.  The  distribution  of  forces 
based  on  this  appreciation  often  contains  in  itself  the 
germs  of  victory  or  defeat.  This  holds  good  first  of 
all  and  in  a  special  measure  for  the  strategic  concen- 
tration. The  mistakes  made  at  this  initial  distribution 
of  forces  can  scarcely  ever  be  made  good  during  the 
course  of  the  war.  This  we  are  also  taught  by  Moltke, 
who  was  the  first  to  think  out  and  direct  a  concentra- 
tion of  considerable  masses  of  troops  with  the  aid  of 
modern  means  of  transport.  But  this  lesson  holds 
good  for  the  initiation  of  any  larger  operation  of  mod- 
ern type ;  with  modern  armies  it  also  holds  good  when 
concentrating  for  battle.  Its  importance  has  grown 
with  the  growth  of  the  armies  of  masses,  since  changes 
in  the  distribution  of  forces  become  all  the  more  dif- 
ficult the  larger  the  masses  with  which  we  have  to  deal. 

The  pernicious  consequences  that  might  arise  from 
our  own  and  the  enemy's  forces  being  wrongly  es- 
timated, and  if  on  this  the  strength  of  the  forces,  the 
grouping  of  the  troops,  and  the  strategic  measures 
are  determined,  are  particularly  well  illustrated  by  the 
way  in  which  the  Russians  conducted  their  recent 
wars. 

They  enormously  underrated  Turkey's  military  ef- 
ficiency in  1877,  and  began  the  war  with  forces  far 


176        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

too  weak.  In  consequence  a  terrible  crisis  arose,  which 
was  safely  got  over  merely  because  the  Turks  did  not 
understand  how  to  take  advantage  of  the  favourable 
situation.  But  in  Manchuria  Russian  command  sinned 
in  the  opposite  direction. 

The  first  victories  of  the  Japanese  seem  to  have 
made  a  positively  overwhelming  impression  upon  the 
Russian  commander.  Since  then  he  laboured  under 
the  notion  of  having  to  fight  against  a  tremendous 
superiority,  even  against  a  tremendous  numerical  su- 
periority, and  this  notion  paralysed  his  energy  con- 
stantly afresh.  Russian  command  has  been  repeatedly 
discussed  already,  it  is  true,  but  it  will  pay  to  study 
it  also  from  this  point  of  view.  Very  interesting  is 
it,  for  instance,  to  compare  the  estimate  made  at 
Russian  Headquarters  of  the  Japanese  strength  with 
the  actual  forces  employed  by  them,  and  to  notice  how 
Kuropatkin,  by  reason  of  this  estimate,  which  some- 
times was  double  what  the  forces  really  were,  thought 
himself  everywhere  too  weak  for  attack,  and  believed 
the  Japanese  to  be  strong  enough  to  turn  him  with 
powerful  masses  without  materially  weakening  them- 
selves in  front.  It  is  highly  instructive  to  see  how, 
owing  to  this  over-estimation  of  the  enemy,  not  only 
the  offensive  spirit  was  completely  paralysed,  from 
sheer  anxiety  of  all  kinds  of  purely  imaginary  dangers, 
but  also  how  the  grouping  of  the  forces  seemed  to 
meet,  with  apparently  wise  foresight,  all  possible  stra- 
tegic contingencies,  yet  never  the  actual  strategic  situ- 
ation. This  can  be  traced  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  the  war. 

This  reflection  brings  us  to  another  demand  of  gen- 
eral importance  in  the  conduct  of  war,  which  ap- 
peals to  the  moral  qualities  of  the  commander.  Clause- 
witz  calls  fear  a  lost  equilibrium  and  Bismarck  terms 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR    177 

it  a  "bad  adviser."  Fear  lured  Kuropatkin  into  adopt- 
ing the  most  contradictory  and  pernicious  measures, 
in  the  same  way  as.it  condemned  to  sterility  Schwarz- 
enberg's  conduct  in  the  War  of  Liberation.  It  acted 
like  a  nightmare  upon  the  opponents  of  Frederic  the 
Great  and  of  the  mighty  Corsican,  and  puzzled  their 
military  judgment.  In  the  face  of  such  manifesta- 
tions we  must  demand  from  a  commander  that  in  for- 
tune and  in  misfortune  he  keeps  his  equanimity  and 
does  not  allow  the  calm  objectivity  of  his  judgment  to 
be  obscured;  that  no  failure  and  no  misfortune  makes 
him  depart  from  the  principles  of  an  offensive  and  of 
a  bold  conduct  of  the  war;  and  that  no  anxiety  should 
get  the  better  of  his  judgment  and  of  his  resolution. 

If  it  is  difficult  under  ordinary  conditions  to  adhere 
unerringly  to  the  guiding  idea  of  a  plan  of  operations 
in  spite  of  the  thousand  and  one  changes  in  the  military 
situation,  never  to  lose  sight  of  it,  and  to  turn  it  into 
deeds  under  the  pressure  of  the  most  contradictory 
demands,  and  under  the  most  difficult  material  cir- 
cumstances, without  being  misled  by  subordinate  con- 
siderations— if  this  alone  requires  a  clear  mind,  tre- 
mendous self-confidence,  complete  mastery  of  arma- 
ments as  well  as  of  troops,  unceasing  energy  and  cir- 
cumspection, ever  full  of  resources,  and  knowing  how 
to  break  down  any  opposition  and  remove  all  friction, 
so  much  more  must  these  qualities  assert  themselves 
when  misfortune  threatens  to  unnerve  the  soul  of  the 
commander,  and  when  the  columns  of  the  army,  beaten 
and  retreating,  begin  to  lose  their  moral  balance  and 
power  of  resistance.  And  yet  it  is  just  in  such  situa- 
tions imperatively  necessary  that  the  commander, 
whose  soul  infuses  life  into  the  whole  army,  should 
not  lose  his  equanimity,  but  keep  alive  his  spirit  of  en- 
terprise and  daring,  and  preserve  the  high  spirit  of 


178        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

his  soul,  which  looks  upon  defeat  only  as  a  step  to 
later  victories. 

The  same  as  in  days  past  Bliicher,  after  the  unfor- 
tunate actions  and  heavy  losses  which  he  suffered  in 
his  march  to  the  Marne  in  February,  1814,  never 
thought  for  a  moment  of  giving  up  the  offensive,  but 
at  once  collected  his  forces  for  renewed  advance;  the 
same  as  Gneisenau,  after  the  unfortunate  Battle  of 
Ligny,  when  making  arrangements  for  the  retreat,  did 
so  already  with  a  view  of  co-operating  with  Welling- 
ton's army,  thus  preparing  the  victory  of  Waterloo; 
the  same  as  King  Frederic  after  Colin  and  Kunersdorf 
only  thought  of  making  good  the  losses  by  all  the 
greater  victories;  so  the  commander  of  the  future 
must  think,  so  must  he  strive  to  act.  In  this  way 
alone  can  also,  in  the  armies  of  masses  of  modern 
times,  that  mental  and  moral  elasticity  of  mind  be 
preserved  which  is  indispensable  for  conquering  in 
war. 

We  must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  that  the  mod- 
ern armies  of  masses,  composed  as  they  are,  will  be 
very  much  more  susceptible  of  depressing  influences 
than  the  smaller  but  more  firmly-knit  armies  of  the 
past.  This  weakness  must  be  compensated  for  by 
greater  elasticity  of  mind  of  the  commander,  and  by 
his  spirit  of  enterprise,  else  it  must  be  feared  that 
every  failure  of  even  single  portions  may  lead  to  some 
demoralization  and  weakening  of  the  whole  army,  thus 
disturbing  at  the  same  time  the  mechanism  which 
moves  the  masses  and  keeps  them  active. 

This  mechanism  is,  by  itself  alone,  something 
powerful  and  intricate.  A  thousand  wheels  must 
organically  work  into  each  other  to  keep  it  going, 
and  yet  the  independence  of  the  members  must  be 
preserved  in  each  place.  That  is  only  possible  when 


THE  OBJECT  AND  CONDUCT  OF  WAR    179 

the  whole  is  animated  by  a  confident  spirit  sure  of  vic- 
tory. The  commander  alone  can  rouse  it  and  keep  it' 
awake.  It  is  enormously  difficult  to  be  equal  to  this 
task,  for  as  easily  as  it  may  happen  that  a  modern 
army  is  demoralized  and  disorganized,  so  difficult  is 
the  art  of  controlling  and  animating  it  spiritually. 
Special  qualities  of  character  are  needed  to  exercise 
that  art.  To  a  few  mortals  only,  called  to  exercise 
authority,  are  given  these  qualities  to  any  great  ex- 
tent ;  nor  are  these  qualities  alone  enough  for  solving 
the  problems  devolving  upon  a  modern  commander. 
The  domineering  greatness  of  his  character  must  be 
supplemented  by  an  inborn  military  talent,  by  superior 
mental  faculties,  and  by  a  comprehensive  profes- 
sional knowledge.  This  is  absolutely  necessary  under 
modern  conditions. 

Every  branch  of  the  military  science  must  be  mas- 
tered by  the  commander  of  to-day,  and  this  knowledge 
be  available  at  any  moment;  he  must  know  the  or- 
ganism of  the  army  to  the  minutest  detail;  he  must 
be  absolutely  clear  on  the  reasons  for,  and  the  conse- 
quences of,  his  actions,  on  the  factors  decisive  in 
war  and  in  battle,  and  on  the  frictions  he  is  likely 
to  meet.  Only  then,  if  he  is  otherwise  fitted  for  it, 
can  he  with  a  perfectly  free  mind  exercise  the  difficult 
art  of  conducting  war  under  modern  conditions ;  only 
then  will  he  inspire  all  his  subordinates  within  all  parts 
of  the  army  with  that  confidence  which  assures  him 
the  control  of  the  masses  under  any  circumstances, 
and  that  can  raise  all  mental  and  moral  qualities  to 
their  highest  pitch. 

Of  the  modern  commander  and  superior  leader  of 
troops  must  be  demanded  that  he  is  a  theorist  of  war 
— certainly  in  the  sense  of  Clausewitz — so  that  he  can 
be  a  successful  practical  soldier. 


i8o        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

The  mere  routinist  fails,  and  must  fail,  the  moment 
he  is  approached  by  the  great  and  difficult  problems 
of  modern  warfare.  He  will  always  try  to  solve  them 
with  the  inadequate  means  afforded  by  his  limited  ex- 
perience. Nor  can  the  "Court-General,"  who  is 
obliged  to  spend  his  life  in  futilities,  and  who  has  no 
time  for  serious  military  study,  ever  satisfy  the  de- 
mands of  the  future.  Those  should  take  this  to  heart 
who  may  be  called  upon  to  take  command  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  In  war  the  mental  labour  cannot  be 
retrieved,  which  was  neglected  in  peace.  The  times 
of  the  "Review-General"  are  past  recovery,  and  in 
the  lower  grades,  too,  the  mere  dare-devil  will  suc- 
cumb to  him  who  is  aware  of  what  he  ventures  on. 

"Put  your  aim  always  high,  if  you  design  a  plan 
of  campaign;  make  the  project  as  comprehensive  as 
possible,  for  we  always  fall  short  of  our  aim.  Con- 
stantly muse  upon  your  profession,  upon  your  own 
enterprises,  and  upon  eminent  commanders.  This 
meditation  is  the  only  means  for  acquiring  that  rapid- 
ity of  deliberating  which  at  once  grasps  everything, 
devises  everything  that  is  applicable  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  moment  .  .  ."  These  are  the  words 
in  which  Frederic  the  Great  clothed  the  doctrines 
once  transmitted  to  him  by  Prince  Eugen  of  Savoy. 
They  have  twice  the  value  to-day,  when  all  military 
action  is  so  much  more  materially  difficult.  A  leader 
who  is  in  doubt  of  what  he  can  do  and  what  he  will 
do,  will  soon  fail  in  resolution  and  action.  A  perfect 
clearness  of  mind  alone  gives  birth  to  resolution.  A 
commander  must  thoroughly  think  out  his  task,  to-day 
more  than  ever. 

He  alone  who  has  well  thought  out  the  art  can  prac- 
tise it. 


CHAPTER  IX 
TIME,   SPACE,  AND   DIRECTION. 


CHAPTER   IX 

TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION 

THE  art  of  war  uses  troops  the  number  of  which  is 
certainly  a  given  factor,  but  the  value  and  efficiency 
of  which  can  only  be  estimated ;  the  art  reckons  with 
mental  and  moral  forces  which  from  their  nature  are 
imponderable,  but  it  also  reckons  with  factors  that 
can  be  placed  in  the  strategical  and  tactical  prelimi- 
nary calculation  as  quantities  of  a  definite  value — that 
is  to  say,  the  art  of  war  reckons  with  space  and  time, 
which  have  a  distinct  reciprocal  effect  upon  each  other. 
Every  military  action  comes  off  in  a  clearly  defined 
space,  and  demands  for  its  execution  a  mimimum  of 
time,  with  which  we  have  to  reckon.  The  assailant 
bent  on  beating  the  enemy  tries  to  gain  space  at  the 
same  time.  He  wants  to  push  the  defender  from  the 
ground  he  is  standing  on,  so  as  to  confine  him  more 
and  more  in  space,  and  deprive  him  of  the  means  he 
is  drawing  from  the  country  for  his  resistance.  The 
defender,  on  the  other  hand,  wishes  to  secure  his 
country  against  conquest  and  preserve  unimpaired  the 
means  of  resistance  afforded  by  that  country.  He 
strives  not  to  lose  space,  and  to  gain  time  while  making 
this  effort.  He  wants  again  and  again  to  beat  off 
the  enemy's  attacks  until  the  latter's  power  of  attack 
is  exhausted  and  he  gives  up  the  combat.  Every  gain 
of  time  is  of  advantage  to  him,  firstly,  because  the 
very  fact  of  the  time  being  gained  prevents  the  con- 

183 


184        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

quest  of  the  country  for  that  period;  and,  secondly, 
because  he  forces  the  assailant  to  increase  his  efforts, 
exhausting  thereby  the  latter's  strength,  and  procuring 
the  chance  of  awaiting  or  bringing  about  a  change  in 
the  political  situation.  The  longer  the  Austrians  could 
keep  the  field  in  1866,  the  more  readily  could  they 
count  upon  France's  intervention  in  their  favour.  Of 
the  same  import  it  was  to  the  French  in  187071  to 
hold  out  in  Paris  as  long  as  possible.  They  not  only 
gained  time  thereby  for  renewed  military  efforts  in 
the  provinces,  but  could  also  hope  for  the  intervention 
of  the  neutral  Powers  if  the  fight  for  the  capital  con- 
tinued for  any  length  of  time. 

Time  is  for  the  assailant,  in  a  certain  sense,  of  de- 
cisive importance  too. 

It  must  first  of  all  be  counted  an  advantage  if  at 
the  beginning  of  hostilities  or  of  any  enterprise  during 
the  war  we  have  completed  our  preparations  sooner 
than  the  enemy — in  other  words,  if  we  have  finished 
mobilization  and  concentration,  or  the  assembly  of 
troops  detailed  for  a  special  object,  sooner  than  he. 
In  that  case  we  can  hope  either  to  attack  the  enemy 
before  he  has  all  his  forces  ready  for  defence,  and  thus 
upset  his  plans  should  he  himself  have  prepared  for 
an  offensive,  or  oblige  him  to  retreat  without  fighting, 
gaining  thereby  at  least  space  and  a  certain  amount 
of  moral  superiority. 

A  further  advantage  of  beginning  operations  early 
is  that  in  advancing  the  area  of  operations  separating 
our  own  from  the  enemy's  army  is  made  smaller  for 
the  enemy,  while  we  ourselves  can  make  full  use  of 
it  for  grouping  our  forces.  This  advantage  is  bound 
to  assert  itself,  especially  under  the  conditions  of  the 
modern  war  with  masses.  The  more  time  all  move- 
ments of  masses  occupy,  the  more  space  do  we  need 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       185 

for  carrying  them  out  while  going  forward.  A  limita- 
tion of  the  area  of  operations  is  therefore  a  grievous 
disadvantage  for  an  army  bent  on  taking  the  offensive, 
because  its  chances  for-  strategic  operations  decrease 
thereby,  while  to  the  enemy,  by  advancing  earlier,  ac- 
crues a  wider  area  of,  and  greater  freedom  for,  opera- 
tions. 

Gaming  space  is,  as  a  rule,  an  advantage  in  war. 
The  farther  we  push  the  enemy  back,  and  the  more 
land  we  occupy,  the  more  we  deprive  him  of  the 
means  for  conducting  the  war,  which  we  then  can 
use  to  our  own  benefit.  On  the  other  hand,  gaining 
ground  may  lead  us  to  occupy  districts  favouring 
operations  and  the  effect  of  arms,  thus  affording  valu- 
able advantages.  Finally,  the  conquest  of  hostile  coun- 
try has  the  twofold  moral  effect  of  increasing  the 
self-reliance  and  the  feeling  of  superiority  of  our  own 
troops,  and  of  shaking  the  enemy's  confidence  in  vic- 
tory. 

Accordingly,  a  loss  of  ground  denotes  generally  a 
moral  and  material  disadvantage.  Yet  there  may  be 
cases  where  this  disadvantage  is  counterbalanced  or 
even  outweighed  by  the  military  advantages  derived 
from  an  abandonment  of  space.  We  can  retire  with 
the  object  of  occupying  ground  favourable  for  fight- 
ing, or  to  force  the  enemy  otherwise  into  an  unfavour- 
able situation.  When  the  Parthians  withdrew  before 
Crassus  so  as  to  lure  him  into  a  hasty  pursuit  and  to 
destroy  him  then  all  the  more  readily,  the  advantage 
they  gained  thereby  far  outweighed  the  disadvantage 
of  the  loss  of  space.  It  was  the  same  with  Russia  in 
1812.  The  moral  and  material  loss  suffered  by  the 
Russians  in  retreating  was  infinitesimal  compared  with 
the  heavy  injury  caused  to  the  French  by  their  long 
and  fatal  advance.  Owing  to  the  size  of  the  Russian 


1 86        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Empire  and  the  then  poverty  of  the  thinly-populated 
country,  the  loss  of  space  hardly  signified  anything  to 
the  defender,  while  the  gain  of  ground,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  turned  into  a  decisive  disadvantage  to  the 
enemy. 

There  is,  however,  no  advantage  or  disadvantage 
inherent  in  the  gain  or  loss  of  space  itself,  but  that 
it  is  always  the  relation  of  space  to  the  vital  military 
forces  that  lends  it  a  certain  amount  of  importance. 
This  leads  us  to  the  further  conclusion  that  the  de- 
cisive direction,  too — that  is  to  say,  therefore,  the 
direction  in  which  the  attack  of  the  military  forces 
may  be  able  to  produce  the  greatest  success  possible 
— can  never  be  determined  purely  by  space,  or  even 
by  geography,  as  was  taught  by  the  pseudo-scientific 
strategists  of  past  days,  in  complete  misconception  of 
the  true  nature  of  war.  It  is  always  entirely  the  re- 
lation to  the  enemy's  forces  that  seems  to  make  a 
certain  direction  the  decisive  one;  this  is  so  even  if 
that  relation  is  not  at  once  recognized,  because  it  is 
an  indirect  one. 

If  we  wish  to  express  the  fundamental  idea  of  all 
warfare  in  a  form  of  universal  application,  we  must 
clothe  it  in  the  definition :  To  use  the  forces  available 
in  such  a  way  as  to  attain,  in  case  of  success,  the  most 
decisive  effect  imaginable — in  other  words,  as  to  shake 
or  break  the  will  of  the  enemy  in  the  surest  manner. 
Any  attempt  to  embody  the  decisive  direction  when 
formulating  this  axiom  would  destroy  its  truth  and 
general  application.  But  if  we  have  in  view  a  war 
of  organized  forces  only,  conditions,  therefore,  of 
European  armies  as  limited  and  defined  by  civilization, 
a  systematic  importance  also  attaches  to  the  decisive 
direction;  then  it  will  be  imperative,  as  a  matter  of 
principle,  to  conduct  the  attack  in  the  decisive  direction 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       187 

and  the  defence  at  the  decisive  point,  which  latter  is 
generally  determined  by  the  direction  of  the  attack. 
This  is  already  expressed  in  the  term  "decisive."  If 
we  want  to  break  the  enemy's  will  by  destroying  his 
armaments — his  troops,  therefore,  above  all — it  is 
clear,  in  itself,  that  we  must  try  to  bring  about  a  really 
decisive  issue,  and  not  only  a  gradual  exhausting  of 
the  forces,  and  that  we  must,  therefore,  strive  to 
bring  about  the  issue  in  a  direction  affording  at  the 
outset  favourable  chances  of  success,  and  just  for  that 
reason  becoming  the  decisive  direction. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  a  definition  of  the  term  "de- 
cisive direction"  of  general  application.  We  must, 
therefore,  confine  ourselves  to  discussing  the  circum- 
stances which  may  cause  us  to  term  a  certain  direction 
as  the  decisive  one.  If  we  are  clear  on  this,  it  must 
in  each  case  be  left  to  the  commander  to  decide  what 
direction  may  under  the  conditions  in  each  case  be 
looked  upon  as  the  decisive  one. 

The  assailant  wants  to  beat  the  enemy  and  conquer 
the  hostile  country,  so  as  to  deprive  the  enemy  of  the 
means  for  renewing  his  resistance.  The  defender 
wants  to  ward  off  the  attack,  inflict  such  heavy  losses 
on  the  opponent  as  to  oblige  him  to  desist  from  further 
fighting,  and  to  hold  the  country  that  provides  him 
with  a  means  for  resistance.  The  decisive  direction 
will  therefore  be  for  the  former  that  which  offers 
the  prospect  of  the  surest  and  most  perfect  victory 
and  the  greatest  gain  of  space ;  the  latter  will  face  the 
assailant  in  a  direction  where  the  country  will  mostly 
favour  the  effect  of  his  arms  and  his  defensive  meas- 
ures, and  in  which  he  covers  best  the  space  he  wants 
to  protect  and  hold. 

If  we  fix  our  glance  before  all  upon  the  assailant, 
who  in  general  has  the  choice  of  the  direction  of  at- 


188        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

tack  and  lays  down  the  law  for  the  defender,  it  is  at 
once  apparent  that  we  must  consider  the  tactical  and 
strategical  direction  apart  from  each  other,  because 
both  must  be  determined  from  altogether  different 
points  of  view;  and  it  is  further  apparent  that  the 
tactical  and  strategical  conditions  lead  to  a  different 
conception  regarding  the  decisive  direction,  and  the 
commander  may  therefore  be  put  into  the  difficult 
position  of  having  to  choose  between  the  greater  stra- 
tegic or  greater  tactical  advantages. 

As  regards  tactics,  there  are  in  theory  three  points 
that  may  fix  the  decisive  direction — the  country,  the 
disposition  of  the  troops,  and  the  situation  of  the  hos- 
tile army's  lines  of  communication.  In  reality  some 
other  circumstances  may  certainly  be  of  influence — 
different  military  value  of  the  opposing  troops,  and 
the  defects  noticed  in  the  hostile  command;  but  these 
things  are  of  an  imponderable  nature,  and  cannot  be 
treated  scientifically. 

The  country  has  a  twofold  importance  with  regard 
to  the  decisive  direction.  That  direction  must  often 
be  termed  the  decisive  one  in  which  the  ground  al- 
lows the  easiest  approach  towards  the  enemy,  or  the 
most  advantageous  effect  of  the  arms,  thus  affording 
the  surest  prospect  of  victory;  but,  then,  in  all  de- 
fensive positions  there  are  some  sections  or  points  on 
the  ground  which  are  more  or  less  decisive  for  the 
possession  of  the  whole  position.  The  direction  of 
attack  against  these  points  must  then  be  termed  the 
decisive  one. 

A  good  example  for  elucidating  this  point  is  afforded 
by  the  Battle  of  St.  Privat.  A  glance  at  the  map 
shows  that  in  this  battle  the  village  of  St.  Privat 
itself,  with  the  commanding  height  it  was  crowning, 
was,  without  the  least  doubt,  the  decisive  point.  If 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       189 

St.  Privat  was  taken,  it  became  not  only  impossible 
to  hold  directly  the  country  as  far  as  Amanweiler,  but 
the  retreat  of  the  Fourth  and  Third  French  Corps  was 
also  most  seriously  threatened,  because  then  the  road 
on  Saulny,  and  thus  the  rear  of  the  French  position, 
lay  open  to  the  Germans.  A  defeat  of  the  French 
left,  on  the  other  hand,  would  have  brought  the  victor 
under  the  guns  of  the  Forts  of  St.  Quentin  and  Plappe- 
ville,  and  could,  therefore,  never  have  become  of  a 
similar  decisive  importance. 

The  disposition  of  the  hostile  troops  may  in  so  far 
become  the  determining  factor  for  the  decisive  direc- 
tion, as  it  sometimes  makes  it  possible  to  concentrate 
superior  forces  against  a  portion  of  the  position,  thus 
bringing  about  victory.  Unprotected  flanks  of  the 
enemy,  or  fronts  too  weakly  occupied,  advanced  and 
badly-supported  positions,  and  similar  things,  will 
often  be  the  cause  of  fixing  the  direction  of  attack. 
Military  history  abounds  with  examples  illustrating 
the  above.  Enveloping  attacks,  flank  attacks,  and 
penetration,  virtually  gain  their  decisive  character 
just  through  the  disposition  of  the  enemy's  troops. 

Lastly,  the  direction  against  the  enemy's  lines  of 
communication  and  lines  of  retreat  is  of  special  im- 
portance. If  during  the  progress  of  attack  we  succeed 
in  pushing  the  enemy,  or  even  a  portion  of  his  army, 
from  the  roads  connecting  the  troops  with  their  depots 
and  railheads,  an  exceedingly  precarious  situation  is 
created  for  the  vanquished,  entailing  too  easily  com- 
plete demoralization  and  disorganization  of  the  troops. 
The  defender  not  only  loses  the  connection  with  his 
supply  and  ammunition  reserves,  but  also  the  chance 
of  directly  covering  the  space  he  wishes  to  hold.  Only 
by  exacting  from  the  troops  the  most  strenuous  ex- 
ertions can  he  by  detours  re-establish  the  proper  stra- 


190        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

tegic  situation.  Sometimes  he  may  in  such  a  situation 
be  even  forced  to  capitulate,  if  his  lines  of  retreat 
are  completely  cut,  or  the  attack  itself  was  made  al- 
ready with  fronts  reversed. 

The  difficulty  of  such  a  situation  grows,  of  course, 
with  the  size  of  the  masses  to  be  moved,  as  they  are 
to  a  greater  measure  than  smaller  armies  dependent 
on  supplies  from  the  rear,  and  as  they  will  scarcely 
ever  find  their  subsistence  in  the  country  itself.  If 
the  Japanese  at  Mukden  had  succeeded  in  pushing 
the  Russian  right  over  the  Charbin  railway  in  an 
easterly  direction,  and  in  taking  possession  of  this 
important  communication,  a  terrible  defeat  of  the 
Russian  Army  would  have  been  inevitable.  It  is, 
therefore,  just  in  the  modern  war  of  masses  that  we 
must  more  especially  pay  attention  to  the  chance  of 
acting  against  the  hostile  communications  when  de- 
termining the  decisive  direction  of  attack. 

If,  therefore,  the  magnitude  of  success  depends,  no 
doubt,  on  the  choice  of  the  decisive  direction,  that 
choice  involves,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  rule  also  the 
greatest  dangers.  That  is  in  the  nature  of  things, 
because  the  most  important  pivots  of  the  enemy's  po- 
sition are  also  most  difficult  to  attack  as  a  rule ;  pene- 
tration forces  us  into  frontal  attack  and  involves  the 
danger  of  being  enveloped ;  enveloping  the  enemy  and 
cutting  his  lines  of  communication  can  mostly  be 
achieved  only  by  exposing  our  own  to  the  same  extent 
as  we  threaten  those  of  the  enemy;  in  case  of  tactical 
failure  we  may  be  placed  in  a  position  similarly  un- 
favourable, at  least,  as  that  we  meant  to  prepare  for 
the  enemy;  and,  worse  than  that,  should  envelopment 
bring  about  an  attack  with  fronts  reversed,  the  risk 
we  run  ourselves  is  tremendous. 

To  determine  the  decisive  direction  from  the  stand- 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       191 

point  of  strategy,  we  must  distinguish  between  the 
actual  operations  on  a  strictly  limited  theatre  of  war, 
and  the  design  of  a  war-plan  or  the  fundamental  ar- 
rangements for  a  whole  campaign.  In  the  first  case 
it  is  a  question  of  the  relation  of  two  armies  acting 
under  definite  conditions  to  each  other;  in  the  second, 
of  the  potency  of  the  States  in  general,  of  geographical 
and  frequently  also  of  political  circumstances.  In  the 
former  case  we  may  speak  of  an  operative  decisive 
direction,  and  in  the  latter,  in  a  wider  sense,  of  a 
strategic  decisive  direction.  Both  terms  cannot,  of 
course,  be  strictly  distinguished  from  each  other,  yet 
they  afford  the  chance  of  sifting  the  conditions  for  our 
reflections.  The  strategic  decisive  direction,  which 
gives  its  distinct  impress  to  the  plan  of  campaign, 
forms  the  basis  from  which  the  operations  develop. 
In  these  latter  the  decisive  direction  may  often  change 
and  be  different  for  the  various  army  portions.  In  the 
plan  of  campaign,  on  the  other  hand,  the  decisive 
direction  is  a  fixed  and,  as  long  as  the  conditions  re- 
main the  same,  a  constant  term. 

If  we  fix  our  glance  first,  in  a  wider  strategic  sense, 
on  the  latter,  it  becomes  apparent  that  political  and 
geographical  conditions  greatly  affect  it  in  the  first 
instance.  Policy,  of  course,  must  not,  as  we  have  seen, 
directly  influence  military  action  proper,  but  we  must 
certainly  pay  heed  to  the  political  attitude  of  neigh- 
bouring States,  their  neutrality,  or  their  likely  par- 
ticipation in  the  war,  and  similar  conditions.  Nor 
must  the  influence  of  geographical  conditions  be  con- 
ceived as  if  any  definite  geographic  direction  could,  by 
itself,  be  accepted  as  the  decisive  one;  but  it  must  be 
understood  to  mean  that  geographical  conditions  may 
force  upon  the  conduct  of  war  itself  certain  restric- 
tions, and,  on  the  other  hand,  hold  out  favourable 


1 92        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

prospects.  These  political  and  geographical  effects 
may  thus  be  of  very  great  import,  and  may  some- 
times be,  to  some  extent,  opposed  to  the  purely  mili- 
tary points  of  view. 

An  examination  of  actual  conditions  will  best  show 
the  many  ways  in  which,  in  this  sphere  of  political 
and  geographical  strategy,  the  different  points  of  view 
cross  each  other — how  difficult  it  therefore  is  to  lay 
down  definite  rules  of  action. 

The  geographic  formation  of  the  frontiers  of  two 
hostile  States  will,  first  of  all,  exercise  a  determining 
influence  on  the  whole  military  action.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  to-day  a  war  should  break  out  between 
Italy  and  France,  the  chances  of  attack  would  obvi- 
ously be  very  limited  for  both  parties,  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  frontiers  of  both  States  are  contiguous 
at  comparatively  short  stretches  only,  and  are  formed 
by  high  mountains,  an  advance  over  which  would  en- 
tail heavy  sacrifice,  and  impose  on  the  conduct  of  war 
a  form  altogether  distinct.  These  difficult  frontiers 
can  only  be  turned  by  the  narrow  strip  of  coast,  which 
can  be  taken  under  fire  from  the  sea,  or  by  neutral 
Switzerland,  therefore  likewise  a  difficult  mountain- 
ous country.  Italy  has,  moreover,  to  protect  a  long 
open  coastline,  which,  on  the  one  hand,  points  France 
towards  co-operating  in  her  land  operations  with  her 
fleet,  and,  on  the  ottier,  forces  Italy  into  making  am- 
ple provisions  for  the  protection  of  her  coast.  These 
considerations  would  no  doubt  have  a  great  deal  to 
say  in  determining  the  main  direction  of  attack  on 
both  sides,  and  in  distributing  the  forces  accordingly. 

The  geographical  conditions  would  again  assert 
themselves  in  a  different  way  in  a  German-Russian 
war.  Owing  to  the  spatial  extent  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire, a  complete  subjection,  or  even  conquest,  of  Rus- 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       193 

sia  cannot  be  thought  of  at  all.  For  Germany  it  would 
in  such  a  case  be  always  a  question  of  a  limited  of- 
fensive only,  where  from  the  outset  the  defensive  must 
be  kept  in  view.  It  would  therefore  be  a  question  of 
not  only  beating  the  Russian  army,  but  also  of  gain- 
ing a  position  which  on  the  one  hand  would  oblige 
the  Russians  to  assume  the  offensive  on  their  part, 
and  on  the  other  would  favour  the  German  defensive. 
It  needs  no  further  proof  that  the  geographical  con- 
ditions would  here,  in  many  respects,  be  decisive.  It 
would  depend  on  cutting  Russia  off  from  the  sea  and 
confining  her  to  her  communications  by  land — there- 
fore, on  restricting  her  to  her  own  inadequate  means. 

Geographical  conditions  will  always  be  of  impor- 
tance in  details,  too.  River  barriers  and  mountains 
considerably  hinder  the  movements  of  armies,  and 
render  the  offensive  difficult.  The  larger  the  masses 
of  the  armies,  the  more  these  difficulties  assert  them- 
selves. It  hardly  need  be  emphasized  that  cultivation 
and  accessibility  caused  by  the  geographical  position 
and  nature  of  the  theatre  of  war  will  affect  all  military 
operations,  and  it  is  just  as  plain  that  all  these  condi- 
tions must  also  exercise  a  certain  amount  of  influence 
on  the  decisive  direction  of  attack.  Difficult  and 
inaccessible  country  we  try  to  avoid  in  the  attack,  but 
take  advantage  of  any  likely  merit  in  the  shape  of  the 
frontier,  while  the  defender  must  likewise  heed  these 
conditions  by  his  counter-measures. 

To  what  extent  the  political,  in  addition  to  the  geo- 
graphical, conditions  may  have  a  voice  in  determin- 
ing what  should  be  considered  as  the  decisive  direction 
is  clear,  for  example,  from  the  Franco-German  War. 
The  French,  in  1870,  thought  to  act  in  the  best  and 
most  decisive  way  by  advancing  in  the  main  direc- 
tion of  Mainz  and  separating  North  and  South  Ger- 


i94        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

many.  They  hoped  that  the  political  particularism  of 
the  Southern  States  would  assert  itself  if  they  ad- 
vanced successfully  against  the  Prussians,  and  at  the 
same  time  preserved  the  Southern  States  as  much  as 
they  could  from  the  horrors  of  war. 

If  we  have  to  fight  several  opponents,  we  will  gen- 
erally direct  the  main  blow  against  that  enemy  from 
whose  political  intentions  we  may  expect  the  greatest 
energy  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  hoping  by  a  vic- 
tory over  that  enemy  to  make  the  other,  with  less 
strong  inclinations  for  war,  to  falter.  But  this  po- 
litical consideration  may  run  counter  to  military  rea- 
sons. 

Considered  from  a  purely  military  point  of  view, 
the  main  attack  should  be  directed  against  that  enemy 
whom  we  may  expect  to  crush  quickest  in  the  most 
decisive  manner,  and  we  should  contain  the  enemy 
on  that  side  which  offers  the  best  prospects  of  defence, 
and  on  which  the  enemy  is,  on  the  other  hand,  less 
likely  to  achieve  easily  decisive  results.  It  must  also 
be  considered  whether  one  opponent  is  likely  to  appear 
appreciably  quicker  in  the  field  than  the  other.  If 
the  various  points  of  view  are  antagonistic  and  cannot 
be  reconciled,  it  is  a  matter  of  ingenious  tact  to  decide 
in  the  one  or  in  the  other  direction. 

If  Germany,  for  instance,  had  to  conduct  a  war 
against  France  and  Russia,  it  would,  from  a  political 
point  of  view,  be  desirable  to  deal  France  first  of  all 
as  crushing  a  blow  as  possible,  her  enmity  towards 
Germany  being,  no  doubt,  deeper  than  Russia's.  We 
arrive  at  the  same  result  if  we  consider  that  France 
is  ready  for  war  very  much  quicker  than  Russia,  where 
mobilization  and  concentration  take  very  much  longer 
time  than  with  her  western  ally ;  so  that  one  can  hope 
to  beat  the  French  before  the  Russians  could  become 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       195 

dangerous.  Nor  must  it  be  overlooked  that  a  rapid 
victory  over  France  would  at  once  paralyse  the  Rus- 
sian conduct  of  war,  and  have  a  cooling  effect  on  Eng- 
land too,  who  might  feel  inclined  to  side  with  the 
French. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
Germany's  strong  western  frontier  can  be  held  defen- 
sively very  much  longer  than  her  eastern  frontier, 
which  is  less  protected  by  Nature.  It  renders  an 
obstinate  and  lasting  defence  of  one  section  after  the 
other  feasible,  and  even  a  victorious  opponent  cannot 
reach  the  sources  of  the  German  defensive  power  so 
easily  as  from  the  east,  which,  supported  by  a  glorious 
tradition  and  a  powerful  public  organization,  is  most 
productive  in  the  north-east.  But  a  defence  of  the 
eastern  frontier  cannot  be  easily  effected  with  weak 
forces,  and  it  will  not  be  long  before  Berlin  is  threat- 
ened by  an  opponent  victorious  in  the  east. 

Under  these  antagonistic  conditions  the  decision  in 
what  direction  the  first  main  attack  must  be  delivered 
— what,  therefore,  must  be  looked  upon  as  the  decisive 
direction — will  depend  on  how  strongly  we  estimate 
the  resisting  power  of  the  French  and  the  offensive 
power  of  the  Russians ;  but  it  will  also  depend,  on  the 
other  hand,  on  the  import  and  intensity  of  the  political 
motives  by  which  the  one  or  the  other  side  is  supposed 
to  be  swayed,  as  well  as  on  the  general  situation  in 
the  world — that  is  to  say,  therefore,  on  the  political 
attitude  of  the  other  Great  Powers  in  Europe.  The 
chances  of  other  States  taking  part  in  the  war  that  has 
broken  out  must  always  be  kept  in  view.  That  must, 
of  course,  not  paralyse  the  energy  of  military  action 
itself,  but  may,  nevertheless,  affect  the  choice  of  the 
decisive  direction  of  attack  in  conclusive  manner.  If, 
for  instance,  it  could  be  expected  that  Austria  would 


196        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

intervene  in  favour  of  Germany,  and  England  in  fa- 
vour of  France,  in  a  war  which  Germany  had  to  wage 
on  two  fronts,  all  the  conditions  determining  the  choice 
of  the  decisive  direction  of  attack  would  at  once  be 
changed.  Every  political  consideration  could,  and 
must,  then  give  way  in  such  a  case,  and  the  decisive 
direction  would  be  fixed  from  purely  military  points 
of  view. 

If  Austria  assumes  the  offensive  against  Russia 
from  the  south-west,  or  even  merely  threatens  with 
such  an  offensive,  Russia  could  only  carry  out  an 
intended  attack  in  the  general  direction  of  Berlin 
with  very  much  weaker  forces  than  if  she  could  engage 
her  whole  strength  against  Germany.  The  danger 
for  Prussia  is  then  much  smaller,  though  still  serious 
enough.  If  England  also  takes  part  in  the  struggle, 
it  can  be  anticipated  that  the  offensive  of  the  combined 
French-English  main  forces  will  be  conducted  through 
Belgium  and  Holland.  In  this  case  not  only  the  strong 
Rhine  barrier  would  be  turned,  but  also  the  German 
naval  basis  on  the  North  Sea  coast  be  most  directly 
menaced,  which  is  of  special  importance  to  England, 
as  most  concerned  in  the  destruction  of  the  German 
fleet.  France,  on  the  other  hand,  by  avoiding  South 
Germany,  would  then  try,  above  all,  to  crush  Prussia, 
with  the  renewed  hope  of  fanning  into  new  life  the 
supposed  German  particularism.  The  passionate  op- 
position raised  by  France  and  England  against  the 
fortifications  of  Flushing  makes  it  plain  that  such  a 
plan  exists.  An  English-French  attack  of  this  kind 
would  be  for  Germany  of  so  threatening  a  nature  with 
regard  to  the  North  Sea  coast  and  the  general  direc- 
tion of  the  attack,  that  she  must,  casting  aside  all  other 
considerations,  recognize  her  main  task  in  delivering  a 
counter-blow  against  that  offensive.  Whence  the  blow 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       197 

must  be  delivered  would  depend  on  the  grouping  of 
her  own  fighting  forces. 

The  reflections  hitherto  have  shown  that  sometimes 
we  cannot  avoid  taking  into  consideration  political 
circumstances  when  determining  the  decisive  direction 
of  attack;  but  at  the  same  time  they  make  it  plain 
that  political  considerations  are  only  justified  if  a  pos- 
sible change  in  the  political  attitude  of  States  hitherto 
unconcerned  or  neutral  threatens  to  change  also  the 
whole  military  situation  with  which  we  must  deal. 
The  ideal  remains  always  the  same,  of  being  able 
to  determine  the  decisive  direction  of  attack  from 
purely  military  points  of  view,  and  statecraft  has 
solved  its  task  in  the  most  perfect  manner  if  it  makes 
it  possible  for  the  military  command  to  act  in  com- 
pliance with  this  ideal. 

The  choice  of  the  direction  of  attack  is  then,  as  a 
rule,  a  comparatively  simple  matter,  because  there 
are  then  only  military  points  of  view  to  be  considered, 
and  the  object  of  the  war  can  be  directly  and  logically 
attended  to :  to  beat  the  hostile  forces  not  only  as  de- 
cisively as  possible,  but  to  stop  also  the  sources  of  the 
hostile  power  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  as  difficult 
as  possible  for  the  enemy  to  re-establish  his  army  after 
the  defeat  it  has  suffered.  The  direction  of  attack 
must  therefore  be  chosen  so  as  to  make  the  advance 
end  in  as  decisive  a  battle  as  possible,  to  push  the 
enemy's  forces  from  their  base — that  is  to  say,  from 
their  connection  with  the  hinterland — and  to  threaten 
as  directly  as  possible  the  main  centres  of  the  hostile 
power.  In  most  cases  it  will  be  possible  to  fulfil  the 
task  thus  set  by  the  choice  of  one  main  line  of  opera- 
tion. But  the  conditions,  especially  in  a  war  against 
a  civilized  State  conducted  with  organized  armies,  may 
sometimes  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  make  the  at- 


198        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

tempt  to  do  justice  to  all  requirements  in  fixing  one 
main  line  of  attack  amount  to  finding  the  square  of 
a  circle.  This  will  always  be  the  case  if  the  enemy's 
main  force  can  nowhere  be  localized,  or  the  defeat  of 
that  main  force  would  not  promise  to  bring  about  the 
decisive  issue  of  the  whole  war,  but  holds  out  only 
the  prospect  of  a  limited  local  success;  if  we  have, 
therefore,  to  deal,  as  it  were,  with  separate  wars,  as 
may  happen  in  a  widely-extended  theatre  of  war.  The 
means  of  breaking  the  enemy's  will  remains  also  in 
this  case  the  same;  the  only  difference  is  we  shall  be 
forced  sometimes  to  strive  for  the  decisive  issue 
through  the  co-operation  of  different  armies  on  sep- 
arate lines  of  operation. 

The  following  factors  are  generally  of  some  ac- 
count in  deciding  on  the  choice  of  the  main  direction 
of  attack:  The  geographical  configuration  of  the  en- 
emy's country  and  the  conterminous  frontiers;  the 
distribution  of  the  fighting  forces  and  the  probable 
intentions  of  the  opponent,  which  can  often  be  gauged 
by  his  preparations;  the  position  of  the  base  of  the 
hostile  army,  of  the  railways  joining  it  with  the  base, 
and  the  efficiency  of  our  own  railway  net  in  so  far  as 
it  makes  the  concentration  of  masses  in  a  definite 
direction  seem  feasible  or  not.  Special  circumstances, 
too,  impossible  to  comprise  into  categories,  may  oc- 
casionally be  of  influence;  and,  lastly,  the  time  at 
which  the  attack  is  to  be  made  is  in  a  certain  sense 
also  decisive  for  the  direction  of  attack.  To  the  side 
which  is  sooner  able  to  operate  than  the  other  is  given 
the  initiative,  to  which  the  opponent  has  to  conform. 
This  same  party  has  also,  on  the  other  hand,  some- 
times the  chance  of  attacking  the  opponent  by  surprise 
before  he  is  sufficiently  prepared  to  fight.  Then  the 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       199 

shortest  line  by  which  the  enemy  can  be  reached  is 
at  the  same  time  the  decisive  direction  of  attack. 

Of  special  importance  among  the  factors  determin- 
ing the  direction  of  attack  is  the  situation  of  the  hos- 
tile base  in  reference  to  the  army,  and  this  is  so  in  par- 
ticular under  modern  conditions,  which  cause  the 
troops  to  be  greatly  dependent  on  their  lines  of  com- 
munication. We  can  generally  assume  the  base  to  be 
the  line  of  railheads  behind  the  field  army;  in  other 
words,  the  collecting  depots  at  the  beginning  of  the 
offensive  and  the  railheads  in  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation area  during  further  advance.  But  in  a  wider 
sense  the  capital  of  the  hostile  country,  and  in  retreat 
our  own  capital,  will  often  acquire  a  great  importance 
as  a  base  of  operations,  because  the  capital  is  the 
main  centre  of  all  military  and  civil  administration. 
:  The  central  authorities  are,  as  a  rule,  all  united  in 
the  capital;  all  main  arteries  of  communication  con- 
verge on  it,  so  that  actually  considerable  military  im- 
portance is  in  most  cases  attached  to  it,  this  impor- 
tance being  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  loss  of  the 
capital  would  usually  produce  a  far-reaching  moral 
effect. 

It  may  therefore  be  indeed  imperative  to  select  the 
hostile  capital  as  the  object  of  attack.  If  it  is  threat- 
ened, it  may  be  anticipated  that  the  hostile  main  force 
must  stand  at  bay  to  protect  the  capital.  And  if  we 
succeed  in  pushing  the  hostile  forces  away  from  the 
capital,  or,  more  than  that,  in  occupying  that  place 
itself,  the  whole  administration  of  the  hostile  State 
is  upset,  and  thus  also  the  army  most  seriously 
damaged. 

Especially  in  France  is  the  importance  of  the  capital 
as  the  centre  of  military  power  still  obvious.  Paris 
is  not  only  the  undisputed  and  sole  spiritual  centre, 


200        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

but  also  the  largest  fortress  and  most  important  ar- 
senal of  the  country.  With  Paris  France  stands  and 
falls,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  after  its  capture  the 
provinces  will  successfully  resist  for  any  length  of 
time.  No  other  capital  in  the  world  can  claim  a  simi- 
lar importance.  But  every  one  of  the  other  capitals 
is  politically  and  militarily  important  too,  though  each 
in  a  different  way.  It  is  so,  perhaps,  the  least  in  Rus- 
sia, where  neither  St.  Petersburg  nor  Moscow  can 
fully  claim  to  be  the  national  capital  of  the  empire, 
and  where  both,  compared  with  its  spatial  extent, 
represent  military  centres  in  a  limited  sense  only.  The 
defensive  power  of  Russia  rests  on  the  extent  of  the 
country  itself.  Much  more  important  is  Vienna  for 
Austria.  It  forms  the  common  point  where  many 
various  national  elements  forming  the  Austrian  State 
unite,  being  thus  a  real  centre  in  which  the  forces  of 
the  different  portions  of  the  empire  are  uniformly 
combined.  There  is  no  Austria  without  Vienna,  but 
merely  individual  portions  pursuing  interests  of  very 
different  kinds.  To  hold  Vienna  is  therefore  of  the 
utmost  importance  also  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
gaining  significance  in  equal  measure  as  the  exclusive 
interests  of  the  various  dominions  of  the  Crown  de- 
velop. Berlin  has  not  quite  the  same  importance  for 
Germany.  The  country  is  not  by  a  long  way  cen- 
tralized in  the  same  way  as  France,  but  its  internal 
union  is  very  much  greater  than  in  Austria.  Neither 
as  a  centre  nor  as  a  point  of  common  ground  has  it, 
therefore,  an  importance  similar  to  that  of  Paris  or 
Vienna.  We  can  also  very  well  imagine  military  re- 
sistance to  be  continued  should  Berlin  even  have  been 
taken  by  a  Russian  invading  army.  But  that  city  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  centre  of  the  Prussian  and 
North  Germany  military  power,  in  which  the  strength 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       201 

of  Germany  virtually  roots,  and  is  the  undisputed  po- 
litical centre  of  the  empire.  As  such  it  will  form, 
no  doubt,  one  of  the  most  important  objects  of  at- 
tack of  our  adversaries. 

Rome,  however,  is  of  no  military  importance  at  all. 
Italy's  strength  rests  entirely  on  her  northern  prov- 
inces, and  it  will  surely  never  enter  anybody's  head 
to  form  a  plan  of  war  having  the  occupation  of  Rome 
for  its  local  object.  In  a  war  with  Italy,  from  what- 
ever side  it  may  be  waged,  it  will  always  be  a  ques- 
tion of  defeating  the  Italian  Army  in  Northern  Italy, 
and  pushing  it  towards  the  Alps  away  from  the  ac- 
tual peninsula.  If  that  is  successfully  accomplished, 
the  main  issue  is  decided  from  a  military  point  of 
view,  and  it  is  then  only  a  question  of  moral  import 
whether  Rome  should  be  captured  as  well. 

Some  examples  will  contribute  to  making  the  effect 
of  the  various  factors  clear  which  may  have  a  bearing 
on  the  choice  of  the  direction  of  attack. 

If  we  place  ourselves  upon  the  Russian  standpoint, 
the  direction  of  attack  on  Berlin  is  positively  the  de- 
cisive one,  even  if  Austria  should  be  allied  with  Ger- 
many. Strong  forces  can  be  most  rapidly  concentrated 
close  to  the  German  frontier ;  here  Russia's  most  vul- 
nerable portion — Germany's  direction  of  advance  on 
St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow — is  most  directly  cov- 
ered; here,  opposite  the  open  German  frontier,  suc- 
cess is,  besides,  comparatively  easiest  to  achieve.  In 
the  south-west,  on  the  other  hand,  the  extensive  Pri- 
piet  swamps  guard  against  an  Austrian  invasion,  and 
afford  suitable  positions  for  defence.  Russia  can  there- 
fore hope  to  have  defeated  the  German  armies  be- 
fore those  of  Austria  can  become  dangerous  in  the 
vast  theatre  of  war.  But  if  Russia's  armies  have  once 
successfully  invaded  Brandenburg  and  Silesia,  she  can 


202        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

attack  Austria  by  enveloping  her  from  different  di- 
rections. It  would  then  be  extremely  difficult  for  that 
State  to  gain  decisive  successes  over  the  hostile  armies ; 
while  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  is  still  a  danger 
to  Russia,  should  the  Austrian  armies  have  been 
beaten,  and  Russian  armies  be  victoriously  invading 
Hungary  and  Galicia.  Geographical  conditions  ac- 
count for  this. 

We  see  that  in  the  domain  of  higher  strategy,  when 
plans  of  campaign  have  to  be  designed,  the  fixing  of 
the  decisive  direction  is  affected  by  factors  of  the 
greatest  variety,  the  importance  and  effect  of  which 
can  for  the  most  part  be  only  estimated.  Full  scope 
is  therefore  always  left  to  individual  opinion,  it  being 
but  rarely  possible  to  term  simply  one  direction  of 
attack  as  the  decisive  one.  The  same  holds  good  when 
dealing  with  actual  operations — that  is  to  say,  with 
movements  of  armies  where  a  purely  military  problem 
must  be  solved  in  conformity  with  the  general  plan  of 
campaign,  within  a  distinctly  limited  theatre  of  war. 
The  conditions  are  simpler  here  in  so  far  only  as  but 
purely  military  reasons  determine  the  action,  provided 
the  procedure  is  sound,  and  operations  and  tactical 
issues  are  very  much  more  directly  connected  with 
each  other  than  in  higher  strategy,  which  deals  with 
the  plans  of  campaigns  and  lays  down  broadly  the 
directions  of  attack.  For  the  rest,  the  leading  funda- 
mental ideas  are  the  same  in  the  broader  domain  of 
strategy  and  in  the  narrower  one  of  tactics — that  is  to 
say,  to  beat  the  hostile  forces  as  decisively  as  possible, 
to  push  them  from  their  lines  of  communication,  and 
to  deprive  the  enemy  of  the  use  of  as  much  land  as 
is  feasible,  is  always  the  task,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  means  of  breaking  the  enemy's  will.  The  decisive 
direction  of  the  operation  must  be  selected  from  this 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       203 

point  of  view.  Frontal  attack,  envelopment,  flank 
attack,  central  penetration,  are  again  and  again  the 
forms  with  which  the  problem  at  hand  must  be  solved ; 
boldness,  surprise,  and  sudden  attack  are  the  means 
of  raising  success  to  its  highest  pitch. 

It  will  generally  be  a  question  of  either  threatening 
the  enemy's  lines  of  communication  or  of  choosing 
a  line,  of  operation  between  separate  hostile  army  por- 
tions endeavouring  to  co-operate.  Within  these  two 
points  of  view  can  be  comprised  most  of  the  cases 
where  we  have  to  deal  with  the  choice  of  the  direc- 
tion decisive  for  an  operation. 

The  question  may  be  discussed  whether  a  strategic 
flank  attack  is  feasible  with  the  armies  of  masses  in 
modern  times.  That  question,  in  a  certain  sense,  I 
should  rather  negative. 

If  small  armies  are  concerned,  as  used  to  be  em- 
ployed in  previous  wars,  a  strategic  flank  attack  can 
certainly  also  be  carried  out  in  future,  and  then  with 
less  difficulty  than  formerly,  because  the  modern  means 
of  communication  altogether  facilitate  every  opera- 
tion. 

But  if  it  is  a  question  of  the  whole  army  of  a  great 
State  acting  as  a  whole  in  compliance  with  a  uniform 
idea,  a  pure  flanking  operation,  an  envelopment  of 
the  enemy's  flank  with  the  whole  of  our  forces,  is 
then  evidently  impossible.  The  breadth  of  front  of 
such  an  army  and  its  equivalent  depth  in  a  flanking 
movement  are  far  too  great  for  such  a  movement  to 
be  uniformly  carried  out.  The  concentration  by  rail 
for  such  an  operation,  and,  before  all,  keeping  the 
lines  of  communication  in  proper  working  order  during 
its  execution,  would  no  doubt  prove  impossible. 

It  may,  however,  be  feasible  to  express  the  funda- 
mental idea  on  which  a  flank  attack  is  based  by  a 


204        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

strategic  form  which  takes  due  account  of  modern 
conditions — namely,  by  the  form  of  a  strategic  attack 
with  one  flank  refused.  It  may  be  compared  with 
the  oblique  battle  order  in  the  sphere  of  tactics.  What 
is  there  attained  in  tactics  on  a  small  scale  is  here  re- 
peated in  strategy  on  the  very  largest  scale  possible. 
General  Freiherr  von  Falkenhausen  has  also  tried  to 
apply  the  idea  of  Leuthen  to  the  movements  of  a  mod- 
ern army  of  masses.*  Yet  in  the  example  he  has 
worked  out  it  does  not  come  to  a  real  strategic  flank 
attack,  but  to  an  attack  upon  a  wing  with  a  twofold  lo- 
cal envelopment  of  the  hostile  army  portion  attacked. 
The  strategic  intention  by  which  he  is  guided  can,  I 
think,  be  expressed  still  more  strikingly  by  the  attack- 
ing wing  not  advancing  on  a  straight  front,  but  with 
the  army  in  echelons,  the  other  wing  evading  the 
hostile  blow,  which  latter  is  also  done  by  General  von 
Falkenhausen.  An  example — of  course,  a  mere  theo- 
retical one — will  illustrate  the  idea  in  the  simplest 
manner. 

Leaving  all  political  conditions  alone,  we  can  very 
well  imagine  a  German  offensive  against  France  being 
conducted  by  the  northern  wing  of  the  German  Army, 
with  its  extreme  right  along  the  sea-coast,  advancing 
with  the  armies  echeloned  forward  through  Holland 
and  Belgium,  while  the  German  forces  in  the  south 
evade  the  blow  of  the  enemy,  retiring  through  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  in  a  north-easterly  direction,  and  leaving 
South  Germany  open  to  their  opponent.  The  advance 
in  echelon  of  the  German  attacking  wing  would  force 
the  left  wing  of  the  opposing  army  into  making  a 
great  change  of  front,  bringing  it  by  this  means  alone 
into  an  unfavourable  situation;  but  in  the  south  the 
French  would  likewise  be  obliged  to  carry  out  a  stra- 
*  "Flankenbewegung  und  Massenheer." 


TIME,  SPACE,  AND  DIRECTION       205 

tegic  left  wheel,  thereby  getting  into  an  unfavourable 
position  to  their  base.  Strategically  would  here  be 
attained  what  Frederic  the  Great  achieved  by  his  at- 
tack in  echelon  at  Leuthen  tactically. 

A  German  success  in  the  north  would  lead  straight 
on  Paris,  and  touch  the  vital  arteries  of  the  French 
Army  much  sooner  than  the  latter  could  gain  decisive 
results  in  South  Germany.  In  such  a  case  the  posi- 
tion of  the  French  army  portions  which  had  pene- 
trated into  South  Germany  would  likely  become  ex- 
tremely critical,  as  they  would  find  their  line  of  retreat 
most  seriously  threatened  from  the  north. 

There  is  no  need  at  all  for  any  specially  intricate 
and  difficult  movements  of  the  German  Army.  It 
would  be  chiefly  a  question  of  properly  distributing 
the  forces  and  regulating  the  extent  of  the  retrograde 
movement  of  the  left  wing.  That  must  never  be  al- 
lowed to  go  so  far  as  to  expose  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation of  the  German  right  wing.  The  pivot  of  the 
movement,  which  might  be  fixed  somewhere  in  North- 
ern Lorraine  and  Luxemburg,  must  be  vigorously 
held,  too.  People  have  therefore  often  thought  of 
turning  Trier  into  an  army  fortress,  and  the  idea  of 
fortifying  Luxemburg  is  also  partly  based  on  similar 
points  of  view.  These  reflections  show,  at  any  rate, 
the  prominent  importance  of  the  fortress  of  Mainz. 
It  would  be,  further,  advisable  to  hold  a  strategic 
reserve  in  a  central  position,  ready  for  reinforcing, 
in  case  of  need,  either  the  right  or  the  left  wing. 

The  forward  movement  of  the  right  would  have  to 
be  made  from  the  Lower  Rhine  in  echelons  of  armies, 
the  leading  army  being  the  strongest.  The  operations 
of  the  left  wing,  however,  would  amount  to  a  great 
strategic  wheel  to  the  rear,  with  much  shifting  of  the 
lines  of  communication,  which  must  be  provided  for 


206        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

in  time.  The  line  of  the  River  Main  would  be  par- 
ticularly suitable  as  a  new  base.  A  comparatively 
strong  detachment  should,  moreover,  retire  from  the 
Upper  Rhine  in  a  due  easterly  direction,  to  protect 
the  outer  flank  of  the  army  giving  way  to  the  north- 
east, and  to  act  as  an  advanced  echelon  on  the  flank, 
as  it  were,  thus  giving  the  chance  of  enveloping  the 
flank  of  the  pursuing  enemy.  The  railways  could  with 
great  advantage  be  used  to  support  such  a  diverging 
movement.  The  offensive  of  the  right  would  also  be 
extremely  favoured  by  the  much-ramified  Dutch-Bel- 
gian railway  system. 

If  we  summarize  what  has  been  so  far  said  on  the 
operative  capability  of  large  armies  in  the  offensive, 
we  find  that  the  commander's  will  is  not  at  all  re- 
stricted to  such  narrow  limits  as  may  appear  at  first 
sight.  Fixing  the  various  rates  of  movements,  com- 
bining marches  forward  and  backward,  detailing  and 
employing  strategic  reserves,  and  echeloning  the 
armies,  are  the  most  essential  means  by  which  the 
commander  can  manifest  his  strategic  liberty;  and 
as  any  change  in  the  grouping  of  the  forces  in  march- 
ing forward  requires  a  sufficiently  large,  open  area  of 
operations,  he  will,  as  a  rule,  be  in  a  position  to  secure 
it  if  he  understands  how  to  make  some  sacrifice  in  the 
interest  of  the  higher  object. 


CHAPTER  X 
PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND 


CHAPTER   X 

PRINCIPLES    OF    COMMAND 

"To  bring  about  the  combat  under  as  favourable  con- 
ditions as  possible,"  is  the  sole  aim  of  strategy.  No 
matter  whether  we  try  to  attain  it  mediately  or  imme- 
diately, this  injunction  ever  remains  the  ruling  factor 
for  all  strategic  action.  Where  we  do  not  satisfy  it, 
we  sin  against  the  spirit  of  war  itself,  and  yet  only 
too  often  do  we  become  aware  in  military  history  of 
this  sinning  against  the  spirit  of  war.  Even  where 
we  are  convinced  of  its  correctness,  we  do  not  always 
act  up  to  it  in  practice;  and  we  find  often  enough 
points  of  view  becoming  decisive  in  the  strategic  meas- 
ures of  commanders  absolutely  contrary  to  the  dictates 
of  an  issue  by  combat.  The  cause,  I  admit,  is  often 
that,  in  spite  of  correct  theoretical  knowledge  of  what 
strategy  must  strive  after,  the  circumstances  them- 
selves are  incorrectly  appreciated;  but  frequently  also 
that  among  the  numerous  demands  of  a  material  and 
personal  nature  approaching  a  commander,  and  the 
many  restrictions  under  which  he  must  act  as  a  rule,  he 
either  loses  the  clear  perception  of  the  points  of  view 
decisive  for  military  action,  or  he  is  wanting  in  en- 
ergy, or  has  no  chance  of  enforcing  his  will  in  spite 
of  all  the  difficulties  besetting  him. 

If  we  survey  the  whole  domain  of  frictions,  which 
often  with  a  semblance  of  justification  and  with  the 
pressure  of  greatest  authority  assert  themselves,  we 

209 


210        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

can  hardly  wonder  that  over  and  over  again  com- 
manders have  been  urged  from  the  path  of  logical 
action,  and  finished  with  adopting  half  and  wrong 
measures.  But  that  is  just  the  worst  that  could  happen 
in  war.  If  in  almost  all  the  spheres  of  practical  human 
activity  errors  once  committed  can  be  rectified,  and 
losses  be  made  good,  errors  in  military  matters,  what- 
ever the  final  result,  must  be  paid  in  blood.  Many 
happy  and  flourishing  human  lives  fall  victims  to  want 
of  character  and  consistency,  truly  murderous  when 
revealed  in  military  command. 

We  must,  therefore,  peremptorily  demand  that  all 
strategic  measures  have  for  their  sole  object  the  bring- 
ing about  of  as  favourable  conditions  as  possible  for 
the  decisive  combat.  But  never  must  we  act  the  oppo- 
site way — that  is  to  say,  look  upon  concentration  and 
war  plan  as  the  given  factors,  and  then  wait  and  see 
whether  from  the  situation  thus  created  we  can  evolve 
tactical  victory. 

The  above  demand  looks  simple  and  natural,  but  is 
in  reality,  under  the  very  modern  conditions,  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  comply  with  in  full  measure. 

But  just  for  this  very  reason  must  we  emphasize  it 
all  the  more. 

So  long,  indeed,  as  we  have  at  our  disposal  a  numer- 
ical or  other  satisfactory  superiority,  we  may  often 
violate  the  spirit  of  this  demand  without  losing  vic- 
tory over  it.  Wrong  action  remains,  then,  seemingly, 
unpunished,  because  punishment  becomes  apparent 
only  by  the  successes  being  smaller,  and  the  losses 
perhaps  greater,  and  because  the  surplus  in  force  suf- 
ficed to  neutralize  the  indifferent  tactical  situation  cre- 
ated by  the  strategic  operations.  But  where  oppo- 
nents equally  matched  face  each  other,  or,  more  than 
that,  where  a  weaker  adversary  must  try  issue  with 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  211 

a  stronger  one,  the  application  of  this  principle  be- 
comes positively  decisive  for  the  conduct  of  the  whole 
war.  The  palm  of  victory  will  be  carried  away  by 
him  who,  in  all  his  measures,  most  logically  and  most 
vigorously  keeps  in  view  the  tactical  issue,  and  knows 
how  to  bring  it  about  under  more  advantageous  pros- 
pects of  success  than  his  opponent.  Strategy  must 
never  be  anything  but  the  obedient  servant  of  the  tacti- 
cal issue.  We  must  try  to  grasp  clearly  what  combat 
requires,  in  what  form  it  is  best  carried  out,  and  from 
this  standpoint  we  must  construe  backwards  the  stra- 
tegic action  which  precedes  combat  in  time. 

From  the  requirement  that  all  strategic  measures 
should  be  adopted  in  deference  to  decisive  combat, 
directly  results  the  further  problem  of  strategy,  to 
group  and  move  the  troops  so  that  all  forces  deployed 
in  the  foremost  line  come  simultaneously  into  action, 
and  that  the  strategic  reserves  take  part  in  the  main 
issue  too.  Also  the  detachments  far  away  from  the 
decisive  field  of  action  must  be  employed  in  such  a 
way  as  to  make  their  activity  gain  a  direct  though 
distant  effect  on  the  combat  fought  in  the  most  de- 
cisive direction.  Forces  which  remain  inactive  during 
the  decisive  issue  are,  under  any  circumstances,  a  loss 
of  force  which  may  often  impair  the  magnitude  of 
success,  or  even  jeopardize  victory.  The  enemy  must 
everywhere  be  held  fast,  and  prevented  from  concen- 
trating his  forces  in  superior  numbers  in  that  part  of 
the  theatre  of  war  in  which  the  decisive  combat  is 
planned  to  come  off.  This  holds  good  for  the  strategic 
offensive,  as  well  as  for  the  defensive.  This  makes 
at  the  same  time  all  those  enterprises  generally  in- 
admissible which  a  former  age  was  wont  to  comprise 
in  the  term  "diversion."  Diversions  are  only  permis- 
sible if  a  substantial  surplus  of  force  is  available  for 


212        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

which  no  room  is  found  in  the  decisive  theatre  of  war. 

If,  for  instance,  in  a  war  of  Germany  against  Eng- 
land and  France,  the  English  made  their  former 
menace  true  and  landed  100,000  men  in  Jutland  to 
operate  on  Berlin,  such  a  procedure  would  be  termed 
diversion;  it  would  paralyse  the  offensive  power  of 
the  adversaries  on  the  decisive  field  of  action  more 
than  that  of  the  Germans.* 

A  further  demand  which  must  be  made  upon  the 
art  of  command  in  the  solution  of  strategic  and  opera- 
tive problems  is  to  this  effect :  The  efforts  must  always 
be  directed  to  maintaining  the  exterior  lines,  to  making 
the  enemy  crowd  together  convergingly,  and  to  never 
exposing  oneself  to  the  danger  of  being  enveloped 
and  crowded  together. 

If  the  demand  of  bringing  all  the  forces  simul- 
taneously into  action  is  rooted  in  the  nature  of  war 
itself,  and  is  therefore  of  general  application,  the  prin- 
ciple of  maintaining  as  much  as  possible  the  exterior 
lines  is  based  on  the  peculiarities  of  modern  war. 

When  small  numbers  are  concerned,  it  is  the  range 
of  modern  firearms,  and  the  chance  thus  created  of 
directing  a  cross-fire  upon  the  enemy  who  is  enveloped, 
from  which  the  superiority  of  the  exterior  lines 
originates.  But  with  large  numbers  the  decisive  factor 
is  the  masses.  The  larger  the  masses,  the  more  they 
need  freedom  of  movement  and  well-regulated  lines 
of  communication  to  become  a  potent  factor.  It  is 
easier  to  preserve  both  on  the  exterior  lines  than  on 
the  inner  line.  If  the  masses  of  modern  armies,  when 
deployed  on  a  broad  front,  are  driven  back,  crowd- 

*  On  the  British  Ambassador's  menacing  question,  what 
the  Germans  would  really  do  if  England  landed  100,000 
men  in  Jutland,  Bismarck,  as  we  know,  answered:  "It  would 
not  hurt  us  much,  after  all;  they  would  be  simply  locked 
up."  And  he  was  right  in  a  military  sense. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  213 

ing  together  on  a  few  roads,  the  possibility  of  sub- 
stituting and  moving  them  soon  ceases,  and  then  a 
catastrophe  is  not  far  off.  General  von  Falkenhausen 
has  most  vividly  and  convincingly  illustrated  this.* 

The  principle  of  keeping  to  the  exterior  lines  must, 
however,  never  become  a  sealed  pattern.  We  must 
always  keep  in  view  that  this  principle  of  strategy  is 
virtually  occasioned  by  the  conditions  created  by  the 
masses,  and  therefore  becomes  untenable  the  moment 
space  either  precludes  the  dangers  of  a  concentric 
retreat,  or  the  masses  are  not  large  enough,  when 
concentrated  in  one  place,  to  be  in  danger  of  losing 
their  freedom  of  action.  We  must,  further,  always 
bear  in  mind  that  all  strategic  action  is  ruled  by  the 
tactical  issue — that,  therefore,  all  strategic  considera- 
tions must  be  held  in  abeyance  when  tactical  success 
is  promised.  A  victory  changes  all  conditions.  If, 
for  instance,  we  wish  to  deduce  from  the  fact  that, 
tactical  and  strategic  penetration  putting  us  on  the 
inner  line,  thus  involving  us  in  the  danger  of  becoming 
enveloped,  we  should  never  attempt  penetration,  such 
a  conclusion  would  be  totally  wrong.  Successful  pen- 
etration, as  pointed  out  already,  leads  to  the  envelop- 
ment of  two  hostile  groups,  thus  affording,  after  origi- 
nally acting  on  the  inner  line,  all  the  advantages  of 
the  outer  lines.  The  defeated,  on  the  other  hand, 
must  do  his  utmost  to  prevent  being  crowded  together 
in  his  retreat  and  pushed  from  his  lines  of  communi- 
cation. 

The  injunction  now — to  be  always  conscious,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  the  superiority  of  the  outer  lines  in  mod- 
ern war,  and,  on  the  other,  to  act  in  each  given  case 
according  to  the  requirements  of  the  situation,  and 
sometimes  even  in  opposition  to  it — makes  us  aware 

*In  his  book,  "Flankenbewegung  und  Massenheer." 


214        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

i 

of  a  great  difficulty  in  the  command  of  armies,  which 
consists  in  that  we  have  always  to  reckon  with  numer- 
ous unknown  and  doubtful  factors,  that  we  hardly 
ever  receive  reliable  information  of  the  enemy,  that 
we  can  never  know  what  he  is  going  to  do,  and  that 
we  can,  again,  always  attain  our  own  object  in  differ- 
ent ways.  So  we  are,  as  a  rule,  divided  in  our  own 
judgment  and  feelings,  since  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
a  decision  free  from  objections,  and  mathematically 
correct,  as  it  were.  More  than  that:  even  the  most 
exact  intelligence  of  the  enemy's  conditions,  which 
we  can  hardly  ever  hope  to  obtain,  would  not  enable 
us  to  act  correctly,  without  the  shadow  of  a  doubt. 
There  are  many  roads  always  leading  to  Rome,  and 
over  and  over  again  are  we  at  the  parting  of  the  ways. 

There  is  only  one  means  of  making  the  decisions 
easier  in  all  these  elements  of  doubt,  and  to  preserve 
unity  of  action ;  the  will  of  using  this  means  unswerv- 
ingly must  therefore  constantly  dominate  a  comman- 
der. It  consists  in  always,  and  under  any  circum- 
stances, even  after  a  defeat  and  in  retreat,  preserving 
the  initiative  and  acting  in  compliance  with  the  pre- 
ponderance- of  one's  own  intentions,  instead  of  sub- 
mitting to  those  of  the  enemy.  He  who  always  tries 
to  learn  first  what  the  enemy  intends  doing,  in  order  to 
make  up  his  mind,  will  always  be  dictated  to  by  the 
opponent.  Ever  to  remain  active,  ever  to  undertake 
something;  never,  without  urgent  necessity,  to  sit  still 
and  wait — that  is  what  is  required  of  a  commander. 
But  this  injunction  gains  more  particular  significance 
under  modern  conditions. 

As  all  strategic  movements  of  modern  armies  of 
masses  occupy  a  great  deal  of  time,  and  as  long  dis- 
tances have,  as  a  rule,  to  be  covered  in  the  vast  the- 
atres of  war,  it  is  very  much  more  difficult  than  for- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  215 

merly  to  carry  suitable  arrangements  through  in  time 
if  we  wait  with  our  decisions  until  we  have  discovered 
the  enemy's  intentions.  The  importance  of  initiative 
is  greatly  enhanced  compared  with  former  times,  as 
I  have  shown  in  another  place.  This  cognition  im- 
poses upon  a  commander  more  strongly  the  duty  of 
preserving  this  very  initiative,  and  this  even  if  the  en- 
emy is  bent  upon  doing  the  same. 

In  such  a  case  superiority  is  asserted  by  him  who  has 
planned  the  most  simple  and  most  decisive  operations 
and  carries  them  through  with  the  most  unswerving 
energy. 

Action  resting  on  the  co-operation  of  different  fac- 
tors always  involves  a  certain  risk  of  failure.  Sim- 
plicity and  clearness  afford  a  greater  guarantee  of  suc- 
cess. "Far  from  making  it  our  aim  to  gain  upon  the 
enemy  by  complicated  plans,  we  must  rather  seek  to  be 
beforehand  with  him  by  greater  simplicity  in  our  de- 
signs," says  Clausewitz  in  one  place,  adding  after- 
wards that  "of  all  military  virtues,  energy  in  the  con- 
duct of  war  has  always  contributed  the  most  to  the 
glory  and  success  of  arms."  Not  cleverness,  however 
high  it  may  be  rated,  but  courage,  must  in  the  first 
instance  determine  our  action.* 

Simplicity  and  energy;  it  is  this,  therefore,  which 
the  great  philosopher  of  war  demands  from  us.  But 
courage  and  boldness,  we  may  add,  must  be  all  the 
greater,  the  greater  the  danger  that  is  menacing  us; 
for  they  are  by  themselves  factors  of  success. 

If  we  now  take  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the  ele- 
ments of  modern  war,  of  the  mass  of  the  troops  raised, 
of  the  abundance  of  technical  adjuncts  needed  for 
their  movements  and  their  communications,  of  the 
manifold  arrangements  requisite  to  supply  the  troops 
*  Clausewitz,  "On  War,"  book  iv.,  chap.  iii. 


216       HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

and  keep  them  efficient  for  fighting,  of  the  great 
difficulties  for  unhampered  strategic  movements  caused 
by  these  very  masses — the  question  instinctively  is 
urged  upon  us,  whether  it  is  at  all  possible  to  comply 
with  the  demands  of  simplicity,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  do  justice  to  energy  in  the  conduct  of  war.  At 
closer  reflection  this  apprehension  must  vanish. 

What  Qausewitz  is  demanding  is  simplicity  of  the 
idea  and  not  of  the  means.  What  he  wants  to  see 
avoided  are  scientific  manoeuvres,  operations  built  on 
artificial  co-operation  of  numerous  columns,  or  opera- 
tions trying  to  achieve  victory  by  strategic  round- 
about ways,  as  he  had  so  often  witnessed  during  his 
lifetime.  What  he  demands  are  measures  striving 
after  victory  by  the  straightest,  but  also  the  most  de- 
cisive road,  and  nothing  was  further  from  his  mind 
than  to  recognize  in  technical  difficulties  a  sufficient 
reason  for  not  carrying  out  an  operation  in  itself  con- 
ceived in  simple  form. 

Nor  must  we  in  this  sense  be  deterred  by  any  tech- 
nical difficulties  from  carrying  out  what,  from  a  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  we  consider  to  be  imperative.  We 
must  rather  endeavour  to  reduce  all  operations,  the 
march  and  supply  technics,  to  such  simple  formulas 
and  rules,  and  to  make  the  troops  so  much  accustomed 
and  familiar  with  them,  that  the  execution  of  the 
various  strategic  movements  are  no  longer  found  to 
be  difficult  at  all. 

Commanders  and  troops  must  be  past  masters  in  the 
art  of  operations,  if  simple  movements  are  really  to 
run  smoothly.  Simplicity  of  action  which  confers 
superiority  over  the  adversary  is  derived  from  com- 
plete familiarity  with  the  means  of  warfare  alone. 
Experimenting  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  is,  however, 
always  dangerous,  and  where  intelligence  of  the  stra- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  217 

tegic  requirements  is  wanting,  command  will  fail  in 
the  solution  of  even  the  simplest  problems. 

When  General  von  Steinmetz,  in  1870,  took  com- 
mand of  the  First  Army,  he. had  probably  never  pre- 
pared in  his  mind  for  such  a  task.  He  was,  therefore, 
still  imbued  with  antiquated  ideas  and  had  not  the 
slightest  notion  of  how  to  arrange  the  marches  of  an 
army.  More  than  that,  he  was  even  obstinately  deaf 
to  all  remonstrances  of  his  Chief  of  the  Staff.  We 
saw  the  consequences.  The  advance  to  the  Battle 
of  Spicheren  brought  the  First  Army  into  such  a  state 
of  confusion,  got  it  into  such  a  maze,  that  it  took  days 
before  it  could  be  disentangled,  and  during  that  time 
it  was  scarcely  able  to  deploy  if  the  French  had  sud- 
denly attacked,  which  was  not  at  all  unlikely. 

If,  therefore,  simplicity  of  the  strategic  idea,  trying 
to  attain  the  object  as  directly  as  possible,  is  what 
command  should  invariably  aim  at,  we  must,  on  the 
other  hand,  not  take  this  to  mean  that  we  should  al- 
ways strive  only  after  the  most  common  and  after 
what  is  lying  nearest  at  hand.  That  would  ultimately 
lead  to  the  crudest  naturalism,  to  totally  inartistic  ac- 
tion, and  would,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  rule  be  con- 
trary to  the  fundamental  axiom  of  the  art  of  war  to 
aim  always  at  the  highest  object.  If  we  wish  to  satisfy 
this  injunction,  we  must,  in  war,  often  resolve  upon 
enterprises  the  execution  of  which  cannot  be  always 
simple,  such  as  operation  against  the  flanks  and  rear 
of  the  enemy,  penetration  of  the  enemy's  position,  and 
similar  things.  We  must  never  fight  shy  of  such  ac- 
tion merely  for  the  love  of  simplicity;  we  must  only 
try  to  carry  out  the  action  in  the  most  simple  and 
most  natural  manner,  without  counting  upon  an  intri- 
cate strategic  clockwork  working  exactly. 

Also,  energy  of  action,  demanded  by  Clausewitz, 


218        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

proceeds  but  from  a  perfect  mastery  of  the  material 
forces,  and  from  a  clear  perception  of  likely  success. 
The  principle  of  acting  always  with  the  utmost  en- 
ergy does,  as  was  shown  in  another  chapter,  not  only 
hold  good  for  the  Commander-in-Chief ;  it  must  also 
become  law  for  every  commander  of  troops  if  the  ut- 
most is  to  be  performed  everywhere.  Energy  forms 
the  necessary  complement  to  the  simplicity  demanded, 
for  it  conquers  also  unforeseen  difficulties,  thus  pro- 
moting simplicity  of  action.  In  1757,  Schwerin  and 
Winterfeld  wrote  to  King  Frederic :  "It  is  true  that  in 
all  operations  difficulties  arise,  but  we  must  despise 
them,  and  conquer  them  by  good  dispositions  and  vig- 
orous execution."  "Activite,  activite!  vitesse!"  thus 
admonishes  Napoleon  his  subordinate  leaders,  and  we 
see  Frederic  the  Great,  too,  incessantly  summon  his 
generals  to  activity  and  action. 

Though,  in  addition  to  simplicity,  indefatigable  en- 
ergy also  forms  a  necessary  element  in  the  command 
of  troops,  yet  it  must,  on  the  other  hand,  never  degen- 
erate into  arbitrariness;  we  must,  rather,  demand 
that  the  uniformity  of  the  military  action  as  a  whole 
must,  with  all  deference  to  energy  in  detail,  be  pre- 
served. The  great  purpose  of  the  total  action  must 
never  be  lost  sight  of  for  the  love  of  energy  in  a  single 
action. 

When  General  von  Schwerin,  in  1757,  broke  from 
Silesia  into  Bohemia  with  the  object  of  co-operating 
with  the  King's  army  for  delivering  a  crushing  blow, 
the  Austrian  General  Serbelloni  was  standing  with  a 
strong  corps  on  his  flank  at  Koniggratz.  The  tempta- 
tion of  defeating  that  corps  before  he  could  join  the 
King  was  great,  and  Schwerin  was  nearly  succumbing 
to  it.  A  crushing  blow  upon  Serbelloni  was  not  at  all 
beyond  the  pale  of  possibility,  and  in  itself  offered 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND          219 

great  advantages ;  it  was  but  natural  that  an  energetic 
general  should  be  attracted  by  such  an  enterprise.  But 
that  plan  was  in  conflict  with  the  great  idea  upon  which 
the  whole  campaign  was  based.  The  Field-Marshal 
renounced  the  enterprise  that  would  have  led  him 
away,  and,  responding  to  the  King's  bold  flight  of 
thought,  he  left  the  enemy  unmolested  on  his  flank 
and  in  his  rear,  marching  without  delay  to  the  main 
decisive  issue. 

The  campaign  of  1866,  too,  is  both  instructive  and 
interesting  with  regard  to  the  required  unity  of  action. 

It  was  because  this  very  unity  of  action  was  want- 
ing that  Moltke's  idea  to  destroy  the  enemy  was  not 
realized.  Field-Marshal  Graf  Schlieffen  has  proved 
this  in  a  striking  manner  in  his  spirited  discussion  of 
the  Bohemian  campaign  given  in  the  oft-mentioned 
essay  "Cannae."  *  Army  Headquarters  did  not 
throughout  make  efforts  to  carry  out  Moltke's  ideas, 
but  acted  from  their  own  points  of  view,  which  were 
quite  contrary  to  Moltke's.  "The  idea,"  writes  Graf 
Schlieffen,  "to  destroy  the  enemy,  which  entirely  ab- 
sorbed Moltke,  was  perfectly  foreign  to  the  subordi- 
nate commanders.  They  thought  it  was  their  task  to 
see  that  the  separate  armies  should  effect  a  junction. 
.  .  .  The  immediate  object  of  the  war  was  for  the 
Army  Headquarters  the  concentration  of  250,000  men 
at  Gitschin  or  Miletin  in  one  single  mass." 

Moltke  intended  to  surround  the  enemy  on  all  sides 
by  advancing  with  the  army  from  widely  separated 
points.  His  subordinates  thought  they  were  acting  par- 
ticularly vigorously  if  they  did  not  fall  in  with  this 
intention,  but  assembled  their  forces  for  battle  locally. 
The  Field-Marshal  was  served  in  the  same  way  as  was 

*  "Vierteljahrshefte  fur  Truppenfiihrung  und  Heeres- 
kunde,"  1910,  vol.  ii. 


220        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Frederic  the  Great  when  he  intended  to  capture  the 
Austrian  Army  at  Prague.  The  learned  soldiers  of 
his  time,  with  Prince  Henry  at  their  head,  looked 
upon  this  as  a  kind  of  madness;  they,  too,  always 
wanted  to  defeat  the  enemy  in  accordance  with  definite 
customary  rules  only,  like  the  Prussian  Army  Head- 
quarters in  1866. 

Count  Schlieffen  characterizes  the  measures  of  the 
army  commanders  for  the  advance  as  follows:  The 
Prussian  successes  had  hitherto  been  achieved  by  the 
"fire  of  the  needle-gun"  and  by  "outflanking."  "The 
fire  of  the  needle-gun  was  therefore  now  to  be  cur- 
tailed by  formations  in  mass  and  organization  in 
depth,  and  outflanking  was  to  be  prevented  by  con- 
tracting the  front,"  *  while  Moltke  was  trying  to  at- 
tain the  very  opposite.  It  was  in  vain  that  he  strug- 
gled against  the  particularism  of  the  Army  and  Army 
Corps  Headquarters  and  against  the  complete  misap- 
prehension of  his  ideas.  The  proof  of  this  fact  is 
traced  by  Count  Schlieffen  throughout  the  whole  cam- 
paign of  1866,  and  he  shows  how  by  this  very  fact 
all  successes  were  stunted  and  grave  dangers  conjured 
up.  These  reflections  show  the  absolute  necessity  of 
Army  Headquarters,  as  well  as  of  all  superior  com- 
manders, doing  their  utmost  to  act  in  the  spirit  and 
sense  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  to  carry  out 
his  intentions,  even  if  they  themselves  do  not  share 
the  views  upon  which  they  are  based.  It  is  then  only 
that  uniformity  can  be  attained. 

A  subordinate  commander  is  only  justified  and 
obliged  to  depart  independently  from  the  directives  of 
his  superior,  if  the  situation  with  the  enemy  proves, 
without  doubt,  totally  different  from  what  was  antici- 

*  "Vierteljahrshefte  fur  Truppenfuhrung  und  Heeres- 
kunde,"  1910,  vol.  ii. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  221 

pated  by  the  superior  commander;  yet  even  then  his 
efforts  must  be  directed  to  preserving  the  uniformity 
of  action  in  the  spirit  of  General  Headquarters.  But 
the  efforts  of  the  subordinate  commanders  to  live  up  to 
the  ideal  must,  on  the  other  hand,  be  also  met  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  He  must  be  required  to  make 
his  intentions  perfectly  intelligible,  relentlessly  enforc- 
ing their  execution  where  met  by  systematic  resist- 
ance. Count  Schlieffen  proves  that  this  problem  was 
not  solved  in  1866.  Moltke  was  not  understood,  and 
the  will  of  General  Headquarters  was  not  enforced 
in  the  face  of  the  Army  Headquarters. 

"Other  commanders,  too,"  writes  the  Field-Marshal, 
"had  to  reckon  with  want  of  intelligence,  training, 
and  resolution  of  their  subordinate  commanders. 
They  tried  to  remove  these  defects  by  the  inviolability 
of  their  authority  and  the  peremptoriness  of  their  or- 
ders. Moltke  being  not  a  commander,  but  merely 
Chief  of 'the  General  Staff,  was  deprived  of  sufficient 
authority,  and  was  not  empowered  to  speak  with  the 
firmness  of  a  commander.  He  had  to  make  the  best 
of  politely  advising,  of  obligingly  leaving  it  to  the 
discretion  of  directives,  and  of  similar  makeshifts,  and 
was  only  allowed,  at  the  direst  necessity,  to  prevent 
the  most  glaring  blunders  by  a  Royal  "I  order  you." 
Similar  conditions  also  obtained  repeatedly  in  1870- 
71.  They  must  not  occur  in  the  future. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  has  a  right  to  rely  on  all 
his  subordinates  showing  an  implicitly  accommodating 
mind,  on  their  entering  without  reserve  into  the  spirit 
of  his  intentions,  and  on  an  obedience  not  merely  for- 
mal ;  but  it  is  no  doubt  as  well  his  sacred  duty  to  take 
care  that  in  peace  and  in  war  his  intentions  are  un- 
derstood, and  to  enforce  relentlessly,  in  case  of  need, 
the  uniformity  and  energy  of  action.  He  can  but  then 


222        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

count  upon  attaining  those  great  objects  he  is  in  duty 
bound  to  pursue. 

In  another  place  it  was  shown  that  it  is  theoretically 
impossible  to  determine  universally  the  highest  aim 
which  can  be  striven  after  in  war.  It  depends  in  each 
case  on  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  adversaries 
and  on  the  particular  circumstances.  But,  considered 
by  itself,  the  total  annihilation  of  the  hostile  fighting 
forces  is  a  success  that  cannot  be  surpassed  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  and  must  therefore  be  looked 
upon  as  the  utmost  attainable.  We  see,  moreover, 
that  the  greatest  commanders  in  all  ages  ever  kept 
this  object  in  sight  as  the  greatest  achievement  of 
military  success.  In  King  Frederic's  plans  of  war 
and  battles,  this  idea  of  destroying  the  enemy  being 
the  main  object  is,  above  all,  most  clearly  manifested. 
Many  commanders  have  politically  placed  their  aims 
higher  than  the  great  Prussian  King;  but  none  has 
thought  greater  in  military  matters,  intended  anything 
more  decisive,  and  ventured  more  than  the  "Old 
Fritz."  But  Moltke  took  him  again  for  his  pattern. 
Both  had  in  mind  the  destruction  of  the  enemy.  They 
did  not  merely  want  to  conquer,  they  wanted  to  destroy 
the  enemy — to  render  all  further  combat  superfluous. 
It  is  the  highest  possible  aim  they  set  themselves.  To- 
tal destruction  of  the  opponent  is  always  the  most 
advantageous,  because  it  sets  the  whole  of  the  victor's 
forces  free  for  other  duties.  The  fact  that  the  Ger- 
mans succeeded  in  sweeping  four  hostile  armies  com- 
pletely away  from  the  theatre  of  war  by  the  capture 
of  Metz  and  Paris,  by  the  destructive  Battle  of  Sedan, 
and  by  the  brilliant  campaign  of  Manteuffel  in  the 
south,  gave  them  that  tremendous  superiority  which 
made  any  further  resistance  of  the  adversary  per- 
fectly hopeless,  and  also  kept  within  bounds  hostile 


PRINCIPLES  OF  COMMAND  223 

neutrals.  For  a  campaign  ending  with  the  total  de- 
struction of  the  enemy  may  be  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance politically,  by  setting  the  forces  of  the  State 
free ;  and  Moltke  knew  very  well  what  he  did  when,  in 
1866,  he  intended  to  put  into  practice  the  idea  of  de- 
stroying the  enemy.  For  there  was  a  dark  cloud 
threatening  for  years  on  the  western  political  horizon. 
If  Moltke's  plan  of  campaign  had  been  carried  through 
in  the  way  it  was  conceived,  the  Austrian-Saxon  Army 
must  have  surrendered  its  arms  on  the  Bistritz,  or 
complete  tactical  destruction  would  have  been  its  fate. 
Had  France  then  intervened,  the  Prussian  main  forces 
would  have  been  available  on  the  Rhine,  and  peace 
might  as  yet  have  been  dictated  in  Paris  in  that  same 
year.  But  because  the  battle  did  not  turn  out  as 
destructive  as  it  was  intended,  and  as,  on  this  account, 
strong  Prussian  forces  were  tied  to  the  Austrian  the- 
atre of  war,  a  situation,  rather  critical,  was  created 
which  might  have  become  dangerous,  if  France  had 
actually  drawn  the  sword  and  Austria  had  resolutely 
continued  her  resistance. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  in  war  we  cannot  always 
place  our  aims  equally  high,  and  yet  in  all  military 
action,  from  the  plan  of  campaign  to  the  surprise  of 
a  piquet,  the  idea  of  destroying  the  enemy  must  be  the 
ruling  factor.  To  destroy  as  many  of  the  enemy  as 
possible — that  is  to  say,  to  render  harmless — must  be 
the  object  of  every  military  action;  then  only  do  we 
lend  it  that  character  which  is  directed  to  the  utmost 
and  conforms  with  the  nature  of  war.  Every  military 
plan  must  be  examined  from  that  point  of  view.  It 
must  become  the  guiding  star,  particularly  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  future.  That  star,  it  is  true,  points  to 
a  path  of  the  gravest  dangers  and  greatest  sacrifices. 
Enveloping  and  surrounding  the  enemy,  righting  with 


224        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

fronts  reversed,  abandoning  our  own  communications 
— these  are  the  operations  to  which  we  are  directed, 
be  they  the  smallest  or  the  largest;  but  by  acting  in 
this  way  the  greatest  prospects  of  brilliant  successes 
are  held  out  to  us  at  the  same  time.  "Audaces  for- 
tuna  adjuvat"  ("Fortune  favours  the  bold"),  wrote 
Winterfield  to  his  King  in  1757. 

We  must  in  all  enterprises  of  war  see  less  of  dan- 
gers and  more  of  likely  successes.  This  must  be  our 
standing  rule.  The  same  as  we  always  fall  short  of 
the  success  we  strive  after,  so  the  possible  dangers 
will  never  all  come  true.  The  errors  committed  by  the 
enemy,  for  the  simple  reason  that  he  does  not  know 
the  intentions  of  his  opponent,  square  many  things, 
and,  indeed,  all  the  more  so  the  bolder  and  the  more 
suddenly  we  attack  him.  Certainly  we  shall  weigh 
before  we  venture;  but  the  venturing  must  follow, 
and  over  the  weighing  the  time  for  action  must  not 
slip  away  unused.  The  German  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations are  right,  "that  supine  inaction  and  neglect 
of  opportunities  deserve  severer  censure  than  an  error 
in  conception  of  the  choice  of  means,"  and  nowhere 
more  than  in  war  hold  good  the  words  of  Hamlet : 

"And  thus  the  native  hue  of  resolution 
Is  sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought; 
And  enterprises  of  great  pith  and  movement, 
With  this  regard,  their  currents  turn  awry, 
And  lose  the  name  of  action." 


CHAPTER  XI 
SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  NAVAL   WARFARE 


CHAPTER   XI 

SOME    CONSIDERATIONS    ON    NAVAL    WARFARE 

HAVING  broadly  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapters 
the  main  points  for  conducting  war  on  land,  there  is 
still  one  branch  to  be  touched  upon  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  will  play  an  important  role  in  every  great  war 
of  the  future — namely,  naval  warfare. 

It  cannot,  of  course,  be  my  intention  to  discuss  in 
detail  the  technical  and  tactical  questions  peculiar  to 
naval  warfare.  That  I  must  leave  to  more  qualified 
writers,  to  men  aided  by  professional  knowledge  and 
experience.  But  since  a  war  by  sea  may,  by  itself, 
gain  in  future  a  very  considerable  importance,  more 
particularly  for  Germany,  and  exercise  a  great  effect 
on  the  course  and  the  issue  of  a  war  by  land,  it  seems 
imperative  to  discuss,  at  least  briefly,  the  general  points 
of  view  which  appear  to  me  to  be  of  particular  sig- 
nificance in  naval  warfare,  and  its  relation  to  a  war  on 
land. 

It  is,  of  course,  exceptional  when  land  and  naval 
forces  directly  co-operate  with  each  other;  therefore, 
in  general  they  will  do  so  only  when  effecting  a  land- 
ing or  when  re-embarking,  and  when  dealing  with  a 
naval  fortress,  such  as  happened,  for  example,  in  the 
case  of  Port  Arthur.  There  the  naval  forces  of  both 
parties  took  a  share  in  the  attack  as  well  as  in  the 
defence  of  that  fortress.  We  can  further  imagine  that 
troops  on  land  are  taken  under  fire  by  the  fleet,  if  they 

227 


228        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

are  marching  or  are  obliged  to  fight  within  range  of 
naval  guns,  as  may  easily  happen,  for  instance,  in  the 
Riviera.  On  the  other  hand,  land  operations  may  very 
well  be  indirectly  affected  by  the  fleet  offensively  as 
well  as  defensively,  and  this  may  often  become  highly 
significant. 

This  manifests  itself  most  strikingly  in  the  case  of 
island  States,  such  as  England  and  Japan.  A  war 
by  land  for  them  is  altogether  possible  only  with  the 
aid  of  a  fleet.  The  latter  must  first  of  all  sweep  the 
hostile  warships  completely  off  the  sea,  and  establish 
safe  naval  communication  between  its  own  and  the 
enemy's  country.  It  must  then  reduce  any  likely  ex- 
isting coast  defences  and  remove  any  mines  before  a 
landing  is  possible.  It  must  further  not  only  protect 
the  transport  of  troops,  prepare  and  cover  the  landing 
itself,  and,  lastly,  secure  the  lines  of  communication 
of  the  landing  corps  in  so  far  as  they  lead  across  the 
sea;  but,  in  case  of  need,  make  possible  and  secure 
re-embarkation  and  retreat.  Landing  and  re-embarka- 
tion must  be  effected  under  cover  of  long-range  naval 
guns,  so  that  both  these  operations  may  not  be  endan- 
gered by  the  enemy's  land  forces.  The  fleet  can  only 
carry  out  all  these  duties  safely,  and  prevent  adverse 
incidents,  if  it  defeats  the  hostile  fleet,  blockades  it  in 
its  ports,  and  tries  to  render  the  hostile  auxiliary  cruis- 
ers harmless. 

In  a  defensive  war  of  an  insular  State,  the  duty  of 
the  fleet  culminates  in  preventing,  firstly,  hostile  land- 
ings by  defeating  the  enemy's  fleet,  and,  secondly,  in 
keeping  open  the  ocean  highway  for  the  import  of  pro- 
visions and  war  material.  For  England — which,  for 
the  subsistence  of  her  population,  depends  almost  en- 
tirely on  foreign  countries — this  duty  of  the  fleet  is 
of  particular  importance,  since  the  country  could  be 


NAVAL    WARFARE   CONSIDERATIONS    229 

simply  starved  if  imports  were  cut  off.  Nor  does  Ja- 
pan produce  all  she  wants  herself,  especially  rice;  she 
can  therefore  be  severely  injured  by  cutting  off  sup- 
plies from  abroad. 

If,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  of  the  fleet,  the  enemy 
succeeds  in  retaining  command  of  the  sea  and  effecting 
a  landing,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  defending  fleet  to  dis- 
turb constantly,  and,  if  possible,  cut  off  altogether,  the 
lines  of  communication  of  the  landing  corps  with  its 
home  country. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  furnishes  a  very  instruc- 
tive example  for  most  of  these  conditions.  Only  by 
destroying  a  portion  of  the  Russian  fleet  by  surprise, 
and  blockading  the  rest  at  Port  Arthur,  was  it  possible 
for  the  Japanese  to  bring  their  army  over  to  Korea, 
and  to  supply  it  permanently  from  home.  Yet,  in 
spite  of  their  decided  naval  superiority,  which  they 
actually  maintained  undisputed,  the  Russian  cruiser 
squadron  at  Vladivostok,  which  had  retained  some 
freedom  of  movement,  succeeded  in  capturing  and 
destroying  a  few  Japanese  transports. 

The  influence  of  the  fleet  on  a  war  of  Continental 
States  will,  of  course,  not  assert  itself  in  this  decisive 
fashion;  yet  cases  may  nevertheless  arise  where  a 
naval  war  may  indirectly  very  much  affect  operations 
on  land.  A  few  examples  will  best  illustrate  the  man- 
ner in  which  this  may  occur. 

If  Germany  should  once  be  forced  to  conduct  an  of- 
fensive war  against  Russia,  it  would  be  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  her  to  gain  undisputed  command  of 
the  Baltic.  She  could  then  completely  paralyse  mari- 
time traffic  on  the  Russian  coast,  thus  preventing  im- 
ports of  war  material  from  other  States  like  England 
and  France,  by  sea  at  least;  she  would  oblige  the  ad- 
versary to  use  a  considerable  number  of  troops  for  pro- 


230        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

tecting  the  coast  and  securing  St.  Petersburg,  which 
would  be  directly  menaced ;  she  could,  lastly,  carry  out 
a  very  much  bolder  offensive  by  land,  if  she  were  able 
to  base  herself  partly  on  the  coast.  If  her  fleet  com- 
manded the  great  Russian  Baltic  ports  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  permit  men  and  war  material  to  be  landed 
there,  and  to  join  thence  the  field  army,  the  Ger- 
man Army  would  have  the  chance  of  advancing  along 
the  coast,  enveloping  from  the  north  all  Russian  armies 
operating  in  the  western  provinces  of  the  country, 
partly  interrupting  and  partly  threatening  their  lines 
of  communication  with  St.  Petersburg,  and  pushing 
these  armies  ultimately  in  a  southern  direction.  The 
fleet  in  such  a  case  would  enable  the  army  to  make  its 
attack  in  the  decisive  direction,  thus  very  materially 
contributing  to  a  likely  victory.  The  fleet  should 
therefore  seek  as  soon  as  ever  possible  for  a  decisive 
issue  with  the  Russian  fleet,  to  beat  it,  and  blockade 
its  remnants  in  their  places  of  refuge.  This  success 
must  immediately  be  followed  up  by  blockading  the 
Russian  Baltic  coast  and  by  the  capture  of  the  most 
important  harbours. 

The  fleet  would  be  of  similar  importance  if,  in  a 
separate  war  between  Germany  and  France,  a  German 
attack  was  conducted  through  Belgium.  In  this  case, 
too,  a  German  offensive  could  act  with  the  utmost 
strategic  freedom  if  the  French  fleet  were  beaten,  and 
the  German  commanded  the  sea  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  allow  the  German  land  forces  to  base  themselves  at 
least  partly  on  the  coast. 

Frederic  the  Great,  we  know,  drew  up  a  war-plan 
starting  from  this  idea.  He  assumed,  in  compliance 
with  the  conditions  then  obtaining,  England,  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Holland  to  be  allied  against  France, 
which  had  her  main  army  assembled  in  Flanders,  while 


NAVAL    WARFARE    CONSIDERATIONS    231 

protecting  her  other  frontiers  by  special  corps.  In 
the  face  of  this  disposition,  the  King  on  his  part 
wanted  to  assemble  the  main  army  of  the  allies  in  the 
north  too.  It  was  to  advance  from  Brussels,  and  beat 
first  of  all  the  enemy's  army  supposed  to  be  in  Flan- 
ders; it  was  then  to  march  off  to  the  right,  capture 
Dunkirk,  Bergues,  and  Gravelingen,  then  base  itself 
on  Newport,  Dunkirk,  and  the  English  fleet,  and,  turn- 
ing nearly  all  the  hostile  frontier  fortresses  in  the  west, 
advance  by  Abbeville  on  Paris.  The  times  have  cer- 
tainly changed  since  the  great  King  designed  this 
project,  but  the  broad  characteristic  features  in  the 
conduct  of  war  have  remained  the  same,  and  so  the 
idea  underlying  this  plan  of  compaign  would  still  re- 
tain its  importance  under  similar  political  conditions 
even  to-day. 

The  defence  of  colonies,  too,  whose  coasts  are  in- 
sufficiently protected  by  fortifications  can  generally  be 
only  effected  indirectly  by  acting  offensively  against 
the  hostile  fleet.  By  attacking  and  defeating  it,  with 
the  object  of  destroying  next  the  transport  fleet,  carry- 
ing the  troops  detailed  to  land  and  attack  the  trans- 
oceanic colonies,  we  can  prevent  the  enemy  from  lay- 
ing hands  on  them.  If  we  are  not  strong  enough  to 
proceed  in  this  manner,  and  if  the  colonies  have  not 
sufficient  land  forces  of  their  own  to  ward  off  an  at- 
tack themselves,  we  must  abandon  them  for  the  time 
being,  and  may  lose  them  sometimes  altogether.  The 
English  would  surely  not  hesitate  to  seize  the  German 
colonies  in  a  war  with  Germany,  and  keep  them  should 
England  remain  victorious,  in  the  same  way  as  they 
once  deprived  Holland  and  France  of  their  most  val- 
uable colonial  possessions. 

When  considering  the  activity  of  the  fleet  and  its 
effect  on  war  by  land,  we  must  keep  in  view  that  the 


232        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

defensive  action  of  the  fleet  is  ruled  by  laws  altogether 
different  from  the  procedure  characterizing  the  de- 
fensive in  a  war  by  land. 

On  the  sea  we  can  act  strategically  on  the  offensive 
and  defensive.  In  the  first  case  we  would  search  for 
and  attack  the  hostile  fleet,  blockade  the  enemy's  ports, 
try  to  reduce  his  coast  defences,  and  do  as  much  injury 
to  his  trade  as  possible.  In  the  other  case,  however, 
we  would  await  the  opponent's  attack,  supported  by 
our  own  coast  and  its  resources,  and  try  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  carrying  through  his  offensive  intentions. 
The  difference  is  solely  one  in  the  mode  of  operation, 
as  occasioned  by  the  intention  of  attacking  or  defend- 
ing. But  the  difference  between  the  offensive  and  de- 
fensive disappears  in  naval  warfare  altogether  in  tac- 
tics, in  so  far  as  that  difference  is  not  occasioned  by  a 
variety  in  the  type  of  ships,  because  ground  is  want- 
ing, and  ground  is  the  first  requisite  of  any  tactical 
defensive.  Assailant  and  defender  by  sea  make  use  of 
absolutely  the  same  means  under  entirely  the  same 
conditions.  If  one  fleet  wished  to  await  the  attack 
standing  still,  it  would  be  at  once  doomed.  It  will 
certainly  happen  that  a  fleet  will  be  attacked  by  tor- 
pedo boats  when  at  anchor  or  sailing,  and  defend  itself 
against  this  attack.  The  distinction  between  attack 
and  defence  is  here  represented  by  the  various  types 
of  ships.  Torpedo  boats  can  only  act  offensively,  and 
battleships  can  only  repulse  them  by  artillery  fire. 
This  condition  is  never  altered,  even  if  the  torpedo 
boats  are  engaged  on  the  strategic  defensive  and  the 
battleships  on  the  offensive. 

It  is  also  quite  possible  that  one  party  acts  more 
offensively  than  the  other;  that  one  party  attacks  like 
Togo  at  Tsushima,  and  the  other  accepts  the  combat 
but  under  the  stress  of  circumstances,  like  the  Russians 


NAVAL    WARFARE   CONSIDERATIONS    233 

in  the  same  battle.  That  does  not  mean  any  differ- 
ence at  all  in  the  mode  of  fighting,  but  merely  a  differ- 
ence in  the  strategic  intention,  and  sometimes  in  the 
energy  of  conducting  the  fight,  which  depends  on  per- 
sonal qualities.  In  the  same  way  is  the  less  efficient 
fleet  also  obliged  to  accept  the  law  from  the  enemy  for 
its  tactical  procedure,  and  appears,  therefore,  more  to 
defend  than  to  attack,  as  can  be  traced  throughout  the 
whole  Battle  of  Tsushima.  But  in  situations  like  these 
the  difference  in  the  attitude  is  occasioned  by  the  vary- 
ing efficiency  of  the  ships  and  not  at  all  by  the  antag- 
onism of  attack  and  defense.  Torpedo  nets  and  mines 
may  be  looked  upon  as  the  only  real  defensive  means 
in  naval  warfare.  We  can  compare  them  with  the 
obstacles  and  the  system  of  mines  in  land  defences. 
But  the  action  of  the  fleet  itself  is  entirely  independent 
of  them. 

As  regards  the  fleet,  it  can,  even  on  the  strategic 
defensive,  act  always  tactically  only  on  the  offensive — 
that  is  to  say  it  must  put  to  sea  and  attack  the  hostile 
fleet  if  it  means  to  fight  at  all.  By  sea  there  is  only 
an  active  defence  though  it  may  be  supported  by  mines 
and  coast  defences.  The  defending  fleet  has,  in  gen- 
eral, the  sole  advantage  of  being  able  to  retreat,  some- 
times rapidly,  under  the  shelter  of  its  own  land  de- 
fences and  of  having  its  base  directly  behind  it — that 
is  to  say,  docks,  workshops  for  repairs,  ammunition, 
and  coal  depots,  and  so  forth.  It  is  supposed,  of 
course,  that  the  pivots  on  land  are  to  some  extent  fa- 
vourably situated  with  regard  to  the  field  of  action 
of  the  fleet,  which  is,  indeed,  not  always  the  case,  but 
is  naturally  assumed  to  be  so  in  theory.  The  attacking 
fleet  is,  on  the  other  hand,  often  very  far  away  from 
all  these  auxiliaries,  and  has  therefore,  in  this  respect, 


234        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

to  contend,  as  a  rule,  with  far  more  difficult  conditions 
than  the  defender. 

In  spite  of  the  advantages  which,  as  in  war  on  land, 
benefit  the  strategic  defensive,  the  strategic  offensive 
remains,  after  all,  superior  by  sea  as  well.  It  affords 
in  naval  warfare  the  same  advantages  as  on  land. 

We  can  try  to  surprise  the  enemy,  act  in  accord- 
ance with  a  definite  plan  designed  by  ourselves  for  the 
attainment  of  a  clearly-defined  object,  force  the  en- 
emy to  have  the  last  hand  and  enjoy  the  politically 
and  morally  important  advantages  of  the  initiative. 
We  can  also  strive  to  block  the  hostile  ports  by  rapidly 
laying  mines,  and  thus  not  only  hampering  and  endan- 
gering the  enemy's  trade,  but  also  rendering  the  base 
of  the  hostile  fleet  unsafe.  In  the  face  of  advantages 
of  this  kind,  the  defender — that  is  to  say,  the  party 
which  assumes  at  first  an  expectant  attitude,  and  wants 
to  make  its  action  dependent  on  the  measures  of  the 
adversary — is  evidently,  in  so  far,  at  a  disadvantage, 
as  it  must  prepare  for  an  attack  from  every  possible 
direction,  and  cannot,  therefore,  keep  its  forces  from 
the  outset  concentrated,  and  engage  them  in  a  definite 
direction. 

As  a  disadvantage  of  the  strategic  assailant  can  only 
be  adduced  the  fact  that  his  lines  of  operation  and  com- 
munication are  often  very  long,  not  only  rendering 
preservation  of  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  fleet  very 
difficult,  but  also  offering  the  enemy  numerous  points 
of  attack,  which  may  in  case  of  a  tactical  defeat  be- 
come fatal.  The  perilous  voyage  of  the  Russian  fleet 
under  Rojdestvensky  to  Eastern  Asia  shows  this  dan- 
ger in  a  striking  manner.  It  is  therefore  obvious  that 
the  advantages  of  the  strategic  offensive  must  become 
all  the  more  prominent  the  shorter  the  lines  of  opera- 
tion with  which  the  attack  has  to  deal,  and  that  the 


NAVAL    WARFARE    CONSIDERATIONS    235 

length  of  the  lines  of  operation  may  sometimes  induce 
us  to  select  the  strategic  defensive.  Guarding  the  lines 
of  communication  and  supplies  absorbs  very  consid- 
erable forces,  and  may  entail  such  a  substantial  weak- 
ening of  the  forces  as  to  neutralize  thereby  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  offensive. 

These  reciprocal  effects  of  strategic  offensive  and  de- 
fensive are  also,  doubtless,  one  of  the  reasons  why  they 
always  talk  in  England  only  about  the  growth  of  the 
German  Navy,  about  the  danger  this  means  for  Eng- 
land, but  never  about  the  stronger  American  Navy. 
The  English  know  very  well  that,  considered  from  a 
purely  military  point  of  view,  an  attack  upon  their 
island  is  very  difficult  to  carry  out  from  America, 
just  on  account  of  the  distance,  and  that  even  they 
themselves  can  in  a  war  become  dangerous  to  America 
only  through  incurring  the  greatest  sacrifices  and  ex- 
ertions. A  naval  victory  over  Germany,  on  the  other 
hand,  situated  as  she  is  directly  opposite  the  English 
coast,  is  much  easier  to  achieve,  promising  success  at 
a  much  smaller  expense  than  one  over  America.  With 
this  latter  competitor  it  is  therefore  much  easier  to 
remain  on  good  terms;  the  other  must  be  destroyed, 
if  possible. 

Conditions  such  as  will  obtain  in  a  naval  war  be- 
tween England  and  America  make,  however,  no  dif- 
ference in  the  reciprocal  effect  of  attack  and  defence 
by  sea.  They  represent  only  a  particular  case,  the 
peculiar  circumstances  of  which  must  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  application  of  the  fundamental  de- 
mands. Each  of  the  two  States  would,  in  the  case  of 
war,  have  to  consider  whether  the  disadvantages  of 
the  long  lines  of  operations  would  outweigh  the  ad- 
vantages of  a  strategic  offensive  or  not.  The  offensive 
itself  remains,  in  spite  of  this,  the  real  soul  of  war, 


236        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

just  as  on  land,  and  it  is  no  doubt  imperative  to  pro- 
ceed offensively  as  a  matter  of  principle,  if  the  propor- 
tionate forces  and  the  particular  circumstances  hold 
out  the  chance  of  success. 

If  we  have  to  deal  with  a  weaker  adversary,  or  one 
equal  to  us,  the  resolve  to  attack,  all  things  being 
otherwise  approximately  equal,  will  generally  urge  it- 
self upon  rs.  In  a  separate  war  of  Germany  against 
France  or  Russia,  for  instance,  it  would  surely  never 
enter  the  heads  of  the  German  naval  authorities  to 
wait  for  the  attack  of  the  enemy;  but  the  enemy 
would  no  doubt  be  hunted  up  in  his  own  waters,  in 
spite  of  all  the  submarines  defending  particularly  the 
French  coast.  But  if  the  enemy  is  superior,  the  sep- 
aration of  his  forces  will  give  occasion  to  local  vic- 
tories. Every  such  occasion  must  be  resolutely  taken 
advantage  of;  nor  must  we,  in  such  a  case,  be  afraid 
of  taking  the  enemy  even  by  surprise,  as  the  Japanese 
did  take  the  Russians.  Merely  by  their  bold  political 
and  strategic  offensive  did  they  succeed  in  attacking 
the  Russian  naval  forces  when  separated,  in  gaining 
thereby  a  decided  superiority,  and  in  permanently  pre- 
venting a  junction  and  effective  activity  of  the  Russian 
ships.  It  is  a  brilliant  example  of  boldness  and 
strength  of  resolution. 

As  separation  of  forces  always  entails  the  danger 
of  small  detachments  being  defeated  in  detail,  we  must 
try  to  escape  this  danger  by  using  our  own  battle 
fleet  as  unitedly  as  possible,  and  keeping  it  as  con- 
centrated as  we  can,  so  that  we  may  act  with  our  full 
strength  wherever  we  resolve  to  fight,  and  not  expose 
ourselves  in  any  case  to  be  defeated  in  detail.  There 
can  generally  be  no  such  thing  in  naval  warfare  as 
conducting  a  delaying  action,  engaging  the  forces 
gradually,  nor  therefore  detailing  reserves.  To  begin 


NAVAL    WARFARE    CONSIDERATIONS    237 

the  combat  with  a  portion  of  the  forces,  and  then  to 
engage  the  main  body  at  the  decisive  point,  is  im- 
possible on  the  sea.  Numerical  superiority  has  here 
a  much  more  destructive  effect  than  in  war  on  land, 
because  on  water  it  is,  much  more  than  on  land,  a 
question  of  war  machines  fighting  against  each  other. 
If  many  ships  concentrate  their  fire  on  a  few,  then, 
all  things  being  otherwise  equal,  the  former  have 
every  chance  of  being  successful.  On  water  all  the 
elements  are  wanting  which  on  land  may  help  the 
weaker  to  be  superior ;  above  all,  the  country  is  want- 
ing which  gives  cover  from  fire  and  view,  thereby  af- 
fording the  chance  of  deceiving  the  enemy  abotit  the 
direction  and  strength  of  the  attack.  On  the  open 
sea  everybody  has  the  same  range  of  view,  no  ship 
can  hide  itself,  and,  all  else  being  equal,  the  numerically 
stronger  must  be  victorious. 

It  is  therefore  a  principle  in  naval  warfare  to  unite 
the  forces  in  space  and  time. 

From  this  point  of  view  one  can  easily  understand 
why  the  English  have  lately  concentrated  the  bulk  of 
their  fleet  in  the  North  Sea.  Owing  to  the  extent  of 
their  colonial  possessions  and  the  necessity  of  having 
to  guard  the  sea-route  to  India,  they  are  obliged  to 
divide  their  fleet.  But  opposite  that  State  which  they 
intend  to  fight  first  of  all,  they  want  to  limit  this  divi- 
sion to  the  smallest  possible  minimum. 

Concentration  of  the  forces  in  space  of  time  must, 
of  course,  not  be  understood  to  mean  that  there  should 
be  no  detaching  at  all.  Locally  limited  and  isolated 
offensive  strokes  of  cruisers  or  torpedo-boat  flotillas 
will  often  be  imperative,  partly  for  reconnaissance,  and 
partly  for  taking  advantage  of  any  particularly  favour- 
able opportunities  the  enemy  may  offer.  Especially  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  sometimes  in  peace  even 


238        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

—if  there  is  no  other  means  of  defending  oneself 
against  superior  force — it  will  be  advisable  to  attack 
the  enemy  by  torpedo  and  submarine  boats,  and  to  in- 
flict upon  him  unexpected  losses. 

War  upon  the  enemy's  trade  must  also  be  early  and, 
if  possible,  suddenly  initiated,  if  valuable  success  is 
to  be  achieved.  If  the  enemy  is  once  prepared  for  it, 
he  will  turn  his  own  auxiliary  cruisers  to  account  and 
warn  his  own  trading  vessels.  The  first  and  most  im- 
portant success  can  only  be  attained  by  surprise.  This 
war  must  also  be  conducted  as  ruthlessly  as  possible, 
since  only  then,  in  addition  to  the  material  damage 
inflicted  upon  the  enemy,  the  necessary  terror  is  spread 
among  the  hostile  merchant  fleet,  and  thereby  more 
injury  done  than  by  the  capture  of  actual  prizes.  A 
certain  amount  of  terrorism  must  be  practised  on  the 
sea,  making  peaceable  tradesmen  stay  in  the  safe  har- 
bours. It  is  customary,  as  a  rule,  to  convoy  prizes 
to  the  nearest  port  at  home  and  to  destroy  them  only 
in  case  of  need,  as  is  also  provided  for  in  the  London 
Declaration.  But  the  party  with  few  naval  pivots  of 
its  own  in  foreign  waters  will  very  often  find  itself  in 
a  position  to  assume  its  case  to  be  one  of  need,  and 
will  then  naturally  destroy  at  once  the  hostile  ships 
captured ;  short  work  must  likewise  generally  be  made 
of  neutral  ships  carrying  contraband.  Mines  which 
we  intend  to  lay  for  disturbing  hostile  trade,  or  for 
barring  the  home  waters,  must  also  be  held  ready  in 
peace-time,  so  as  to  be  at  once  used  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

The  offensive  fleet  itself  must,  of  course,  be  equipped 
with  the  requisite  adjuncts  of  transport  ships  and 
reconnoitring  organs.  It  will,  before  all,  be  important 
to  organize  a  regular  supply  of  coal  and  ammunition, 
and  an  early  evacuation  of  sick  and  wounded,  es- 


NAVAL    WARFARE   CONSIDERATIONS    239 

pecially  when  the  lines  of  operation  are  long.  These 
things  must  be  so  regulated  as  to  allow  the  squadrons 
to  operate  with  perfect  freedom.  Their  activity  is  un- 
der all  circumstances  decisive.  Nor  can  any  coast  de- 
fences resist  an  attack  for  any  length  of  time  without 
the  co-operation  of  the  active  fleet;  they  will  succumb, 
and  it  will  then  be  possible  for  the  enemy  to  land 
troops  on  the  coast  attacked  and  to  intervene  in  the 
land  operations  directly  from  the  sea  coast.  The  bat- 
tle-fleet must  therefore  strive  by  all  means  to  defeat 
the  enemy,  and  to  seek  for  a  decisive  issue,  if  in  any 
way  possible,  especially  when,  by  surprise  or  local 
victories,  we  have  succeeded  in  weakening  the  hostile 
force  right  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

There  may,  however,  be  conditions  making  such 
action  of  the  battle-fleet — challenging  an  issue — ac- 
tually impossible;  and  this  will  be  the  case  if  one  has 
to  fight  an  enemy  overwhelmingly  strong,  who  has 
his  forces  united  and  ready  for  immediate  action.  In 
such  a  case  a  strategic  offensive,  seeking  for  a  decisive 
issue,  is  no  doubt  inexpedient.  It  could  only  lead 
to  the  ruin  of  one's  own  fleet,  without  the  chance  of 
inflicting,  in  the  hopeless  struggle  against  superior 
numbers,  losses  upon  the  enemy  even  proportionately 
equal.  The  law  of  numbers  rules  on  the  water  as  well, 
and  there  are  proportionate  strengths  making  victory 
positively  impossible. 

But  a  great  people,  claiming  a  portion  of  interna- 
tional commerce  and  carrying  its  naval  ensign  over 
the  ocean,  must  not  even  in  such  a  case  conduct  the 
war  without  striving  at  least  by  every  means  after 
victory.  It  must  never  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  passive 
defence;  it  must,  in  spite  of  the  enemy,  always  try  to 
gain  and  maintain  the  high  sea  victoriously. 

When  the  Carthaginians,  powerful  at  sea,  attacked 


240        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Rome,  a  military  State,  to  break  its  rising  power  and 
nip  it  in  the  bud,  the  Romans  did  not  confine  them- 
selves to  mere  defence,  but  they  built  a  fleet,  defeated 
that  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  carried  the  war  into 
Africa.  Now  things  have  indeed  very  materially 
changed  compared  with  formerly.  To-day  a  fleet  can 
no  longer  be  created  during  war,  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment,  as  the  Romans  could  at  that  time,  when 
naval  architecture  was  a  comparatively  simple  thing. 
To  create  a  fleet  now  is  rather  a  long  and  tedious 
process,  the  enemy  having  plenty  of  time  to  adopt  all 
his  counter-measures.  One  cannot,  therefore,  hope 
to  augment  the  number  of  available  ships  to  any  sub- 
stantial extent  during  the  war  itself;  yet,  by  the  mode 
of  conducting  the  war,  one  can  try  to  bring  about  by 
degrees  an  equalization  of  the  forces,  and  thus,  per- 
haps, make  it  possible  to  fight  under  more  favorable 
conditions  the  decisive  battle  avoided  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

This,  I  think,  can  only  be  achieved  with  the  aid  of 
the  coast  defences.  The  latter  gain  thereby  an  im- 
portance which  goes  far  beyond  the  notion  of  a  pure 
measure  of  protection.  They  become  an  active  factor 
in  naval  warfare.  The  enemy  must  reckon  with  them 
as  if  with  an  active  force.  He  has  now  two  ways 
open  by  which  he  can  try  to  fight  down  the  defender 
— the  blockade  and  the  attack. 

Keeping  up  a  blockade  makes  very  great  demands 
upon  a  blockading  fleet;  that  service  is  exceedingly 
exhausting,  and  all  the  more  so  when  the  enemy  con- 
trols a  battle-fleet  which  takes  an  active  part  in  the 
coast  defence,  and  when  the  blockading  line's  naval 
base  is  far  away.  The  blockading  fleet  cannot  con- 
tinually keep  to  the  high  seas.  It  must  generally  con- 
fine itself  to  watching  keenly  the  hostile  coast  with  a 


NAVAL    WARFARE   CONSIDERATIONS    241 

number  of  ships,  remaining  with  the  bulk  of  the  battle- 
fleet  at  a  safe  naval  pivot  behind  the  line  of  observa- 
tion, so  as  to  oppose  thence  any  hostile  sorties.  If 
there  are  no  such  pivots  within  easy  reach  of  the  fleet, 
it  will  try  to  seize  such  pivots  in  close  proximity  to 
the  coast  blockaded — perhaps  a  suitable  island,  or  a 
point  on  the  hostile  coast  itself. 

The  defender,  on  his  part,  will  turn  these  circum- 
stances as  much  to  his  advantage  as  possible.  He  will 
first  of  all  occupy,  and  if  feasible  fortify,  at  any  rate 
obstinately  defend,  all  those  points  which  would  suit 
the  enemy  as  pivots;  he  will,  further,  strive  to  keep 
the  blockading  fleet  continuously  on  the  alert  by  con- 
stant, and,  if  possible,  sudden  attacks,  especially  at 
night,  partly  with  submarines  and  torpedo  boats,  partly 
also  with  the  battle-fleet  itself,  inflicting  upon  it  as 
many  losses  as  is  ever  possible,  but  always  breaking 
the  action  off  when  the  enemy  succeeds  in  uniting 
superior  forces  against  the  ships  making  the  sortie. 
With  successful  reconnaissance  it  will,  no  doubt,  be 
possible  to  assail  the  enemy  with  advantage  at  times, 
when  he  has  weakened  himself  at  one  or  the  other 
place.  A  blockade  by  its  nature  necessitates  a  certain 
amount  of  division  of  forces,  while  the  defender's  fleet 
can  lie  always  concentrated  at  safe  anchorages,  ready 
to  make  a  sortie. 

A  blockade  of  this  sort  will  no  doubt  exact  from  the 
assailant  great  exertions,  severely  strain  his  ships,  and 
entail  heavy  losses.  It  is  therefore  not  to  be  antici- 
pated that  he  will,  and  can,  confine  himself  to  con- 
ducting the  war  in  this  indecisive  fashion.  He  must 
therefore,  sooner  or  later,  make  up  his  mind  to  attack 
the  coast  defences  and  mining  fields,  so  as  to  capture 
the  enemy's  naval  bases  and  destroy  the  hostile  fleet 
itself. 


242        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

It  is  obvious  that  this  is  no  easy  matter.  The  de- 
fender's howitzer  batteries,  being  perfectly  concealed, 
are  difficult  to  fight  from  the  fleet,  which  is  only 
equipped  with  guns  for  direct  fire,  whereas  the  coast 
howitzers  can  inflict  most  serious  losses  by  their 
indirect  fire  upon  the  ships  of  the  assailant.  Torpedo 
and  submarine  attacks  may  also  be  successful,  because, 
the  channels  being  known  to  the  defender,  the  op- 
ponent must  move  in  them  with  great  caution.  There 
seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  assailant  is  bound  to 
suffer  heavily  in  such  warfare.  If  he  succeeds  in  sup- 
porting the  naval  attack  by  landing  corps  and  advanc- 
ing to  attack  the  pivots  of  the  defender,  they  must  be 
opposed  by  the  coast-defence  troops.  Considering 
this  danger,  it  is  important  to  fortify  the  naval  pivots 
on  the  land  side,  at  least  hastily,  so  as  to  be  prepared 
for  such  a  combined  attack  and  not  to  succumb  to  it. 
Such  attempts  at  landing  in  support  of  an  attack  by 
sea  are,  for  the  rest,  rather  dangerous  enterprises.  If 
the  attack  of  the  fleet  is  successfully  repulsed,  and  if 
the  fleet  of  the  defender  sallies  forth  at  the  decisive 
moment  for  a  counter-attack,  re-embarkation  ,of  the 
detachments  landed  may  sometimes  be  seriously  en- 
dangered. 

No  proof  is  needed  that,  under  such  circumstances, 
reconnaissance  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the 
assailant  as  well  as  for  the  defender.  Reconnaissance 
alone  can  inform  the  former  of  the  position  of  the 
hostile  works,  the  effect  of  his  own  fire,  and  the  move- 
ments of  the  hostile  fleet,  and  give  the  defender  the 
chance  of  selecting  favourable  moments  for  attacking. 
But  the  latter  will,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  superi- 
ority, be  unable  to  secure  the  necessary  intelligence 
by  ships  alone ;  he  will  rather  have  to  make  extensive 
use  of  reconnaissance  by  air.  In  that  branch  he  is, 


NAVAL    WARFARE   CONSIDERATIONS    243 

as  we  have  seen,  superior  to  the  assailant.  He  must 
therefore  resolutely  attack  hostile  airships  and  flying- 
machines  appearing  at  the  coast,  and  beat  them  off 
with  anti-balloon  guns.  If  we  succeed  in  developing 
aerial  navigation  to  use  airships  also  for  purposes  of 
bombardment,  it  would  create  a  new  element  of  su- 
periority for  coast  defence,  it  being  very  difficult  to 
start  enterprises  of  this  sort  from  the  attacking  fleet, 
whereas  airships  and  flying-machines  can  always  easily 
ascend  from  the  coast,  and  reach  the  hostile  offensive 
fleet  in  a  very  short  time. 

If  we  now  survey  all  the  difficulties  accruing  to  the 
assailant  in  his  blockade  and  attack  upon  a  well-de- 
fended and  fortified  coast,  and  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  consider  how  comparatively  favourable  the  con- 
ditions are  under  which  the  war  can  be  conducted 
by  the  defender  in  a  situation  like  this,  we  can  very 
well  imagine  that  even  a  great  superiority  in  ships  will 
gradually  dwindle  away,  and  that  ultimately  a  state 
of  affairs  may  be  created  in  which  the  original  differ- 
ence in  force  seems  to  be  equalized,  and  that  the  ideal 
state  in  Beseler's  fortress-defence  has  arrived — 
namely,  "that  the  assailant  will  become  defender  and 
the  vanquished." 

If  that  moment  seems  to  have  arrived,  the  battle- 
fleet  of  the  hitherto  defender  must  put  to  sea  and  fight 
the  decisive  battle.  If  during  its  long,  wearisome 
struggle  on  the  coast  the  fleet  has  succeeded  in  gaining 
and  maintaining  moral  .superiority  over  the  attacker, 
if  it  has  inflicted  heavy  material  injury  on  him  and 
broken  the  elasticity  of  his  will  to  conquer,  then  it  will 
come  out  victorious  in  this  combat.  But  if  the  at- 
tacker has  endured  all  hardships  of  the  blockade  and 
of  the  attack  on  the  coast  with  unbroken  courage,  and 
if,  in  spite  of  all  losses,  he  maintains  a  substantial 


244        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

numerical  superiority,  he  may  also  in  this  last  combat 
gain  a  victory  and  thus  bring  about  a  decision  in  his 
favor. 

It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  in  such  a  war  not 
only  the  material  forces  will  decide,  but  also  the  spirit 
in  which  they  are  used,  and  the  spirit  of  the  nations 
who  have  sent  their  sons  to  fight  will  weigh  decisively 
in  the  scale  of  victory.  No  doubt  the  quality  of  ar- 
mour and  the  effect  of  projectiles,  as  well  as  the  power 
and  speed  of  the  ships,  will  most  effectively  assert 
themselves;  but  where  the  factors  of  victory  are,  to 
some  extent  at  least,  balanced,  the  persevering  vigour 
and  energy  of  attack,  ruthless  sacrifice  of  human  life, 
unyielding  will  to  conquer,  and,  lastly,  the  spirit  and 
genius  of  command,  will  decide. 

Let  us  hope  that  if  our  German  fleet  is  called  one 
day  to  fight  it  will  appear  on  the  stage  of  the  world 
with  as  surprising  and  decisive  an  effect  as  the  Prus- 
sian Army,  in  1866,  which,  being  raised  by  universal 
service,  had  then  been  completely  misjudged. 


CHAPTER   XII 
RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT 


CHAPTER   XII 

RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT 

WHEN  I  began  to  put  together  and  arrange  in  proper 
order  the  works  and  thoughts  which  had  over  and 
over  again  occupied  my  mind  whilst  studying  military 
events,  as  well  as  whilst  doing  duty  and  training  officers 
and  men;  when  I  tried  to  see  clear  in  this  enterprise, 
in  what  my  work  should  really  culminate,  to  what  re- 
sult it  should  lead,  the  demand  urged  itself  sponta- 
neously to  discover,  not  only  the  nature  of  war  of 
to-day  in  theory,  but  also  to  develop  from  this  cogni- 
tion a  superior  principle  of  action,  and  to  arrive  at 
a  standpoint  whence  we  can  exactly  judge  of  all  the 
various  military  questions  in  their  reciprocal  effect, 
and  thus  of  their  real  importance  for  the  conduct  of 
war.  It  seemed  to  me  that  should  we  succeed  in 
solving  this  problem,  and  in  acting  upon  this  solution, 
not  only  in  war  itself,  but  also  in  preparing  war  in 
a  definite  direction,  we  ought  to  gain  superiority  over 
opponents  who  are  proceeding  in  a  manner  less  ra- 
tional and  critical,  who  therefore,  perhaps,  persist  in 
a  mechanical  conception  of  a  war  with  masses,  and 
expect  the  final  solution  of  many  important  tactical 
and  strategic  questions  from  the  war  of  the  future 
itself.  It  seemed  to  me  possible  and  useful  to  con- 
duct war  from  the  outset  in  accordance  with  distinct 
principles  recognized  a  priori,  and  to  master  spiritually 
the  powerful  forces  bound  to  be  let  loose  in  it,  instead 

247 


248         HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

of  leaving  them  to  their  innate  impulses,  in  opposition 
to  the  Italian  general  who  insists  that  in  a  war  of  the 
future  only  the  original  direction  given  to  the  masses 
can  be  intended,  but  that  afterwards  "the  stream  will, 
so  to  say,  move  on  automatically."  *  It  seemed  to  me 
that  particularly  we  Germans,  if  we  once  take  up  arms, 
must  not  hand  over  our  armies  to  this  stream  of 
automatic  movement  and  thus  to  chance,  as  it  were, 
because  we  shall  be  obliged  to  fight  against  enemies 
far  superior  in  numbers,  and  shall  therefore  need 
spiritual  superiority  to  equalize  the  numerical  one. 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  this  idea  that,  starting  from 
the  most  striking  military  phenomena  of  modern 
times,  I  followed  up  my  reflections,  and  now,  having 
arrived  at  the  end  of  my  investigations,  the  question 
faces  me  whether  I  have  attained  the  object  set,  and 
whether  from  the  inquiries  and  discussions  instituted 
a  result  can  be  extracted  which  is  of  importance  as  a 
guide  for  the  preparation  and  conduct  of  war,  and 
which  may,  as  a  principle  of  action,  guarantee  a  certain 
amount  of  superiority  over  our  enemies.  The  answer 
must,  from  what  I  have  tried  to  develop,  result  as  it 
were  of  its  own  accord;  and  if  I  have  succeeded  in 
giving  clear  and  convincing  expression  to  my  thoughts, 
the  reader,  having  closely  followed  them,  must  during 
their  development  have  himself  arrived  at  the  conclu- 
sions resulting  from  the  nature  of  things,  and  at  which 
I  also  have  arrived  in  the  course  of  this  investigation. 
I  shall  try  to  summarize  briefly  the  conclusions  I  have 
come  to. 

If  we  look  back  to  the  description  I  tried  to  give 
in  the  preceding  pages  of  the  modern  conditions  of 
war,  we  soon  recognize  that  there  are  virtually  three 

*  General  Count  Luchino  Del  Mayno,  "Ueber  die  Million- 
enheere,"  "Deutsche  Revue,"  September,  1911. 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT   249 

factors  pressing  a  distinct  stamp  on  war  of  to-day — 
the  masses,  the  improved  arms  of  defence  and  offence, 
and  the  modern  means  of  communication.  These 
phenomena  are  of  so  dominating  a  nature  that  the 
whole  investigation  had  to  start  from  them.  But  if 
we  view  the  effects  of  these  factors  upon  the  conduct 
of  war  in  their  totality,  it  is  seen  that  on  the  one  side 
they  are  promoting  power,  but  on  the  other,  again, 
that  they  have  a  paralysing  effect,  and  are  a  hindrance 
to  freedom  of  action.  They  represent  factors  of  force, 
but  also  of  weakness.  Of  this  fact  we  must  remain 
conscious,  to  judge  correctly  of  their  importance. 

The  masses  mobilized  to-day  for  war  entail  the 
obvious  advantage  of  all  the  vital  forces  of  a  people 
being  called  to  arms,  and  of  the  State  having  at  its 
disposal  for  conducting  war  a  material  of  men  all  but 
inexhaustible.  But  masses  comprise  the  danger  of 
troops  deteriorating  in  the  military  value  which  rests 
on  training,  on  traditional  discipline,  and  on  the  firm 
bonds  between  superior  and  subordinate,  the  masses 
thus  becoming  sometimes  a  danger  to  themselves. 
The  size  of  the  armies,  moreover,  renders  strategic 
mobility  difficult,  and  necessitates  subsistence  from 
depots. 

The  improved  weapons  evidently  benefit  the  con- 
duct of  war,  by  the  fact  that  they  produce  extra- 
ordinary material  and  moral  effects;  but  this,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  led  to  all  closed  formations  being 
abandoned,  has  caused  actions  to  be  fought  at  very 
much  greater  distances  than  formerly,  and  has  forced 
the  troops  to  be  careful  of  cover  and  protective  means 
to  an  enhanced  degree.  The  conduct  of  an  action  is 
thereby  rendered  exceedingly  difficult,  especially  for 
the  attacker,  and  forms  of  fighting  have  thereby  been 
created  antagonistic  to  conducting  an  action  vigor- 


250        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

ously.  But  if  we  consider  the  reciprocal  effect  of  mass 
and  weapon,  we  see  that  less  disciplined  troops  will, 
on  the  average,  be  opposed  to  increased  effect  of  the 
latter — that  therefore  in  spite  of  improvements  of 
arms,  we  may  expect  tactical  performances  to  be  in- 
ferior. 

The  means  of  communication  of  modern  times, 
railways  and  motors,  facilitate  movements  of  masses, 
enhancing  their  mobility ;  but  they,  on  the  other  hand, 
tie  the  masses  to  permanent  railways  and  regular 
roads,  also  to  field-railways  when  they  try  to  follow 
the  movements  of  troops. 

Modern  communication  service,  lastly,  facilitates,  no 
doubt,  reconnaissance,  transmission  of  orders  and  in- 
telligence but  also  creates  new  spheres  of  action,  thus 
complicating  the  conduct  of  war  still  further,  and  ren- 
dering surprise  difficult,  which  in  former  times  so 
often  ensured  success. 

These  so  contradictory  conditions  have  caused  the 
frontal  defensive  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  deliberate 
strategic  offensive  on  the  other,  to  be  much  stronger 
than  formerly — the  former  because  it  has  above  all 
benefited  by  the  effect  of  arms  and  country,  and  the 
latter  because  the  fact  is  chiefly  to  its  advantage  that 
in  the  more  extensive  theatres  of  war  of  large  armies, 
and  owing  to  the  linear  forms  of  strategy  and  tactics 
resulting  from  the  effects  of  the  arms,  the  chances  of 
improvized  operations  have  more  and  more  dwindled 
away. 

In  contrast  with  these  altered  manifestations  of  war, 
the  factors  of  success,  rooted  in  the  nature  of  war 
itself,  have  remained  the  same.  Courage  and  boldness 
are  still  of  decisive  importance  to-day — well-trained 
and  well-led  troops  perform  still  infinitely  more  to-day 
than  troops  less  disciplined  and  badly  employed;  the 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT   251 

assailant  is  still  superior  to  the  defender  to-day  by  the 
fact  that  to  him  is  left  the  choice  of  the  direction  of 
attack,  and  the  chance  of  concentrating  forces  by 
surprise,  and  that  he  can  more  uniformly  and  firmly 
strain  all  moral  elements;  the  spiritual  and  moral 
factors  of  force  are  to-day  still  superior  to  the  mate- 
rial ones  of  numbers  and  armaments. 

If  in  the  midst  of  this  abundance  of  antagonistic 
elements  and  effects  we  wish  to  find  or  pave  the  road 
to  victory,  we  must  not  leave  things  to  take  their  own 
course,  their  "automatic"  development.  That  would 
lead  to  a  purely  mechanical  competition,  in  which 
there  is  no  spiritual  preponderance  apparent.  Every- 
body would  try  to  beat  his  opponent  by  the  mass  of 
his  army,  by  the  quality  and  number  of  his  arms,  and 
by  the  improvement  of  the  means  of  transport  and 
communication;  the  increased  desire  for  protection 
would  lead  to  still  greater  extension  of  the  battle- 
fields and  theatres  of  war;  all  material  forces  would 
increase  immensely;  but  in  this  general  levy  would 
disappear  more  and  more  the  mental  and  moral  factors 
of  success,  while  in  reality  it  is  just  the  spiritual  su- 
periority to  which  they  open  a  wide  field  to  manifest 
themselves. 

We  must  set  our  face  against  this  seemingly  natural 
development,  which  would  lead  to  destruction  and  vic- 
tory of  the  material  forces  over  the  highest  and  noblest 
faculties  of  the  peoples.  We  must  strive,  above  all,  to 
make  those  elements  subservient  to  us  which  are  apt  to 
increase  the  energy  in  the  conduct  of  war,  but  to  limit 
and  neutralize  as  much  as  possible  the  effect  of  par- 
alysing and  weakening  factors. 

If  we  regard  from  this  point  of  view  the  most  es- 
sential manifestations  of  war  of  to-day  in  their  recip- 
rocal effect,  we  shall,  I  believe,  arrive  at  the  conclusion 


252        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

that,  above  all,  two  elements  will  prove  in  a  war  of 
the  future  decisive  and  determine  the  issue  just  be- 
cause they  are  antagonistic  to  the  seemingly  natural 
development  of  things — namely,  the  military  and 
moral  value  of  the  troops  and  their  strategic  efficiency. 

The  main  disadvantage  of  the  armies  of  masses  is, 
I  believe  to  have  convincingly  proved,  due  to  their 
inferior  value  in  marching  and  fighting,  to  their  in- 
ferior mobility,  and  to  their  unwieldiness  for  strategic 
operations.  The  party,  therefore,  which  is  in  com- 
mand of  better  troops  and  more  efficient  for  operations 
than  the  opposing  one  will  attain  an  undoubted  su- 
periority. 

If,  moreover,  improved  arms  produce  greater  mate- 
rial and  moral  effects  than  the  inferior  arms  of  for- 
mer wars,  the  party  must  again  have  an  advantage 
which  with  equal  armaments  brings  a  superior  kind  of 
troops  into  action— that  is  to  say,  troops  which  can 
stand  severer  losses,  have  greater  offensive  power,  and 
are  less  affected  by  moral  shocks. 

Troops  more  efficient  for  operating — that  is  to  say, 
troops  that  can  march  better,  can  stand  greater  ex- 
ertions and  privations,  and  have  a  more  efficient  trans- 
port service — will  be  more  independent  of  railways  and 
roads  than  troops  less  mobile  and  less  enduring;  they 
will  therefore  be  able  to  operate  more  freely  than  the 
latter,  and  thus  again  obtain  an  advantage  over  their 
opponent.  They  will  make  a  better  use  of  the  results 
of  reconnaissance,  too,  and  have  more  prospects  of 
achieving  successes  by  surprise  than  their  opponent,  if 
less  mobile  and  less  efficient  to  strike. 

Now,  people  may  certainly  reply  that  the  same  fac- 
tors of  superiority  also  existed  formerly,  and  achieved 
successes  in  former  wars.  I  do  not  mean  to  deny  this 
at  all;  but  what  I  maintain,  on  the  other  hand,  and 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT        253 

what  I  believe  to  have  proved,  is  that  the  tactical  and 
operative  efficiency  of  the  troops — in  face  of  the 
masses  of  modern  armies,  which  in  general  are  worse 
trained  and  more  unwieldy — has  gained  to-day  in 
significance ;  this  efficiency  constitutes  a  comparatively 
very  muck  more  superior  -factor  of  superiority  than 
formerly.  That  constitutes  its  decisive  importance. 

There  is,  in  like  sense,  another  factor  of  extra- 
ordinary significance.  I  think  to  have  irrefutably 
proved  that  the  attack  is  not  only  by  itself  the  stronger 
form  of  warfare,  but  that  it  has  in  a  war  of  to-day 
and  under  modern  conditions  gained  in  superiority. 
But  this  superiority  chiefly  rests  on  strategic  conditions. 
The  assailant  has,  owing  to  the  prerogative  of  initia- 
tive, a  start  in  space  and  time,  which  even  an  equally 
mobile  opponent  cannot,  as  a  rule,  make  good  any 
longer.  If  he  is  now,  in  addition,  quicker  in  his  op- 
erations than  the  latter,  and  has  better  troops,  the 
original  superiority  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  he  can 
move  quicker  and  be  victorious  in  action  quicker  than 
an  equally-matched  opponent.  If  it  is  an  incontest- 
able principle  in  warfare  that  we  should  always  try  to 
act  offensively,  we  can  act  in  accordance  with  it  all 
the  more  successfully,  the  more  mobile  and  the  more 
efficient  the  troops  we  command.  On  these  two  qual- 
ities of  an  army  depends  freedom  of  action,  by  which 
alone  the  conduct  of  war  can  develop  into  an  art,  and 
in  which  boldness  and  heroism  thrive.  These  rank 
before  numbers. 

The  latter  remain,  nevertheless,  always  a  substantial 
factor  of  success.  The  law  of  numbers*  remains  un- 
altered, and  cannot  be  violated  unpunished.  Nor  must 
we  ever  reduce  the  number  of  troops  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  allow  the  hostile  masses  to  cross  the  frontiers 
*Vol.  i.,  book  ii.,  chap,  ii.,  p.  91. 


254        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

without  meeting  everywhere  with  resistance,  and  with- 
out being  stubbornly  fought.  But  within  these  limits 
it  is  infinitely  more  important  and  more  valuable  to 
have  efficient  troops  than  large  masses.  This  truth 
stands  out  all  the  more  boldly  the  more  we  realize  the 
importance  of  time  and  of  the  decisive  direction. 

The  side  which  gains  a  victory  in  the  decisive  di- 
rection is  placed  in  a  strategic  position  whence  it  can 
fight  the  enemy's  secondary  armies  under  the  most 
favourable  conditions,  no  matter  whether  it  has  gained 
the  flank  of  the  hostile  army  or  pierced  its  front.  He 
who  gains  this  victory  before  the  enemy  has  achieved' 
on  his  part  success  on  the  secondary  fronts  enjoys  the 
further  advantage  of  being  able  to  co-operate  in  the 
combats  afterward  with  the  undefeated  troops  of  the 
other  strategic  fronts,  and  of  thus  having  greater  pros- 
pects of  more  successes.  But  defeats,  too,  suffered, 
perhaps,  in  portions  of  the  theatre  of  war,  away  from 
the  decisive  direction,  are  by  this  victory  in  the  main 
issue  squared  up  and  compensated  for.  That  victory 
dominates  the  whole  theatre  of  war.  But  to  gain  it 
rapidly — particularly  when  it  must  be  fought  by  a 
frontal  attack — is  only  possible  if  by  greater  strategic 
mobility  we  can  unexpectedly  unite  superior  forces  in 
the  decisive  direction,  if  we  can  defeat  the  enemy  in 
action  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible  by  the  superior 
efficiency  of  our  troops,  and  if,  after  the  victory,  we 
are  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  favourable  situation 
by  our  further  operations.  This  superiority  leaves 
no  doubt  of  what  the  principle  of  action  should  be.  It 
is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  war  itself*  that  we  must 
proceed  offensively  as  far  as  circumstances  will  ever 
admit ;  we  must  strive  to  gain  a  victory  as  rapidly  as 
possible  at  the  decisive  spot  by  a  sudden  strategic  con- 
*Vol.  ii.,  book  iv.,  chap,  iii.,  p.  211. 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT        255 

centration  of  the  forces  in  the  direction  thought  to 
be  decisive,  and  then  to  take  advantage  of  it  with  the 
utmost  energy,  tactically  and  strategically.  We  must 
always  make  efforts  to  create  by  our  operations  fa- 
vourable conditions  for  battle. 

No  proof  is  needed  that  such  a  mode  of  action  will 
only  prove  superior,  and  also  give  the  numerically 
weaker  the  chance  of  being  successful,  if  we  excel  the 
enemy  in  military  value  and  strategic  mobility  of  our 
troops.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  then  the  enemy,  if  he 
acts  according  to  the  same  principle,  has  the  same 
prospects  of  success,  and  numbers  will  decide. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  I  may  be  allowed  to  state 
distinctly  that  in  a  future  war  that  side  will  obviously 
have  an  advantage  which  in  organisation  and  training 
of  its  army  has  most  logically  taken  these  two  factors 
into  account,  has  resolutely  subordinated  to  them  all 
other  considerations,  and  has  thereby  succeeded  in 
having  an  army  which  no  other  equals  in  tactical  effi- 
ciency and  strategic  mobility.  But  that  commander 
will  not  prove  a  "modern  Alexander"  who  from  his 
"comfortable  arm-chair"  tries  to  inspirit  uncounted 
numbers  through  the  telephone;  but  he  will  who — of 
course  in  substance  only — leads  a  phalanx  against  the 
enemy  such  as  at  one  time  victoriously  followed  the 
imperious  will  of  Alexander  the  Great  against  the 
superior  host  of  the  Persian  Empire,  or  followed  the 
genius  of  Frederic  the  Great  against  the  united  forces 
of  Europe. 

That  is  the  result  of  my  studies,  and  at  the  same 
time  my  unshakable  conviction. 

But  if  in  this  regard  I  am  not  at  all  mistaken,  if 
what  I  see  so  clearly  before  my  eyes  convinces  also 
others,  and  holds  its  own  in  the  conflict  of  opinions, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  supreme  military  authorities  to 


256        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

prepare  war  from  this  point  of  view,  to  judge  every 
single  military  question  from  it  alone,  and  to  under- 
take or  sanction  nothing  that  is  not  subservient,  or — 
worse — opposed  to  it.  The  idea  of  enhancing  the  of- 
fensive power  of  the  army  by  increasing  the  efficiency 
of  the  troops  and  their  strategic  mobility  must,  then, 
be  the  leading  one,  dominating  all  the  labours  in  peace 
for  war. 

To  comply  with  this  demand  is  no  easy  task.  It 
makes  the  highest  claims  on  a  nation's  willingness 
to  make  sacrifices  for  military  purposes.  To  point 
out  how  this  must  manifest  itself  in  detail  would  lead 
me  here  too  far;  by  its  comprehensive  importance  it 
is  a  subject  for  an  independent  work.  I  shall  but 
briefly  direct  attention  in  what  follows  to  the  most 
important  points. 

It  is  first  oi  all  a  matter  of  coming  to  an  under- 
standing with  regard  to  the  question  of  masses.  By 
constantly  raising  new  Reserve  and  Landwehr  forma- 
tions, by  training  Ersatz-Reservists  and  suchlike  make- 
shifts, which  we  can  make  use  of  to  compensate  for, 
or,  more  than  that,  excel  in  numbers  a  likely  adversary, 
in  spite  of  a  comparatively  small  peace  army,  it  is 
evidently  impossible  to  attain  superiority  over  an 
enemy.  The  more  such  formations  we  establish  the 
more  inferior  will  they  become,  but  the  more  they  will 
weaken  the  regular  army,  which  must  be  drained  of 
its  blood  to  infuse  any  life  at  all  into  the  new  forma- 
tions. We  must  rather  resolve  to  limit  these  inferior* 
formations  as  much  as  possible,  and  only  establish  the 
number  absolutely  requisite  for  containing  the  general 
levies  of  the  enemy  on  the  secondary  strategic  fronts. 
But  we  must  instead  augment  the  troops  of  the  line 
and  the  firmly-knit  peace  formations,  so  as  to  be  able 
to  fight  on  the  decisive  battlefield  with  tactical  and 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT        257 

moral  superiority.  Future  salvation  lies  in  concentra- 
tion of  strength,  not  in  widely  spreading  it,  fully  con- 
scious that  this  is  in  opposition  to  the  theory  of  masses 
in  modern  times. 

It  is,  secondly,  a  matter  of  making  the  troops  which 
go  afield  fit  for  the  strategic  operations.  In  so  far  as 
this  fitness  depends  on  the  march  performances,  it  is 
already  determined  by  the  kind  of  troops  itself.  The 
line  regiment,  brought  up  to  war  strength  by  the 
youngest  classes  of  reserves,  will  march  infinitely  bet- 
ter than  a  Landwehr  unit  composed  of  family  fathers 
full  of  care.  But  apart  from  the  proficiency  in  march- 
ing, strategic  mobility  depends  directly  on  how  sup- 
plies are  regulated. 

When  organizing  the  army  we  must  first  of  all 
keep  in  view  that  the  larger  units  to  which  are  gener- 
ally assigned  one  road — the  army  corps — must  not  go 
beyond  a  certain  strength.  They  must  not  in  simple 
column  of  route  become  so  deep  as  to  prevent  their 
being  continuously  subsisted  from  the  rear.  I  think 
the  utmost  permissible  limit  is  attained  by  a  depth  of 
25  kilometres  of  the  column.  We  must  not,  therefore, 
indiscriminately  load  the  army  corps  with  new  sub- 
sidiary services — with  artillery,  ammunition  columns, 
air-detachments,  and  so  forth.  The  seeming  addi- 
tional strength  is  none  such  at  all  if  the  efficiency  of 
the  troops  to  march  and  to  operate  is  thereby  impaired. 
The  advantage  of  being  able  to  meet  each  hostile  army 
corps  with  an  equally  strong  or  even  stronger  corps 
goes  for  nothing  if  one  army  succeeds  in  uniting  on  the 
decisive  field  of  battle,  by  more  efficient  operations, 
five  or  six  corps,  somewhat  weaker,  but  fresh  and  well 
supplied,  whilst  the  other  can  bring  up  perhaps  only 
three  of  them,  which  by  themselves  are  stronger,  but 
taken  altogether  are  weaker  than  the  enemy's,  and 


258        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

have  constantly  had  to  contend  with  difficulties  of 
supply. 

We  must,  therefore,  know  how  to  limit  ourselves 
in  regard  to  depth  of  march  columns  and  strength  of 
army  corps  if  we  wish  to  preserve  strategic  mobility; 
and  we  must  not  mind  the  seeming  sacrifice  in  fighting 
power  which  may  thereby  be  demanded. 

The  transport  service  of  the  troops  must  next  be 
organized  in  such  a  way  as  to  permit  the  daily  and 
frictionless  supply  of  the  troops  being  unhesitatingly 
and  permanently  carried  through.  I  have  already 
pointed  out  in  another  chapter  that  with  this  object 
we  would  do  well  to  form  the  supply  columns  of  the 
army  corps  into  corps  and  divisional  units,  and  not 
to  organize  them  in  a  series  of  successive  lines  behind 
the  whole  force.  It  is  also  important  to  keep  the 
transport  service  itself  as  mobile  as  possible,  so  that 
it  can  follow  all  the  operations  forward  and  backward. 
Corps  and  divisions  not  equipped  with  a  transport 
service  efficient  in  this  respect,  and  organized  for  active 
service,  are  positively  useless  for  a  great  modern  war, 
as  they  would  only  paralyse  the  strategic  mobility  of 
the  other  troops,  and  therefore,  as  a  rule,  do  more 
injury  than  good.  Formations  which  cannot  be  fur- 
nished with  the  necessary  transport  are  better  not 
raised  at  all,  or,  at  least,  used  only  in  local  defence 
on  secondary  points,  where  they  can  live,  partly  at 
least,  on  the  country.  That  to  the  cavalry  also,  if  it 
is  to  be  of  any  use  at  all,  columns  must  be  attached 
suiting  its  peculiar  character  needs,  of  course,  no 
further  mentioning ;  and  it  is  as  obvious  that  not  only 
the  troops  themselves  must  be  provided  with  the  neces- 
sary transport  service,  but  also  that  the  lines  of  com- 
munication must  be  able  to  follow  the  march  of  the 
columns  of  the  army  with  the  requisite  depots.  The 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT        259 

railroads,  be  they  trunk-lines  or  field-railways,  must 
follow  the  troops  as  closely  as  possible,  or  be  replaced 
by  mechanical  transport,  motors,  etc.,  designed  to  keep 
up  the  traffic  between  regimental  transports  and  rail- 
heads. We  must,  lastly,  take  care  that  in  war  itself 
the  roads  are  not  encumbered  with  unauthorized  trans- 
port. I  can  still  vividly  recall  to  my  mind  the  long 
rows  of  knapsack-wagons,  the  long  columns  of  cattle, 
of  the  voluntary  ambulances,  of  the  endless  wagon- 
park  of  General  Headquarters,  of  the  tent- wagons 
which  one  cavalry  division  had  with  it,  of  the  innu- 
merable wagons  requisitioned  by  the  troops  for  carry- 
ing supplies — all  of  which  followed  the  army  to  Sedan. 
Had  there  been  a  retreat,  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  preserve  order  and  strategic  mobility  with  a  crowd 
like  this.  A  nuisance  of  this  sort  must  be  sternly  sup- 
pressed in  future. 

If  with  all  these  means  we  succeed  in  raising  the 
strategic  mobility  of  the  troops  to  the  highest  possible 
pitch,  we  can  only  make  the  fullest  use  of  this  decisive 
advantage  if  we  are  informed  in  time  of  the  enemy's 
measures  by  rapid  and  reliable  reconnaissance.  It 
is  therefore  imperative  to  prepare  particularly  care- 
fully beforehand  all  the  means  serving  for  reconnais- 
sance ;  before  all  things,  therefore,  td  have  a  numerous 
and  efficient  cavalry,  able  to  screen  the  movements  of 
our  own  army  and  defeat  the  opposing  cavalry,  so  as 
to  carry  on  reconnaissance  successfully.  But  we  must 
at  the  same  time  by  all  means  train  the  aerial  fleet 
and  develop  the  means  of  communication,  particularly 
those  which  do  not  depend  on  conductors — above  all, 
therefore,  visual  signalling  and  wireless  telegraphy. 
If  we  should  succeed  in  developing  the  latter  so  that 
it  can  be  extensively  used  by  the  troops,  it  would  mean 
a  great  advance  in  raising  their  strategic  mobility. 


260        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

Striving  in  this  way  to  create  favourable  conditions 
for  the  strategic  operations  of  our  own  troops,  we 
must,  on  the  other  hand,  endeavour  to  paralyse  the 
enemy's  mobility.  For  this,  too,  the  cavalry  is  the 
proper  means,  if  it  is  able  to  cut  the  communica- 
tions in  rear  of  the  enemy's  army,  thus  preventing  it 
being  regularly  supplied.  In  opposition  to  the  gener- 
ally accepted  view,  that  army  will,  in  consequence  of 
these  conditions,  have  a  distinct  advantage  which  has 
a  strong,  efficient,  and  superior  cavalry,  and  under- 
stands how  to  use  it  in  a  strategic  sense.  The  low  es- 
timation in  which  it  is  everywhere  customary  to  hold 
this  arm  to-day  is  solely  due  to  the  fact  that  people 
insist  upon  wishing  to  use  the  cavalry  as  an  arm  for 
battle  and  for  charging,  while  they  do  not  understand 
how  to  use  it  strategically,  nor  have  organized  it  at 
all  with  that  object.  But  that  it  can  be  employed  in 
this  sphere  to  the  greatest  advantage  and  can  also  con- 
duct a  vigorous  fire-fight  without  being  unduly  ham- 
pered by  its  horses  or  losing  them,  is  sufficiently  proved 
by  the  American  War  of  Secession  and  by  the  South 
African  War.  I  am  therefore  of  opinion  that  those 
who  guide  the  army,  and  who  correctly  discern  the 
nature  of  modern  war,  must  consider  it  as  one  of  their 
most  paramount  duties  greatly  to  augment  the  cavalry, 
and  to  see  that  there  is  always  a  sufficient  supply  of 
horses.  The  next  war  will  confirm  the  correctness  of 
this  view. 

All  other  military  questions  must  be  subordinated 
to  the  broad  points  here  characterized  with  a  few 
strokes;  they  must  be  solved  from  these  points  of 
view  if  an  army  is  to  come  up  to  the  requirements 
demanded  by  a  war  of  to-day.  The  land  and  coast 
defences,  too,  must  be  completed  in  the  spirit  of  offen- 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT   261 

sive  warfare,  and  must  nowhere  assume  the  character 
of  a  mere  defensive  measure. 

The  issue  of  the  next  European  war  hangs  in  the 
balance  of  strategic  offensive;  but  only  that  State  will 
derive  all  the  advantages  from  it  which  knows  how 
to  initiate  the  war  under  auspicious  political  circum- 
stances, and  thus  to  create  favourable  conditions  for 
the  military  action  itself.  The  grouping  of  the  neigh- 
bouring States,  brought  about  by  policy,  and  the 
choice  of  the  moment  for  beginning  the  war,  broadly 
create  the  conditions  under  which  the  war  must  be 
waged,  and  these  may  be  decisive  for  its  whole  course. 
Nor  can  an  army  be  permanently  kept  at  its  highest 
point  of  efficiency.  Any  bow  may  snap  if  the  string 
is  always  pulled  without  darting  the  arrow  at  the 
right  moment.  And  so  also  will  an  army  which  is 
always  used  only  to  keep  the  peace,  and  not  to  con- 
duct a  war  at  the  right  moment,  lose  within  a  meas- 
urable time  its  mental  elasticity,  and  with  it  its  effi- 
ciency— just  the  same  as  a  nation  whose  power  is  not 
put  in  action  for  the  attainment  of  great  aims  and 
objects  will  gradually  forfeit  this  power  and  fossilize 
in  its  comfortable,  peaceful  habits  and  narrow  circles 
of  personal  interests.  Policy  must  reckon  with  these 
factors  and  take  advantage  of  the  culminating-point 
of  development  when  a  favourable  political  constella- 
tion in  the  world  invites  thereto,  and  thus  procure 
the  people  and  the  State  wider  spheres  of  action  and 
ensure  their  sound  development. 

In  the  regions  of  political  strategy  the  law  of  initia- 
tive rules  too;  it  creates  material  and  moral  values  of 
superiority  which  turn  into  military  advantages  if 
policy  leads  to  war.  "No  doubt  no  man,  unless  he 
is  an  idiot,  will  leave  his  enemies  time  calmly  to  adopt 
his  measures  to  destroy  him,  but  take  advantage  of 


262        HOW  GERMANY  MAKES  WAR 

his  start,"  wrote  Frederic  the  Great  to  Pitt  on  July  3, 
1761,  and  in  another  place  he  said:  "Is  the  term  'as- 
sailant' such  a  terrible  one?  It  is  a  scarecrow  to 
frighten  cowards  only."  His  doctrines,  which  he  con- 
firms by  deeds,  remain  immortal,  and  should  always 
serve  virile  statecraft  as  a  guide  in  our  days  too.  The 
political  initiative  must  then,  of  course,  be  followed 
up  by  a  corresponding  military  initiative.  The  war 
must  be  actually  a  continuation  of  policy,  certainly 
by  other  means,  yet  in  the  same  spirit  of  ready  initia- 
tive. But  if  a  bold  policy  ends  with  a  cautious  de- 
fensive conduct  of  the  war,  which  leaves  the  enemy 
time  to  adopt  his  political  and  military  counter-meas- 
ures, it  can  scarcely  expect  to  be  successful. 

When  the  Boers  sent  their  ultimatum  to  the  English 
they  acted  in  Frederician  spirit.  But  when  this  bold 
political  step  was  followed  by  but  a  halting  offensive, 
and  when  they  thought  they  could  combine  a  strategic 
attack  with  a  tactical  defensive,  they  came  in  conflict 
with  themselves,  and  the  military  consequences  could 
not  fail  to  follow.  A  counterpart  of  this  mode  of  ac- 
tion is  the  attitude  of  the  Japanese.  Their  policy,  too, 
was  pervaded  by  Frederician  spirit,  when  they  boldly 
flung  down  the  gauntlet  to  Russia.  But  the  political 
deed  was  followed  by  military  action.  By  an  un- 
broken offensive  they  tried  to  make  full  use  of  the 
military  advantages  they  had  made  sure  of  by  their 
political  initiative ;  and  their  success  showed  they  were 
right.  It  was,  above  all,  their  boldness  which  para- 
lysed the  arm  of  their  far  superior  enemy,  and  made 
them  by  one  stroke  the  dominating  race  of  Eastern 
Asia,  the  same  as  I  hope  the  German  people  will  as- 
sert and  maintain  itself  as  the  dominating  race  of 
Europe: 

That  such  a  dream  of  the  future  can  only  be  realized 


RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT   263 

if  we  constantly  retain  political  and  military  initiative 
needs  no  further  proof  for  him  who  has  become  con- 
vinced by  my  expositions.  We  must  strive  with  every  < 
means  to  uphold  our  military  supremacy,  and  if  we 
realize,  on  the  one  hand,  the  dangers  threatening  us 
from  all  sides,  and  on  the  other  the  loftiness  of  the 
problems  which  seem  to  be  in  store  for  us  in  the  future 
as  a  political  power  and  a  civilized  nation,  then  will 
also  awaken  in  the  soul  of  our  people  that  self-sacri- 
ficing spirit  which  this  injunction  demands  from  us. 

I  believe  in  the  German  people;  I  believe  that  a 
great  future  is  in  store  for  it,  and  that  it  has  to  ac- 
complish a  high  calling  in  the  development  of  man- 
kind. But  it  can  only  put  this  task  to  good  account 
if  it  exerts  its  military  strength  to  the  utmost,  and  if 
its  policy,  while  placing  its  aims  high  and  not  afraid 
of  dangerous  paths,  remains  conscious  of  the  truth 
that,  as  in  war,  so  also  in  the  political  intercourse  of 
States,  the  will  and  action  alone  can  achieve  great 
things,  and  that  in  all  human  affairs  the  words  of  the 
poet  hold  good : 

"Im  Anfang  war  die  Tat."  * 
*  "Action  was  the  beginning  of  everything." — Translator. 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


QL  JAN  1  6 

rtEC'DYRL  OCTHtJO' 


TOT 


JUP 


